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THE  title of  this book, finance  capitalism, is employed as a conces- 
sion to popular  usage, for this study is essentially an inquiry into 
the  nature  of  the  non-financial and the  financial  institutions  of 
Security  capitalism  which  is a more accurate term.  The study is 
based on the general theory that economic processes are determined 
not by laws which remain fixed but by  institutions which change. 
The evolution of  these institutions is therefore traced for the pur- 
pose of  indicating the principles of  private and public control which 
should be exercised in the future in order that the system may pro- 
duce the highest results from the standpoint not only of  individual 
wealth  but also  of  social  welfare.  The non-financial  institutions 
considered  in  this  study  include  the  political,  social,  economic, 
philosophic  and legal forces which have moulded the evolution of 
the system.  Analysis is made of  such political  institutions in the 
domestic field as the rise and decline of  parliamentary government 
and in the international field as the coming and passing of  world 
peace ;  of  such social institutions as the rise and decline of  the rate 
of  population growth and the changes in the welfare of  the various 
groups in society ;  of  such economic institutions as the adjustment 
between production and consumption ; of  the schools of  economic 
philosophy  such  as the rise of  classicism and of  such  legal institu- 
tions, as the growth of  corporate law.  A survey is also made of  the 
purely financial institutions such as the central bank, commercial and 
investment banks, and the stock exchange,  as well as the force of 
investment and of  saving in the capital market. 
These  institutions  are  treated  historically,  comparatively  and 
statistically.  The historical approach is used, for security capitalism 
should be studied in relation to the past.  The dramatic financial 
events of  recent years do not constitute an isolated  episode which 
suddenly  crashed  upon  an unsuspecting  world  in  October,  1929, 
but rather they were the inevitable results of tendencies in operation 
for decades.  Instead of  viewing merely the recent day-to-day events 
of security capitalism, it is necessary to study the long-range trends 
which are the antecedents of  the current movements.  A compara- 
tive  analysis  is  undertaken  to  contrast  the  growth  of  institu- 
tions in various countries.  This study is also based on a statistical 
foundation, for the economic historian  must make full use  of  the 
statistical technique developed in recent years.  Particularly  in the 
field of  financial history is it necessary to apply the science  of  sta- 
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tistical  analysis.  In recent  years  considerable  progress  has  been 
made in developing more exact measurements, and quantitative tests 
have been used effectively in applied finance in analyzing the posi- 
tion of  a particular corporation or government.  This study seeks 
to employ in the field of social finance for the public interest, the 
same measurements which  were  heretofore  utilized  purely  for  in- 
dividual gain.  As  far as possible the text  is kept  free of  the sta- 
tistical data which are presented either in tables accompanying the 
text or in appendices in those instances where the data are the basis 
for conclusions in more than one chapter. 
Throughout the book the same general order of  presentation is 
followed in considering each couptry.  The stages of  the rise, the 
development and the crisis of  security capitalism are studied.  Con- 
sideration is  given  successively  to  the political,  social,  economic, 
philosophic and legal background  of  the system, to the growth of 
financial organization  in the form  of  the central bank,  the com- 
mercial  and investment  banks and the stock exchange, to the de- 
mand for capital as expressed in governmental and corporate secur- 
ity  investment,  to the supply of  capital  as  reflected  in saving, to 
the various problems arising from the operation of  security capital- 
ism, to the criticism of  the system and finally to the efforts at public 
control. 
The evolution  of  security capitalism  in leading  countries,  as 
England,  France  and Germany, as  well  as  the general  trends  in 
world security capitalism are first traced.  These studies serve as a 
setting for the comparative analysis of the evolution and the prob- 
lems of  security capitalism in the United  States which constitutes 
the major part of  the book.  The rise and the development of  the 
system  in the United  States from approximately  1820  to  1914  is 
first traced; consideration  is given to the relation of  American se- 
curity capitalism to the World War and the political, economic and 
social  background  of  post-war  security capitalism  in  the  United 
States is  then  surveyed.  The changing  function of  the financial 
organization  is  presented,  and a  study  is  made  of  the  problems 
arising out of  the demand for capital in the fields of  corporate and 
governmental investment.  There are next presented an analysis of 
investment policies and a financial statement of  American security 
capitalism.  Public control of  the demand for and the supply  of 
capital is critically analyzed.  The final chapter presents the prin- 
ciples and policies which should form the basis for reconstructing 
security capitalism. 
The system  of security capitalism  is  highly  technical,  and  in 
practical operation is as intricate as the most highly developed in- 
dustry.  However, in these days of rapid change, a study of  technical 
practice is of  little more than antiquarian interest, since the 
old  are being largely discarded, and the new methods have 
yet been formulated.  Many parts of  the financial machine have 
broken  down, and the experts are still  doubtfully  experimenting 
with  the repairs.  The student  of  security capitalism,  therefore, 
faces the danger of  losing his way  in the maze of  an intricate and 
ever-changing financial machinery and of  not arriving at an under- 
standing of  the basic  forces which at first  aided  the development 
of the system and later checked it.  In view  of  the technical and 
complicated nature of  the subject  it would be  an error  to over- 
simplify it.  Persons who would  hesitate  to air their views  on an 
intricate  problem  in  physical  science,  think  nothing  of  survey- 
ing the entire subject of  security capitalism in a five-hundred word 
article or in a  fifteen-minute radio broadcast.  The presentation 
should not be brought down to the reader, but realizing the chal- 
lenge to his intellectual power, the reader should rise to an under- 
standing of  the subject. 
A  further difficulty  which  obstructs  an inquiry  into security 
capitalism is that over all the years of its operation, little progress 
has been made  in placing security capitalism on a scientific basis 
by  developing a classified and verified body of  knowledge about it. 
As  a result  of  this lack of  scientific progress, security capitalism is 
presented, and often taught, as an incoherent mass of  fragmentary, 
unsubstantiated  and confused statements.  The student of  the sub- 
ject  of  security  capitalism  should,  therefore,  seek  to  produce  a 
body of  classified and verified facts which taken together has some 
coherence. 
It should also be realized that security capitalism is an imper- 
fect system which, at times, has not  functioned satisfactorily from 
the standpoint either of  the individual or of  society.  As  a result, 
critics of  security capitalism overemphasize the dramatic and sen- 
sational  misdeeds of  particular  individuals.  On the other  hand 
apologists, unwilling to admit the limitations of  security capitalism, 
seek  to veil the failure of  both public and private financial states- 
manship  by  senseless propaganda.  Critical  iconoclasts and apolo- 
getic idolators have built up prejudices and myths which have found 
widespread acceptance not only among the general public but even 
unfortunately among professional  economists.  Security capitalism 
therefore needs understanding both from those who have little real- 
ization of  the practical difficulties in finance and from those who 
have scant appreciation of the social consequences of their errors. 
Too often in recent years attack has come from those who cannot 
very well be considered deep students, from those who write sweep- 
ingly and condemn in broad generalization; too frequently defense x  PREFACE 
has  come blindly  from  those  who  lack  understanding,  and from 
those who in self-interest tolerate no honest criticism.  The limita- 
tions of  security capitalism should be viewed with neither destruc- 
tive assault nor uncritical defense, but rather with constructive cri- 
ticism and objective detachment.  To  the radically  inclined mind 
the following presentation  of  security capitalism will  seem merely 
another useless  disclosure  of the known  weaknesses of  the system 
and a  futile effort  to  bolster  up a decadent  institution.  To the 
reactionarily inclined mind the presentation will appear as just  an- 
other inquisitorial venture.  It is the hope of  the author that the 
book  will  attain the fundamental  test  of  scholarship in being an 
honest search for truth, whether pleasant or unpleasant, and based 
on this truth in proposing a  constructive  program  of  controlling 
security capitalism which, despite its imperfections in the past, has 
served the interests of  society. 
We should therefore  approach  the subject  for the purpose  of 
understanding the underlying principles, of  grasping the significance 
of  its complicated  organization, of  assembling and ceordinating a 
body of  classified and verified facts concerning the system  and of 
searching out its imperfections with a view toward reconstruction. 
For the general method of  treatment the author is indebted to 
Dr. Charles A. Beard under whom he studied at Columbia Univer- 
sity a quarter of  a century ago.  Dr. Beard developed  a technique 
of  historical institutional research which had been sadly lacking in 
financial investigation. 
The manuscript  has been read by Professor James  D. Magee of 
New York University, Professor Nelson P. Mead and other members 
of  the History Department of  the City College of  the College of  the 
City of  New York, Professor Joseph L. Tynan of  the English Depart- 
ment and by  Mr. Jerome B.  Cohen of  the Economics Department. 
Acknowledgment  is due to Dr. Harold G. Moulton who  gave the 
author the idea of  an integrated study of  the financial system.  The 
initial compilation of the tables and appendices was  undertaken by 
members of  W. P. A. Project 165-97-6999 (6051) which I sponsored. 
I owe a debt to my students of the City College of  the College of  the 
City of  New  York  who  over the years have  constituted a  critical 
though  always a  friendly  and  stimulating audience.  My  deepest 
obligation is to my wife not only for her painstaking research and 
careful preparation of the manuscript but particularly for her en- 
couragement and inspiration which have made the writing of  this 
book a joyful  experience. 
The  later chapters dealing with American security capitalism are 
in a  large  measure  based  on the findings  of  the various  govern- 
mental investigations of the system.  The results of  these findings 
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have been  analyzed and an attempt has been made in this book to 
g  ive a critical and orderly presentation of  these data.  The student 
of security capitalism is deeply indebted to Joseph Healy, Ferdinand 
pecora  and Max  Lowenthal  for the wealth  of  information  which 
they  have  disclosed respectively  in the hearings on public utility, 
banking and railroad finance.  Liberal use  has also been made of 
the findings of the munition  industry inquiry and the reports of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.  In writing the chapters 
on the history of security capitalism on the Continent, the author 
was  fortunate in having available the studies of  Alfred  Neymarck, 
the comments of Werner Sombart and the work  of  Jacob  Rieser. 
The source material for the early chapters was  obtained over a 
period of  years  from libraries in this country and abroad, as  the 
New  York Public Library, the Congressional Library, the libraries 
of Harvard University, of  the Federal Reserve Board, of  the Ameri- 
can  Bankers'  Association, of  the British  Museum, of  the London 
School of  Economics and of  a number of  French, German, Belgian, 
Austrian  and Scandinavian banks.  The general plan  of  this book 
was  conceived  in Germany in 1922 while  undertaking a study of 
European financial organization and part of  the data was  gathered 
in subsequent visits to Europe.  In the chapters on post-war tenden- 
cies the author has drawn upon his own direct observations in this 
country and abroad.  He was  fortunate in having had the oppor- 
tunities for such direct observations  through association with  vari- 
ous departments of  the federal government and also with privatq 
organizations  such  as  in  founding  the  Institute  of  International 
Finance for the Investment Bankers' Association of  America and in 
working with  the American  Bankers'  Association  at various times 
in recent years. 
GEORGE  W. EDWARDS 
Hartsdale, New York 
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CHAPTER 1 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
THROUGHOUT  its evolution, capitalism has taken various forms, and 
can be grouped according to its territorial extent as local, national 
or international  capitalism ; according to its relation  to the state, 
as private or as public capitalism ; according to the economic class 
which  dominates  the system  as agrarian, mercantile,  industrial  or 
banking  capitalism.  A  more  important  principle  of  classifying 
capitalism is according to the nature of  the transfer of  capital.  Thus 
a distinction  should  be drawn between  individual capitalism  and 
security capitalism.' 
Under individual capitalism the funds for financing economic 
activities  are furnished by  the entrepreneur operating as  a single 
owner or in partnership with others.  These funds may be applied 
either to private or to public undertakings.  In the former case the 
funds are generally  used by  the entrepreneur in his own business 
where capital ownership and executive management are combined. 
In the latter the entrepreneur, singly or with a group, turns over 
his  funds to  the  ruler as  an  individual.  In private  finance  the 
single-ownership and the partnership have been gradually replaced 
by  the corporation while in public finance the ruler, as the borrow- 
ing party, has been  supplanted by  a legislative body, and in both 
fields today the transfer of  capital is largely evidenced by securities. 
Individual  capitalism  thus  has  given  way  to "stock-and-bond"  or 
Security ~apitalism.~ 
Individual  capitalism and security  capitalism  differ  in several 
essential respects.  Individual capitalism depends largely  on entre- 
preneur capital, it is  personal  in nature and the basis  underlying 
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its capital  consists largely  of  tangible assets  as farms,  factories  or 
ships.  Security capitalism rests on investor capital, it is essentially 
impersonal  and the instruments  evidencing claims  to wealth  are 
based on intangible as well as tangible assewa 
Under individual capitalism,  the entrepreneur finances himself 
for short periods of time by commercial credit, while under security 
capitalism there is more reliance on investment credit.  Under indi- 
vidual capitalism, labor and land are the important factors in pro- 
duction, but capital is  dominant under security capitalism. 
MEANING  OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
Security capitalism may be defined as the economic system which 
is financed  through the conversion  of  the saving of  investors into 
security investment.  Security capitalism is  thus the system which 
brings together the forces of  saving and of  investment as far as they 
relate to securities. 
Saving, on the one hand, results from  the collective choice of 
individuals willing to restrict their expenditures in relation to their 
immediate  income,  while  investment  arises  from  the  collective 
action  of  entrepreneurs  or governments desiring  to increase  their 
expenditures beyond  their  current  income.  Saving refers  to  the 
accumulations  of  the consumers,  whether  individuals or corpora- 
tions, while  investment  denotes the forms evidencing the transfer 
of  the saving to entrepreneurs  or governments.  This investment 
may be evidenced in various forms such as commercial paper, mort- 
gages  and  particularly  securities.  This study  deals  with  the ap- 
plication of  saving to security investment which today constitutes the 
greater 'part of  total investment. 
The  relation between saving and investment can be studied from 
the standpoint  of  the individual  saver  and the individual  entre- 
preneur.  Such a treatment lies in the province of  a treatise in the 
field of  investment practice presented from the standpoint of  indi- 
vidual profit.  This book is concerned rather with the relation be- 
tween saving and investment  from  the social viewpoint  and deals 
with the operation of  these two forces from the standpoint of  public 
interest.  Saving will  therefore be considered as  the excess of  na- 
tional income over expenditure.  National income will be used  in 
the sense of  the money value of  the goods and services received by 
the individuals composing the nation over a definite period of  time 
such as a year. 
PARTIES  TO SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
There are three leading parties to the system of  security capital- 
ism namely the saving-investor, the saving-receiver and the saving- 
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dealer or the investment banker.'  The first party, whom we  will 
call for brevity the investor, retains the ownership of his saving, but 
the executive management to the receiver who in exchange 
g 
iVes  paper claims in the form of  shares or of  bonds.  The incen- 
tive which induces the investor to part with the control of  his sav- 
ing is the expectation of income in the form of  dividends on stock, 
interest on bonds, or of  profit through the appreciation of  the mar- 
ket  value of  these  securities.  The expectation  of  income by  the 
investor is based on his confidence in the earning power of  the cor- 
poration or in the fiscal power of  the government. 
The receiver  of  saving may be either a corporation which  ap- 
plies it to some private  enterprise or a government which  directs 
the saving to some public undertaking.  It is  important through- 
out this entire discussion to keep in mind that security capitalism 
facilitates the application of  saving  not  only  to  private  but also 
to public financial  operations.  The third party  to the system  is 
the investment  banker.  He is not an essential  party,  for  saving 
can be converted  into security investment through the sale of  se- 
curities by a corporation or a government directly to the investor. 
However,  such  direct  sales  are relatively  unimportant.  The in- 
vestment banker is primarily a dealer who purchases securities and 
sells them to the investor.  The  purchasing operation of  the invest- 
ment  banker  has  become  an important  activity  in  the  modem 
capitalist system.  It is a power which has deep social and economic 
significance.  Through  the  purchasing  function  the  investment 
banker exercises a selective power by which he can either grant or 
withhold new capital so essential to financing the needs of  corpora- 
tions and of  governments.  By  the exercise of  this selective power 
the investment banker  therefore controls the flow of  new  capital. 
After purchasing  an issue of  securities,  the investment banker 
sells  them  to  the  investor  either  directly  or indirectly  through 
other financial institutions, such as deposit banks,  including both 
savings banks and commercial banks receiving savings deposits, in- 
vestment  trusts,  or life  insurance  companies.  Under  the  direct 
relationship between  the investment  banker and the investor, the 
latter exchanges his saving for the securities of  the receiving cor- 
poration or government.  Under the indirect system, the investor 
obtains a claim  on a financial institution which  in the case of  the 
bank is  a deposit account, in the case  of  the investment trust is a 
stock or a bond, and in the case of  the life insurance company is a 
policy.  These institutions in turn may  place the funds of  the in- 
vestor in securities of  corporations or governments. 
Old capital, as represented  in securities already outstanding, is 
bought and sold through brokers, who act as agents, and derive their 4  FINANCE  CAPITALIShI 
return from a commission on the purchase or the sale of  securities. 
Such  brokers  are  grouped  in  either  fully  organized  stock  ex- 
changes which trade in listed securities or more loosely in over-the- 
counter  markets  for  the purchase  and sale of  unlisted  securities. 
The so-called commercial bank has also become an important party 
to the system of security capitalism.  As  mentioned before,  it may 
serve as an institution of  indirect investment.  Another important 
function is to supply credit for carrying  securities.  Similarly the 
operation of the central bank,  as  the keystone of  the commercial 
banking  system, has  been  influenced  by  security  capitalism.  In 
practically every country the central bank grants advances collater- 
alled by securities, and in certain countries it performs other secur- 
ity services. 
RELATION  BETWEEN  MANAGEMENT  AND  BANKING 
It is  frequently  held  that  the  prominence  of  the  investment 
banker in the financial system necessarily leads to his assuming the 
function of  capital management.  In American economic literature 
this extension of  his function is  generally described  as domination 
by Wall Street and in European literature there is a similar criticism 
of  the grip which the investment banker  is  supposed to hold over 
the  industrial  life of  the nation.  As  will  be  indicated  in  later 
chapters describing the financial organization of various  countries, 
there  is  not  always a  close  relation  between  investment  banking 
and industry, and banking domination is not necessarily an essential 
characteristic of  security capitalism. 
The evolution of  the financial relation between capital manage- 
ment and investment banking generally passes through three stages. 
In the early history of a particular corporation or industry, or even 
economic  system,  the  relation  between  capital  management  and 
investment banking is generally negligible.  Industry finances itself 
internally through the reinvestment of  its earnings and this policy 
is usually the result not of  choice but of  necessity, for the untried 
corporation or the young industry or the new  system is unable to 
finance  its growth by  the sale of securities  to the public.  In the 
course of  time the particular corporation or the industry or system, 
if  operations are profitable,  is in a stronger position  to finance its 
growth by the sale of  securities.  At this point a close relationship 
between management and investment banking may develop.  This 
tie is not a necessary result, for if  the needs of  the corporation are 
not pressing the management may readily retain control of its own 
business.  Furthermore,  the same result  may  follow if  the supply 
of  capital  in  the market  is  abundant, as  was  the case  in England 
in the nineteenth century.  If  the expansion  is  so rapid that the 
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must  have  a  large  and continuous  supply  of  capital, 
and if the supply of available capital is limited, then the investment 
banker may very  well obtain control over  the management of  the 
of  the corporation.  Such conditions prevailed  in  Germany 
in the period of rapid industrial  expansion  in the last  quarter of 
the nineteenth century. 
In the course of time there comes a third stage in the relation- 
ship between industry and investment banking.  As a nation attains 
maturity the supply of  capital funds directly owned  by 
increases, and under these conditions they are less de- 
pendent upon investment banking.  Similarly, the increase of  profits 
enables  the management  to finance its expansion more and more 
from the reinvestment  of earnings, and as  a result the control  of 
investment banking over industry is weakened.  Such was  the his- 
tory  of  the  relationship  of  investment  banking  to  industrial 
management  in  the post-war  period  in the  united  States  when 
banker control was lessened.  The decline of  control by the banker 
and the re-assertion  of  control  by  industry also occurred in Ger- 
many in the post-war years, but unfortunately was accompanied by 
sweeping political changes.  The history of  security capitalism in- 
dicates  that  control  of  the management  of  industry  by  banking 
capitalism is but a transitory  stage. 
CHARACTERISTICS  OF SECURITY CAPITALISM 
The underlying characteristics  of  security capitalism  may next 
be noted.  In the first place, while the investor retains the owner- 
ship of  his capital, he generally loses control over its management. 
This  divorce  of  management  from  ownership  of  capital  is  par- 
ticularly true in indirect investment where the investor turns over 
the disposition of  his funds to the deposit bank, to the investment 
trust or to the life insurance company.  Even under direct invest- 
ment  in  corporate finance,  the investor has  frequently  been  sep- 
arated from control of  his funds through the creation of  such divorc- 
ing agencies as the voting trust,  non-voting class A  stock and the 
holding company.  In public finance, the investor has  practically 
no control of his capital.  Furthermore, security capitalism has led 
to wide diffusion  of  the ownership of  corporations.  This tendency 
is frequently described as the "democratization"  of  capitalism.  It is 
true that  security  capitalism  has  transferred  corporate ownership 
from the few to the many, but because of  the diffusion  of  securities 
among many  holders,  control  still continues in the hands of  the 
few who  manage not only their own  capital  but also that of the 
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ownership of  capital but brings about monopolization  of  the con- 
trol of  capital. 
A second necessary feature of  security capitalism is the creation 
of stocks and bonds.  Since the owner of  capital surrenders its man- 
agement, he must receive some instrument which  indicates his re- 
tention of  ownership and which describes the conditions governing 
the relation  between  the investor and the saving-receiver, such  as 
that governing the  payment  of  interest  or of  dividends and the 
ultimate repayment of  the principal in the case of  a bond.  These 
stocks and bonds are the paper representatives of  the assets of  the 
corporations or of  governments which have issued them. 
The  third characteristic of  security capitalism is the impersonali- 
zation  of  the financial  relation  between  the saving-investor  and 
the saving-receiver.  Their relationship is no longer based on per- 
sonal  acquaintance, for the two  parties  seldom  know  each  other. 
This change in relationship has occurred both  in private and in 
public  finance.  In early  public borrowing  the  banker gave  his 
own funds to the king, and the loan was a purely personal transac- 
tion between these two parties.  Under modern security capitalism, 
the state by an act of  the legislative body obtains funds through the 
sale of  its bonds to investors, and the relationship has therefore be- 
come impersonal on both sides. 
FINANCIAL  PROBLEMS  OF  SECURITY CAPITALISM 
Each  of  these  characteristics  of  security capitalism  has  led to 
certain inevitable financial problems.  The separation of  the owner- 
ship of  capital from its management has frequently tended toward 
irresponsibility  in  its  administration.  Under  the  system  of  in- 
dividual  capitalism  where ownership  and management  of  capital 
are combined in the single individual or the partnership, extreme 
prudence  is naturally  exercised  by  the managers in the handling 
of  their own funds.  On the other hand, under security capitalism 
where the owners of  capital transfer its management to the directors 
or officers of  a corporation or to the officers of  a government, it is 
inevitable that the latter will not generally be inclined to exercise 
the same prudence in the handling of  the funds of  others as  they 
would in the care of  their own.6 
The creation of  securities based on underlying assets has given 
rise to the problem of  capitalization, or the actual pecuniary rela- 
tionship between the face or the par value of  outstanding securities 
and the true valuation of  the underlying assets of  the corporation 
or the government.  The true value of  these assets in the case of 
a corporation is based  primarily on its earning power  and in the 
case of  a government on the return from its own revenue-producing 
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P  ropertY or on the receipts from the taxable property and income of 
its inhabitants.  Overcapitalization is the issuance of  securities with  ,  face or a par value in excess of  the true value of  the underlying 
assets.  Overcapitalization is also the overstatement of  this asset value 
and results in the creation of  paper claims in the form of  securities 
unsupported by underlying a~sets.~ 
A third result of  security capitalism in recent years has been the 
growth  of  financial  instability  as reflected  in  the widening range 
of  security  prices.  One cause  has  been  the impersonality  of the 
financial relations  under  security  capitalism  as  described  above, 
whereby the investor exchanges his capital either for securities under 
the method of  direct investment or for a bank ,deposit, or a life in- 
surance  policy  under  indirect  investment.  Either  method  ac- 
celerates the shiftability  of  capitala7 
Shiftability of  capital  is accomplished  under direct security in- 
vestment by  the sale of  a stock or a bond in the security market. 
Under  indirect investment  the conversion  of  a bank deposit  into 
cash  is accomplished by  its withdrawal, and a life insurance policy 
by  obtaining its cash-surrender value.  This indirect method in the 
end necessitates the marketing  of  securities or other  assets, since 
the deposit bank  or the life insurance company must  sell some of 
its assets  in order to meet  the demand of  the depositor  or of the 
policy holder.  Economists in the past have generally looked with 
favor upon this increase in the shiftability of  capital resulting from 
the wider use of  securitie~.~  Defenders of  the stock exchange have 
generally pointed out that this institution, by  providing a so-called 
free market  and enhancing shiftability,  tends  to stabilize  security 
values.  As a matter of  fact, the improvement of  the machinery of 
the stock exchange in recent years has been accompanied by greater 
financial instability, as evidenced by  the everwidening upward and 
downward  swings  of  security  prices.  The increase  in  the  shift- 
ability  of  capital  has  been  the  mechanical  factor leading  to the 
instability of  security capitalism. 
A second factor causing instability has  arisen out of  the policy 
recapitalization.  Whether such recapitalization has meant over- 
capitalization  or  undercapitalization,  the  change  in  the  capital 
creates uncertainty  over  the pecuniary  valuation  of  the 
Securities in relation to their underlying assets.  .The valuation of 
tangible assets as evidenced by a factory or a farm is hard enough, 
but the appraisal of  securities issued on intangible assets, as good 
and franchises, is much  more difficult.  A third factor which 
has  increased  the uncertainty  of  determining the value of  stacks 
and bonds  has  been  the growing complexity of corporate and of 
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the closed mortgage bond and the participating warrant have been 
devised for  the purpose of  seeking to protect or to benefit  the in- 
vestor.  More  usually  such characteristics  have  been added  to se- 
curities and placed  in corporate indentures by  the issuers for  the 
purpose of  obtaining a greater control of  the invested capital.  As 
a  result,  securities  have become more complicated, and in  conse- 
quence their valuation  has  been  rendered  more difficult.  There 
has  been  a  growing  complexity  also  in  public  finance.  There 
have been many cases of  one government guaranteeing the obliga- 
tions of  another government or of  a semi-public corporation ;  of  a 
government  issuing  not  only  general  credit  obligations  but  also 
bonds  based  on  specific security;  and of  a  government  creating 
overlapping political  bodies with separate taxing powers. 
A further problem of  security capitalism  is  the adjustment be- 
tween saving and investment in the form of  the supply of  and the 
demand  for capital.  A  relative  surplus of  saving results in what 
may be described as capital market deflation, while a relative excess 
of  investment really amounts to capital market inflation.  It is true 
that  theoretically  the  volume  of  investment  cannot  exceed  the 
amount of saving, but actually over a short space of  time such tem- 
porary excess of  investment may  be rendered possible through the 
use of  credit extended for the purpose of  carrying securities which 
have been  issued  but which  have  not yet  been  sold.  Capital  re- 
sponsibility,  security  capitalization,  financial  stability  and  saving- 
investment adjustment are among the major problems relating to the 
financial institutions of  security capitalism. 
CHAPTER 2 
RISE  OF BRITISH SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
IN  WORLD history, economic systems pass successively through their 
rising,  developed  and declining  stages.  IYithin the  framework  of 
the declining stage of  the old system appears the rising stage of  the 
new  system.  I11  the developed  stage  the  new  system  acquires the 
characteristics of  its pure form, and in the  declining  stage it dis- 
appears within the framework of  the rising stage of  the succeeding 
system.  The rapidity of  these movements has varied.  The evolu- 
tion of  early economic systems, as the growth and the disintegration 
of the  Roman  Empire, the coming and the pas~ing  of  European 
feudalism and the rise  of  individual  capitalism  slipped  over  the 
centuries with the imperceptibility  of  a slow-moving glacier.  The 
evolution  of  security  capitalism  however  has  been  one  of  the 
swiftest-moving dramas in all the history of  human civilization, and 
its course has sped onward with the rush of  a fast-flowing  mountain 
stream. 
The evolution  of  individual  capitalism  in  Western  Europe 
covered  the period  from the thirteenth century  through  the  first 
half of  the nineteenth century.  This period was marked by momen- 
tous developments in the field of  politics,  technology,  philosophy 
and finance.= 
The dominant political movement  was  the growth of  national 
government in France, Spain and England.  Now for the first time 
in  centuries  property  received  protection  and as  a  result  capital 
was  accumulated.  With the growth of  towns came the rise of  the 
middle  class which  in time wrested  the political  power  from  the 
hands  of  the agrarian aristocracy  and later  from the  king.  The 
mechanical  tools of  society were  developed ; the  improvement  in 
navigation facilitated the crossing of  the oceans and the age of  dis- 
covery  was  initiated.  Technological  progress  also  made  possible 
the  erection  of  public  buildings.  The dominant  economic  phi- 
losophy was  that  of  mercantilism  which  preached  the importance 
Of a powerful self-sufficient  state, and urged that all economic policies 
be directed to this end.  The financial organization of  individual 
came with  the rise of  the private  merchant  bankers, as 
the Peruzzi, the Medici and the Fuggers.  In the later years of  this 
Period came the crude beginning of central banks as feeble organiza- 
tions to bolster  government  treasuries and not yet  institutions to 
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regulate the credit of  nations, and the start of  stock exchanges as 
mere fairs to exhibit goods and not yet powerful security markets 
to transfer paper claims to wealth. 
DEVELOPED  INDIVIDUAL  CAPITALISM  IN  ENGLAND 
In England  the  developed  stage  of  individual  capitalism  ex- 
tended from the end of  the seventeenth century to the close of  the 
Napoleonic Wars.  This period included the first industrial revolu- 
tion of  the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries.  The vast transfonna- 
tion in the industrial life in England over these years was financed 
almost entirely by  entrepreneur capital.  Although the canal, turn- 
pike  and  dock  enterprises  of  the  later  eighteenth  century  were 
organized as corporations, their securities were almost entirely held 
by the managers and were not usually offered for sale to the general 
public.  By  the beginning of  the nineteenth  century the sweeping 
changes in the textile and mining industries were likewise under- 
taken  almost  entirely  by  individuals  who  contributed  their  own 
capital,  and the expansion of  these  early  enterprises was  financed 
out of  the reinvestment  of  their  subsequent  earnings.  Save  for 
listing the stocks  of  a  few  mining  companies,  the  London  Stock 
Exchange  until  the  first  quarter  of  the nineteenth  century  had 
practically  no contact with  the vast  movements  which  were  com- 
pletely  transforming the industrial life of  England. 
From  the  days  of  Athens  and Rome  until  the  close  of  the 
eighteenth century there had been little widening in the forms of 
investment,  for  land  and shipping still  dominated  as  outlets  for 
the placement  of  funds.  The stock of  the Bank  of  England and 
of the East India Company offered a possible but limited corporate 
demand for the rapidly accumulating capital of  the eighteenth cen- 
tury.  The paucity  of  satisfactory  media  of  investment  is  well 
illustrated by the predicament of  Alexander Pope's father who, upon 
retiring  from  his  successful  linen  draper's  business,  had  a  con- 
siderable fund.  He was apparently unable to find a suitable form of 
investment and so he placed his money in a strong box from which 
he took out sums whenever needed for his household e~penses.~ 
Practically the sole form of  security investment throughout the 
eighteenth  and early  nineteenth centuries was  the national  debt. 
The  successive wars of  the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
necessitated  extensive public borrowing, so that the national debt 
rose  from  f i3,ooo,ooo  in  1709  to  fgoo,ooo,ooo  in  1816  when 
Napoleon was finally banished to St. Helena.=  As Napoleon's armies 
overran Europe, many  capitalists transferred their funds from the 
Continent  to England  for safety  and a  large part  was  placed  in 
British  government bonds.  National  government  securities  con- 
stituted the bulk of  the trading conducted on the London  Stock 
Exchange. 
Throughout the eighteenth century the Exchange evolved from  ,  mercantile market essentially for the purchase and sales of  goods 
into a true stock exchange  for the transfer  of  securities.  Francis 
Hirst placed the beginning of  the modern security exchange in 1773, 
when the brokers resolved that it should be called the "Stock  Ex- 
change."4 In 1802 the Exchange took  over the building which  it 
was  to occupy up to the present  time.  In the same year  the Ex- 
change received a deed of  settlement,= and it was  deemed unneces- 
sary  to obtain any further legal basis for its existence, such as an 
enabling  act  from Parliament  or a  charter under the Companies 
Act.  At first any one could obtain daily admission to the Exchange 
on payment of  six pence.6 
However,  as  reported  in the official  history  of  the Stock Ex- 
change,  "it  became  apparent that the indiscriminate admission  of 
the public was calculated to expose the dealers to the loss of valuable 
~roperty." As  a result the Exchange established a privileged group 
of  security dealers who ultimately gained monopoly in the handling 
of  security  transacti0ns.l 
The Stock Exchange during this early stage, had an unsavory 
record.  In 1810 Abraham Goldsmid the so-called King of  the Stock 
Exchange became involved  in scandal and committed suicide.  So 
serious was  the effect of  Goldsmid's  death, that the news was sent 
by  a special messenger to the King and the Prince of  Wales.  An- 
other stockbroker, Benjamin Walsh, who had raised himself to mem- 
bership in Parliament, was finally excluded from the House on the 
ground of  fraud.  In 1814 Admiral  Cochrane,  prominent  in the 
British Navy and in politics, was one of  a group which circulated a 
false rumour concerning the death of  Napoleon for the purpose of 
putting through a stock market deal.  For this offense the Admiral 
Was  deprived of  his seat in Parliament.8 
Thus in the developed stage of  individual capitalism the system 
of  security capitalism made its appearance in the growing volume 
the national government bonds and in the formation of  a market 
dealing in these securities. 
BACKGROUND  OF RISING SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The declining stage  of  individual capitalism  in England  was 
the period from the close of  the Napoleonic wars until the middle 
the nineteenth century when British security capitalism was pass- 
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brought about the growth of  security  capitalism  may be found in 
fields  of  politics,  economics,  philosophy  and  law.  International 
political  relations, after the almost  century-long duel between  En- 
gland  and France,  were fortunately  quiet, and  for almost  a  half 
century there were no major wars.  Domestic politics  in England 
was marked by the rise of  liberalism, for suffrage was widened and 
with  the abolition of  the rotten boroughs, Parliament came to be 
fairly  representative  of  the  popular  will.  The complexion  of 
British  politics  was  changing, and the issues were revolving more 
over social  welfare  rather than  merely  private  gain.  The Whigs 
and their  more progressive  associates were  influenced  by  the hu- 
manitarian movement of  the day, and were gradually forcing meas- 
ures for political and social betterment upon Parliament. 
This changing political  ideology had  its effect upon England's 
foreign  investments in  stimulating  particularly  the flow  of  funds 
to Greece, South America and the United States.  The British pub- 
lic sympathized  deeply  with  Greece in its efforts to throw off  the 
Turkish yoke, and large sums were raised to finance this movement. 
There was  also widespread  popular  support for the revolutionary 
struggles in South America.  After the successful outcome of  these 
uprisings British investors loaned millions of  pounds to the newly- 
founded  republics.  The British  Whigs  also  felt  a  deep  kinship 
with  Jacksonian  democracy  which  was  sweeping  away  the  last 
vestiges  of  federalism  in  the  United  States.  In all  three  fields 
British humanitarianism was rewarded with heavy financial reverses. 
The Reverend Sydney Smith's "Humble  Petition to the House of 
Congress at Washington"  expressed not  only the injured feelings 
of  British bondholders who held  defaulted American state obliga- 
tions, but also the keen disappointment of the British  liberals who 
regarded these defaults as a betrayal of the new political philosophy. 
The petition and letter read in part as follows : 
Nor  is it only  the loss  of  property which  your  petitioner laments;  he 
laments still more, that immense power which the bad faith of  America 
has given to the aristocratical opinions, and to the enemies of  free institu- 
tions, in the Old World.  It is in vain any longer to appeal to history, and 
to point out the wrongs which the many have received from the few.  The 
Americans, who boast to have improved the institutions of  the Old World, 
have at least equalled its crimes.  A great nation, after trampling under 
foot all earthly tyranny, has been guilty of  a fraud as enormous as ever 
disgraced the worst king of  the most degraded nation of  Europe. 
The letter concludes with  the parting comment that: 
. . . having eased my  soul of its indignation, and sold my  stock at 4a 
percent discount, I sulkily retire from the subject, with a fixed intention 
of  lending no more money to free and enlightened republics, but of  em- 
ploying my  money  henceforth in buying up Abyssinian bonds, and pur- 
chasing into the Turkish Fo~rs.~ 
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These were years of  economic progress.  The industrial revolu- 
tion initiated a half century before was now  well under way  and 
mines and factories were increasing their operations enor- 
mously.10  The increased  manufacturing production  was  absorbed 
not only by an expanding domestic but also by ever-increasing over- 
seas rnarket.ll  Early  British  security capitalism  was  given a  firm 
monetary foundation,  for in  1821 the Bank  of  England resumed 
specie payment thus making England the first nation to adopt the 
modern gold standard.12 Among the advocates of  specie resumption 
were the Ricardos.  NO doubt they sincerely believed in the validity 
of their  economic  argument  for  specie resumption, but it is  also 
worth noting that the stock exchange house was short on stocks and 
therefore stood to profit whenever specie payment was  resumed by 
the Bank of  England.'' 
British  economic philosophy was  travelling fast along the road 
of classicism as  marked out by  Adam  Smith.  By  the first quarter 
of the nineteenth century it seemed that the majestic laws of  classi- 
cism had definitely settled most of  the great economic problems of 
the world, and that there was  little further labor for future eco- 
nomists except to follow the beaten paths laid out by the founders 
of  the new science.  The  insignificant position of  security capitalism 
in these  early years was  reflected in the scanty references  to it in 
the economic literature of  the day.  Adam  Smith, writing in the 
period of  developed individual capitalism, made only passing refer- 
ence to the  security  market.14  He failed  entirely  to  foresee the 
future importance of  the corporation as reflected in his statement 
"  though  such  companies  may  not,  in the  present  times  be  very 
oppressive,  they  are certainly  altogether  useless." l5  Malthus,  al- 
though writing at the time that security capitalism was rising showed 
little interest in it.  Even Ricardo, a leading figure in the security 
capitalism  of  his  day,  gave  the system only passing notice.  The 
significance of  security capitalism was however appreciated by David 
Hume even though he was writing in the second half  of  the eight- 
eenth  century.  In his  essay  "Of  Public  Credit."  Hume wrote: 
"Public  securities are with  us become  a kind of money, and pass 
readily at the current price as gold or silver." " 
Hume believed  that  the burden  of  the national  debt was  so 
heavy  that the government  was  headed  for bankruptcy.17  Hume 
Was  critical of the stock exchange, and stated that : "What produc- 
tion we owe change-alley, or even what consumption except that of 
coffee, and pen, ink and paper, I have not yet learned." 
He believed that the turnover of  securities did not have the same 
economic significance as the turnover of  commodities, a statement 
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The economic philosophy of  the period generally accepted with 
little question the social value of  individual saving.  Malthus how- 
ever had certain reservations on the value of  thrift as may be seen 
in his  statement  that: 
. . . if, at the very  time that the supply of  commodities compared with 
the  demand  for  them,  clearly  admonishes  us  that  the  proportion  of 
capital to revenue is already too great, we go on saving from our revenue 
to add still further to our capital, all general principles concur in shew- 
ing that we  must of  necessity  be aggravating instead of  alleviating our 
distress.le 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  CORPORATE ORGANIZATION 
The development  of  corporate organization  may  best  be con- 
sidered as  a  result  rather  than  a  cause  of  the  economic  changes 
of  the period.  The increasing demand for capital made necessary 
an improvement  in the form of  business  organization,  as  the de- 
mand for capital became so great that it could no longer be sup- 
plied from resources mobilized  by the forms of  business  organiza- 
tion under individual capitalism,  namely, the single ownership or 
the partnership.  It  was therefore essential to develop the corporate 
form in order to provide co-operative capital tapped from innumer- 
able private sources.  Although the principle of  corporate organiza- 
tion had been recognized in the eighteenth century, the number of 
corporations remained small and their range limited until the sec- 
ond quarter of  the nineteenth century.20  The formation of  new 
corporations  was  still  checked  by  restrictive  legislation  of  the 
eighteenth century,  particularly  by the Bubble Act.  Peter Moore, 
one of  the leaders of  the new  security capitalism  and a  member 
of  Parliament, attacked  the statute, and through his leadership  in 
1825 it was repealed.21  As a result corporations now grew in num- 
ber and in capitalization from only  127 with a paid-up capital of 
£1 ij,ooo,ooo in 1827 to 994 with a capital of  ~~45,000,ooo  in 1844." 
These corporations were supposed to express the general theory 
of  democracy then being developed in the field of  domestic politics. 
Democratic corporate control was to be achieved by giving one vote 
to each share, and the shareholders were to  elect a board of  directors 
at the annual meeting.  In this way  the principle of  representative 
government was to apply to the field of  business.  However, even 
in this early stage of  corporate history, the movement for the separa- 
tion of  the management  from the ownership of  capital developed 
quickly.  Shareholders surrendered their proxies at the annual meet- 
ings in return for the small payment of  the stamp duties by the man- 
agement  and so  actually had little voice in the administration  of 
their capital.l8 
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FINANCIAL  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  NEW  CAPITALISM 
TUith  the close  of  the Napoleonic  wars,  the Bank  of  England 
assumed a more  important  position  in the money  market.  After 
1819 the membership of  its board of  directors improved in quality, 
and included  persons  who  grasped  the theoretic  problems  of  the 
institution.  The Bank was  fortunate in having as governor, Hor- 
Sley  Palmer, who made a real contribution in developing not only 
sound  banking  practice  but  also  sound  credit  theory.  Under 
Palmer's  guidance the Bank took recognition of  the importance of 
the government security  market  by  borrowing on consols, that is, 
selling government bonds  and repurchasing  an equal  quantity to 
be paid for at a later date and following what may be today termed 
an open market policy.24 However, over these years the Bank was 
none too successful in coping with the problems arising out of  the 
new security capitalism, for in the crisis of  1825 and again in  1839 
the  Bank  of  England  had  to  turn for  assistance  to  the  Bank  of 
France.25 
Commercial banking  developed  rapidly  both  in  the provinces 
as well as in London.  In hundreds of  towns throughout England 
a local  merchant,  manufacturer  or shopkeeper, having  attained  a 
measure of  business success in his own field, would dabble in bank- 
ing by  receiving  the deposits  of  his  fellow  townsmen.  Since his 
credit was  generally better known  than  that  of  the others in his 
community, in the course of  time he would permit bills of  exchange 
to be drawn on himself  on behalf  of  his less-known neighbors and 
would  charge  a fee for this service.  Later on he would  discount 
or purchase  bills drawn on other parties.  After a while these ac- 
tivities  increased  in  importance,  and the individual  would  limit 
himself  to these banking operations.  In addition to these  private 
banks, there was a growth in the number of  incorporated banks. 
The private or the incorporated commercial bank, and not the 
investment bank  was  the institution which  aided in financing the 
industrial  revolution.  Capital  for  the  new  manufactures  came 
largely from the personal resources of  the individual entrepreneurs, 
but  credit came  from  the commercial  banks  particularly  in the 
Provinces.  These institutions financed the manufacturers to enable 
them  to pay  their  employees and to purchase raw  materials,  and 
these loans were repaid out of  the sale of the finished goods.  The 
banks also extended credit to the merchants engaged in marketing 
goods to domestic and to foreign buyers. 
These conditions gave rise to the so-called classical or orthodox 
theory of  the function of the commercial bank.  Adam Smith, writ- 
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under  individual capitalism, stated the classical theory of  the func- 
tion  of  the commercial bank as follows : 
What a bank  can  with propriety advance to a merchant or undertaker 
of any  kind, is  not  either the whole  capital with  which  he  trades, or 
even any considerable part of  that capital; but that part of  it only, which 
he  would  otherwise be  obliged  to  keep  by  him  unemployed,  and  in 
ready  money  for answering occasional demands.26 
In order  to  enable a  bank  to maintain  a  sufficiency  of  quick 
assets to meet its demand liabilities, the orthodox theory  held that 
a bank should confine its operations to the granting of  loans which 
were  liquid  in  the  sense  of  supplying  their  own  means  of  self- 
extinguishment  at maturity.  Unquestionably  the orthodox theory 
was fully justified under the financial system prevailing in England 
in the early nineteenth century.  Credit was needed primarily over 
a short period of  time either for converting raw materials into fin- 
ished  products  or moving  them  to  market  whether  at  home  or 
abroad.  Such commercial bank credit was extended not as today by 
granting  the borrower  an increase  in his  deposit  account, but by 
giving him bank notes.  These continued to be the dominant form 
of  bank  credit until  1844 when  the Act  of  that year  limited  the 
amount of  the notes of  the existing banks and prohibited new banks 
from issuing such  obligation^.^^ 
Because of  his control of  credit, the commercial banker exercised 
an important influence on the political  and social life of  England. 
William  Cobbett commented  satirically  on  the  large  number  of 
parliamentary  seats which were bought up by  the country bankers 
or ."rag merchants"  as he termed them.28 A parliamentary  seat was 
a distinct asset to a banker, for he was thereby in direct touch with 
the political and economic currents of  the day.  Even more valuable 
to a banker was  a cabinet portfolio.  The commercial banker also 
held a high social position.  Usually the banker and the merchant 
classes constituted the local aristocracy, for  the manufacturer  had 
not yet been admitted to this social group. 
The investment  banker  differed  from  the commercial  banker 
in  that  the  former  granted  no commercial  credit  and  therefore 
issued no notes.  Most of  the investment banking houses did not 
receive deposits.  In fact, with the exception of  Ricardos, they did 
not  even  conduct  a  stock  brokerage  business.  They performed 
solely  the function of  issuing  new  securities  and selling  them  to 
investors, and further limited  these transactions largely  to govern- 
ment bonds.  The investment banking houses had little to do with 
the  financing  of  corporations  or  with  industrial   undertaking^.^^ 
The great  investment  houses  bitterly  opposed  the numerous  cor- 
porate  issues  which  were  floated  in  1824  and  1825.  Alexander 
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~~~i~~,  in a speech to Parliament, strongly  denounced these early 
issues in the statement that: "it  was  ridiculous to see the objects 
for which joint-stock  companies were forming every day."  30  The 
investment houses for a long time refused to take part even in the 
financing of  the British rail~ays.~l 
The business of investment banking was  highly  remunerative, 
for the  sources of  profit  were  quite  extensive.  The investment 
banker  first  derived  a  large  commission  from  the loan which  he 
floated particularly since the commission was calculated on the par 
value of  the issue and it was customary to issue bonds with a low 
coupon at a low  price."  The banker also usually retained a part 
of the issue for himself, and so controlled  a  large  portion  of  the 
floating supply.  He was thus able to manipulate the market price, 
and derive profits from this speculative operation.  The banker was 
also generally appointed agent for the handling of  the interest and 
sinking  fund payments,  and the fees for this  service  were  high. 
Furthermore, he was  usually given an option on subsequent flota- 
tions.  In contrast to the large number of  commercial  banks, the 
investment houses were few in number.  The leading houses were 
Baring  Brothers,  Rothschilds,  Ricardos  and  Goldschmidts.  The 
record of  these houses as judged  by  the investment  experience of 
the foreign loans  which  they  floated in the period  from  1823  to 
1825 may be seen in the following table : 
From this  table it is seen that Rothschilds' record was  perfect, 
since every one of its foreign loans continued to pay  interest.  This 
is  all the more outstanding in view  of  the poor  investment 
of other  foreign  loans.  Both  loans  made  by  Barings 
Went into default, as  did those  of  Goldschmidts, while  the single 
foreign loan of Ricardos likewise brought loss to its holders.  If  the 
eight Successful loans of Rothschilds are omitted, all the other issuing 
r 
NAME  OF 
Barings . . . .  . .  . .  . .  .  . 
Goldschmidts . . . .  .  .  . 
Ricardos . . . .  .  . .  . .  .  . 
Rothschilds. . .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Other houses.. .  . .  .  .  . 
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houses  had  a  record  of  sixteen  defaults  and only  two  successful 
issues.  It is  therefore  little wonder  that  Rothschilds  acquired  a 
high reputation in these years, for they made profits not only for 
themselves but also for their clients.  The  successful operations of  the 
Rothschilds added prestige to the entire investment banking frater- 
nity.  Contemporary  recognition  of  the importance of  the invest- 
ment banker is seen in the comment of  the Reverend Sydney Smith 
that: 
If  Caesar were to reappear upon  earth . . . Rothschild would  open and 
shut the Temple of  Janus; Thomas Baring,  or  Bates, would  probably 
command the Tenth legion, and the soldiers would march to battle with 
loud cries of  Scrip and Omnium reduced, Consols, and Caesar.34 
GROWING  DEMAND  FOR  CAPITAL 
Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth  centuries the 
most important demand for capital, as mentioned before, came from 
the national government.  However,  after the close of  the Napole- 
onic conflict, the national debt declined, and as this form of  invest- 
ment ceased to absorb the saving of  the British public it turned to 
investment  in  European,  South  American  government  bonds  as 
well  as South American  mining ~ecurities.~~  In  1817 the French 
indemnity loan was floated, and in 1818 Rothschilds placed a Prus- 
sian loan which was the first unguaranteed foreign-government issue 
to make its appearance on the London money market.36  The Lon- 
don market also took one-half of  an international Russian loan, and 
in 1824 made liberal advances to Greece to enable that country to 
free itself  from Turkey.  The Greek loan of  1824 was  handled by 
a committee of which Lord Byron was  a member, and the loan of 
1825 was issued by Ricardos.  Only a small part of  the proceeds was 
ever applied to the lofty purpose for which  the loans were  issued. 
The greater part went to various  intermediaries as the Greek com- 
missioners to pay  them for their arduous labors in negotiating  the 
loan, several well-known English  Philhellenes to compensate them 
for their losses in a falling security market, Admiral Cochrane to 
enable him to spend the rest of  his life in ease and several Brooklyn 
shipbuilders to pay them for frigates, most of  which never saw serv- 
ice in the cause of  Greek liberty.  The Greek Government did not 
pay  the interest on these bonds for over a half  ~entury.~'  In this 
period  of  foreign  loans Colombia  by  contracting a  loan in  1820, 
repudiating in 1828 and settling by  means of  a new  issue in 1845, 
began  the succession of  loan  flotation, loan repudiation  and loan 
settlement which was  destined to stand as  a lasting tribute to the 
patience and to the endurance of  the internationally-minded British 
investor.  A bond issue was even floated for the non-existent "King- 
dom of ~~~ais."~'  At least the South American loans floated by  our 
New york  bankers in recent years in every case  were extended to 
vernments which actually existed. 
The demand for capital by domestic corporations was small until 
the second quarter of the nineteenth century.  Until then corporate 
were floated only by public utility  (canal, dock, turnpike) 
and by  financial  (bank and insurance) companies.  For a number 
of years George Stephenson had urged the application of  steam to 
but his proposals were met with ridicule.3D However, 
in  1825  Stephenson, aided by  the funds of  individual  capitalists, 
the first railroad from Stockton to Darlington.  By  the early 
forties the railroads accounted for most  of the corporate securities 
issued in England. 
A statement of the nominal value of  the total securities listed on 
the London Stock Exchange in 1843 is given in Table 2. 
TABLE  2 
SECURITIES  LISTED  ON  THE  LONDON  STOCK  EXCHANGE,  1843.~~ 
(pounds sterling) 
From this table it is seen that the securities of  the national gov- 
ernment constituted 69.09 percent  of  the total, while  foreign gov- 
ernment  securities accounted  for another  10.86  percent.  The se- 
curities of  banking and other corporations amounted to only 20.05 
Percent of the total. 
CLASSES OF SECURITIES 
National government. . .  .  .  . . . 
Foreign  governments. . . .  .  .  . . 
Banking corporations. . . .  .  .  . . 
Other corporations.. .  .  .  . .  .  .  . . 
Total.. .  .  . 
- 
INCREASE  IN  CAPITAL SUPPLY 
The  volume of capital available for the security market increased 
throughout  the second quarter of  the centur~.~'  This in- 
was due to the profits derived from England's rapidly expand- 
In% foreign  trade,  from her  developing  finance  and particularly 
from her new factory system.  Throughout the nation thousands of 
manufacturers were enlargening their shops and mills, artisans 
were  raising  themselves to  be  proprietors  of  their own  establish- 
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manufacturers.  These individuals  generally  furnished  their  own 
initial  capital, and usually  preferred  to reinvest  their  subsequent 
profits in their businesses rather than spend them on consumption 
goods.  Unquestionably  the expansion of  British manufacture was 
financed by entrepreneur and not by  investor capital.42 
The expansion of  manufacture brought increased income to the 
land-owning class.  Many of these families, after struggling for years 
with  rising  taxes,  suddenly  found  themselves wealthy,  due to no 
effort of  their own  but to the increase  in  the rent  rolls on their 
properties either near a newly  erected  factory town  or a recently- 
opened coal mine.  Thus the Earl of  Derby rejoiced to see the rent 
rolls on his Lancashire estates rise from Li4,ooo a year to Ei80,ooo 
a year.43  As  a result of  these  profits from industry and from the 
unearned increment on land, national wealth almost doubled from 
1820 to 1840.~~ 
Capital  accumulation was  going  forward  not  only  because  of 
the active force of  saving, but also because of  the negative influence 
of  the relative  decline  of  government  taxation  as  compared  with 
the rise in national income.  It was estimated that in 1815 taxation 
absorbed 9.0  percent.  of  the national income, but by  1843 this pro- 
portion had dropped to 5.5 per cent.45 
DIFFUSION  OF SECURITY HOLDINGS 
Diffusion of  security holdings is an inherent characteristic of  se- 
curity capitalism, and by  the end of  the second quarter of  the nine- 
teenth  century  both  government  and  corporate  securities  were 
widely held.  The new capitalism involved a large number of  per- 
sons, and so the tendency in finance parallelled the movement in Brit- 
ish politics.  Just as  suffrage, narro~vly  confined  in the eighteenth 
century, was widened in the early nineteenth century, so the holding 
of  the government's securities was similarly broadened.  In the eight- 
eenth century, according to the estimate of  Hume, the number of 
fundholders was  only  17,000,4~  but by  the early  part of  the nine- 
teenth century the official government figures placed it at ~75,839.~' 
A similar popularization of  investment holdings occurred in the 
new field of  corporate securities.  The head of  Barings, in a speech 
to Parliament in 1825, noted that "the gambling mania that was  at 
present abroad had seized upon all classes, and was spreading itself in 
all parts of  the country."  13y  the forties, it was said that: 
In every street of  every town persons were to be found who were holders 
of  Railway Shares.  Elderly men and women  of  small realised fortunes, 
tradesmen  of every order, pensioners, public functionaries, professional 
men, merchants, country gentlemen -  the mania had affected all.4B 
to the London Times, even the clergy were forsaking the  '  .-- 
=jpture for "ript." 
rf the demand and the supply of capital are compared, it would  -- 
seem that throughout this period the latter generally  exceeded the 
former.  A vivid  demonstration of  the strength of  the supply  of 
capital is illustrated by an episode in i 8 18 when the popular demand 
for an issue of Treasury notes was  so  insistent that a mob of sub- 
scribers, assembled in front of the Bank of England at two o'clock 
in the morning before the books were opened, crashed the gates off 
their hinges, and later the entire issue was subscribed by  the first 
ten  persons  in  line."  Statistical  evidence  of  the greater  rate  of 
saving over  the rate of  investment throughout  the second quarter 
of the nineteenth  century  is  seen  in the decline in the yield  on 
government bonds from 4.42  percent in 1820 to 3-11  in 1850.~~ 
CRISES  UNDER EARLY SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
In the second quarter of  the nineteenth century British security 
capitalism experienced two severe speculative crises.  The crisis of 
1825 was  brought  about by  the flotation  of  unsound and highly 
speculative securities of  foreign governments and of  domestic cor- 
porations.  The promoters of  one company stated that it was formed 
"to drain the Red Sea, in search of  the gold and jewels  left by  the 
Egyptians, in their passage after the Israelites." 53  Also a company 
was  organized, with  the unconsciously  true purpose  of  exploiting 
"the  immense  mineral  wealth  in  Ireland  which  is  almost  un- 
known." 54  In a satirical  novel of  the day, "The Gold, Wine and 
Olive Joint Stock Company"  is organized by  a promoter who says : 
"Why, you  talk as if we  had any real business to transact.  All we 
have  to do is to puff our shares  up to a  premium,  humbug the 
public  into buying  them,  and then  let  the whole  concern  go to 
ruin."55  All  the elements of thin margin trading were  present in 
this  first speculative  excess  of  the  new  security  capitalism.  The 
of the House of  Parliament saw fit to warn shareholders that 
were  liable  on the full  amount  of  their  subscription,  even 
the initial deposit which they had made was only one pound 
deposit for every hundred pounds of full subscripti~n.~~ 
The inevitable crash came in the autumn of  1825.  The provin- 
cial banks were the first to be affected and a number failed.57 These 
bank failures accompanied a sharp collapse of  security prices on the 
London Stock Exchange and losses on securities were placed at ap- 
Proximately Li6,ooo,ooo.  Thus the new  system of  security capital- 
experienced its initial reverse, and society faced the melancholy 
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The next  serious maladjustment in British  security  capitalism 
came in 1846.  However  in this case the new  speculative medium 
was  the stock of  the domestic railway  corporations.  The leading 
figure in the railway development of  these years was George Hudson 
who  was  characterized  as  "The Railway  King." js  Even  in these 
early days Hudson developed  advanced  methods of  railway  financ- 
ing,  for  he "maintained  his  popularity  with  the shareholders  by 
serving them up dividends paid out of  their own capital." 6B 
Herbert Spencer, at that time a sub-engineer on the London and 
Birmingham Railway, made the following note on the rising tide of 
railway speculation : 
During the thirties speculative local magnates and far-seeing capitalists, 
having  projected  railways  which  would  obviously  be  advantageous, 
thereupon chose their engineers, and subsequently let portions of  their 
work  to contractors ; but, as  fast  as  there grew  up considerable classes 
of  wealthy contractors, and of  rich  engineers accustomed  to co-operate 
with them, it became  the habit for these to join  in getting up schemes, 
forming companies, and practically  appointing boards -  a policy  in all 
ways  beneficial  to themselves.  Thus, by  1845, there had  arisen  many 
and various interests uniting to urge on railway enterprise ;  and anyone 
who took a broad view of  the causes in operation, might have seen that 
great disasters were certain to ensue.60 
Spencer's father invested in a Derby railway but his philosopher 
son had sufficient foresight to take him out before the crash came.61 
According  to a contemporary comment:  "Every  nook and avenue 
of  England which, with any shew of  decency, could be described  in 
a public print as  'an  important  district',  abounding in traffic  of  a 
certain description, was forthwith occupied by an incipient railway 
~ornpany.''~~ 
Every symptom of  a speculative security boom was present, with 
increasing public optimism, with rising stock prices of  existing com- 
panies and with the formation of  new companies.  The particularly 
serious aspect of  this speculative movement was  that the investment 
in railways locked up large amounts of  capital in fixed assets and so 
absorbed the liquid capital of  the money market.6S  The reaction 
finally came in 1846 and railway securities fell sharply.  The total 
losses on railway securities were estimated at over jSloo,ooo,ooo thus 
far exceeding the losses in 182.5.~~ 
CRITICISM OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The  new system of  security capitalism was subject to bitter criti- 
cism.  There was considerable public opposition to stock exchange 
operations  and particularly  to  speculation  in  government  bonds 
.c,,hicll ~onstituted  the preponderant. bulk of  securities in this early 
period.  The leading critic was William Cobbett who stated that : 
such indeed, is  the  operation of all  great capitals of  credit which 
enable the capitalist by  means of banks to multiply the natural power of 
his  even  three and  fourfold; to  grasp, monopolize  and  control 
everything . . . Large  capitals  and  credit  . . . have  a  tendency  to 
monopolizati~n  and to form a kind of bourgeois and upstart aristocracy 
with all the faults of the former and without any of its ~irt~es.65 
cobbettls  attitude has been well etched by G. K. Chesterton in the 
following words: 
He would have been as  ready as  any  merchant or trader to face the 
fact that man, as  God has  made him, must  make money.  But he had 
a vivid sense that the money  must  be  as  solid and honest  as  the corn 
and fruit for which it stood, that it must be  closely  in touch with the 
realities that it represented;  and he waged  a furious war  on all those 
indirect  and  sometimes  imaginary  processes  of  debts  and  shapes  and 
promises and percentages which make the world of  wealth today a world 
at the worst  unreal and at the best  unseen  . . . what he was  at once 
predicting and denouncing, like a small cloud that had not yet  become 
a universal fog, was  that vast  legal  fiction which  we  call finance.66 
The investment  bankers  were  frequently  pilloried  in the  public 
press,  especially  because  of  their  loans  to  foreign  governments. 
These loans were  criticised  particularly on the basis of  their  eco- 
nomic disadvantage for they were considered as injuring rather than 
helping the foreign trade of  Great Britain as the funds were applied 
to build  up competing  industries.  In the House of Lords it was 
urged  that the owner of  capital  should be restricted  by  law from 
sending his capital out of the country.G7 "The profitable employ- 
ment of  our o~vn,"  it was argued "and not foreign people nor slaves, 
constitutes the wealth and prosperity of  the British Empire."68  For- 
eign loans were also scored on political  grounds that they were  "a 
mere prop for military despotism." 
This opposition  to  the  foreign loan  operations of  the  invest- 
"lent  bankers came from varied sources.  At times objection came 
from particular classes, as  the Jews and the Quakers who  in 1845 
bitterly opposed the loans to Russia.  The Westminster Review  de- 
clared that  "it was  the duty of  the inhabitants of  Western  Europe 
endeavor to prevent  further loans being made to Russia."  The 
was prophetic, but about eighty years too early, in forecasting 
that "the spirit of  Freedom has gradually but steadily marched east- 
ward until it has at last reached the frontiers of  Russia,"  and con- 
cluded with a forecast of  a "complete  revolution and a repudiation 
Of  the Russian  debt tomorrow."70  At  a  meeting  in the London 
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policies of  Lord Palmerston,  introduced a resolution  that the cur- 
rent Austrian loan was not safe and that armament loans were "u11- 
sound in principle and injurious to the interests of  nations."  71  The 
provincial commercial bankers as the financiers of  individual capi- 
talism also were loud in their criticism which found vent  in their 
"Circular to Bankers," the official organ of  the Association of  Coun- 
try Bankers.  'These banking critics expressed the resentment of  the 
entrenched though  passing  individual capitalism in its opposition 
to the rising security capitalism. 
EARLY  FINANCIAL JOURNALISM 
A necessary institution of  security capitalism  is its own journal- 
ism, and this institution was developed in England in the first half 
of  the nineteenth century.  The newspapers of  the day, such as the 
London Tzmes and the Morning Herald began  their "city"  article 
or financial column in  1825.'~ By  the thirties there was a well de- 
veloped financial press, and not only the London but also the pro- 
vincial  newspapers  carried  regular  "city"  articles.  In time came 
publications devoted  entirely  to financial  subjects,  but they  were 
written  mainly  for  bankers  and primarily  from  the  professional 
viewpoint.  A little later the financial press made a broader appeal, 
and catered  to  the general  public.  The Economist,  founded  in 
1843 as a journal  to sponsor free trade principles, gave  increasing 
space to financial data and attained a high level of  journalism. 
The new security capitalism had need of  developing additional 
journalistic aids to reach  the ever-widening range of  individual in- 
vestors.  As  long as securities consisted mainly of  the bonds of  the 
national  government, there was  little need  of  an intensive system 
of  security  journalism.  However, when  corporate securities  were 
first introduced in the market, it became necessary to "educate"  the 
investing public, and thus the art of  prospectus writing was born.73 
The educational work of  these prospectuses was often reinforced by 
brief  pamphlets  which  supposedly  gave  impartial  economic  and 
financial information concerning investments.  A typical  brochure 
was one entitled "An Enquiry into the Plans, Progress and Policy of 
the American  Mining  Companies,"  written  in  1825 by  Benjamin 
Disraeli.  This pamphlet  was  written  mainly  for  the purpose  of 
keeping up the price of  certain mining shares.74 
LACK  OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL 
Notwithstanding the abuses of  the rising security capitalism in 
issuing unsound foreign government  and later over-capitalized do- 
mestic railway securities, practically no effort was made to place the 
system under  government  control.  So  strong was  the prevailing 
classical philosophy  of  individualism  and  of  laissez-faire in  the 
eighteen twenties that a member of  Parliament in commenting on 
a  bill  to charter  a  fraudulent foreign mining company, said  that 
parliament "had no right to take upon itself to prevent the citizens 
of  don or the people of  England, from disposing of  their money 
in any way  they might please." '' 
 ition ion  in Parliament to the new  security capitalism came 
largely from the Tory members, who, however, were unable to bring 
about any restrictive legi~lation.'~ 
In the forties there was a feeble effort to control the expansion 
of security capitalism.  In 1844, Gladstone, then a Tory and Presi- 
dent of the Board of Trade, became Chairman of  the Select Com- 
mittee on Joint  Stock  Companies.  This Committee  in  its  final 
report  concluded  that  "periodical  accounts,  if  honestly  made and 
fairly audited, cannot fail to excite attention to the real  state of  a 
cotlcern ; and by  means of  improved remedies, parties  to misman- 
agement may be made more amenable for acts of  fraud."  The Com- 
mittee thus accepted the principle of  disclosure that protection of 
the investor in corporate securities rested  in giving him the truth 
about the securities which were offered to him.77 The Committee's 
report  formed  the basis of  the Companies Act  of  1844 which re- 
quired the registration  of  prospectuses.  This Act marked the be- 
ginning of  legislative protection of  security purchasers in England. 
The Committee, in general, took  a narrow  view  of  the necessary 
extent of  governmental control in the conclusion that "the  imposi- 
tion of statutory regulations and prohibitions calculated not merely 
to put a stop to the activities of  the wrong-doer but to place quite 
intolerable fetters upon private business." 
Gladstone attempted to extend a degree of regulation over the 
railroads in the Railroad Bill of  1844.  The original bill contained 
a provision giving the government a limited right to purchase the 
railways then being constructed, but this provision  was  rejected by 
Parliament.  Probably  one reason  for the elimination of  this and 
regulatory provisions of  the bill was the fact that 157 members 
Parliament were listed on the registers of  the new  railway com- 
panies."  Economic self  interest as well as economic reasoning thus 
the parliamentary support for a laissez-faire policy in re1.1- 
to British security capitalism throughout the second quarter of 
the nineteenth century. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus throughout the eighteenth century the origins of  security 
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securities, in the increase in the number of holders of  such securities 
and in the formation of  the London  Stock Exchange.  Over these 
years individual capitalism still prevailed.  However, in the period 
from the close of  the Napoleonic wars until the middle of  the nine- 
teenth century, under favorable political and economic conditions, 
security capitalism made its appearance along with  declining indi- 
vidual capitalism.  At the beginning of  the period the latter system 
tvas still dominant and continued to finance the economic transfor- 
mation of  England with capital  supplied by  the individual entre- 
preneurs and credit furnished by the commercial banks. 
However, the institutional characteristics  of  the new  system of 
security capitalism were taking definite shape.  First came the rise 
of  public  security  investment  when  Europe  and  South  America 
floated bond issues in London.  Then with the growth of  corpora- 
tions came private securities particularly for financing railroads, and 
this development of  transportation with  the exception of  banking 
was  the only  important phase  of  the industrial  revolution  which 
was  financed  l5y  security capitalism.  Coterminously came  the ac- 
cumulation of  funds seeking such security investment.  For the first 
time in English  history  came the widespread  diffusion  of  security 
holdings which is one of  the fundamental characteristics of  security 
capitalism.  In order to bring together  these forces of  the supply 
of  and the demand for security investment, there developed the nec- 
essary machinery in the form of  investment banking houses organ- 
ized to place new securities, stock exchanges operated to facilitate the 
purchase and sale of  outstanding securities and a security journalism 
conducted to disseminate financial information to the investing pub- 
lic.    he supply of  capital at first exceeded the demand, and the 
presence of this surplus capital  led to an increase  in demand for 
new securities.  The volume of  these new securities increased tem- 
porarily and overinvestment led to the crises of  1825 and of  1846. 
In  both cases the increased volume of  new securities was accompanied 
by a decline in the quality of  these securities, and eventually brought 
losses  to the holders.  However, over  this period  there  was  little 
governmental control of  security capitalism with the exception of  the 
adoption of the disclosure principle in the Companies Act of  1844. 
CHAPTER 3 
TRIUMPH OF  BRITISH  SECURITY  CAPI TALISM 
TH~  period  Erom  the end of the forties  until  the early  nineties 
marked  the triumph of  British  security capitalism.  This period, 
which falls within the Victorian era, was the high tide of  England's 
economic prosperity.  The knowledge of  her scientists, the shrewd- 
ness of her business men and the intelligence of  her bankers brought 
to her  shores a  material prosperity  and a  social well-being never 
before attained  in any  country up to that time with  the possible 
of  the United  States.  Agriculture  entered  its  "golden 
age,"  for farming under advanced methods of  cultivation was  con- 
ducted with  satisfactory results.  Over these years England became 
the  manufacturer, the  merchant  and  the  banker  for  the  ~vorld. 
The power which  drove the wheels of  industry in this period was 
steam, and for this purpose  England possessed  the richest coal de- 
posits  in  all  Eur0pe.l  The output of  coal,  pig  iron,  and  steel 
e~panded.~  Although the output of  England's  factories increased, 
there was no oversupply of  goods, as new foreign markets were con- 
tinually developed.  True, the Continent was also becoming indus- 
trialized,  and Western  European countries were  now  largely  satis- 
fying their needs  for  finished goods  from their own  factories and 
mills.  England, however, found markets in other parts of  the world, 
including her own colonies, as well  as in the Far East and in the 
new countries in South America. 
The population of  England in the latter half  of the nineteenth 
<Tew rapidly and provided an ever-increasing domestic de- 
mand  for British  goods.  The economic,  financial  and social sys- 
tem of the Victorian era thus was flexible, and was capable of  adapt- 
ing itself to the changes taking place in a dynamic society. 
PHILOSOPHIC  INTERPRETATION  OF SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The second half  of  the nineteenth century was marked by  rapid 
progress, and there was a growing reliance on pure ratio- 
cination as a means  solving the problems of  the day.8  Particularly 
Was  this true in the field of economic theory.  A leading interpreter 
developed  British  security capitalism was  Walter Bagehot  who, 
banker, rvas a successful practitioner and, as editor of  the Econo- 
mzst,  was also a keen student of  the system.  Another close observer 
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was  Viscount  Goschen who grasped the significance of  the institu- 
tions of  the new  system.  John Stuart Mill, writing in the middle 
of  the century, was naturally more conscious of  the meaning of  the 
new system than the earlier classicists.  The growing importance of 
the corporation over  these  years  may  be  seen  by  contrasting the 
economic  views  of  Adam  Smith  and of  Mill.  While  the former 
failed  to foresee the future position  of  the corporation, the latter 
fully  recognized  its significance particularly  in  the field  of  large 
scale  operation^.^  Mill  likewise sensed  the importance of  capital 
in the new  economic systems5 He accepted the classical theory of 
the value of  saving, but with certain qualifications.  In commenting 
on "The Tendency of  Profit  to a Minimum,"  he observed that in 
developed countries capital  could  tend to become  so great that it 
might threaten the extinction of  pr0fits.O 
In general  the Victorian  period  was  an age of  economic  self- 
satisfaction and the favorable attitude of  the general public to se- 
curity capitalism was reflected in the following contemporary article 
on the growth of  capital: 
Millionaires benefit  mankind  more  than  themselves.  In their  search 
for new  millions, they  lead  to  universal  enrichment; in themselves at- 
taining leisure, they win  it for others.  They are ranged on the side of 
peace  and good-will among men; and  however  greedy  of  wealth  per- 
sonally, are allied with the practical moralists of  the age.  The ministers 
and  servants of  economy,  they  throw  down  the  ramparts erected  by 
barbarism against  the  intellectual and  ethical  progress  of  our  species, 
and proclaim the fraternity of  mankind.  They  drag the savage  from 
his  cave and make him share in the gains of  civilisation; they  lift the 
felon from his lair and bid  him  toil  at  honest  work; they bid  labour 
economi~e  its  capital, and  place  it in  the general  reservoir  of  wealth, 
thereby to share yet  more largely in the triumphs of  trade.  Thus war, 
pestilence,  and  famine disappear,  and  peace,  health,  and  plenty  pre- 
vaiL7 
ABSENCE  OF  FINANCIAL  IMPERIALISM 
The Continent was disturbed by  a series of  conflicts which had 
ominous political effects for the future, but in which England was 
not a direct participant except the Crimean War.  It engaged in a 
number of  "little"  wars, and in the second half  of  the nineteenth 
century gained additional overseas territory.  With the exception of 
the Egyptian War, these conflicts and this expansion had little rela- 
tion to banking security capitalism.  In fact, the Marxian  charge, 
that security capitalism leads to "imperialistic"  wars waged  to ad- 
vance or to protect the interests of  bankers and bondholders, is not 
justified  by the actual facts of  England's financial and political his- 
tory.  In spite of  the extensive political power and the vast economic 
strength  of  the  British  holders  of  foreign  securities,  they  rarely 
forced their government into a policy of  collecting unpaid debts by 
battleships or by bayonets.  Defaults by foreign governments on the 
bonds  floated and held  in  England  were numerous in these  years, 
and the circumstances of these repudiations were often exasperating. 
Nevertheless, the British government did little to protect the interests 
of British holders of foreign sec~rities.~ 
This passive attitude of the government was severely criticised by 
the financial press  which  felt that the government was  not giving 
sufficient protection to the holders of foreign securities. 
GROWTH  OF  CORPORATIONS 
In the previous  period the corporate form of  organization had 
grown by  fits and starts.  In the boom years of  1824-1825  and of 
1g44-1845, the number waxed  considerably  only to wither in the 
lean years which followed. Now the growth of  corporate organization 
was continuous and sustained. The number rose from 700 in 1855 to 
2,000  in  1864 and to 7,900 in 1883.~  The impetus for this increase 
came in 1855 when the limited liability feature of  corporate organi- 
zation was  definitely  specified in the Companies Act of  that year.l0 
This statute marked the passing of  the dominance of  individual capi- 
talism and the beginning of  the supremacy  of  security capitalism. 
The single owner and partnership  forms of  business  organization 
were at last replaced by the corporation, and the personal element in 
business now gave way  to the impersonal character of  corporate or- 
ganization.ll So reckless was the formation of  many of  these new com- 
panies that the master of  the rolls declared:  "no doubt many com- 
panies were started for the purpose of  being wound  up." l2  This 
unsatisfactory result of  the new Companies Act cast serious doubt on 
the advantages of  limited liability which  was  in consequence char- 
acterized as a "pestilential principle." l3 
DEVELOPMENT  OF FINANCIAL  ORGANIZATION 
These years witnessed a rapid development of  financial institu- 
tions such as the Bank of England, the commercial banks, the over- 
seas banks, the investment banks, the investment trusts and the stock 
exchange.  The Bank  of England continued its  passive policy  to- 
"ard  security capitalism.  However, in one important respect  the 
system was  recognized by  the Bank  and that was  in granting 
loans on marketable securities listed on the London Stock Exchange 
mining shares, and even on unlisted  securities if  they were 
and if their value could be ascertained.14 
For  a number  of years  the large commercial banks developed 
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banks.  This movement was  accelerated  by  the Companies Act  of 
1862 which facilitated the formation of  incorporated banks.  By  the 
end of  the century the large banks were absorbing not only private 
but also the smaller joint stock banks of  the interior, Thus passed the 
provincial commercial banks which had financed the individual capi- 
talism of  the early nineteenth century.  The new amalgamated joint 
stock banks, while mainly engaged in extending commercial credit, 
also participated to an increasing degree in the financing of  security 
operations.  By  the close of  the century there was a decline in the 
volume of  commercial paper in the form of  bills, and an increasing 
amount of  bank  credit was  being  applied  to security operations. 
One financial commentator stated : 
Turning now  to  the  stockholders, we  find  that  they  have  of  late 
years occupied an increasing share of  the portion of  bank capital utilized 
on the Money Market, and the reason of  this is to be looked for in the 
gradual diminution in the number of  bills seeking discount happening 
in conjunction with, and in spite of, the rapid increase of  banking funds 
and general business.  Consequently bankers have been obliged to devote 
greater attention to the third division of  the financial system, and lend 
to a greater extent on negotiable securities.16 
Not only did this indirect participation of the commercial banks in 
security capitalism increase, but their direct holdings of  investments 
also rose  over  these  years.  Thus the British  banks, generally re- 
garded as  the outstanding  example of  pure commercial  banking, 
actually were abandoning the orthodox theory and were becoming a 
part of  the financial machinery of  security capitalism. 
Special overseas banks were also founded to facilitate the expan- 
sion of  foreign trade and investment.  These banks operated in un- 
developed countries on the Continent, in the Near  East, the Far 
East and Latin America.16 
Investment banking now reached maturity.  Barings and Roths- 
childs grew in power, but other firms also became important issuers 
of  securities.  Investment  banking in this period became more ag- 
gressive in its  methods.  An  observer  remarked:  "Now  we  have 
wealthy  firms, with  large  machinery,  whose  whole  time  and staff 
are devoted to hunting about the world  for  powers to bring out 
loans."1T  British  houses, instead of  operating  alone, now  formed 
syndicates or groups for the purchase and the sale of  securities, since 
issues  became  so  numerous  and so large  that  no one house  was 
willing to assume the entire risk  and by  means of  the syndicate it 
was  spread  over  a  number  of  distributing houses.18  Investment 
banking became more impersonal in its relation to both the issuer 
of  securities and particularly to the investing public,  as  securities 
were more widely diffused.  With this growing impersonality came 
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the inevitable weakening in the individual responsibility of  the issu- 
ing bankers for their security  offering^.'^ 
The British  investment houses, as in the previous period, con- 
tinued to limit their activities mainly to the flotation of  foreign gov- 
ernment bonds.  Meagre interest was shown in financing the needs 
of home industry.  British industry was now financed largely through 
the issuance of securities  which  were handled  through small  pro- 
moters rather than through the great investment houses.  Thus in 
England security capitalism did not develop a close relation between 
industry and investment banking.  Critics of  security capitalism, as 
Nicolai Lenin, who were more familiar with the Central European 
system made the error of  considering this relationship a necessary 
feature of  the system.20 
The British investing houses, however, exerted extensive finan- 
cial power.  It was charged that these institutions so controlled the 
money market that, despite the Bank of  England, they were able to 
keep rates low  in order to facilitate  the  flotation  of  their  issues. 
"The great  capitalists,"  declared  the Statist,  "have  strained  every 
nerve to make money cheap, and they have succeeded. And, although 
the Bank of  England rate of  discount remained at 5 per cent, the 
discount rate in the open market in London on the Wednesday was 
barely  2%  percent,  and last week the discount houses lowered the 
rates they allow on deposit 1/2  percent."21 
Over these years,  England also developed the investment trust 
as  an institution  of  indirect  investment.  Investment  trusts were 
first organized in the sixties, and until the end of  the eighties their 
growth was gradual and on a sound basis.  However the number of 
trusts multiplied rapidly in the years from  1888 to 1890."  Invest- 
ors unwisely  gave  the managers  of  these  trusts blanket  power  to 
Operate  as  they saw  fit.  For  example, the L'Association  Limited 
was  organized  to carry on business  "without  limit  or restriction 
. in any  kind  of  business,  profession  or calling . . .  in every 
Pa*  of the  The Investors'  Review  spoke of  the invest- 
ment trust as "really only a stock gambling and loan and company 
floating machine,  or it is a rubbish heap which  firms, overloaded 
with unsalable  securities  have  established  for their own  relief."24 
The  reaction  in the security market in 1890 brought heavy losses 
the investment trusts."  However by  1895 the trusts had recav- 
ered from these  reverses, and thereafter generally  followed  mund 
Policies.2a 
the middle of the century the London stock exchange attained 
Undls~uted  supremacy of the nation's security market.  Through the 
Second quarter of  the century several of  the provincial  exchanges 
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markets took an active part in financing the  railroad^.^'  However, 
the subsequent crash in railroad securities contributed largely to the 
decline  of  these  provincial  exchanges.  Furthermore, as  the local 
railroad  lines were  merged  into major  systems  with  terminals  in 
London,  the capital  requirements for such consolidations were  so 
large that they  could  be satisfied only  in London.  The London 
Stock Exchange therefore expanded its transactions in railway secur- 
ities, and at the same time increased its already extensive listings of 
government obligations.  Thus in the period of  the fifties and sixties 
the provincial security markets lost their significance and the Lon- 
don Stock Exchange came to dominate the security transactions of 
the entire nation.28 
With the Bank of  England assuming the note issuing function, 
with  London  commercial  banks  absorbing  the  provincial  banks, 
with  investment  banking concentrated,  with  the investment trusts 
expanding their operations and with  the London  Stock  Exchange 
holding  undisputed  sway  over  security  transactions,  London  now 
became the financial metropolis of  the world. 
Part of  the financial press continued to serve the interests of  the 
investment bankers faithfully, but the welfare of  the investors was 
at times forgotten.  The city editor of the London Times,  Marma- 
duke B.  Sampson, was  a director  in the Rothschild-controlled San 
Paulo  Railway.  Sampson  seldom  missed  an opportunity to com- 
ment  favorably on  Brazilian  and on Russian  securities.  He was 
finally forced out in 1874, retiring with the consolation which could 
be derived from a large fortune-the  well-earned result of  his efforts 
in security journalism.  Fortunately another part  of  the press  re- 
mained true to the standards of  honest financial journalism.  The 
Statist particularly  criticized many of  the unsound practices of  the 
financial market, and the Economist did its best to interpret fairly 
the important changes occurring in the financial world. 
The art of  prospectus  writing,  the crude beginnings of  which 
were  observed  in  the  previous  chapter,  now  attained  perfection. 
The  Statist described the sales-promotion method of  the "financier" 
of  the day as follows: "His [the financier's] 'literary man' has turned 
out the prospectus  for him in fine Johnsonian  periods,  garnished 
with  statistics,  and  illuminated  with  some  beautiful  flights  of 
fancy."29  The flotation of  corporate securities also gave rise to a 
new class of  lawyers who specialized in company promotion.  "Law- 
yers  are to be  found,"  says  a correspondent  in the  Statzst,  "who 
will lend their services to any of  the most  abominable schemes de- 
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.ired  under the shelter of the Limited Liability Acts . . . the City 
is crammed with legal advisers who take sides with wicked promoters 
and dishonest directors against the poor suffering shareho1der."3o 
CHANCING  DEMAND  FOR CAPITAL 
The decline in the demand for long-term capital by the national 
government, in operation  ever  since  the  close of  the  Napoleonic 
Wars, continued.s1  However this decline was  more than offset  by 
the increase in the demand from foreign governments.  After their 
losses in  1825 British  investors were discouraged  from buying  the 
bonds  of South  American  governments, and it was  not  until the 
sixties that these obligations were again  floated on a large scale in 
the London market.  The history  of  any bond cycle shows that it 
generally passes through recurring stages as to the quality of  bonds 
issued.  In a period following a financial reaction only bonds of  the 
highest quality are taken by investors.  As  these bonds rise in price 
and  as  their  yields  decline,  investors  are tempted  into securities 
slightly below the highest quality.  In the course of  time, medium- 
grade and finally low-grade bonds are issued.  This was  true of  the 
cycle  of  foreign  bonds  in the sixties and seventies in the English 
security market.  Some of  these bonds issued at the later stage of 
the cycle were of  a decidedly low-grade quality. 
The demand of domestic industry for short-term capital fell off 
markedly in these years.  This decline was  in large measure due to 
the improvement in international transportation and in communi- 
cation.  The replacement of  sailing vessels by  steamships shortened 
the period during which goods were in transit.  The  opening of  the 
Suez Canal reduced the length of  time necessary for shipping car. 
goes to the Far East.  As  a result, capital used to finance these tran- 
sactions was  not tied up for so long a period.  Also  the telegraph 
gave better control of  overseas business transactions.  The effect of 
these mechanical improvements on methods of  financing is described 
by  the Statzst as follows: 
Active business  men  want  less floating capital, and  what  has  been  SO 
Set free has, year  after year, ~ressed  upon the markets for  fixed  invest- 
ments, assisting the rise in the latter, and the supply of  long investments 
has by  no  means kept pace  with the demand.s2  -  - 
These  forces marked the decline in the demand lor short-term capi- 
tal and  therefore  the lessened  importance of  commercial  finance. 
On the other hand the domestic demand for long-term capital  for 
financing fixed improvements developed rapidly  in the last half of 
the century as evidenced by  the fact that the volume of new corpor- 
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As a result of the rapid growth of new issues, the volume of  se- 
curities listed on the London Stock Exchange increased, and in 1875 
the amount was  as follows : 
SECURITIES  LISTED  ON  THE  LONDON  STOCK  EXCHANGE,  1875.~ 
(pounds sterling) 
CLASSES OF SECURITIES  I  AMOUNT 
Total. .  . . .  /  4,459,459,128 
Government. .  . .  . .  .  . .  .  .  . .  .  , 
Railway. .  . .  . .  .  . .  . .  , .  . ,  .  .  . 
Bank  (paid up). .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  , 
Other companies (paid up), . 









2 1  7,3373286 
From these figures it is seen that government issues, both domes- 
tic and foreign still dominated the security market, but the propor- 
tion had declined from almost 80 percent in 1843 to 67.95 percent 
in 1875.  Corporate securities increased due particularly to the large 
volume of  railroad securities which now constituted 25.02 percent of 
the total.  Also the total volume of  securities rose from £1,118,831,- 
174 to £4,459,459,128.  The proportion of these total securities to 
national wealth rose from 27 percent to 52  percent.  These figures 
give quantitative evidence of  the increasing importance of  security 
capitalism in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. 
ABUNDANT SUPPLY OF CAPITAL 
Ever since the end of the eighteenth century, London had been 
a city of  refuge for foreign capital seeking to avoid loss and confisca- 
tion  due to political  uncertainties at home.  For a time after the 
close of  the Napoleonic Wars, the amount of such foreign capital in 
London de~lined.'~  However, the revolutionary movement of  1848 
caused widespread fear among European capitalists who transferred 
their funds to England which seemed to stand out as the one safe 
haven in the disturbed world of  the time?=  Throughout the latter 
half of  the nineteenth century the London market continued to at- 
tract large funds from abroad, even though political conditions on 
the Continent  generally  remained  quiet.  Of  the total  securities 
listed on the London Stock Exchange in  1875, as  indicated in the 
preceding table, about ~~,ooo,ooo,ooo  were held abroad.s6 
The  domestic supply of  capital increased rapidly over these years. 
National  wealth  rose  from L4, ~oo,ooo,ooo  in  I 840  to ~g,4oo,ooo,- 
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ooo  in  18go, and national  income  from  £335,ooo,ooo  in  1860 to 
~~69,~~o,ooo  in 1890."  Due to the decrease in commodity prices, 
the increase in real  wealth  and income  was  even  greater.38  The 
burden of  the government debt grew lighter, and the annual interest 
charge absorbed  a  declining  proportion  of  the  national  income. 
The percentage  of debt service to national  income  declined  from 
8.7 percent in 1860 to 3.7 percent in 1890.~~ 
The position of the lower class improved over this period and it 
shared to an increasing extent in the growing wealth of  the nation. 
In 1851 there were  1,300,000 families with  incomes from £150  to 
~1,000,  while in 1881 there were ygo,ooo more.  This represented a 
more rapid rate of increase than that of population over these years!O 
Viscount Goschen in his study, well documented by statistics of the 
time, concluded  that there was  a growth  in the number of  these 
moderate  incomes  greater  in proportion  than  that  of  the  large 
incomes." 
DECLINE  IN  BOND  YIELDS 
For certain periods of  time, particularly between  1883 and 1890 
when  there was  an investment  boom,  the rate  of  investment  ex- 
ceeded the rate of  saving.  However, this condition was exceptional, 
and the rate of saving outstripped and the rate of  investment.  The 
effect of  this excess of  supply over demand for capital was reflected 
in the decline in bond yields.  The yield  on British  government 
bonds dropped from 3.1 1 percent  in 1850 to 2.76  percent in 1900 
and in consequence the price of  these securities rose sharply?2  Not 
only British  government  but also high-grade corporate bonds rose 
in price.  Evidence of  this tendency is seen in the course of  the de- 
benture  stockda of  the leading  British  railway  companies  which, 
being irredeemable and involving only a small element of  risk, re- 
flected directly  the current rate of  interest.  The debenture stock 
of the London Southwestern railroad, a leading system, rose from a 
Price of 93 in 1867 to 120  in 1896.~' 
The disproportion between  the volume of  saving as compared 
with the volume of investment and the decline in the rate of inter- 
est were viewed with concern by  the financial press.  In 1887 the 
observed that: 
 eve^ year the savings in this country are very large, and a considerable 
!?on  of  those savings go into investments in Stock Exchange Securities. 
the amount of  Stock  Exchange  Securities  remained  constant,  it is 
therefore,  that the tendency of  prices  would  be  per  etually up  t  wards.  The money  seeking investment growing larger and  arger every 
year$  while  the investments themselves remained the same, price  must 
go  . . . outside  the United  States there has  not  been  so  rapid  a 
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large proportion of  the new  capital . . . the creation of  securities is not 
excessive ; and certainly it is moderate here at home compared with the 
savings of  the c0unt1-y.~~ 
In the latter part of  the period under review the question was raised: 
"Is it that the savings of  the world are becoming too great for the re- 
quirements of  the world, and that capital is to depreciate so much 
that practically the business of  banking threatens to become unprof- 
itable, and that it will require hundreds of  thousands of  pounds for 
a  private  family  to live  out of  its  investments in even  moderate 
comfort?" 
MODERATE  CONTROL  OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
Throughout this period the economic philosophy of  laissez-faire 
was still so strong that there was only moderate governmental regu- 
lation  of  security  capitalism.  Some effort was  made  to eliminate 
the abuses resulting from the use of  the corporate form of  business 
organization.  In 1867 the disclosure  principle was  broadened  by 
amending the Companies Act to require that a prospectus contain 
a statement of  the dates and the names of  parties to every contract 
into which the promoters had entered with the ~ompany.'~ 
The Stock Exchange had so far operated under the deed of, set- 
tlement issued in 1802.'~  In 1877 a Royal Commission, after study- 
ing security operations recommended  that the Exchange  be incor- 
porated and have the power to license brokers.  The Exchange was 
therefore  given  a legalized monopoly  of  the stock brokerage busi- 
ness.lD This change in the legal basis of  the Exchange was recom- 
mended  by  the Commission  not  because  it desired  closer govern- 
mental regulation of  the Exchange, for the Commission made it clear 
that regulation of  the Exchange should be outside of  the jurisdiction 
of  the government.  The Commission made  a  number  of  recom- 
mendations to check speculative irregularities, but urged that these 
reforms  should  be  instituted  by  the Exchange  itself.  As  the Ex- 
change voluntarily  accepted  most  of  the recommendations,  there 
was  no agitation for governmental  regulation  of  the security  mar- 
ket.  Thus British security capitalism in this period continued to 
operate with little governmental control. 
THE  BARING  CRISIS -  AN  INTERLUDE 
The  suspension in 1890 of  Barings, so closely associated with the 
London  capital  market  since the eighteenth  century, serves  as  a 
striking interlude between the passing of  triumphant British capital- 
ism and the coming of  the crisis at the close of  the nineteenth cen- 
tury.  This episode was an ominous harbinger of  the gloomy events 
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that  were  to  follow.  The immediate  cause of  the  suspension  of 
~~~in~s  was the default of the Argentine government.  The  relation 
between Baring Brothers and Argentina had been close since the sec- 
ond quarter of  the century.  Over this entire period, according to the 
 stor^' or^' Review, "It cannot be said that the Federal  Government 
ever met its foreign debt charges squarely from revenue.  On one pre- 
text or another  the money was  always borrowed." 50  In  1884 the 
debt of  the country was £42,600,000  and by  1891 the combined in- 
ternal and external debt had risen to ~154,500,ooo  or an increase of 
12,000,ooo  in less than seventeen years.  There was, according to 
the Investors' Review : 
no equivalent value of permanent public works to show in return.  The 
Government of  the country condoned  an expenditure far in  excess  of 
their legitimate income.  They have squandered all available assets to 
meet  the continually accruing liabilities.  They drew bills on the future 
until their credit became w~rthless.~~ 
As  early as 1887 the Statist sharply criticized Barings for its mis- 
handling of  Argentine finance, and declared that the prospectus of 
the Province  of  Buenos Aires issued by  Barings was  "without  one 
word of  explanation as to its object, or the slightest reference to the 
indebtedness and resources of the state." 52 
International  economic  conditions  at  the  beginning  of  the 
nineties became unsettled and the difficulties of  the London market 
were  inten~ified.~~  British  security capitalism, now  thoroughly  in- 
ternationalized, suffered  from  these  disturbed  conditions through- 
out the world, and in  1890 Barings was  forced to suspend.54  The 
associates of  the embarrassed house made every effort to extricate it 
from its difficulties.  A so-called "Argentine Committee" was formed 
under the presidency of  Lord Rothschild, and held frequent meet- 
ings at the Bank  of  England.  The operations of  this Committee 
Were  severely critized  by  the editor of  the Investors'  Review,  who 
publicly accused the Committee of  bad  faith  on the ground that: 
in its short-sighted attempt to save the situation so  that the big people 
and  institutions 'caught'  in the Argentine smash  might  unload  on  the 
public, in  actual fact did its best  to  furnish the Argentine people with 
an irresistible argument in favor of  open and complete default. 
He added the comment that: 
Their proposals fittingly crown the edifice of  folly which the loan mongers 
had  built.  Primarily  their  motives  seem  to  have  been  benevolent 
themselves alone, as creditors of  the Baring estate.  They wished, 
?Peaking vulgarly, to  'fake up' an appearance of  solvency for Argentina 
In Order that the balances of unplaced loans held by  the Baring House, 
and by  the maimed houses surrounding it, might be quickly sold.  The 
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already done by  the previous financial operations, but to the loan monger 
the sorrows, losses, and misery of  such are invisible, and therefore to be 
disregarded.66 
The reserves of the Bank of  England fell sharply, and again it was 
forced to borrow from the Bank of  FranceP6 
CONCLUSION 
Aided by  favorable economic, political and social forces, as  in- 
creasing industrial production, expanding foreign trade, relative in- 
ternational peace and a growing population, British security capital- 
ism attained its full development in the latter half of  the nineteenth 
century.  Although the national debt was steadily reduced, the total 
volume of  security investment rose due particularly  to the increas- 
ing amount of  foreign government bonds and railroad issues.  The 
supply of  capital available for the security market was  augmented, 
and there was a continuation of  the popular diffusion of  the holdings 
of  securities.  In general, the system brought economic benefits not 
only to investors, because of  the rise in the price of  their securities 
but to all classes because of  their  participation in the increase  in 
national income and wealth.  The  closing years of  the century, how- 
ever, were marked by the suspension of Barings-which  symbolized 
the end of  the development of  British security capitalism. 
CHAPTER 4 
pRE-WAR  CRISIS  OF  BRITISH  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
JUST  as the Periclean age marked  the height of  Athenian civiliza- 
tion so the Victorian era was  the apogee of  British  security capital- 
ism.  IVhile the last quarter of  the nineteenth  century in general 
witnessed the high tide of  British economic well-being, evidences of 
a decline were apparent even a generation before the Golden Jubilee 
of  Queen  Vict0ria.l  British  agriculture  faced  increasing  foreign 
even in the later part of the developed stage of  security 
capitalism.  The Richmond Commission, appointed to inquire into 
the "depressed condition of  agriculture and the causes to which it is 
owing," reported on the unfavorable results of  "foreign competition 
aggravated by  the increased  cost of  producti~n."~  The output of 
the leading industries as coal, iron and steel as well as general in- 
dustrial production rose  over  these  years.=  However, the rate of 
growth declined after the third quarter of  the nineteenth cent~ry.~ 
In contrast to this slackening rate of  increase in production, other 
nations  as  Germany  and  the  United  States  were  experiencing  a 
rapidly increasing rate.5 
A large part of  the well-being enjoyed by England in the period 
of triumphant security capitalism was based on the flourishing state 
of the export trade.  True, the export trade of  Great Britain rose, 
but that of  other nations increased more rapidly."  As noted before, 
when the industrial revolution spread  to the Continental nations, 
and led  to the industrialization  of  these countries,  their  factories 
supplied their own markets and thus displaced the wares of  British 
manufacturers.  They, however, turned to the colonies and to the 
countries of  South America and of  the Far East which absorbed the 
increased output of  the British factories, and so there had been no 
maladjustment between the supply and demand for British  goods. 
Now, however, the Continental  manufacturing countries and also 
the  United  States unable  to dispose of  the increasing  output of 
their goods at home turned to the South American and Far Eastern 
markets, and so  came in direct competition with  British products. 
On this competition for overseas markets, Engels, the co-worker of 
Marx,  sarcastically commented:  "Even  the  Negroes  of  the 
Congo are now  to be forced  into the civilization  attendant upon 
ManChester calicoes,  Staffordshire  pottery,  and Birmingham  hard- 
ware."7  New markets could no longer be found for the manufac- 
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tured goods of  England, and as a result there was a growing malad- 
justment  between  British  production  and foreign  demand.  The 
keenness  of  competition  was  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  goods 
stamped  "made  in Germany"  were  dumped in the English  home 
market. 
Not only was Great Britain facing a relatively declining foreign 
market but even the home market was  no longer expanding at the 
former rate.  The birth rate in England had reached its maximum 
by 1876.8  The  death rate continued to fall due to the improvement 
in public health, and so  there was  a  net  increase  in population. 
However the decennial rate of  increase tended to decline after the 
decade ending in 1881.  The  purchasing power of  the home market 
was  further restricted  as the proportion of  the unemployed to the 
total employable population rose after 1890.~ 
Leading  British  economists  and statesmen were  fully conscious 
of  the difficulties facing their country.  Inglis Palgrave, in a speech 
as early as 1883, was reported as saying that "the days of  great trade 
profits in England were over, and there was a pause in the progress 
of  several great branches  of  industrial  labor.  The country might 
almost be said to be entering the non-progressive state."1°  Looking 
back  over this period, Lloyd George in 1933 said: "If  we had not 
had a great war, if  we had gone on as we were going, I am sure that 
sooner or later  we  would  have  been  confronted  with  something 
approximately like the present chaos."ll 
These  changing  economic  conditions  influenced  the  trend  of 
British politics.  In 1906 the Conservatives were forced out of  office 
by the Liberals lead by  Asquith and Lloyd George.  The new gov- 
ernment promptly entered upon a program of social legislation in- 
cluding provision  for  an improved  workmen's  compensation, old 
age pensions and unemployment  insurance, and also  increased the 
scope of  popular education.  The  resulting financial burdens were 
resisted  by  the House of  Lords, but its opposition was  overcome. 
Over these years the Labour Party, expressing mainly  trade union 
principles, grew in strength but did not attain political importance. 
GROWING  UNSETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS 
The close  of  the  nineteenth  century was  marked  by  growing 
unsettlement in international politics.  Some of  these disturbances 
were isolated episodes, as the Spanish-American War, the Boer War, 
the Boxer Rebellion and the Russo-Japanese War.  Overshadowing 
all these local conflicts was the growing international tension on the 
Continent which led to the Balkan War and finally to the catastro- 
phe of 1914.  None of these conflicts were caused by the actions of 
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the British bankers.  The Boer War to a large extent was  caused 
by the  economic interests of  the British  in South Africa. 
However,  these  investments  represented  proprietary  interests  held 
by large industrial  capitalists as Cecil Rhodes, who personified the 
revived  imperialism  of the late nineteenth century.12  Rhodes ob- 
tained the active support of an influential section of  the press, par- 
ticularly the Times.  Colonel Younghusband, correspondent of  the 
Times in South Africa, carried messages for Rhodes, while  Flora 
Sllaw, writer on South African affairs for the Times, was confiden- 
tial representative of  Rhodes in London.13 
British bankers made every effort to avoid the war with Germany 
up to the very  day of the opening of hostilities.  It is said that in 
the beginning of August,  1914, a committee of  bankers called  on 
Lloyd George and notified him that "the interests both of  the coun- 
try and of  the world at large demanded that Great Britain should 
stand aside and should not take part"  in the conflict.14  Lord Mor- 
ley, in describing a session at the outbreak of  the War, wrote that 
Lloyd George "informed us that he had been consulting the Gov- 
ernor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of  England, other men of 
light and learning in the city and they were all aghast at the bare 
idea  of  our plunging  into  the European  conflict;  how  it would 
break down the whole system of  credit with London as its center." 
PHILOSOPHIC  CRITICISM  OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The unsatisfactory  trends of  security capitalism over this period 
led to a growing literature of  criticism.  J. A. Hobson was a leading 
critic of  the system, and his study on imperialism was a caustic an- 
alysis of  the effect of  international capital movements on backward 
countries.15  Hobson also led the attack on the institution of  saving 
and developed the theory of  oversaving.16  John M. Robertson criti- 
cized the system of  security capitalism on the ground that : 
much  of  the  saved  claim  to  wealth  passes  to  borrowing  States,  who 
spend it on implements of  slaughter which in a generation grow obsolete 
even at that; and to the mere buying of  foreign land.  But it is further 
notorious  that  of  the annual savings of  claim  to  wealth  an immense 
mass passes away, even on the bankers' books, in respect of  futile under- 
takings for the production of  certain forms of  wealth.l7 
AMALGAhlATION  OF  BANKS 
The movement for banking concentration  made rapid progress 
in the half century before the Great War and as a result the number 
of  joint  stock  banks  declined  while  the  number of  branches  in- 
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75 per cent of  all the deposits in the hands of  the English banks, and 
under these conditions the private banks almost di~appeared.'~ 
Toward the close of  the period before the War there was a rising 
opposition  to the orthodox  theory  of  the function  of  the British 
bank and a growing criticism that the British banks were not fully 
performing their part in the economic system.18  Professor Foxwell 
was  a  particularly severe critic of  the orthodox  theory.  He con- 
tended that "the proper and primary business of  a banking system 
is to finance industry and trade," and held that the British banking 
system was making too great sacrifices on the altar of  liq~idity.~~ 
MALADJUSTMENT  OF  CAPITAL  MARKET 
With the beginning of  the new century the demand for capital, 
especially by the national government, changed markedly in nature. 
The  decline of  the British national debt in progress since the decade 
after the Napoleonic  Wars came to an abrupt end in  1900 when 
England issued several loans to finance the Boer Warmz1  Even after 
the direct  war  expenditures ceased, the government  budget  con- 
tinued to show deficits caused largely by the further preparation for 
war.22 The government was  therefore forced to re-enter the capital 
market.  In the field of local governmental organization, there was 
a trend toward consolidation.  Smaller governmental units were re- 
placed  by  larger  units  through  the  amalgamation  of  towns  into 
county boroughs, and also through the creation of special bodies as 
the Metropolitan Water Board.23 These larger local governmental 
units necessarily expanded their functions, and increased their bor- 
rowings.'  As  a  result  the debt of  the local authorities  rose  from 
£348,135,745  in 1900 to £651,768,729  in 1914.~' 
A third drain on the capital market was the borrowing  of  the 
British colonies.  As  part of  the policy of  empire building, Parlia- 
ment passed  an act  making colonial  bonds  eligible  as  trustee  se- 
curities.  The creation of  this artificial market for the securities of 
the colonies enabled them to borrow on very favorable terms, and 
they  were quick to take full advantage of this opportunity.  This 
step  added  about ~300,000,000  to the volume of  eligible trustee 
sec~rities.~~  There was also an increased demand for capital on the 
part of  domestic industry, particularly  the new  fields as electricity. 
Foreign borrowing in the London market increased at a rapid rate 
due to a number of  factors.  Foreign nations, particularly those on 
the Continent, sought additional funds to carry out social reforms 
and to meet their increased military expenditures.  At the same time 
the supply of  capital available on the Continent was contracting, for 
Germany was reducing the proportion of  its foreign investment and 
even  France,  growing  uneasy  over  disturbed  international condi- 
tions, was  inclined to keep its funds at home.  London, therefore, 
was the only available major international money market willing to 
meet these foreign demands.  AS a result of  this increased domestic 
and foreign demand, the annual volume of  new issues in the London 
market rose enormously.28 
While the rate of  investment  was  increasing sharply,  the rate 
of saving went  forward at a slower pace.  From  1890 to 1913 the 
nominal  amount of  national  wealth  rose  from  ~g,qoo,ooo,ooo  to 
~14,3~0,000,000  and  national  income  from  ~669,000,000 to 
~~~~,ooo,ooo.~~  However  over  these  years commodity  prices  also 
rose, and so the increase in real wealth and real income was smaller. 
In fact Bowley concluded that after 1900 national income measured 
in pounds sterling "barely kept pace with the diminishing value of 
money"  and  that  "real  income  increased  little  faster  than  the 
population."  A check in the rate of  saving apparently took place 
as early as the eighties.  Giffen, an authority on this subject, in his 
address as President of  the Economic Science and Statistics section of 
the British  Association stated that : 
There is much  prima facie evidence to begin with, that the rate of  the 
accumulation of  wealth  and the rate of increase of  material prosperity 
may  not have been so great of  late years, say  during the last ten years, 
as in the twenty or thirty years just  before that.28 
One important reason for the decline in saving was the increased 
absorption of  national income by the government through its heavier 
taxes.  The proportion of its total expenditures to national income 
rose from  12.9 percent  in 1890 to  17.3 percent in 1900.~~  The in- 
crease in government  expenditures was  partly due to the growing 
appropriations for the army and navy.81  The total revenues of the 
national  government  had  always been  below the hundred million 
mark  until  1896, when  they rose  to jSiog,ooo,ooo,  and ultimately 
reaching  £1 88,000,ooo in 19  I 3.82  The local governments also  in- 
creased their demands upon the national  income.  Local  taxation 
for England and Wales increased only slightly hom £53,867,000  in 
l881 to f  57,558,000 in 1891, but by  igoi it mounted to f i i l,gl7,000 
and by  1914 to ~16g,325,000.~~ 
The increasing rate of  investment as compared with that of  sav- 
ing resulted in a maladjustment in the capital market.  After the 
'Urn  of the century large issues of  government securities especially 
for financing the Boer War flooded the market.  These flotations 
were not well received, and the British financial press began to use 
jhe American expression of  "undigested securities." 84  In the years 
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again and again were forced to take over securities which the invest- 
ing public could not absorb.35  This unsatisfactory condition led the 
Statist to declare that : 
The quantity of  new  securities is  so  vast  that  underwriters  and others 
have begun  to call a halt.  It is  true that the resources of  this  country 
in the matter of new  capital  are very  great, but great as they  are, it is 
obvious they have a limit.  Doubtless in another generation the amount 
of  new  capital  that it will be possible to raise in this country  may  be 
twice as great as  the amount at present.  Nevertheless, it is  evident that 
this year we  are face to face with a situation in which the amount which 
the world is demanding is beyond our ability to  supply.^^ 
Evidence of the maladjustment of  the capital market is indicated 
in the rise in the yield of  government bonds from 2.76 in igoo to 
3.39 in 1913, and the consequent fall in price of  these securitie~.~~ 
The  drop in consols was accompanied by a similar fall in highgrade 
corporate  securities.  The debenture stock  of  the London South- 
western railroad  fell from  120 in 1896 to 84 by  1910.~~  Not only 
bonds but also shares declined in price and the average mean price 
of  British  railway  ordinary  (common) shares fell from  154.762  in 
1896 to 107.910 in 1g11.38 
This decline in security prices in turn had serious financial con- 
sequences.  The  private savings banks suffered heavy losses on their 
portfolios and as a  result some were reduced almost  to a  position 
of  in~olvency.'~ Commercial  banks also were hard hit by  this de- 
preciation  of securities.  It was  estimated that  British  bankers  in 
1898 held securities with a market value of  ~250,000,000  and these 
experienced  a  depreciation  of  about  twenty-eight  percent  over  a 
fourteen year period from 1898 to 1  g  12  .41  Individual investors also 
suffered  from the decline in security values.  The English  middle 
class no longer derived an unqualified benefit from security capital- 
ism.  Reviewing this  subject  in  the light of post-war  knowledge, 
John Maynard Keynes commented : 
No one who has  examined typical lists of investments made by  middle 
class investors in  pre-war days  would  lightly maintain  that  in practice 
the investor had proved capable of  looking after himself.42 
GROWTH  OF CORPORATE  MALPRACTICES 
In the  security  market  the  period  was  marked  by  corporate 
frauds.  Most of the old devices to trap the unwary speculator and 
some new practices were extensively employed.  One unsatisfactory 
practice  was  the  inclusion  on the  list  of  directors of  the  names 
of  earls, lords and members of  the nobility  as window  dre~sing.'~ 
Unscrupulous promoters also used the practice of  rushing the public 
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into  for the shares of new companies by adopting the 
today  closed  tomorrow"  subscription  list  system.  Security 
P  rospectuses  frequently overstated the facts relating to new issues."  The British market also suffered from overcapitalized companie~.~" 
commenting on the financial results of the years from 1890 to 1897 
,he official receiver stated :  --- - 
There has  been  lost  to  the  community  and gone into  the  pockets of 
the unworthy no less a sum than £28,159,482  made up of  losses of cred- 
itors  dealing  with  companies,  £7,696,848,  and of  loss  to  the wretched 
or  shareholders £20,462,633.'~ 
The movement to eIiminate these unsound security practices led 
to the appointment of  the Departmental Committee on Joint Stock 
Companies.  Parliament finally passed  the Companies Act of  1900 
which sought to overcome some of  the flagrant abuses of  corporate 
financing.47  Toward the close  of  the period the Stock  Exchange 
itself made efforts to eliminate some of  these evils.  As  a result of 
the investigation of the Marconi stock, the Exchange  undertook  a 
thorough house-cleaning in  1  g 1  3.48 
CONCLUSION 
Thus while England was the first nation to experience the rise 
and development of  security capitalism, it was also the first to face 
the crisis of  the system.  Already in the period before the TVar, there 
were distinct evidences of  relative economic decline in agriculture, 
manufacture and even in foreign trade.  These economic difficulties 
were  reflected  in the  clash  between  the conservative  and liberal 
parties on the issue of social legislation.  Economic philosophy pro- 
duced a literature which was critical of  the institutions of security 
capitalism.  In the field of financial organization the most important 
trend was the amalgamation of  the commercial banks which welded 
them into a few institutions.  These banks departed more and more 
from strictly commercial operations and engaged in security opera- 
tions to a greater extent than in the past.  There was a complete 
reversal in the relation of  the demand for and the supply of capital 
with the increase in the relative demand for capital as compared 
with the supply.  As  a  result,  the price  of  fixed-interest  bearing 
declined, with losses to the individual and institutional 
The  security market witnessed widespread frauds and there 
Was  an extension of  governmental regulation of  corporate practices. 
These  tendencies  were  symptoms of  the growing crisis  of  British 
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CHAPTER 5 
RISE  AND DEVELOPMENT  OF FRENCH  SECURITY 
CAPITA  LISM 
THE  early stage of  security capitalism in France covered  approxi- 
mately  the period  from the close of  the Napoleonic  Wars to the 
middle of  the nineteenth century or from the passing of  the Great 
Napoleon to the coming of  Louis Napoleon.  Early French security 
capitalism rested  primarily on the former's policies as to currency, 
banking, public debt and corporate law.  After  the disastrous ex- 
perience with the assignats, French currency was placed on a sound 
basis in 1803 and remained so despite the costly military operations 
in the years which followed.  The stability of  the currency was in 
a  measure  due to the  operation  of  the  Bank  of  France  which 
Napoleon  I founded in  1800.l  A further reason  for the strength 
of  the currency was  Napoleon's  policy of  having his wars paid  by 
the conquered enemy and not by the French people.  Napoleon was 
definitely opposed to a public debt which he described as "immoral 
and destructive ;  silently undermining the basis of  the State, it de- 
livers the present  generation to the execration of  po~terity."~  As 
a result, by the close of  the Napoleonic Wars, France had a much 
lighter debt and tax burden than England.3 
Another Napoleonic institution which further aided French se- 
curity capitalism  was  the Commercial  Code of  1807 with  its im- 
portant sections concerning corporations.  The code permitted the 
formation of  a "sociktC  anonyme"  or a business corporation under 
a  general  incorporation  law  and also  recognized  the principle  of 
limited liability.'  The Code formed the basis for the corporate law 
of  a number of  Continental countries as they came under the mili- 
tary jurisdiction of the Napoleonic armies. 
UNCERTAINTIES  OF THE  RESTORATION  PERIOD 
It was fortunate that this foundation of  French security capital- 
ism had been firmly built, for it was forced to undergo a severe test 
in the Restoration period.  During the years immediately following 
the close of  the Napoleonic Wars, the position of  French public credit 
was  threatened  by  heavy internal and external  burdens  upon the 
public treasury.  The restored  Bourbons  made  an effort  to reim- 
burse the old nobility for losses sustained during the Revolution and 
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sought to finance this compensation by  increasing the floating debt 
the government.  At the same time the Allies demanded an in- 
demnity  of  700,000,000 francs.  Pending its payment,  France  was 
occupied by  armed forces under the Duke of  Wellington, and for 
their upkeep France was  to pay  an additional  sum of  400,000,000 
francs. 
a result,  French public credit declined, and Metternich was 
said to have expressed his willingness to discount Austria's share of 
the indemnity payment on the basis of  30  per cent of  its face value 
if he could obtain cash.  By the end of  1816 France stopped payment 
on the indemnity  altogether.  Reparations payments  were  finally 
by the flotation of an international loan.5  Thus the new sys- 
tem of security capitalism was used for the first time as a mechanism 
to force the vanquished to buy off  the victors. 
The political  events from the return of  the Bourbons until the 
middle of  the nineteenth century were disturbing and at times had 
an unfavorable effect on the financial system of  France.  Political, 
rather than  economic factors, caused most  of  the French financial 
crises of  this period.  The payment of  the war indemnity led to a 
severe crisis in 1818.~ 
Again the revolution of  1830 was  followed by difficulties while 
the revolution  of  1848 caused a financial panic in Paris and later 
in  the provinces.  The industrial  development  of  France  in the 
second quarter of  the nineteenth century was relatively slow as evi- 
denced by the meager output of  coal and pig iron particularly when 
compared with the output of  England.T 
The philosophic writings of  this period make little mention of 
security capitalism.  Simonde de Sismondi, in presenting his theory 
of crises, in part placed the blame upon the banks since they sup- 
plied funds to speculators.'  The writings of  Saint-Simon exerted a 
considerable influence on some of  the leaders of  the new  security 
Saint-Simon accepted in general the economic order of 
his day, but urged modifications.  His school recognized the growing 
of the banker and advocated the reform of  the economic 
through the agency of  a socialized banking system.O 
GROWTH  OF  FINANCIAL  ORGANIZATION 
The Bank of  France was the dominant institution in the financial 
of  the nation.  It was  founded on sound principles and was 
generally well managed.  The Bank recovered  so  rapidly after the 
wars that it was in a position to assist the Bank of  Eng- 
land in its difficulties in 1825 and in 1839.  The administration of 
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the two hundred largest stockholders who in turn elected a govern- 
ing board of fifteen Regents.  With the passing of  the years mem- 
bership  on  the  Board  of  Regents came  to  be  almost  hereditary. 
Throughout the nineteenth century and until the reorgafiization of 
the Board  in  1936, the great banking families, as  the Rothschilds, 
the Hottingeurs and the Mallets, had almost  continuous member- 
ship.1°  The financial system was  largely in the hands of  this group 
of  private bankers who together constituted what was known as "La 
Haute Banque." l1 
The progress of  incorporated banking was slow in the first half 
of  the nineteenth century.  After the close of  the Napoleonic Wars 
there was  urgent  need  for  the development  of  a banking  system 
which could mobilize capital particularly for financing the railroads. 
To  meet this need new banking institutions were formed.  Unlike 
the British incorporated banks these institutions combined both com- 
mercial and investment operations by  receiving deposits from busi- 
ness  houses  and at  the same  time  dealing  in  railroad  securities. 
Such  operations were  none too  carefully  performed  and most  of 
these banks suspended  payment  in the crisis of  1848.12  Through- 
out the first  quarter of  the  nineteenth  century  the Paris  Bourse 
played an insignificant part in the financial structure of  the nation, 
as is evidenced by  the slow growth in the listing of  securities.  By 
1830 the Bourse listed only thirty ~ecurities.'~ 
SMALL DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF  CAPITAL 
In. the second  quarter of  the century  the  demand  for  capital 
increased  slowly.  The debt of  the national government  over the 
entire period rose only moderately in spite of  an initial increase at 
the time of  the Restoration.14  Corporate security  investment  was 
confined largely to the railroads and developed only after 1840.  The 
French  political  and  scientific leaders  showed  no enthusiasm  for 
the new form of  transporation.  Jn referring to the railroad, Thiers, 
the French statesman, grudgingly said :  "We must give the Parisians 
this as a toy, but it will never carry a passenger or a parcel."16  A 
prominent French scientist opposed the building of  railway tunnels 
on the ground that passengers would be suffocated in going through 
a tunnel even a few  yards  long.lG  It was  not until well  into the 
forties that the railroads  attracted capital on a  large  scale.  Over 
these years France was still a borrower of  foreign capital and not a 
lender, and even as late as  1848 there were only six types of  foreign 
securities traded on the Paris Bourse.17 
The supply of  capital likewise increased slowly over the second 
quarter of  the century.  From  1820 to 1850 the volume of  national 
wealth sllowed almost no change.18  The lack of  capital in relation 
to  the even small demand  is  evidenced  by  the fact  that the yield 
on ~~~~~h  government bonds rose from 18.10 to 1850 at a time when 
the yield on British government bonds was declining.19 
A  of the early stage of security capitalism in England 
and in  France  therefore sho~'s  that  the  latter  made  much  slower 
progress.  By  the middle of the century, England possessed a clearly 
defined banking System and an active capital market with a rapidly 
growing demand  and s~lpply  of capital.  In France  on the other 
hand the banking system except for the central bank was still poorly 
defined, while  both  the  demand  and  supply  of  capital  was  com- 
paratively small. 
DEVELOPMENT  OF FRENCH  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The developed  stage of  French  security capitalism  covered  the 
period from the middle of  the nineteenth  century until the Great 
War.  This span  of  time  included  the Franco-Prussian War and 
the Commune which together served only as a momentary interrup- 
tion in the growth of  the system.  The entire period can therefore 
best  be studied  as  a unit, since the various tendencies over  these 
years  were  c:ontinuous and  were  unchecked  by  the  political  dis- 
turbances of  the early seventies. 
The year  1848 marked a definite milestone in the evolution of 
French  security  capitalism.  The system  had  been  growing  very 
slowly, and the widespread political  and social disturbances in this 
year  threatened its very  existence.  The depreciation  in the value 
of securities on the Paris exchange within less than two months in 
1848 amounted to over q,cjoo,ooo,ooo francs.20 However, after 1848, 
French security capitalism entered upon a period of  rapid develop- 
n~ent. In the second half  of  the century France passed through the 
industrial revolution which quickened the entire life of  the nation." 
POLITICS  AND  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The course of security capitalism in France as in no other coun- 
trY  was  dominated  by  the  political  trend.  From  the coming  of 
Louis Napoleon in 1848 until the outbreak of  the War in 1914, the 
nature of French security capitalism was moulded to meet the needs 
domestic and international political aimi.  In this sense, there- 
lore,  French  security capitalism was  political  in nature, for it was 
extensively employed  as  a  mechanism  to finance  the aims  of  the 
Individuals and the groups which  controlled  the national  govern- 
ment.  Security  capitalism  made  possible  Louis  Napoleon's  vast 
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duct and the payment of  the Franco-Prussian War and maintained 
France's  share of  the armed peace which  finally led to the climax 
of  1914.  Colonial  expansion  in Northern  Africa  and in the Far 
East was financed largely by  means of  loans floated in the home se- 
curity market. 
SECURITY  ACTIVITIES  OF THE  BANK  OF  FRANCE 
Throughout the greater  part of  its history  the Bank of  France 
was under the close control of  the government.  Under Napoleon I 
the Bank became merely "an engine of  the state." 22  The Bank was 
frequently forced to grant liberal advances to the national govern- 
ment, and at the close of  the Franco-Prussian War these loans ex- 
ceeded 1,400,000,000  francs.23 
In the case of England the central bank adopted a passive attitude 
toward security capitalism and made little effort to guide its growth. 
The Bank  of  France,  on the other hand,  took  an active  part in 
aiding the growth of  the new system.  Under an enactment in 1834, 
the Bank gave positive encouragement by granting loans on securities 
directly to  individual^.^^  At  first these loans were  extended  only 
on the obligations of the national and of  the municipal governments, 
but later they were also granted  on the stocks and bonds  of  rail- 
roads.  The Bank  granted  advances of  from 60 to 80 per cent of 
the value of  the pledged  securities.  In the early years the rate on 
these loans was the same as the rate of  discount on  commercial paper, 
but when security borrowings grew excessive in the sixties a higher 
rate was exacted. 
Between  the years  1858 and 1861 the Bank of  France  entered 
upon an adventure in the field of  security capitalism which, to say 
the least, was unusual for a central bank.  In these years there was 
increased  activity in railroad building, and to finance some of  the 
new  railroad companies, the Bank, acting as an investment dealer, 
purchased  and sold a large volume of  railroad bonds.25  These op- 
erations fortunately proved highly successful both to the Bank and 
to the purchasers,  for the bonds experienced a sharp appreciation 
in price.  It is questionable whether the Bank under its statute had 
the legal  power  to engage  in these  financial  operations,  but they 
were probably undertaken  with the full understanding of  the gov- 
ernment which was anxious to further railroad building. 
Toward the end of  the century, the Bank, acting not as dealer 
but as broker, undertook  the execution  of  stock exchange  orders 
for its clients.  Another service which the Bank performed for the 
growing security capitalism was to provide safe-keeping facilities for 
~ecurities.'~ 
After the Bank of France the most important banking institution 
the Credit Foncier which  was  established  in 1852 as a central 
bank."  Throughout its entire history this institution was 
Under strict control of the government  which  named  its directors 
and supervised its financial ~perations.~~  It was  first organized  to 
finance urban real estate, but later the Bank extended its activities 
to ,id  agriculture.  The Bank granted loans not only to individuals 
but also to cities and to departments.  The funds for these under- 
takings came in part from the Bank's own capital, but largely from 
the poceeds derived from the sale of its securities to the investing 
public.  Thus the Bank performed an important service to French 
security capitalism by creating a continuous flow of  sound securities 
to meet the growing volume of  French saving. 
SPECULATIVE  BANKING 
~t was  indeed fortunate that French security capitalism had the 
stabilizing influence of the Bank of  France and of the Credit Foncier, 
for French banking in the third quarter of the century developed 
highly unsatisfactory tendencies.  The financing of  the new under- 
takings of  this period involved a high degree of  risk, and so required 
a large amount of speculative long-term capital.  This need led to 
the development of  speculative banks willing to furnish capital  to 
these  hazardous enterprises.  Furthermore French banking  in this 
period  also  possessed  a  peculiar  non-financial  nature  which  was 
destined  to lead to troubled waters.  In the years of  recovery im- 
mediately following the disturbance of  1848, French banking under 
the influence of the theories of Saint-Simon started on the wierd 
path of  basing its policy upon philosophy.  Saint-Simon deeply im- 
pressed the PerPires brothers who set out to reorganize the financial 
system  on  the basis  of the  former's  philosophy  by  founding the 
SocidtC  Gendrale de Credit Mobilier in 1852.  The Perkires were 
Jews and most of  their associates were of  the same faith.  The  Roths- 
childs took no part in the Credit Mobilier which was really directed 
against them.28 The institution was in effect a gigantic holding com- 
PanY  engaged  in  financing  and  managing  industrial  enterprises. 
The  securities of  the controlled companies were  used  as assets on 
which the CrCdit  Mobilier  issued its own  securities, to be sold to 
the public.  For a number of  years the Bank was highly successful, 
and performed notable service in promoting railroads and public 
The Credit  Mobilier  had  close  relations  with  Louis 
as Emperor.'O  This relationship in one case did not re- 
dound to the welfare of  the Emperor or of  his Empire.  The Em- 
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Nobel for improvitg the manufacture of  explosives.  The Emperor 
therefore recommended  Nobel to the Perkires who granted an ad- 
vance to finance a factory in Swedem31 This very plant thus financed 
by  French bankers was  later destined to bring large profits to  its 
owners in the sale of  explosives to the Germans for killing French 
soldiers in the Franco-Prussian War.32 
The Bank  also extended its activities to foreign  countries.  It 
granted  financial  assistance  to Cavour  in  his  preparation  for  the 
struggle of  Sardinia against Austria.  The Rothschilds had refused 
to extend any funds for this purpose, but the CrCdit Mobilier, at a 
high price for its help, aided the cause of  Cavour.  He commented 
upon this change of  his financial relations by the statement that : "If 
atter divorcing the Rothschilds we marry  Mm.  Pertire I think we 
shall get on very  well together." 33  Due to its hazardous  stock ex- 
change ventures the securities of  the Bank acquired a reputation of 
being "most dangerous papers" and the Bank itself was termed noth- 
ing more  than  a  "gambling  den  where  they  played  with  marked 
cards." 34  The operations of the Bank proved more and more unsuc- 
cessful so that it showed heavy losses  in 1866 and in the following 
year it failed.s5 
The period  immediately after the close of  the Franco-Prussian 
War witnessed  another ambitious attempt  to combine both  non- 
financial  and financial objectives in banking.  In 1878 the Union 
Generale was  founded for the purpose of  attaining certain political 
and religious as well as financial ends.  The institution was  formed 
to support the Royalist cause against the Republic, and also to dis- 
place  the  Jewish  bankers  who  held  an  important  place  in  the 
financial system.  Finance was thus to be liberated from the Jew and 
to be "christianized."  36 
The Bank  organized a group of  business enterprises, and used 
the simple financial device of  applying its funds to purchase its own 
stock and that of  its  controlled  companies.  The consequent  rise 
in the price of  these  securities  then  enabled  the Bank to increase 
the capitalization of  its companies, and the new  funds were  again 
used  to purchase the outstanding securities.  The market  price of 
the Bank's shares rose sharply from  1,000 to  1881 to over 3,000 in 
1882.  Then followed the inevitable collapse and the price of  the 
securities dropped to 450 in three weeks.  The Bank was  then de- 
clared insolvent and the officers were arre~ted.~? 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  CONSERVATIVE  BANKING 
In contrast to these speculative financial enterprises conservative 
banking was  also  developed.  The private  savings  banks  grew  in 
strength, municipal  savings  banks  were  formed  and in  1881  the 
government began  a  national  savings bank known  as the "Caisse 
pJationale d7Esparg"e." 
Even more important was the founding of  the three conservative 
com,eKial-investment  banks,  the  Comptoir  d9Escompte,  the 
s~~~C~C  Generale and the Credit Ly~nnais."~  These banks in time 
developed a  network  of  branches  throughout  France  and  were 
among the leading institutions in the banking systemlo  They com- 
bined both commercial and investment banking operations.  While 
most  of  their  funds were  placed  in commercial  assets,  the banks 
engaged actively  in  security  operations  through  carrying  a  large 
of  securities  and  through  buying  securities  and  selling 
them to the public.  The French investing public, consisting mainly 
of individuals of small means, was  unwilling to trust its own judg- 
ment and came to rely on the large banks for direction in the place- 
ment  of  its savings.  A  leading official of the Credit  Lyonnais  in 
testifying  before  the  National  Monetary  Commission  in  1910 
frankly said : 
By  examining  the balances  of  the  accounts  of  our  customers we  can 
know whether they want to invest or not, and then we  endeavor to have 
stocks and bonds to offer to them as they require.'l 
Thus while  France developed  the system of  direct  investment 
it was  really  controlled  by  the large banking institutions.  These 
incorporated banks  were  formed under the general  incorporation 
law  and  not  under  a  separate  banking  statute  as  in the  United 
States."  The banks were  therefore not closely supervised  by  the 
government  and were  not  even  required  to  publish  detailed  re- 
port~.'~ 
In the  last  quarter  of  the century,  long-term  financing on  a 
conservative basis was developed by the so-called "banques-d'affaires" 
as the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas and the Banque de L'Union 
Parisienne.  The former institution was created in 1872 as a result 
of the merger  of the Banque de Paris and the  Banque des Pays- 
Bas, a Dutch instit~tion.~'  The Bank was formed by a small group 
of powerful industrialists who desired a financial institution of their 
Own  for forming and managing security  syndicate^?^  This institu- 
tion  therefore  did little  business with  the public and its deposits 
were received  mainly  from the big  industrial  corporations which 
had promoted  the Bank.46  The Bank  undertook  the financing of 
railroads, tramways and electrical enterprises."  It therefore invaded 
the field occupied by  La  Haute Banque or the group of private 
bankers active in security flotations since the early stage of French 
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L'Union  Parisienne as  a  permanent  syndicate  of  private  bankers 
to protect themselves.'*  The Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas there- 
fore represented industrial capitalism, and the Banque de L'Union 
Parisienne stood for banking capitalism.  The investment trust, as 
an institution of indirect investment, made little progress in France 
due to the activity of the commercial banks in caring for the invest- 
ment of  the funds of  the small investor~.~o 
IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  BOURSE 
After  the middle of  the century  the Paris security market  ex- 
panded and took  an active part in the economic rehabilitation  of 
France following the Franco-Prussian War and the Commune.  Both 
the Bourse and the Coulisse, the Paris curb exchange, aided in float- 
ing the indemnity loans and supported the government  rentes or 
perpetual  obligations.  In fact,  the security market  was  both  the 
means and the expression of  recovery after  I 87 I.  The succeeding 
months witnessed a wild speculative rise which could be interpreted 
either as a gambling frenzy or as an economic revival  of  a nation 
arising from  the throes of invasion  and of  social disorder.  Leroy 
Beaulieu,  writing  in  1897, when  the  Bourse  was  being  attacked, 
recalled : 
the already remote years  of our convalescence, after the invasion, years 
at once sorrowful and comforting, when with the gloom of  defeat and 
the suffering of  dismemberment, mingled  the joy  of  feeling the revival 
of  France.  Whence came our first  consolation, our first vindication be- 
fore the world?  Whether glorious or not, it originated on the Bourse.50 
In the course of  time, Paris obtained complete supremacy over 
the security  markets  of  the nation.  Lyons  for  a  time developed 
an important security market, particularly  due to  the  activity  of 
the Credit Lyonnais, and even participated occasionally in the flota- 
tion of foreign securities.  There were also small security markets 
in Bordeaux, Toulouse,  Lille and Nante~.~l  However by  the be- 
ginning of the twentieth century  the Paris  market  accounted  for 
most  of  the security  transaction^.^^  French  financial  organization 
was  decidedly monopolistic in nature, and the.security  market was 
dominated by a so-called "money  trust" which, through its control 
of  credit, had the power  to manipulate security prices.  Parker  in 
his study of  the Paris Bourse claimed  that it was  possible for this 
d 4 money  trust"  seriously  to upset  the normal  market, cause  wide- 
spread distrust, and demoralize the whole speculating and investing 
public." 
POLITICAL  NATURE  OF  DEMAND  FOR  CAPITAL 
The political nature of the demand for capital in the period im- 
mediately preceding the Great War may be seen in the statistics on 
the distribution of the securities  listed on the Paris Bourse.  The 
distribution of these Securities by classes is given in Table 4 : 
SECURITIES  LISTED  ON  THE PARIS  BOURSE,  1906.54 
(million francs) 
I  I  I  1 
CLASSES  OF SECURITIES  I  AMOUNT  1 ::  I 
..................  Rentes  .....:.......... 
Credit Fancier.. ......................... 
Paris, departments and c~lonies.~.  .......... 
Railway and navigation companies.. ....... 
Railways and tramways.. ................. 
Electric and industrial companies. ......... 
Insurance companies. .................... 
Banks and credit companies.. ............. 
Foreign securities. ....................... 
Miscellaneous ........................... 
Total.. ... 
This table shows  the essentially political  nature of  French  se- 
curity  capitalism.  The securities  of  the French  government,  the 
Credit Foncier,  as a government  institution,  and the local govern- 
ments together accounted for almost a fourth of  the total listings. 
Foreign  securities, mainly governmental, constituted over one-half 
of  the  total,  and  private  securities  including  those  of  railroads, 
financial institutions and industrial  companies  together  amounted 
to less than one fourth of the total.  It is thus clear that the course 
French  security  investment was  determined  largely by  political 
forces.  Louis  Napoleon,  unlike  his  uncle,  appreciated  the  pos- 
sibilities of the debt-creating  power  of  the government,  and as  a 
result the pressure of  the government on the capital market during 
the  period  of  the Second  Empire  was  heavy.  Later the Franco- 
Pruaian War and the  indemnity  to  Prussia  were  financed  to an 
extent by  public  loans.  The ensuing armament race  with  Ger- 
man~  placed an ever-growing burden on public finance.  Expendi- 
ture for armament rose sharply, and accounted for about one-fourth 
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the huge appropriations in the ordinary budget, the government also 
maintained a special extraordinary account for armament expendi- 
tures financed by  short-term borro~ing.~~  As a result of  increasing 
deficits  in  the budget  the national  debt rose  from  5,426,000,ooo 
francs in 1850 to i2,3  io,ooo,ooo francs in 1870 and to 33,220,000,ooo 
francs  in  lgl~.~~  It was  estimated  that  armament  accounted  for 
two-thirds of  this debt and that only the remaining third went into 
public works.58  Caillaux commented that as an offset for this large 
debt, France had "only minor industrial possessions composed of  a 
rather  poor  state railroad  system  and certain  scattered  sources of 
credit, principally railroad companies." 
FLUCTUATIONS  IN  FOREIGN  INVESTMENT 
As  seen  in  Table 4  the  most  important  demand  for  capital 
throughout the second half of  the nineteenth century came from the 
rapid growth in the volume of  foreign securities.  After the middle 
of  the century France became a lender in the international capital 
market.  In 1865 both the Paris and the Lyons markets participated 
with London in the flotation of an Italian loan.  The Paris market 
joined  with London in the flotation of  a Mexican  loan to aid the 
ill-fated  Maximilian,  and also of  a  Spanish  loan  in collaboration 
with various continental money markets.60 As a result, by the open- 
ing of  the Franco-Prussian War, the volume of  foreign securities held 
by the French was conservatively estimated at 12,000,000,000 francs.61 
These foreign  holdings stood  the  French  in good  stead,  for  they 
were used as a means of  meeting a large part of  the indemnity pay- 
ment to Prussia.  As a result, however, the total arnount of  French 
holdings of  foreign securities was sharply reduced.  The export of 
capital was  soon resumed, and the total amount of  French foreign 
investments  rose  from  15,000,000,000 francs  in  1880  to 40,000,- 
ooo,ooo francs in 1  g 1  2?2 
INCREASE  IN  SUPPLY  OF  CAPITAL 
In the period  from  the Franco-Prussian  War until  the Great 
War,  the volume  of  French  saving increased  rapidly.  The wide 
diffusion  of  French  saving is  indicated  in various statistics on in- 
direct and direct investment.  The number of  depositors in French 
savings banks rose from 56 1,000 in 1849 to 4,32 i ,000 in 1882.  The 
mass of  French people not only invested indirectly in savings insti- 
tutions but also directly in securities.  The extent of  the populariza- 
tion of  security  capitalism in France  is evidenced  by  the number 
of  separate entries of  holders of  national securities on the govern- 
ment books.  There were 291,000 in 1848, over  l,ooo,ooo in 1860, 
3,500,00~  in 1870 and over 4,500,000 in 1903.~'  It would seem that 
the rate of  saving grew more rapidly than the rate of  investment as 
evidenced by  the fact that the yield on government bonds fell from 
5.30 percent in 1850 to 3.00 percent in 1900.~ 
CRITICISM  OF SECURITY CAPITALISM 
=hroughout  the last quarter of  the nineteenth century and the 
early part of the twentieth century, the attacks on security capitalism 
Ivere intense.  The stock exchange, the banks, and foreign  lending 
were all subject to biting criticism.  The attacks on banking security 
capitalism came  from  two  widely  different  sources.  On the one 
hand, the system  was  assailed by  the radical critics who charged  it 
with social disutility.  In the period immediately preceding the War 
the large  banks were  bitterly  scored.  In  1907 Jaurez,  an active 
radical member of  the Chamber and a prominent leader of  revision- 
ist socialism declared that : 
The public credit  establishments  must  recognize  that  they  cannot 
make many  more  mistakes.  Their power  has grown,  they  monopolise 
and centralise in blocks of  milliards, the savings and the spending power 
of this country ;  in the measure that their power has grown, so  also has 
grown  their respon~ibility.~~ 
The policy of  secrecy of  the French banks was assailed in the French 
Chamber of  Deputies where one member  declared:  "We must lift 
the veil which hides all that goes on in these establishments." 66 
On the other side, banking security capitalism  was  attacked by 
the  spokesmen of  industrial  capitalism  who  directed  their  shafts 
particularly against the economic disutility of  the international loans 
of the French banks.  Raymond PoincarC, representing the interest 
of French industrial capitalism, urged a policy of  financial and eco- 
nomic  nationalism  and opposed  the export  of  French  capital.  A 
leading advocate of  this viewpoint was a publicist named Le Tailleur 
who conducted a virulent  campaign  against  foreign loans  particu- 
!:rl~  to Germany.  "It  is  thanks  to French money,"  he declared, 
treacherously surrendered by  our great financial institutions, that 
has been able to this day  to develop her industries, over- 
come her crises, place her loans, and maintain her monstrous arma- 
ments aimed against our country."  Public sentiment lashed out 
against the banker in such statements in the financial press as: 
' -  We are the richest nation of  the earth ;  and if  I, personally, am not 
rich:  lt is  because  there are persons  who  turn  these  riches  off  toward 
f?relgn countries, whereas  a part  of  them  should belong  to me.  The 
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Defense of  French  security capitalism came  from a  well-subsi- 
dised press, for in no other great nation did security journalism fall 
so low as in France.  It was a recognized practice for foreign govern- 
ments borrowing in the French capital market to bribe the French 
press in advance of a new issue.  The Serbian, Argentine, Brazilian 
and  particularly  the  Russian  governments  contributed  generous 
largess to the Parisian new~papers.~~ 
POLITICAL  CONTROL 
Control over security capitalism was  exercised not so much for 
the protection  of  the individual  depositor  or investor  but rather 
in the interest of  the state for purely political purposes.  There was 
therefore  practically  no supervision over  the  domestic  operations 
either of  the commercial banks or the investment banks.  However 
other institutions affected with political  interest were controlled by 
the state.  The Bank  of  France  and the Credit  Foncier  were  of 
course in the hands of the government.  Likewise  the state con- 
trolled  the Paris  Bourse  and its  members  were  governmental  li- 
censees who operated under a government  monopoly.70  In  1880, 
the government  issued  decrees giving the minister of  finance  the 
right to withhold or to grant listing privileges on the Paris Bourse.71 
Successive ministers of  finance made repeated use of  this power par- 
ticularly  to regulate  the volume  of  foreign  loans  in  the  French 
money  market.12  Security transactions were further controlled by 
a  law  of  1907  which  provided  that  announcements of  all  issues, 
sales or introductions of  securities were first to be published in the 
official journal.  Regulation  was  also  extended over the Coulisse. 
In the case of  this institution governmental approval for listing was 
not mandatory, but the government made it clear that such approval 
was highly desirable before securities were listed. 
Denial of  the listing privilege  was  frequently exercised to ban 
foreign securities from the French capital market.  Thus the stock 
of  the United States Steel Corporation was denied listing privilege. 
In 1908 Argentina placed an order for artillery with the Krupp con- 
cern of  Germany instead  of  with  the Schneider works  of  France. 
As  a result, in the following  year,  when  Barings  sought  to place 
an Argentine  loan  in Paris,  its admission  was  prohibited  by  the 
French  government.  The government  also  banned  a  Bulgarian 
loan  in  igog,  because  no orders were  to be  placed  with  French 
rnanufacturer~.~~ 
The capital market was particularly used to win the support of 
Italy and of  Russia.  Throughout the greater part of  the last quar- 
ter of the nineteenth century the relations between France and Italy 
were unfriendly, but by the close of the century a reconciliation was 
attained in a large measure through the financial assistance granted 
by the Paris market to Italy.74  The shortsightedness of  this policy 
of combining international finance and international politics is well 
represented  in the relations between the French money market and 
the Russian government.  In 1906 the Czarist government had been 
weakened by the Japanese TVar, and the liberal elements in Russian 
politics  were  pressing  their  advantage  for  constitutional  reform. 
For a time it seemed as if they would be successful in this objective, 
as the Czar, financially embarrassed, authorized the convening of a 
constitutional assembly in the form of  the Duma.  Here at last was 
hope that the autocratic Russian government would be reformed in 
keeping  with the principles of western  democracy.  However,  the 
French  capital  market granted a loan  to the Russian  government 
without waiting to obtain the consent of  the Duma.  The Czar then 
promptly  dissolved the Duma, since he was  no longer  under the 
necessity of  asking it for financial aid.  A little over a decade later 
another Russian  government repudiated the entire debt owing to 
France. 
CONCLUSION 
During the period  from the middle of the nineteenth century 
until the early years of the twentieth century, French security capi- 
talism passed through the developed stage.  The period comesponds 
roughly to the same stage as for England but there was a difference 
in the rate of  growth  of  the system  in the two countries.  At the 
beginning  of  the  period  British  security  capitalism  had  already 
reached an advanced state, while in France a mere start had been 
made.  However after the middle of  the century France made rapid 
strides  and a  mature  system  was  attained  by  about  the eighties. 
Louis  Napoleon  was  the ~ersonification  of  developed  French  se- 
curity  capitalism  and his  Empire  became  a rococo  facade  of the 
new system.  The financial institutions in each country were differ- 
ent in nature.  The Bank of  England took relatively  little part in 
the development of security capitalism due probably to the fact that 
it had operated before the rise of  the system.  On the other hand, 
'he  Bank of France was  started almost simultaneously with the be- 
ginning of security capitalism in France and grew up with it.  The 
Bank of France therefore took an active part in the development of 
the new  system.  While British  banking acquired a specialized na- 
ture,  French  banking  tended rather  to combine  the functions of 
and investment banking.  British banking was actuated 
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nineteenth century was influenced by non-financial motives as philo- 
sophic theories as well as political and even religious prejudices. 
British and French security capitalism differed  decidedly  in the 
nature of  their respective demand for capital over these years.  On 
the one hand the demand for capital by  the British government de- 
clined from the close of  the Napoleonic Wars until the end of  the 
nineteenth century.  On the other hand the pressure of  the French 
government on its capital market increased after the middle of  the 
century and became  particularly heavy  after  1570.  TVhile  the ex- 
port of  capital was large in the case of  both countries, the foreign 
investments of England were economic in nature and there was an 
almost complete absence of  political  pressure.  On the other hand 
the export of French capital was decidedly political in nature.  The 
regulation of  security capitalism was undertaken in England for the 
purpose of  protecting the individual against  loss, while in the case 
of  France it was exercised to promote the policy of  the state.  The 
system of  security capitalism  in the two  countries,  therefore, had 
different characteristics. 
CHAPTER 6 
RISE AND DEVELOPMENT  OF  GERMAN SECURITY 
CAPITALISM 
UNLIKE  France and England, Germany, in the sense of  Prussia and 
the other German states, continued in the stage of  individual capi- 
talism until the middle of the nineteenth century.  This arrested 
development was  due largely  to the  disturbed political  history  of 
Germany.  Throughout the  greater  part  of  the  seventeenth, the 
eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries the economic develop- 
ment of  Germany was checked by  the succession of  European con- 
flicts from the Thirty Years through the Napoleonic Wars.  At the 
close of  this last struggle Germany was in economic ruin.  The  series 
of  crushing military defeats on German soil and the later War of  the 
Liberation left the country exhausted. 
CONTINUATION OF INDIVIDUAL CAPITALISM 
The years from the close of  the Napoleonic Wars to the disturb- 
ances of  1848 marked  a  period of  peace  which  gave  the German 
people the opportunity for  economic rehabilitation.  Over these years 
the economic system of  Germany was still very simple.  The greater 
part of  the population  was engaged  in agriculture, the h~usehold 
system of  manufacture prevailed, and even textile making continued 
to be  a home  occupation.  The development of  steam  power was 
slow, and as late as 1840 the number of  steam engines within the in- 
dustrial area of the German Zollverein was less than 500 as compared 
with  over  5000 in England by  1810.l  Little railway  construction 
was started before the middle of the century, and until  1855 there 
were only short lines operating between the larger towns. 
Until almost the middle of  the nineteenth century slow progress 
Was  made in developing corporate law in most of  the German states. 
True  the Hanseatic  towns  adopted  the  French  Commercial  Code 
which recognized the principle of  limited liability and permitted the 
issuance of corporate charters under a general company law.  Due 
the need  of  financing the new railroads,  the state of  Prussia  in 
1838 passed a railway company law based on the French Code, and 
in '843  enacted a general law for the formation of  joint  stock com- 
panies.'  However, in most of  the other German states a corporation 
'Ould  be formed only by receiving a special charter from the govern- 
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merit.  This policy had both an unfavorable and a favorable conse- 
quence.  On the one hand, it checked the growth of  corporations 
needed  for the financing  of  railroads  and of  industry,  but at the 
same  time  avoided  the security  speculation  which  brought  such 
heavy losses to both England and France during the first half of  the 
nineteenth century. 
The nearest  approach  to a  central  bank  among  the German 
states was  the Seehandlung or the State Bank  of  Prussia  founded 
by Frederick the Great.  It was little more than an adjunct of  the 
treasury, and its  early operations were  mainly  for the purpose  of 
financing the needs of  the government.  After the close of  the Na- 
poleonic Wars, the Bank increased its private operations by making 
extensive loans to the large  landowner^.^  These operations proved 
unsuccessful, and as a result over the years a deficit was accumulated 
which remained concealed until 1846 when the Bank was forced to 
reorganize. 
The  center of German private banking was the Rhine Valley par- 
ticularly in the cities of  Frankfurt-on-the-Main  and Cologne.  Frank- 
furt, the original home of  the Rothschilds, developed in importance, 
and by the middle of the nineteenth century was one of  the leading 
financial centers of  Western Europe. Even in the eighteenth century 
Cologne possessed a number of important families in the field of 
banking, as the Schaaffhausen family which  later founded the Dis- 
conto  Gesellschaft, one of  Germany's  leading joint  stock  banks.' 
Most  of  these families were originally engaged primarily in trade 
and only incidentally in banking, but by  the early nineteenth cen- 
tury their  banking  operations  became  relatively  more important. 
The surplus funds of the private banks which these families estab- 
lished were later used to finance the early manufacturing and mining 
industries of  the Rhine Valley.  In promoting these industrial un- 
dertakings  the private  bankers  introd,uced the joint-stock  form  of 
business organization, and so they  themselves accelerated the tran- 
sition from individual to security capitalism. 
The Berlin Bourse was organized as far 5ack as 1685, but deal- 
ings were at first in goods and in foreign exchange.  By  the end of 
the eighteenth century a few  securities, as those of  the State Bank 
of  Prussia, were bought and sold, but the security operations of  the 
Bourse were unimportant during this peri~d.~ 
Under the simple economy of  the first half  of  the century, capi- 
tal  accumulation was very small, and capital, therefore, had to be 
obtained from abroad in order to finance any important undertak- 
ing.  Thus the early gas plants of  the German cities were financed 
by British capital. 
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German security capitalism passed  through the early stage from 
18q8  until 1870 and the developed stage from 1870 until 1914.  The 
P  olitical disturbances of 1848 for a time shook the German states,  but after the dramatic events of that year conditions at home again 
became tranquil.  The  War of the Liberation against Napoleon had 
aroused a  strong feeling of nationality  among  the  Germans,  and 
led ultimately to the formation of the German Confederation, and 
the Customs Union laid the basis for  the economic unity of  Germany. 
German industrial  production  was  still  small  over  these years 
when compared with other countries.  Thus in  1860 the industrial 
output of  Germany was  still only half  that of  France.  However, 
moderate  progress was  made  in  some  fields  of  economic  activity. 
Railway construction made headway, and the short lines were gradu- 
ally joined  and extended.  Also the number of  corporations grew 
rapidly over these years.  In the twenty-four year period from 1826 
to  1850 only  102  joint  stock companies  of all classes with  a  total 
capital of  only 638,000,ooo marks were formed in Prussia, while for 
the nineteen-year period  from 1851 to  1870, 295 joint  stock com- 
panies with a capital of 2,405,000,000 marks were formed. 
COMING  OF THE GERMAN  CREDIT BANKS 
As in the case of  France, the period immediately after 1848 wit- 
nessed the formation of  new financial institutions, known in German 
financial literature as credit banks, which were to supply the foun- 
dation of  the banking organization of  the later peri~d.~  The  Schaaff- 
hausen'scher Bankverein was formed in Cologne, the Bank fiir Han- 
del und Industrie in Darmstadt, and the Dresdner Bank in Dresden, 
while the Disconto Gesellschaft and the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft 
were started in Berlin.  In fact, the leading banks, with the excep- 
tion of  the Deutsche Bank, were all founded before 187  1.  Eventually 
these institutions located their main offices in Berlin. 
It is interesting to note the policy  formulated by  one of  these 
early banks,  the Darmstadter  Bank  fiir Handel und Industrie,  in 
determining its relation  to the system of security capitalism.  Ac- 
cording to the first report iaued by  the Bank, it sought on the one 
hand to avoid the evils of  security capitalism by declaring that "it 
is in no way  the task of  the bank to pave the way  for stock-jobbing 
Operations, and to stimulate capitalists to unproductive  gambling 
On  'change.'"  On the other hand, the Bank  aimed to attain for 
itself and for the community the advantages of security capitalism, 
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and extensive  undertakings by  its own  participations,  and by  in- 
vesting outsiders' funds intrusted to its care.'I7  The German banks 
early in their history improved the methods of  investment finance, 
and in 1859 made use of  the syndicate as a method of  distributing 
securities.  The Darmstadter Bank was  the first to employ this de- 
vice, and in its report for 1860 declared that the syndicate was an 
essential device, "since  it diminishes the risk of the individual par- 
ticipants and facilitates the accomplishment of  the common task."8 
These years also  witnessed  a development  of  a  financial  press. 
Frankfurt particularly  became  the leading center for  publications 
on  financial subjects.  In  this city the Aktioniir Was founded in 1854, 
and the Frankfurter Gesclzaftsbericlzt, which later became the Frank- 
furter Zeitung und Handelsblatt, was started in 1856.  In Berlin in 
1855, the Berliner Boersenzeitung, with the supplement of  the Ber- 
liner Boersen Courier, was established.  These publications through- 
out the period  under review functioned as excellent organs of  se- 
curity capitalism. 
The  demand for capital increased over this period.  The  amount 
invested  in the railroads rose  from about a  billion marks at the 
middle  of  the century  to four billion  marks  by  1870.  Also  the 
capital of the joint stock companies increased. 
Thus the third quarter of  the nineteenth  century  marked  the 
rise of  German security capitalism.  While economic progress  was 
slow when compared with other nations, a sound financial organiza- 
tion was established in the form of  well-managed incorporated banks 
which  were destined  to lead  Germany through the period  of  the 
development of  its security capitalism. 
DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN SECURITY  CAPITALISM -  POLITICAL  SETTING 
The domestic and foreign political forces exercised a strong in- 
fluence on the development of security capitalism in Germany. After 
the Franco-Prussian War the unification of  the German people was 
accomplished in the formation of  the German Empire.  Under the 
domination of  Prussia, Germany was now  a powerful state able to 
protect  itself  from foreign  aggression,  and capable of  assuring  its 
people of  peaceful economic growth within its borders.  Although 
provision was made for a legislative  body known as the Reichstag, 
Germany  never  actually  accepted  the  principle  of  parliamentary 
government.  The philosophy  of  eighteenth century mercantilism 
continued to dominate the attitude of  the German state toward eco- 
nomic  activities and was  the underlying reason for  the extensive 
government regulation of  German industry. 
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The overseas expansion of the German Empire was slow at the 
outset  Bismarck was more interested in welding the German Em- 
pire  into a  unit, and at  first cared  little for colonial possessions. 
However  in time, influenced by bankers as Bleichrijder, he yielded 
to the urge for foreign territory, and later Emperor William  I1 ex- 
tended German power into Africa, Asia and the Pacific until it In- 
cluded territory of over a million square miles and of  over fourteen 
million  people.'  Prince von  Biilow  could therefore, with  true na- 
tional pride, just before the outbreak of  the TVar, assert that: 
The German Empire today is  a great world  power, not only by  virtue 
of its industrial and commercial interests, but ot  its power  in  interna- 
tional politics; its power  in the sense that its arm can reach  to the far- 
thest  corners of  the  world  and  that  German  interest  can  be  injured 
nowhere with impunity.1° 
INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION 
The  economic development of  Germany after 1870 was probably 
the most  rapid of  any country in any period of  history until the 
Great War.  The industrial revolution was first experienced in the 
mining and smelting industries.  The  importance of  this movement 
was well attested by Sombart in his observation that: 
In the coal and iron deposits of Germany lies . . . the explanation why 
the  German economic world  turned so  decisively  to industrial  activity 
during the latter half  of  the lagt century, as well  as of  the intensity of 
Germany's  capitalistic  development.ll 
The  output of  coal, pig iron and steel ingots increased at an astound- 
ing rate.lThe  household manufacture of  cotton goods disappeared 
completely by  1870, and thereafter the development of the textile 
industry was remarkable.13  In 1879 at the Berlin  exhibition  the 
Siemens  Company demonstarted the ~ractical  operation of the dy- 
namo, and in 1883 the firm installed the world's  first  electric rail- 
In the early eighties Emil Rathenau began the development 
of the German electrical industry through the formatiori of several 
companies  which  were  destined  to play  an important part  in the 
development of  electrical power not only in Germany but through- 
Out the world. 
In the fourth quarter of  the nineteenth century Germany took 
unquestioned  leadership  in the field  of  chemical  research.  The 
growth of this activity is well illustrated by the rise of the German 
industry.  In 1880 Von  Bayer  produced  synthetic  indigo, and 
this step began the expansion of  the German dye industry.  By  1913 
Germany produced over eighty percent of the xvorld's supply of syn- 
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profits from this industry provided the means for financing the ex- 
periments  of  the  German  chemists  who  now  extended  their  re- 
searches to wider fields, not only to develop the science of  industry 
but also to improve the art of war.15  As a result of  all this activity 
the general industrial production of  Germany rose enormo~sly.~~ 
Manufacturing, consequently  became  more important  than the 
previously dominant agriculture and commerce.  In 187  I  two-thirds 
of  the population  was  engaged in agriculture, while in the period 
before the Great War less than one-third was so occupied. 
Throughout the eighteenth and the first half  of  the nineteenth 
century commerce had presented the most attractive possibilities for 
profit, and the merchants were the most influential class in the eco- 
nomic society of the day.  However, in the latter half  of  the nine- 
teenth century, manufacture offered more opportunities, and in time 
commerce became relatively  less  important.  The leaders  in Ger- 
man economic life, in addition to the bankers, were now the indus- 
trialists as the Krupps and the Thyssens in the iron and steel indus- 
try and the Siemens in the electrical  industry.17  Thus was laid the 
foundation of  industrial capitalism which in the post-war period was 
to wrest control of  the economic and political life of  Germany from 
banking capitalism. 
SATISFACTORY SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
The increase in population was very rapid, and provided a sub- 
stantial home market for the products of  German industry.  At the 
same time the industrialization of  the nation absorbed the increase 
in population.  The opportunities for satisfactory  employment  in 
Germany improved, and as a result German emigration fell off  con- 
siderably.  The decline was  particularly significant when compared 
with the increase in the excess of  births over deaths.18 
There was a difference of  view among German economists as to 
the social distribution of income in Germany in the pre-war period. 
Adolph JVagner was firm in the belief that the increase in national 
wealth and in national income was poorly distributed.  He felt that 
certain  elements  were  "enriching  themselves,"  and criticised  the 
"constantly growing concentration of  income evidenced not only in 
the case  of  some particular rich  persons,  but also by  the constant 
growth  in numbers of  the classes  occupying a  high  and even  the 
highest  place  in  the economic  scale."  l9  In support of  this view, 
Wagner showed that in Prussia at the middle of  the century only 
loo persons were receiving an income of  over ioo,ooo marks, while 
in the same territory by  1907 3,600 persons were receiving such an 
income.20  Confirming this view Gustav Schmoller showed that the 
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number of persons  in Prussia  paying  taxes  on income  exceeding 
three thousand marks rose from 123,284 persons in 1873 to 449,741 
in 1902.~~ 
On the other hand, Riesser  demonstrated that this increase  in 
the number of persons receiving large incomes was due to the rise 
in the number of persons  moving  upward  from the lower to the 
higher tax grades. He further showed that the number of  non-tax- 
payers in proportion to the total population who were moving up 
into the tax paying class was increasing.  The statistics, as presented 
by  Riesser, indicated that the rise in total national income was faster 
than the increase  in population, and that the increase  in total  na- 
tional income was  shared not only by  the wealthy but also by the 
middle  and lower classes.z2 
SUPREMACY OF THE BERLIN  BANKS 
German financial organization now passed through a rapid evo- 
lution.  The Reichsbank, founded in 1871 from the State Bank of 
Prussia, grew  with  the development of  security capitalism.  As  a 
result  the Reichsbank, in the same fashion as the Bank of  France, 
took an active part in the expansion  of  security capitalism.  The 
Reichsbank granted loans on the securities of  the national and mu- 
nicipal  governments, of  the railroads and even  on foreign govern- 
mental and foreign railroad securities guaranteed by their respective 
g~vernments.~~ 
Control of  the banking system passed definitely from the hands 
of  the individual private bankers to the incorporated banks of  Ber- 
lin.  The leading  private  bankers  as  Bleichroders,  Mendelsohns, 
Rothschilds and Warburgs, continued to conduct a large volume of 
business, and the total number of private houses even increased.  But 
relatively they  were  outstripped by  the  "Great  Banks"  of  Berlin 
which, important in the period of  the rise of  German security capi- 
talism, now in the developed stage of  the system, expanded rapidly. 
During the second  half  of the nineteenth  century  German incor- 
porated  banking developed certain marked tendencies, particularly 
with reference to the source of  its funds, the extent of  combination 
both  in the form of  concentration and integration,  its relation  to 
industry and its internationalization.  A  considerable  proportion 
the funds of  the German banks came not from the deposits of 
customers but from the capital subscribed by the proprietors them- 
selves.  In this respect  the German banks differed from the British 
which  derived  the greater part of their funds from the de- 
PO~itors.24 
German banking  experienced  a rapid movement  toward  com- 
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units.  The large banks not only absorbed other institutions, but 
also opened branches throughout the nation.  The most important 
factor bringing about banking concentration  was  the rapid forma- 
tion  of  industrial  cartels.  These large  units  required  enormous 
capital which could only be furnished by powerful banking institu- 
tions.  A  further reason  was  the necessity  for  transferring  capital 
from  places  where  there  was  an excess  to  those  localities  where 
capital was needed.  Such mobilization was especially important in 
Germany where financial resources  were  limited in relation to the 
growing demand of  industry and of  the government. 
Not only did German banking advance the movement for con- 
centration or the grouping of  like banking units, but more impor- 
tant it aggressively undertook combination in the form of  integration 
or the bringing together of  unlike operating units under the same 
management.  The German banks thus engaged in mixed banking 
and differed from the British banks engaged primarily in specialized 
banking.  While the French banks also engaged in mixed banking, 
they emphasized their commercial operations.  The German banks, 
on the other hand, stressed investment operations and were formed 
not so much for receiving deposits and grallting loans but rather for 
supplying the investment requirements of  industry.  The main rea- 
son for the development of  mixed banking was  the lack of  capital 
which forced industry to turn to the banks for assi~tance.~~ 
Investment  operations were  the dominant activity  of  the Ger- 
man banks.  In general, the business of  issuing new securities by the 
German banks was conducted on a conservative basis, as it was their 
policy to emit bonds and stocks only to the actual cash value of  the 
property of  the corporation being financed.2G The Berlin banks de- 
veloped  an extensive  stock  exchange  business,  and the  Deutsche 
Bank at one time had 50 members on the Bourse. 
RELATION OF BANKING TO INDUSTRY 
Unlike  the  British  financial  institutions  the  German  banks 
directed  rather  than  followed  the  industrial  revol~tion.~~  The 
Dresdner Bank proudly stated that its directors were on the boards 
of  nearly 200  corporation^.^^  The extent of  the power of  German 
banks over industry was evidenced in the case of  the Phoenix Steel 
Works.  When it hesitated  to join  the Steel  Cartel the Company 
was forced to enter the combine due to the pressure exerted by the 
Schaaffhausen'scher  Bankverein which held a large financial interest 
in it. 
However, certain powerful industrial interests retained their in- 
dependence.  Thus the Krupps financed their rapid expansion with- 
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out banking assistance, and represented the latent strength of  indus- 
trial security capitalism which in the post-war period was to triumph 
banking security capitalism.2e  German banking therefore de- 
veloped a close  relationship  with  industry  which was described  as 
follows: 
the bank  attends an industrial  undertaking  from its birth  to its death, 
from promotion  to liquidation, they  stand  by  its  side whilst  it passes 
through the  financial processes  of economic life, whether  usual  or un- 
usual,  helping it and at the same time profiting from it.50 
This relationship  between  banking  and industry was  effected 
by the mutual exchange of  directors.  On the one hand the banks 
invited leading industrialists to their boards,  but these representa- 
tives  exercised  little influence  on banking policy.  On the other 
hand, the banks placed  their representatives  on the boards of  the 
illdustrial corporations and exerted an extensive control over man- 
agerial policy.  In several cases provincial banks were dominated by 
industrialists, as the controI of  the Rheinische Bank by August Thys- 
sen, and the Mittelrheinische Bank by  Hugo Stinnes.  Toward the 
close of  the pre-war period the formation of  finance companies by 
the industrialists themselves  tended in a measure to increase their 
independence from the banks.31  These finance companies were or- 
ganized  particularly in the newer industries  as  electric  generation 
and electric traction.  However with such exceptions the German 
banks exercised a controlling influence over industry.  This move- 
ment was characterized by Lenin as "the   as sing of  the old Capital- 
ism  and the coming of the new, the passing  of  the domination  of 
capital  proper  and the  beginning  of  the  domination  of  finance 
capital." 
A further feature of German banking was  the internationaliza- 
tion of its operations.  The  early effort  at overseas financial develop- 
ment was a failure, and brought heavy  financial losses.  These mis- 
adventures were  sharply  criticized  in the  German  financial  press 
which held that the banks "intended to establish silent partnerships 
in the regions  peopled  by  the Riff pirates,  Kaflirs, and Blackfoot 
However, in the closing years of  the century the Ger- 
man banks entered aggressively upon a policy of  overseas expansion 
Particularly  through  the  formation  of  subsidiary  banks  which 
limited their operations exclusively  to foreign  finance.  Thus the 
Disconto  Gesellschaft  established  the  Brasilianische  Bank  fiir 
Deutschland,  whose  head  office  was  in Hamburg with  a  number 
of branches in Brazil. 
BY the opening of  the twentieth  century there were six "great 
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tions.  The principal members of this group were popularly knorvn 
as  the  "D"  banks  from the fact that  the Deutsche,  the  Disconto 
Gesellschaft the Dresdner, and the Darmstadter Banks all bore the 
same initial letter.  In addition to these four, there were two other 
major financial institutions, the Commerz-und-Privat Bank and the 
Berliner Handelsgesellschaft.  Besides these porverful Berlin Banks, 
there were a number of important provincial banks  as the Barmer 
Bankverein.  Most  of  these institutions were founded in the latter 
half of  the nineteenth century, and like the Berlin institutions, pn- 
erally operated branches at home and had extensive correspondent 
relations abroad. 
The social position  of the banker  even  as late as  the reign  of 
William I was not high, as evidenced  by  the fact that few bankers 
were raised to nobility  during the reign  of  the monarch.34  How- 
ever in the reign of William 11,  the social status of  the banker rose 
considerably and many of them were raised to n~bility.~" 
JEWISH  INFLUENCE  IN  GERMAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
Jervish  influence  in  German security capitalism in the pre-war 
period was considerable.  Table ij shows the percentage of  Jervs who 
were managing directors and who were  members of  the board of 
directors to the total in each case in the leading industries of  Ger- 
many at the close of  the pre-war period: 
TABLE  5 
PROPORTION  OF  JEWS  CONTROLLING  GERMAN  INDUSTRIES IN  THE 
PRE-WAR- PERIOD.^' 
(per cent of  total) 
I 
INDUSTRY 
Average.. ...  1  13.3  1  24.4 
Brewing. ......................... 





..  Mining. ......................  :. 
Potash.. .......................... 
Textiles. .......................... 
From this table it is seen that the proportion of  Jews who were 
managing directors in tfie various  industries ranked  from a low  of  ,  percent to a high of  25 percent  and averaged  13  percent.  The 
of Jews who were members of  the board of  directors of 
these  industries ranged  from a  low  of  13 percent  to a high  of 31 
percent and averaged 24 percent.  In view of  the fact that the Jews 
constituted only about one percent of  the total population of Ger- 
many, it is seen that the extent of Jewish control of  German industry 
in the pre-war period was very high.37 Jewish influence in German 
banking was  likewise considerable, and this condition  in the post- 
war period led to a social antipathy which was  to have widespread 
political consequences. 
Stock exchanges were  developed  particularly  in Frankfurt and 
in Berlin.  The Frankfurt exchange was more concerned with gov- 
ernment and railroad obligations, while the Berlin Stock Exchange 
specialized  in  industrial  se~urities.~~  Although  the Frankfurt  ex- 
change continued in importance, the Berlin exchange in time came 












HEAVY  DEMAND  FOR  CAPITAL 
MEMBERS OF 
BOARD  OF 
DIRECTORS 
Throughout the latter half of  the nineteenth and the early twen- 
tieth century the demand for capital by both the governments and 
the large industrial corporations was very heavy.  The Prussian gov- 
ernment borrowed extensively to finance its wars against  Denmark 
and Austria and its debt rose sharply.  The war against France cost 
Prussia relatively little, but the armed peace of  the subsequent years 
imposed a heavy burden on the German Empire.  Expenditures for 
armament rose sharply after  1890 and the proportion  of  such out- 
lays to total ordinary expenditures increased  from  23.4 percent  in 
1890 to over  55.7 percent  in  1913.  As  a result  the national  debt 
mounted rapidI~.~ 
The provincial governments, particularly Bavaria  and Saxony, 
and the municipal governments, especially Bremen and Hamburg, 
Were  almost  continuous borrowers  over these  years.  The annual 
of  these domestic, state and communal loans increased from 
139,0~o,ooo  marks in  1895 to  i,77o,ooo,ooo marks in 1908.'~  This 
increased issue of  municipal securities was  characterized as a "sort 
mania of  greatness," and one German economist added, 
Every mayor  thinks he has  failed to live up to the requirements of  his 
Office if  he does not borrow a million every couple of  years for slaughter- 
houses,  sewer-, the construction or  purchase of  electric plants and  city 
'ailways,  nay, even for paving and schoolhouses, the expenses for which 
Ought  to be  defrayed out of  current revenuesfl '7 2  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
Corporate issues in the German capital market at first consisted 
mainly  of  the securities  of  the railroads.  In time  the  industrial 
companies also entered the capital market, as  the number of  cor- 
porations grew and the cartel movement  expanded.  Indicative  of 
this movement the number of  corporations increased from 2,143 in 
1887 to 5,486 by  1913 and corporate capital rose from 4,876,000,000 
marks to 17,357,000,ooo marksS4* 
As in the case of the other capital-accumulating countries,  Ger- 
many also invested in foreign securities.  The cause of  this export 
of  capital was ascribed to "the steadily diminishing yield of  capital 
investment within our present  economic area."43  It is quite prob- 
able that a large proportion of  foreign securities issued in the Ger- 
man market over these years was not absorbed by domestic investors 
but was finally placed with foreign capitalists.  A large part of  the 
export of  German capital went into proprietary  investment as the 
direct ownership of mines, factories and banks in foreign countries. 
Germany in the eighties floated foreign loans with the same un- 
restrained enthusiasm which characterized the misadventures of  the 
United  States in the period  after  the World Tlt'ar.  Germany  ex- 
tended loans to Greece, Portugal, Serbia, Chile and Brazil, and most 
of  these "exotic  securities" fell in price almost as promptly as they 
were issued.  The issuance of  foreign securities attained its greatest 
prominence in the German capital market in the eighties and there- 
after declined in relative importance.  In the period from  1886 to 
1889 foreign issues in the German market amounted to almost one- 
half  of  the total  issues; by  1905 the proportion  had dropped to a 
little above one-third ; in 1906 it was less than one-tenth and in 1907 
it amounted to only about one-fifteenth of  the total  issues.44  It is 
thus seen that, while  German security  capitalism became  interna- 
tionalized, it was not necessarily a corollary that such international- 
ization had to continue.45 
INCREASING  SUPPLY  OF CAPITAL 
The supply of  German capital in the last quarter of  the nine- 
teenth century and the years  until the War increased rapidly,  as 
evidenced by  the rise in the volume of  saving funds.46 The annual 
saving of  the German  people  in the period  of  developed  security 
capitalism was conservatively estimated at 2,500,000,000 marks.47 It 
is estimated that about one-third of the annual saving was invested 
in  securities.  The total  wealth  of  Germany  was  conservatively 
placed at zm,ooo,ooo,ooo marks,48  and the amount of  securities held 
in Germany at 30,000,000,000 marks.4B Such security holdings there- 
fore represented  about  one-seventh  of  the  total  wea1tha5O 
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Notwithstanding the increase in the supply of  capital, it was fre- 
quently insufficient to meet the pressing drains on the market.  The 
demand for capital from the federal and state governments was  al- 
ways heavy, and when  in addition the demand of  private industry 
and to some extent of foreign borrowing became large, the combined 
burden caused a maladjustment in the German capital market which 
contributed to the periodic financial disturbances.  Thus the over- 
rapid growth of corporations and the overissue of  securities caused 
the panic  in  1873.  Again,  the heavy  flotation  of  securities  in the 
period  from  1897 to  1900 led to the crisis of  1900.  Francis  Hirst 
expressed the opinion that: 
Germany's wealth was  then probably increasing more rapidly than  that 
of France, but  its annual surplus was  mostly  absorbed  by  the require- 
ments of  the Imperial and State governments and of the municipalities 
. . . as well as  by  the demands of  a world wide trade which was  largely 
carried on credit.el 
CRITICISM  OF SECURITY CAPITALISM 
The new  security capitalism  was  subject  to frequent criticism 
in German economic literature.  Jhering commenting on the events 
which led to the crisis of  1873, stated that : "the devastations which 
they [the joint  stock companies] caused among private property are 
worse  than if  fire and drought, failure of  crops,  earthquake, war, 
hostile occupation, had combined to ruin the national pro~perity."~~ 
Ruhland declared : "The word capitalism denotes today a social sys- 
tem in which the liberty to practice usury is more or less completely 
legalized," and capitalists  were described  as  "usurers  in the widest 
sense of  the word." " He further added "that money interests pre- 
dominate and that trade and robbery,  gain,  usury,  and extortion 
merge into each other."  54 
Among  the industrial workers  of  the cities  there was  a  strong 
undercurrent of  radicalism and a latent opposition to security capi- 
talism.  However, the middle class, which placed more and more of 
its saving into securities and derived a satisfactory income and even 
in value from its investments, became ardent support- 
ers of the new system. 
CONTROL OF SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The national government  exerted extensive regulation over se- 
curity capitalism with  particular reference to the capitalization  of 
and the operations of  the stock exchange.55  The cor- 
poration  law of  1884 sought to prevent  the overvaluation of prop- 
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companies to establish a legal reserve fund to which a certain part 
of  annual net  profits and the premiums  on new  stock had  to be 
transferred.  The effect of  this law  was  to  force the companies to 
accumulate considerable reserve funds, and this policy enabled many 
of  them successfully to withstand the crisis of  1900. 
The political strength of the agrarian members of  the Reichstag 
led in 1893 to the appointment of  the Stock Exchange Inquiry Com- 
mission  which  undertook  a comprehensive study of  the stock  ex- 
change  operation^.^^  As  a result of  the report of  this Commission 
the Reichstag passed a sweeping law controlling stock exchange oper- 
ation~.~~  This statute  proved  too  drastic, and was  later amended 
particularly by the law of  1908.  This statute established boards for 
the admission of  new securities to all the German stock exchanges. 
The  membership of these boards included bankers and industrialists. 
It was the hope of the framers of  the act that the boards would pro- 
tect the agricultural and industrial interests of  the nation from the 
increasing domination of the bankers.  The act therefore conferred 
upon the boards extensive powers  to exclude the listing of any se- 
curity which was against the public interest.  However in the end 
the boards apparently came under the control of  the banking inter- 
ests.  In actual practice the boards exercised their powers very nar- 
rowly, for instead of following a broad policy of  controlling security 
capitalism, they limited their activities to mere technical regulation 
as  scrutinizing  prospectuses for fraud or improving  the collateral 
pledged for bond issues.58 
The act also sought to check security speculation and stipulated 
that  mining and industrial  stocks hhd  to be  purchased  on a cash 
basis and could not be carried on the customary monthly settlement 
for such transactions.  The purpose of  this regulation was to elimi- 
nate altogether speculation in these securities.  In order to trade in 
other classes of  securities a person had to sign an "exchange regula- 
tion."  However, very few signed the regulation and speculation still 
continued  by  devices which  circumvented the law  so that  it was 
repealed  in  1908.~~  State  governments  also  passed  laws  regulat- 
ing the security markets within their respective jurisdictions but this 
control was not seriously invoked.  Toward the closing years of  the 
period rigorous control of  the German banks was  urged from vari- 
ous quarters.  In no other country, outside of the United States, was 
there such a demand for government regulation of the banking sys- 
tem.  One proposal was to fix the legal ratio of  capital which banks 
should maintain against savings deposits. German economic thought 
was thus the first to appreciate the necessity for banks to maintain 
solvency by means of  an adequate proportion of  capital to deposits. 
Several of  the expert witnesses  who  appeared before the Banking 
inquiry Commission of 1908 recommended  that the investment of 
bank funds be  placed  under legal regulation.  This proposal  was 
ued  on  the  ground  that  the administration  of  national  saving  u=-, 
not be entrusted to a small group of  persons without legal 
safeguards. 
RELATION  OF  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCE  AND  POLITICS 
As in the case of  France, there was  a close relation between  in- 
ternational  investments and international  politics.  Riesser  stated 
frankly that "international flotations ought to be but the means for 
attaining national ends and must be placed in the service of  national 
labor." 60  A  close relation  existed  between  German banking  and 
the foreign office in the extension of  overseas loans.  Financial  as- 
sistance to Italy and to Russia was  encouraged by  the government 
largely for political reasons. 
In these various n~oves  on the chessboard of  international  poli- 
tics, the German bankers in most cases were the pawns and not the 
kings.  In general  the  German  bankers  like  the  British  bankers 
threw their influence  on the side of  peace.  Particularly was  this 
true in the case of the Bagdad Railroad where the Deutsche Bank 
showed a willingness to yield  to the British  in order to arrive at 
an amicable settlement.  Von Gwinner of  the Deutsche Bank, who 
handled  these  negotiations,  later said:  "if  the question had been 
fully explained to the British public, and they had been made aware 
of the conditions offered by  the Deutsche Bank, their views would 
have been considerably altered."  61 
CONCLUSION 
Until  the middle of  the nineteenth century the German states 
continued in the stage of  individual capitalism, for the institutions 
necessary for security capitalism had not yet been developed. Manu- 
facture was still largely in the domestic stage and railroad construc- 
tion  had  made  little  progress.  The laws of  most  of  the German 
states made no ~rovision  for corporate organization.  The financial 
structure was still of the simplest form, with no central bank, with 
banking in the hands of  private individuals, with the Bourse having 
Only insignificant security dealings, and capital accumulation meagre. 
Thus while England and even France had moved along the path of 
early security capitalism, by the middle of  the century Germany had 
not yet entered this stage. 
The third quarter of  the nineteenth century marked the rise of 
German security capitalism with the increase in industrial produc- 
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quarter of the nineteenth century and the years until the War wit- 
nessed the full development of the system.  The formation of  the 
Imperial government laid the political  basis  for the system.  Ger- 
man security capitalism in this period was  dominated by  the great 
banks  which  exerted control over industry  to an extent  found in 
no other country.  In general the demand for capital to finance the 
rapid expansion of domestic industry was  so  heavy  that there was 
a decline in the relative importance of  exported capital.  Thus de- 
veloped  German security capitalism,  unlike British  and French  se- 
curity  capitalism,  did  not  become  increasingly  internationalized. 
Furthermore,  German  security capitalism, unlike  British  security 
capitalism, operated not under laissez faire but under strict govern- 
mental regulation aimed at both economic and political objectives. 
CHAPTER  7 
RISE AND DEVELOPAIENT  OF EUROPEAN SECURITY 
CAP1  TALZSM 
CONSIDERATION has been  given  to the evolution  in the pre-war pe- 
riod of  security capitalism in England, France and Germany, which 
together with  the United States, were the leading countries of  se- 
curity capitalism.  No attempt will be made to analyze in detail the 
evolution of the system in the remaining countries of  the world, for 
such a study would be largely a repetition of  the above movements. 
Rather, a comparative analysis will be made of  the more important 
general tendencies in the rise and development of  European security 
capitalism as a whole in the prewar peri0d.l 
COMPARATIVE  INTERNATIONAL  PEACE 
In general  the domestic  and international  political  conditions 
throughout  the  World  from  1815  until  1914  were  stable.  Ex- 
cept for the disturbances of  1848 domestic political conditions were 
relatively quiet, and in most of  the nations of  Western Europe par- 
liamentary government, in form if  not in substance, was developed. 
Likewise,  except  for  limited  conflicts,  international  political  rela- 
tions were comparatively peaceful.  The local revolutions and minor 
wars  of  this period were  of small  importance  compared  with  the 
preceding  French  Revolution, and the Napoleonic  Wars  and the 
subsequent Great War and the Russian Revolution of  the twentieth 
century.  The  hundred-year period from 18 15 to 1  g 14 was therefore 
a lull between two periods of major political  upheaval.  This con- 
dition of  comparative peace was  one of  the most  important factors 
making  possible  the  growth  of  the modern  capitalist  system,  for 
political stability in turn brought about economic and financial sta- 
bility. 
There were  however  two  international political  trends which 
were ominous for the future.  In the first place, while the conflicts 
of this  period  were  confined  in their scope, they  tended  to keep 
Europe in a state of  armed peace.  Furthermore, the last quarter of 
the nineteenth  century  witnessed  a  revival  of  colonialism  which 
added  24,600,ooo square kilometers,  or an area  twice  the  size  of 
Europe to the lands already possessed  by  the Great P~wers.~  This 
Scramble for overseas territory inevitably led to international rivalry 
and ill will. 
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ECONOMIC  EXPANSION 
The period  from the middle of  the nineteenth century  to the 
Great War was marked by rapid expansion in world production and 
trade.  Production  throughout  the world  increased  enormously as 
evidenced by the rapid rise in the output of  coal, pig iron and steel, 
and the sharp increase in the monetary value of  the output of  the 
leading basic commoditie~.~  This increase in world production was 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in world trade which rose 
from  Egqi,ooo,ooo  in  1820 to  ~832,000,000  in  1850 and to £3,- 
377,000,ooo in 1890.' 
TVhile the leading countries as England,  France, Germany and 
the United States shared in this economic expansion the respective 
rate varied considerably  as  indicated in Table 6. 
From these  figures it is seen that the United States made the 
most  rapid progress in the output of  coal and pig iron, while Ger- 
many was next, then France and Great Britain last.  In the increase 
in the output of  steel Germany led France, with the United States 
next and Great Britain last.  In the relative growth of  exports, the 
United States was  first, Germany second and Great Britain barely 
exceeded  France.  An  indication  of  the  comparative  technical 
progress of  these four leading countries of  security capitalism is re- 
flected in the number of  patents granted.  From  1840 to 1914 the 
number of  patents granted in England totalled 96,510, in the United 
States 82,287, in Germany 56,204, and in France 42,884.  However 
in England the number of  patents showed a declining trend, while 
in the other countries,  particularly  the United States, there was  a 
sharp rise? 
Throughout the period  there was  a rapid expansion of  world 
population.  From  1820 to  1913 it rose from 732,000,ooo to  1,657- 
ooo,ooo or a  greater  increase  within the century  than in all the 
previous period in human hist0ry.l 
GROWTH  OF  CORPORATE  ORGANIZATION 
Over these  years  the corporate  form  of  business  organization 
was widely accepted, and special charters for joint-stock enterprises 
were replaced by  general incorporation laws which recognized the 
principle  of  limited  liability  of  stockholders.  Throughout  the 
nineteenth century there was a trend toward uniformity in corporate 
law.  In the first half  of  the century the French Commercial  Code 
of  1807 formed the model for the corporate laws of  the Continent. 
In the second half of  the century the British Companies Act of  1862 
initiated a movement for reform of  the corporate law, and resulted 
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in such statutes as the French  Corporation  Law of  1867, and the 
German Law of  1870 which in turn formed the basis for the Hun- 
garian, Swiss and Italian codes8 
The application of  the corporate form of business organization 
made possible the movement for industrial combination, which, by 
creating large issues of  new  stocks and bonds, contributed to the 
growth of  security capitalism.  The extent of  this concentration was 
expressed by  Walter Rathenau in his statement in 1909 that "three 
hundred men, all of  whom know one another, direct the economic 
destiny  of  Europe and choose their successors from  among them- 
selves." 
MARXIAN  INTERPRETATION  OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The most important interpretation of  world security capitalism 
came  from  Karl  Marx  and his  followers.  Marxian  literature  is 
naturally replete with comments on security capitalism.  However, 
this discussion of  the system  is  lacking in agreement,  and so  no 
unified criticism of  the nature and the institutions of  security capital- 
ism can be discerned in Marxian theory.  One important reason  is 
the fact that the Marxists were observing and interpreting the mani- 
festations of  security capitalism in different countries and at different 
times.  Thus Marx himself  and later Kautsky based their observa- 
tions largely on British security capitalism, while Lenin and Hilferd- 
ing supported their comments primarily by noting German security 
capitalism.  As  shown in the previous chapters these two types of 
security  capitalism  differed  in many  respects.  Furthermore Marx 
and the later Marxists were observing the system at different periods. 
Thus Marx was writing at a time when security capitalism in most 
countries was  still in its early stage, while  the later  writers were 
observing a system which had largely attained the developed stage. 
Marx  showed  an  appreciation  of  various  aspects  of  security 
capitalism as the difference between individual and security capital- 
ism, the distinction between industrial and banking capitalism, the 
power  of  banking capitalism and the international  economic  and 
political implications of  the new system.  He distinguished between 
individual capitalism and security capitalism in the statement that: 
With the development of  large-scale industry money-capital, so far as it 
appears on the market, is not represented by  some individual capitalist, 
not by  the owner of  this or that fraction of  the capital on the market, 
but assumes more and more the character of  an organized mass,  which 
is far more directly subject to the control of  the representatives of  social 
capital, the bankers, than actual production is.lo 
While  banking  capitalism  was  not  considered  as  productive,  in- 
dustrial capitalism as employed in commerce and industry was re- 
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garded by  Marx as productive.ll  Marx described the powerful posi- 
tion of the leaders of the new  banking  security capitalism in the 
statement that "the most absolute monarchs became dependent upon 
the Stock Exchange Barons through the national debt system."12 
Marx recognized  the international economic aspect  of  modern 
capitalism  in the statement that: 
the expansion of foreign trade which is  the basis of  the capitalist mode 
of production in its stages pf infancy has become its own product in the 
further progress  of capitalist development  through its innate necessities 
through its need of  an ever expanding market.13 
The political  aspect  of  the  international  expansion  of  modern 
capitalism is reflected in the statement that: 
, . . imperialism is at the same time the most prostitute and the ultimate 
form of the State power  which  nascent  middle  class  society  had  com- 
menced  to  elaborate as  a means  of  its own emancipation from feudal- 
ism." 
Marx  laid  bare the unsatisfactory  technical  results of  security 
capitalism such as overcapitalization and stock market manipulation. 
Overcapitalization  is scored in the statement that : 
Those who say  that there is merely a lack of  means of  payment  . . . are 
fools who  believe  that it is  the duty and power of  banks  to transform 
all  bankrupt  swindlers into  solvent  and solid  capitalists by  means  of 
pieces of  paper.15 
The evils of  stock market manipulation, arising out of  the difficulty 
of evaluating paper claims to wealth, are indicated in the following 
words : 
Since property here exists in the form of shares of  stock, its movements 
and transfer become purely a result of  gambling at the stock exchange, 
where  the little fish  are swallowed by  the sharks and the lambs by  the 
wolves.16 
More  important  were  the sweeping charges  of  Marx  that  the 
System  possessed  inherent weaknesses which  would  inevitably  lead 
to  disasterous economic,  social  and political  results  such  as  crises 
of  increasing  severity,  increasing  misery  of  society  and  eventual 
world  revolution.  The system, he held, contained the seed of its 
0""  destruction, and the commercial crises "by  their periodical re- 
turn put  the  existence  of  the  entire  bourgeois  society  on  trial, 
each time more threateningly.""  Marx expressed his famous "in- 
:yeasing  misery theory"  of the laboring class in the statement that: 
Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time, 
acc~m~lation  of misery, agony of  toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality. 
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increasing  misery  Marx  held  would  be  the disappearance  of  the 
middle class.  Capitalism, according to Marx, was  doomed to end 
in violence  and revolution.  This catastrophic end of  capitalism, 
he believed to be almost at hand. 
These theories of  crises of  increasing severity, a society of  increas- 
ing misery and political revolution were not supported by the actual 
economic, social and political  history of  Western  Europe until the 
Great War.  The crises of  the nineteenth century and of  the years 
until  1914 were not of  increasing severity.  The early stage of  se- 
curity capitalism in England was characterized  by  a speculative ex- 
cess probably  unequalled  in the late history of  security  capitalism 
in  England.  While  speculation  continued  as  a  characteristic  of 
British  security capitalism  in its developed  and also critical stage, 
there is no indication that speculation tended to increase in intensity. 
The Marxian  forecast  of  the increasing  misery  of  society  and 
the disappearance of  the middle class did not materialize in England, 
France,  Germany  or the United  States in the developed  stage  of 
security capitalism.  The welfare of  society improved in the nine- 
teenth century as evidenced by the increase in national wealth and 
national income,  the widening  distribution  of  this income among 
the various social classes, the satisfactory condition of  employment 
in England, Germany  and the United States, notwithstanding the 
rapid increase  in population  in these countries, and the growing 
diffusion of  security holdings and of  savings deposits.  The middle 
class, instead of  disappearing, really increased and shared extensively 
in the material prosperity of  this period. 
With the exception of  the short-lived Paris Commune, the revolu- 
tionary movement in Western Europe in the latter half  of  the nine- 
teenth century was  unimportant, and the world enjoyed a state of 
comparative  international  peace.  Thus the fundamental  error of 
the Marxian view of  capitalism was misjudgment of  the time element 
in the evolution of  capitalism.  In a way  it may be said that Marx 
mistook the sunrise for the sunset. 
VIEWS  OF  LATER  MARXIANS 
This error in the time element was recognized by  later Marxian 
writers.  Engels,  first  believing  with  Marx  that  the  new  system 
would lead to crises of  increasing severity predicted  "a  new  world 
crash of  unheard  of  violence"  or a chronic rotation  of  crises with 
ever shorter and feebler business recovery and ever lengthening de- 
pression.  However, by  1894 when such world crises failed to occur, 
Engels retreated from the theory.lB 
Influenced by the satisfactory economic, social and political trend 
of security capitalism in the closing years of the nineteenth century 
and early years of the twentieth century, the moderate or revisionist 
socialists rejected the catastrophic theories of  the master.  Bernstein 
denied that crises were  of increasing  severity and maintained  that 
4Gsigns  of an economic world-wide crash of  unheard of violence have 
not been established, nor can one describe the improvement of  trade 
in  the  intervals  between  the crises  as  particularly  short-lived."  *O 
Many of the later  Marxists also rejected  the theory  of  impending 
revolution, and felt that international peace could be attained under 
modern capitalism. 
However, other Marxists continued an uncompromising criticism 
of security capitalism.  These revolutionary socialists supported the 
=atastrophic theories of  Marx.  Rosa  Luxemburg was  firm in  the 
belief  that the modern  credit system accentuated  speculation  and 
crises.21  The extreme  Marxists  held  steadfast  to  the  belief  that 
social misery was on the increase and that the system would end in 
world-wide revolution.  The later radical writers went farther than 
Marx in emphasizing the adverse international aspects of  capitalism. 
As  mentioned before, Marx recognized the international nature of 
capitalism,  but did not  foresee the vast  overseas movement  which 
changed the nature of  modern capitalism  in the last quarter of  the 
century.  His failure to note the significance of  this phase of  modern 
capitalism was due to the simple fact that the capitalist system of  his 
day had not yet  acquired pronounced  international  characteristics. 
However, the later Marxists as Rosa Luxemburg writing at a time 
when the Great Powers were aggressively pushing their overseas ex- 
pansion gave full recognition to the so-called "imperialistic"  nature 
of modern capitalism. 
CENTRAI.  BANKING 
During the nineteenth century the leading countries ~erfected 
their financial organization.  In the period  before the Great War 
practically every country under security capitalism formed a central 
bank.  In most cases it was a ~rivate  corporation and its capital came 
from  the  investing  The central  bank  generally  had  a 
monopoly of issuing circulating notes; sought to control the money 
market  by  changes  in its  discount  rate  and aided  the growth  of 
Security capitalism by granting loans collateralled by securities.  Such 
acceptable security collateral ranged from only government obliga- 
tions in some cases to a wide list including even corporate securities 
in other cases. 
In addition to the central note-issuing bank, most of  the nations 
organized a central mortgage bank similar to the French Credit 
Fancier.  These  institutions  possessed  the  same  general  charac- 
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properties, required adequate margin for the safety of  these advances, 
and the mortgage indentures made provision for rapid amortization 
and prompt foreclosure in case of  nonpayment.  The funds for these 
loans came  from the sale of  the obligations of  the banks.  These 
bonds had a high credit standing in the security market, and sold 
on a basis very close to that of  the securities of  the national govern- 
ment itself.2s 
HOUSE  OF  ROTHSCHILD 
Under individual capitalism, the banking system was in the hands 
of  the private houses and they continued in ascendency throughout 
the first half  of  the nineteenth  century.  The most important was 
the house of  Rothschild.  In the eighteenth century it was  only of 
local significance, but in the first half  of  the nineteenth century it 
became the undisputed leader of  the new system of  security capital- 
ism  on the Continent.  While the parent bank was  in Frankfurt, 
the firm  operated  important branches  in London,  Paris,  Vienna, 
and Naples,  and was  thoroughly  international  in character.  The 
Frankfurt house continued  as the headquarters  until  about  1820 
when the Paris office took the leadership.%  The growing financial 
importance of  the Paris house was  in time given social recognition 
when  Louis Philippe,  the personification  of  the rising  French  se- 
curity capitalism, conferred the grand cross of  the Legion of  Honor 
upon James Roths~hild.~~ 
As  indicated in the chapter on British  security  capitalism,  the 
firm  dominated the market for government loans.  So strong was 
its grip on public credit that if  a state were placed on the blackboard, 
or "black list,"  by  Rothschilds, such an act meant the financial em- 
barrassment of  that government.  No finance minister could survive 
the displeasure of  this powerful house.  In general the influence of 
the house of  Rothschild was  in support of  international peace and 
of  constitutional government.16  The  firm refused to finance Sardinia 
in its warlike preparations against Austria.  The firm also threw its 
support in favor of  parliamentary  government, and, as stated by  a 
speaker in the Reichstag in commenting on the Rothschilds, "Capi- 
tal as a rule is constitutional." 27 
For a long time the house refused to take any part in the financ- 
ing of  the railroads.  Even  Nathan  Rothschild,  who  was  later to 
become the railway king of Europe, was at first firm in the opinion 
that  the horse  could  never  be  effectively  supplanted  by  the rail- 
road.18  A number of  years passed  before Nathan  Rothschild came 
to the realization that the railway could serve as a means of  widen- 
ing his  sources of  profit.  By  this time railway  construction had 
made rapid progress in England, and it was too late for the house 
to take an active part in that country.  However, there was still time 
to seize the leadership  in financing railway  building on the Con- 
tinent, and this opportunity was  quickly  grasped  by  Rothschilds. 
~h~ firm advanced credit to the various governments for the financ- 
ing  of the early railroads, and it was said that the Rothschilds and 
not the state owned the railroads.  The  firm in time also participated 
in industrial financing and "scarcely a company that was started in 
Germany but looked to the good will of  Rothschild.  Those in which 
he had no say were not very successful, and little could be made out 
of them." 
GROWTH  OF  INCORPORATED  BANKING 
Throughout the first half of  the nineteenth century the growth 
of incorporated banking was slow on the Continent with the excep- 
tion of Belgium.  The most important financial  institution in the 
history of  Belgium,  and one of  the great banking corporations  of 
world security capitalism, was  the SociCtC Generale pour Favoriser 
le Commerce et L'Industrie.  This institurion had been formed by 
King William V of  Holland for the purpose of  looking after his ex- 
tensive  personal  business  interests.  It maintained  close relations 
with  those  corporations which  it controlled, and so was  the first 
financial institution to initiate the policy of  banker domination of 
industry.  The bank performed  commercial as well  as  investment 
operations, and therefore engaged in mixed  banking before it was 
developed  even  in  Germany.  The Socibte  Generale  thus  held 
a unique place in the history of security capitalism in being the first 
important banking  institution  to be organized  as  a  holding com- 
pany, to engage in banker control of  industry and to perform the 
functions of  mixed banking.  Other large banking institutions were 
founded in Belgium and by  the middle of  the century it was the 
only Continental country to possess adequate banking facilities to 
finance its industrial expansion. 
The first stage in the development of  Continental bankin,  0. out- 
side of France and Belgium  came in the fifties, when  banking  in 
Central Europe fell under the influence of  the Credit Mobilier move- 
ment of France.  Thus the Oestereichische Credit Anstalt fur Han- 
del und Gewerbe  (the Austrian Credit Institute for Commerce and 
Industry) was formed for the purpose of  controlling the entire cor- 
porate  system of  Austria.  While this organization was  similar in 
nature to the Credit Mobilier of  France, the directors of  the Austrian 
bank were careful to point out that there was no business relation 
between  the  two  institutions.  When  the  French  bank  was  en- 
Y?"tering  difficulties, the Austrian bank, in its report, emphasized 
the virtue of  the Austrian daughter''  in contrast with "the French 
mother whose vice was  speculati~n.~'~~  The Austrian  bank  grew RISE  OF EUROPEAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM  87 
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in importance, and in time  became  the  dominant  institution  in 
not only financing the industry of  Austria but even in providing its 
monetary system.  In most countries there was a concentrated bank- 
ing system  composed  of  a small group of  joint  stock banks  each 
having its head office located in the financial center of  the nation 
and operating a system of  branches.81  By  the latter part of  the nine- 
teenth century even  Russia  had developed  joint  stock banks,  and 
by  1914 the banking system of that country consisted of  the Imperial 
State  Bank,  forty-seven joint  stock  commercial  banks  with  743 
brarrches, 8000 savings banks and numerous other financial institu- 
tion~?~  The  incorporated banks of  the Continent generally followed 
the German rather than the British  form.  The Continental banks 
usually  engaged not only  in commercial  but in investment opera- 
tions and so were mixed rather than specialized financial institutions. 
In general, the banking system expanded its operations and its func- 
tion broadened.  Not only did investment credit increase in amount 
in these years, but through efficient mobilization by the banks the 
total  volume  available was  rendered  more  effective.33  Until  the 
last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  wars  were  still  generally 
financed by the great banks of  the nation.  Even the Franco-Prussian 
War was largely financed by  the banks, for during this conflict the 
Prussian government placed most of  its loans with the private banks 
as Rothschilds, and the incorporated banks as the Disconto Gesell- 
schaft.  However, the Franco-Prussian War was  the last great con- 
flict  to be  financed  by  the resources  of  the banking  institutions. 
Thereafter wars were financed by means of  the resources of  the gen- 
eral investing public mobilized  by  the great banks.34 
In every Continental country of  security capitalism, the function 
of  the stock exchange was transformed.  The early operations facili- 
tating the sale of goods and foreign currency became relatively less 
important, as the dealing in stocks and bonds increased in volume 
and the exchanges  became  essentially  security markets.  Most  of 
the Continental countries developed  active stock exchanges, which 
became the mechanism for direct investment in securities.  By  the 
middle of  the century the security markets of  the Continent were 
beginning  to  be  internationalized.  The financial  crisis  of  1857 
clearly demonstrated  the fact that the security markets of  Western 
Europe were tied together for better or for worse. 
THE  ARMAMENT RACE 
The demands for capital throughout  the world  came from the 
growing  needs  of  the  business  enterprises  and from  the  govern- 
ments.  Under the individual capitalism of  the eighteenth and early 
centuries the demand by  the merchant and by the small 
manufacturer was  essentially  for  short-term  or working  capital  to 
P 
for labor and to carry inventory for a limited period of  time 
the goods were sold or converted into finished form.  Under 
security capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth century the de- 
mand by  business enterprise was  essentially for long-term or fixed 
capital particularly for the building of  railway systems and later for 
the expansion of  industrial plants. 
In the eighteenth and early  nineteenth  centuries the demand 
for capital by the governments was light, since their functions were 
limited in range, and their military equipment was relatively simple. 
Jn the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries  governments  needed 
long-term capital in large amounts to finance their broadening social 
responsibilities and increasing military establishments.  The  govern- 
ments required funds to maintain their expanding social disburse- 
ments, and subsidies were granted not only to unemployed  urban 
lvorkers in the form of  doles but to struggling small farmers in the 
form of  bounties.  In some cases, the state took over the operation 
of railways and telegraph systems.  Leon Say well said that "democ- 
racy tends to transfer to the State many functions with which it was 
not formerly burdened."  35 
The industrial revolution not only  improved  the technique of 
peace, but also of  war, and the new weapons for international strife 
were costly.  Until  I 850 the expenditures of  the leading nations for 
armament showed little growth, and the amounts remained relatively 
However, after the middle of  the century the erection  of 
new fortresses and the building of  new warships required more and 
more funds.  The Crimean War marked the beginning of  the race 
for naval supremacy.  The great powers,  particularly England and 
France, had the opportunity to compare their naval  strength, and 
the rivalry among the leading maritime nations now  developed in 
earnest.  Wooden sailing vessels gave way to iron-hulled vessels and 
in time to steel-hulled warships. 
The unfortunate characteristic of  late nineteenth and early twen- 
tieth century  security capitalism  was  this  unsound  nature of  the 
governmental  demand for capital.  The most serious defect in the 
was  the absorption of much  of  the national saving, largely 
the result of  individual thrift and self-denial, by  enormous govem- 
merit  loans which were mainly dissipated in maintaining the ever- 
military establishment of these years.  Most of  the gov- 
ernment financing over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
diverted the flow of  capital into unproductive purposes, particularly 
for the financial settlement of  past wars, the conduct of current wars 
and the preparation of  future wars.8' 88  FINANCE  CAPITALISM  RISE OF EUROPEAN  SECURITY  CAPITALIShi  89 
GROWTH  OF  DEBT 
These social and military expenditures were financed largely by 
borrowing, and as a result the debts of  the nations of  the world in- 
creased enormously after the middle of  the century.g8  The aggre- 
gate of  the national debts of  the leading countries in 1820 was £1,- 
5 15,00o,ooo,  in 1848 it rose to ~3,381,000,000  and by  1900 it reached 
~5,i63,00o,ooo.~~  The trend of  the national debts of  the leading 
nations for the period until the War shows a contraction of  the debt 
of  the United Kingdom and of  the United States, a moderate rise in 
the debt of  the Netherlands and rapid expansion  in the debt of 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia.  It is probable that the 
debt structures of  Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 
and the United States were sound.  On the other hand, most likely 
the debt structures of  Austria, Belgium,  and France were unsound 
and those of  Italy and Russia were critical.&O By  1888 Alfred Ney- 
marck  mourned that "the finances of  Europe are so involved as to 
make one fear lest they should fatally lead on the governments to 
ask whether war, with its terrible eventualities, is not to be preferred 
to the maintenance of  a precarious and costly peace."'l  He added the 
prophetic statement that "all  Europe, with the weight of  military 
expenditures and burden of public debts and taxes crushing it, is 
marching, if  it perseveres in this course,  toward  war, ruin, and a 
veritable industrial and economic revolution."  Even  General von 
Moltke, in a statement to the Reichstag,  declared that in the long 
run, nations would be unable to support military burdens. 
Not  only  national  but provincial  and municipal  governments 
were heavy borrowers in the capital market.  The Continental mu- 
nicipalities, like the national governments, entered extensively upon 
policies of  social relief  and of  public enterprises as gas works, elec- 
trical power  stations and tramways, and for these purposes  had  to 
resort to the capital market.  It was stated that the burden of  munic- 
ipal debts was almost  equal to that of  the national   government^.'^ 
As a result there was a rapid rise in the volume of  new securities, 
in the last quarter of  the nineteenth and the first part of  the twen- 
tieth centuries.  Grouped by  five-year periods the total outstanding 
securities rose  from  40,000,000,000  francs  from  1891  to  1895, to 
6o,ooo,ooo,ooo from  1896 to 1900, to  8~,ooo,ooo,ooo  from  1901 to 
1905 and to 1 14,000,000,000 from 1906 to 19  10."  The  total volume 
of  securities outstanding in the leading countries by  iglo may be 
seen in Table 7. 
From this table it is seen that by  1910 Great  Britain with  24 
percent was the leader of  security capitalism judged from the stand- 
point of  the largest proportion of  the outstanding securities of the 
TOTAL  SECURITIES  OUTSTANDING  IN  LEADING  COUNTRIES,  1910.~ 
(billion francs) 
world.  The United States came next with  22 percent and France 
with  18 percent came  third while  Germany with  15 percent was 
fourth.  These four nations together accounted for four-fifths of  the 
securities of  the world. 
COUNTRY 
Great Britain. .......... 
United States.. ......... 
France. ................  ..............  Germany. 
Russia. ................  ........  Austria-Hungary 
Italy.. ................. 
Japan .................. 
Other Countries. ........ 
Total.. .. 
MALADJUSTMENT  IN THE WORLD  CAPITAL MARKET 
Little information is available on the supply of  capital in the 
Continental countries until the middle of  the century.  It is, how- 
ever, reasonable to suppose that the volume was  small due to the 
simple economy of the time.  Most of  these countries had to import 
capital from England.  However, in the latter half of  the nineteenth 
century saving in Europe rose sharply.  This accumulation of  capital 
in Europe in the latter half  of  the nineteenth century represented 
one of  the most important economic tendencies of  the period.  The 
philosophy of saving dominated almost every class in economic so- 
ciety.  The small income group had not only a comparatively sat- 
isfactory standard of  living, but in addition was able to save a con- 
siderable proportion of  its annual income.  While each individual 
amount may have been relatively  small, the total saving of  the ar- 
tisan, the shop-keeper and the farmer was considerable.  The  capital 
accumulation of  the nouveau riche of  the nineteenth century was 
enormous.  Aside  from the spectacular few  who  squandered their 
fortunes, the majority  of  the wealthy  class  did not  increase  their 
Standard of  living in proportion to the rise in their income, and as 
a result  the capital accumulation of  this group, added to that of 
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years.  Even in backward states as Russia there was accumulation of 
capital.  From  1900 to  1912  the volume  of  Russian  government 
bonds placed at home doubled in amount, and by  the outbreak of 
the War more  than  two-thirds of  Russia's  capital issues were  ab- 
sorbed intern all^.'^ 
In the closing years of  the nineteenth century there was a com- 
plete change in the relation between the demand and the supply of 
capital in the security markets of  the world.  From the close of  the 
Napoleonic  Wars until the last  decade  of  the nineteenth century 
there was generally a surplus of  capital over the demand for it.  One 
auth~rity,'~  Georges De Lavaleyle, estimated that the force of  Euro- 
pean saving available for the capital market was sufficient to absorb 
from four to five billion francs in securities annually and that the 
volume of  new issues until the beginning of  the nineties generally 
fell below this range.  Thus as a result interest rates continued to de- 
cline.  Commenting on this downward trend, an economist of  those 
days declared :  "the question which is forcing itself home upon every 
civilized  people  to-day is,  where openings are to be  found in the 
future for the productive investment of  their saved capital.  Can new 
opening be found for investments?"  The  decline in the rate of  in- 
terest  enabled the governments  to convert  their  old  high  coupon 
issues into new lower coupon issues so that by the early nineties three 
percent was the usual coupon on government obligations.  Thus the 
governments of  the world, despite the fact that their borrowings were 
increasing, were able to raise funds at a lower cost.  However, as a 
result of  the enormous amount of  public and private financing in 
the closing years of  the nineteenth century and the opening years of 
the twentieth century, maladjustment between the force of  invest- 
ment and the force of  saving developed.  The capital markets  of 
Europe before the War suffered from almost a chronic state of  over- 
issue.  The financial press of  this period bears evidence that there 
was full appreciation of  "the excessive use of  credit and the exces- 
sive issue of  new  securities." 48 
The change which occurred in the money markets of  the world 
about the turn of  the century is seen in the following table showing 
the changes in the yield of  the bonds of  leading governments from 
1873 to 1912. 
From these figures it is seen that throughout the seventies bond 
prices gradually began to rise and the yields declined until the period 
from  1896 to 1905, the former date marking the upturn in British 
bond yields and the latter the upturn in Italian yields.60 
CHAE~GES  IN  YIELD  OF BONDS  OF  LEADING  GOVERNMENTS,  187y191~.4~ 
(percent) 
THE COMING OF WAR 
The employment of  the system  of  security capitalism to finance 
the armed peace came to the inevitable end in the summer of  1914. 
The security  markets of  the world  failed completely to anticipate 
the outbreak of  the War.  The significance of  the murder of  the 
Austrian  archduke in the end of  June was  apparently not realized 
by  the financial press.  The London Economist the week after this 
event,  in  commenting on the London  Stock  Exchange,  said  that 
"The further tragedy  in the House of  Hapsburgs  had  no effect." 
The Berlin correspondent  of  the Economist,  in his report of  July 
gth, noted that "the Norway voyage of  the Kaiser marks the begin- 
ning  of  the  dead  season  in  German  politics." 51  Even  the  Paris 
capital market  in the beginning of  July  was  strong.  The French 
government issue placed on July 7th was oversubscribed many times 
mainly by  speculators anticipating a rapid rise.  The issue did actu- 
ally rise in price, and it was  not until the closing days of July that 
Security prices began  to fall sharply.  By  the closing week  of July 
there was a complete collapse of  the security markets in every coun- 
t'~.  On July 25th the rush of  selling orders overwhelmed the Paris 
Bourse  which  with  the  Coulisse  closed  its  doors.52  On the  last 
of July the London  Stock Exchange,  which  had  never  closed 
even  in the darkest days of  the Napoleonic  conflict, was  forced  to 
Suspend operations.  A  few  hours later the New  York  Stock Ex- 
change, which had closed only at the time of the failure  of Jay Cooke, 
also suspended  operations."  Thus, as Janus opened the portals of 
temple security capitalism closed its doors, and the crisis was at 
hand. 
COUNTRY 
~~stria-Hungary..  . . 
England ............ 
France. .  . .  .  .  .  . .  . .  . . 
Germany ........... 
Italy ............... 
Russia. . . .  . . .  . .  . .  . . 
United States.. .  . .  . . 
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CHAPTER 8 
CRISIS OF  BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN SECURITY 
CA  PI TALIShl 
CONSIDERATION  has now been given to the evolution of  security capi- 
talism of  England, France, Germany, and of  Europe in general in 
the pre-war period.  The war years will not be studied in themselves 
since they constitute an abnormal period, but the effects of  the War 
as reflected in the after years will be analyzed.  The post-war crisis 
in the security capitalism of  England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia 
and Japan and the world will be studied. 
POST-WAR  CRISIS OF BRITISH SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The most  important factor in British  domestic  politics  in the 
post-war era was the rise of  the Labour party, since it was to fur- 
nish  the  most  concerted  opposition  to  British  security  capital- 
ism.  In the pre-war period  the membership of  the Labour party 
was confined mainly to trade unionists but in the post-war period it 
broadened its appeal and gained wider social support.  In 1924 the 
Labour party obtained control of  the government, but in the follow- 
ing year  was  overthrown by  the combined votes of  the Conserva- 
tives and the Liberals.  In 1929 the Laborites again took over the 
ministry.  With the advent of  the depression however, their difficul- 
ties were intensified,  and they met with  opposition  in attempts to 
obtain financial assistance in foreign security markets, particularly 
New York and Paris.  In 1931 the Labour Government was  again 
overthrown by  the combined opposition of  Conservatives, Liberals 
and even some Laborites who formed a national g0vernment.l  In 
the elections of  1935 the national  government was  continued  in 
power. 
The economic  tendencies  in  England  in  the post-war  period 
were unsatisfactory.  The demand for coal was  lessened by the de- 
velopment of  new sources of  energy as oil and hydro-electric power. 
As a result, the output of  coal continued at a level below that of  the 
pre-war period.  The output of  pig iron, steel ingots and of indus- 
try  in general  moved  un~ertainly.~  The industrial  expansion  of 
England in progress from the close of  the Napoleonic Wars had con- 
tinued until the third quarter of  the nineteenth century when the 
rate of  increase has been retarded.  It was now definitely checked in 
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the post-war period, and many fields of  economic activity registered 
actual declines. 
In the closing years of  the pre-war  period,  England had  been 
facing increased trade rivalry from Germany and the United States 
in  foreign markets.  In the post-war period  England encountered 
additional competition from France, Italy and Japan, while some of 
the backward  countries  as  China,  India,  Russia  and even  South 
America, once extensive markets for British  goods, now  began  to 
supply their own needs.  In consequence, foreign trade, so essential 
to the very  existence of England's  economic  life,  dropped  almost 
continuously throughout the post-war period.  As a result of  these 
unfavorable economic conditions there was  a sharp increase in un- 
employment and throughout the post-war period  it remained at a 
high level without precedent in British industrial histox-y.8 
CHANGFS  IN  FINANCIAL  ORGANIZATION 
In the post-war period there were marked changes in the British 
financial organization particularly in reference to the Bank of  Eng- 
land and the joint-stock banks.  One of  the most important tenden- 
cies was  the change in the relation between  the government  and 
the Bank of  England.  Throughout the pre-war period the Bank had 
been able to maintain its traditional  policy of  independence from 
governmental control.  However, the difficulties of  the Exchequer 
in the war and post-war periods  necessitated  a closer  relation  be- 
tween  the Bank and the Trea~ury.~  This tendency was evidenced 
by  the fact that the directors of  the Bank in the post-war period in- 
cluded not only representatives of  the business  interests, but also 
former government officials. 
The Bank had been none too successful in coping with the prob- 
lems arising out of  security capitalism  in the nineteenth century. 
After the Baring crisis, particularly in the years before the outbreak 
of the World War, the Bank had to seek help from the Bank  of 
France.  In the post-war period its dependence on traditional meth- 
ods of control proved ineffective in meeting the difficult conditions 
of these years as seen in the uncertain monetary policy of England. 
During the War the gold  standard had  been  abandoned but was 
restored in 1925.  However, with the deepening of  the depression 
the gold standard was again abandoned in  1931 and replaced by  a 
of  managed currency.  Thus the effort of  the Bank to restore 
One  of the fundamental institutions of  pre-war security capitalism 
failed. 
The movement  for  bank  amalgamation  made  rapid  headway. 
Before the War the large banks absorbed small institutions, but in 94  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
the war years the large joint  stock banks  in several cases absorbed 
each other. This movement for bank amalgamation aroused concern 
over the possibility of a money trust, and the subject was considered 
by a Treasury Committee on Bank Amalgamations.  The Committee 
reported  "that  the  possible  dangers  resulting  from  further  large 
amalgamations  are  material  enough  to  outweigh  the  arguments 
against  Government interference,  and that,  in view  of  the excep- 
tional  extent  to which  the  interests of  the whole  community  de- 
pend on banking arrangements, some measure of  Government con- 
trol  is  essential." s  A  bill  was  accordingly  drafted,  but was  later 
withdrawn when the banks and the Treasury came to an agreement 
that there would be no further amalgamations by the former without 
the consent of  the latter. 
Notwithstanding  the movement  for  concentration the relation 
between the  British  banks  and industry was  not  close.  Industry 
was not dependent upon the banks for capital due to the large supply 
obtainable from  direct  investors  who  generally  selected  securities 
on their own judgment and not upon the advice of  the banks.  As 
a result, although British  industry obtained its short-term credit fa- 
cilities from the commercial  banks,  the latter exercised practically 
no control over industrial management.  This absence of  close rela- 
tion between banking and industry was criticised not only by busi- 
ness  leaders but was deplored even by  the MacMillan Committee, 
which  included prominent  bankers.  The Committee declared: 
We believe that in any  community which  wishes  to keep in the van  of 
progress the financial and industrial worlds should be  closely integrated 
through. appropriate organizations.  In the last few  exceedingly difficult 
years  it would have been  of  high value  if  the leaders, for instance, of 
the steel or ship-building or other industries had  been  working in the 
closest  cooperation with  powerful financial and banking institutions in 
the City with a view  to their reconstruction on a profitable basis.s 
Even in the pre-war period the British banking system, theoreti- 
cally regarded as pure commercial banking, had broadened its func- 
tion.  In the post-war period this tendency continued in even greater 
force.  There was  an increase  in  the proportion  of  fixed or time 
deposits  and a consequent  relative  decline  in current  or demand 
deposits.'  In the post-war period the proportion of  total securities 
to total assets of  the British banks rose sharply from 15.3 percent in 
1925 to 27.2  percent in 1934.~  This increase was  due largely to the 
rise in the volume of  government securities held by the banks.O  The 
liquidity of  the British banks was high as shown by  the satisfactory 
proportion  of reserve assets to total deposits which rose from 31.8 
percent  in  1925 to 44.2  percent  in  1954.  On the other hand the 
solvency of  the British  banks,  or the adequacy  of  their capital  to 
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meet losses on their assets, was  unsatisfactory.  The proportion  of 
net capital to total assets was at a low level of  5.3 percent in 1925 
and declined further to 4 percent in ig34.11  The proportion of  net 
capital to total securities dropped from 34.7 percent in 1925 to  14.6 
percent  in  ig34.12  A  further indication of  the inadequacy of  the 
capital of  the British banks is seen in the low level of  net capital to 
total deposits which declined from 6.1 percent  in  1925 to 4.5  per- 
cent in 1934.1S  As in the case of  American banks, the British banks 
also made the error of  tying up an increasing proportion  of  their 
capital in buildings and other fixed assets.14 









Over  this period the capital  market was  forced  to meet heavy 
demands of both governments and corporations.  One of  the most 
pressing problems of  British  security capitalism in the post-war pe- 
riod was the burden of the national debt.  In the decade following 
the War  the national  government made  an effort to  contract  its 
debt, and the total was somewhat reduced.  However,  during the 
depression it rose again, exceeding even the high level as at the end 
of the war period.15  The  seriousness of  the burden of  this national 
debt was due essentially to the fact that, created mainly as a result 
of war finance, it was a dead-weight debt in the sense of being un- 
Productive and not providing the means of  its repayment.16  Unques- 
tionably the payment of  the service on this debt constituted a heavy 
burden upon the taxpayers as evidenced by the fact that the propor- 
tion of the debt service to total expenditures of  the national govern- 
ment rose from  13.2  percent in 1913 to 42.8  percent in 1930.'~ 
While the debt of  the national government at least did not in- 
crease over the entire post-war period, the debt of  the local authori- 
ties in England and Wales rose from f  657,000,000 in i g~ i  to f  i ; 
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Opinion was divided on the extent to which this increasing local 
debt was  unproductive.  Lord Bradbury contended that the local 
debt  was  in the nature of  a  dead weight.  The majority  of  the 
Economy  Committee also  expressed  "grave  concern"  over  the in- 
crease in local indebtedness, while the minority of  the Committee 
pointed  to  the  "increased  value  of  the assets possessed  by  local 
authorities as a result of  that expenditure."le 
The demand for capital by  private industry in the post-war pe- 
riod was  heavy.  There was  a  rapid growth  in  the formation  of 
new companies.  This movement reached a high level in 1928 when 
the number of  new companies totaled 9,012 with a nominal capital 
of  £220,506,126.  In the previous sixty years these figures were ex- 
ceeded only in 1899, in 1919 and in 1920.~~ 
The nature of  this governmental and corporate financing was in 
part reflected in the distribution of  the securities listed on the Lon- 
don Stock Exchange as seen in Table lo showing the listings  for 
1933.  From this table it is seen that corporate securities constituted 
56.78 percent of  the total, while the issues of  the national govern- 
ment accounted for the bulk of  the public securities. 
The trend of the supply of  capital  in the post-war period was 
SECURITIES  LISTED  ON  THE LONDON  STOCK  EXCHANGE,  1933.~~ 
(million pounds) 
The nominal  amount  of  national  income  moved 
downward from ~2,462,000,000  in 192 1 to ~2,qoi,ooo,ooo  in 1924, 
then slightly upward to ~2,531,000,000  in 1929 and to £2,725,000,- 
ooo in  1931 and the nominal amount of  saving funds over these 
years rose from a low of  f  ~5~,000,000  in 192 1 to a high of  £537,000,- 
ooo in 1934.~~  While the nominal amount of  national income and 
of savings funds was thus higher than in the pre-war year of  191  3, 
the real  amount compared  unfavorably in view  of  the fall  in the 
value of  the sterling.23  The unsatisfactory trend of  individual sav- 
ing is further evidenced  by  the fact that from  1923 to 1927 with- 
drawals exceeded receipts at the post office savings banks.  The trus- 
tee savings banks showed a  decrease in deposits, offset in part  by 
an increase in the amount of government securities held for deposi- 
tor~.~~  In  general  over  the  post-war years,  the  annual  increase 
in the deposits of  the savings banks was only equal to the interest 
earned on existing deposits.25 AS in other countries, corporate sav- 
ing became an increasingly  important part of  national saving.  It 
was estimated in 1924 that about 40 percent of  the new accumulation 
of capital was in the form of  profits retained by  corporations and 
private businesses.% 
The unsatisfactory trend in the volume of  saving was due to the 
operation of  several factors.  In the first place the heavy  expendi- 
tures of  the national and local governments absorbed a larger pro- 
portion  of  national  income  than  in  the  pre-war  period.  The 
proportion  of  the expenditures  of  the  national  government  to 
national  income  alone  rose  from  19.9  percent  in  1913  to 32.3 
percent in 1931.27 In addition the expenditures of  the local govern- 
ments  in England and Wales rose  from ~168,000,000  in 19 10  to 
f  566,000,000 in  ig3i.28  A  further cause of  the decline in saving 
was the #unsatisfactory  state of employment in the post-war years, and 
the resulting  low level  of  wages  which  allowed  little margin  for 
saving.  As  a result of  these forces the proportion  of  saving funds 
to  national income, which  was  26.9  percent in  1913, fell  to  12.9 
Percent in 1920 and was never higher than 16.9 percent until 1930.~~ 
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FINANCIAL RESULTS  OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The financial results of  British security capitalism in the post-war 
Period were unsatisfactory.  Because of the heavy demand for capital 
and the unfavorable trend in supply, the London  capital  market 
Suffered from  the overissue of  securities.  One commentator  de- 
clared : "The company promoters and the issuing houses float just as 
...  many  issues as  they  think the investing public  will  stomach 
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the needs  of  industry  but the needs  of  financial  salesmanship." 30 
British security capitalism continued to follow the direct rather than 
the indirect method of investment.  In 1932 the total security hold- 
ings of the financial  institutions of  indirect investments as  the in- 
vestment trusts, the life insurance companies and the building and 
loan  associations,  together  amounted  to  only  ~i,~oo,ooo,ooo.  As 
pointed out before  the official  list of  the London Stock Exchange 
alone included securities with a nominal value of  £1 8,37  1  ,OOO,OOO.~~ 
As a result  British securities were widely diffused among investors. 
A study made by  the Economist  showed that ~i~n,ooo,ooo  of  com- 
mon and preferred stock of  some 18 companies was  held  by  more 
than  500,000 individual  shareholders, each  having  an average  of 
£300.~~  In the period following the crash of  1929, the diffusion of 
corporate investments  continued, and the interests dominating the 
corporations  employed  the same practices  as were  applied  in  the 
United States in order to retain control.  Non-voting stock was sold 
to the public and shares with disproportionate voting power  were 
issued to the inside interests.33 In the case of  48 issues, the investing 
public contributed 93 percent of  the cash but obtained less than 22 
percent of  the equity and would have received only 2 1 percent of  the 
prospective  profits.34 
As in other countries, the decline of  security prices in the autumn 
of 1929 affected  all classes of  issues but the securities of  the old cor- 
porations depreciated less than those of  the new corporations.  The 
former group lost but about one-fifth of  their value in the decline 
from the peak of  prices in the fall of  1929 to the end of  that year, 
while the latter group experienced a depreciation of  from 65 to 80 
percent.35  Losses  were  particularly  heavy  in the  field of  foreign 
investments.  The default on the principal amounted to nearly 40 
percent of  the total of  foreign   investment^.^^ 
The market price of  British  government bonds was  satisfactory 
during the post-war period.  I11  1927 the yield was 4.56 percent and 
in 193  1 when the government abandoned the gold standard the yield 
was maintained at 4.53 percent.  However, as a result of  the cheap 
money policy the price of  government bonds rose and the average 
yield in 1935 was down to a 2.91 basis.s7 
CRITICISM  OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The various financial  institutions of  British security capitalism 
were bitterly scored in the post-war period.  The Bank of  England 
was  accused  of sacrificing  national  for  international  financial  in- 
terests.  The  joint-stock banks also were charged with favoring inter- 
national business rather than domestic enterprise, with favoring the 
BRITISH,  FRENCH  AND GERMAN  CRISIS  gg 
security speculator rather than the industrialist and the large busi- 
ness man rather than the small business man.s8  Dr. T. E. Gregory 
stated that "the banker is unpopular, not merely in Labour circles, 
but among the business community also, admits to-day of  no dispute. 
In its way  it is one of the most significant of  the differences between 
1914 and 1927, and deserves the closest attention."  3D 
The joint-stock  banks,  because of  their  prominence,  bore  the 
brunt of  the public opposition.  The short-comings of the invest- 
ment houses in failing to finance domestic industry were laid at the 
door of  the joint-stock  banks.'O  Lloyd  George criticised  the large 
banks in the statement that: 
The City  is  the stronghold of  reaction.  All  the  time when  I was 
Chancellor of  the Exchequer up to  1914, I had to fight the City. . . No 
Government  will  ever  get  a big  programme  through  unless  it  is  pre- 
pared  to  face  up  to  the  reactionary  money  interests  in  the  City  of 
London:" 
The MacMillan  Report  gave  a  tempered  defense of  the joint 
stock banks in the statement that : 
We  have  in  this  country  a great  financial  and  banking  organization 
with great experience and great traditions.  It is  through and with that 
organization  that we  have to work, for they  alone are the repositories 
of  the skill and knowledge and they  alone possess  the equipment neces- 
sary  for  the  management  of  our  financial affairs.  Their  views  and 
opinions, however they may  fail to commend themselves  to  enthusiastic 
reformers,  are factors  to  be  reckoned  with  just  as  much  as  the views 
and  opinions of  trade unions have  to  be  reckoned with  on  questions 
of wages  and working conditions.42 
There was  considerable  body  of  opinion  which  held  that the 
Trustee Act was in error in limiting the authorized investments to 
fixed-interest securities with the two nominal exceptions of  the stock 
of the Bank  of England  and the Bank  of  Ireland.  This limited 
range  was  criticised on the ground  that  "no  legislature  can  now 
retain  the  impression  that  fixed-interest  stocks,  however  eminent 
their status, confer immunity from disturbing fluctuations in capital 
values, in sympathy with changes in general interest rates."43  The 
eligible list excluded such important securities as the prior charges 
of gas companies, electrical companies, port and harbor authorities, 
and  of  course  industrial  corporations.  In  1928 a  committee was 
appointed by the Lord Chancellor to review the subject of  trustee 
Securities.  The committee, however, approached the subject from 
a purely legalistic viewpoint and refused to recommend any drastic 
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The national government exercised a moderate control over the 
supply of  capital through such agencies as the National Debt Com- 
mission and the Public Trustee.  The National Debt Commission 
regulated not only the national debt but also the advances made out 
of  the Local Loan Funds to local g~vernrnents."~  The government 
also  influenced  the  flow  of  capital  to  a  limited  extent  through 
the office of  the Public Trustee which had been established  in  1906 
and which increased the volume of  the trusts which it admini~tered.~~ 
The  Public Trustee under its administration carried about one-third 
of its trust funds in the securities of  the national government and 
the remainder  was  distributed  among  domestic  railroad,  colonial 
and foreign government bonds. 
A more important control of  the capital market was  exercised 
by the Government in its regulation of  the demand for capital.  Par- 
liament extended its regulation of  corporate financing by  carrying 
further the principles  embodied  in the various  companies acts of 
the pre-war period particularly that of disclowre in the Act of  1929. 
This statute required that corporations give full and accurate infor- 
mation  of  their  financial  position  in their balance  sheets  and in 
their  profit  and loss accounts, and also  increased  the liabilities of 
officers and directors for misrepresentation  in financial statements. 
The provisions  of  the Companies Act  were  applied  against  Lord 
Kylsant  who  was  convicted  on the charge  of  publishing  a  false 
prospect~s.'~ There was, however, a growing feeling that the Com- 
panies  Act  was  inadequate and  that  further control  was  needed 
particularly in protecting the public against the abuses of  the hold- 
ing companie~.~~ 
During the War the flow of  capital was restricted by the govern- 
ment, and this control was continued in the post-war period.  The 
government had no parliamentary  authorization to prevent invest- 
ment houses from floating new issues, but these houses carefully ob- 
senred the restrictions "requested  by  the Treasury and the Bank 
of  England.4g In 1925 an embargo was applied to foreign loans in 
order to aid the government  in its policy of  returning to the gold 
standard.  In 1931 with the intensification of  the world depression 
the embargo was extended to other forms of  investment.  Through- 
out 1933 the government continued its unofficial embargo on issues 
particularly  those  for new  capital.  Apparently  these  restrictions 
were  not always  enforced, and certain  corporations  placed  issues 
which appeared to be contrary to the provisions of  the embargo.50 
In 1936 the Treasury appointed a body, later know  as the Foreign 
Transactions Advisory Committee, including representatives of  the 
Bank of  England as well as of  industry, to consult with the Chan- 
cellor  of  the Exchequer  on the administration  of  the government 
control  over  the capital  market.51  The Treasury  further ordered 
investment trusts to limit the proportion of  their foreign investments 
to the bare minimum necessary to conduct their business in accord- 
ance with the policy of  investment trusts, to attain geographic diver- 
sification of  their holdings, and recommended that if  the actual pro- 
portion of  foreign securities was  "unusually  high  it should be  re- 
duced." 52 
The  most drastic proposals for control of  security capitalism came 
from the Labour Party.  At first it urged only the nationalization of 
the Bank of England, but in 1933 it recommended the socialization 
of  the joint-stock banks as well.j3  In the post-war period there was 
a growing conviction among students of  security capitalism that the 
capital market ought to be more carefully ~ontrolled.~~  E. H. Dav- 
enport wrote : 
The State must  supervise or direct the investment of  the national sav- 
ings  if it is  to  ensure national  stability . . . investment cannot safely 
be  left to the haphazard competition of  the various private agencies that 
now  exist for the utilization of  savings.  Investment must be directed by 
the State into fields of  production which it considers conducive to the 
maintenance of  employment at the highest possible leve1.65 
This proposal  for governmental control  of  the capital  market 
was embodied by the Labour Party in its plan for a board of national 
investment which would direct the flow of  capital in order to prevent 
its misdirection.  56  This body was  to be appointed by  the govern- 
ment  and was  to co-operate  closely  with  a  nationalized  Bank  of 
England.  The proposal for a board of  national investment had the 
approval of John Maynard Keynes who urged qualitative as well as 
quantitative control.s7 
CONCLUSION 
Thus the crisis of  British security capitalism, which had already 
started with the close of the nineteenth century, was  intensified  by 
the War and was deepened in the post-war period.  For the first time 
in the history of  British  security capitalism, over a period of  years, 
industrial production not only showed no increase but actually de- 
clined.  Similarly  foreign  trade,  the very  life blood  of  England, 
also dropped in amount.  The Bank of  England, never well adapted 
to the system of  security capitalism, found itself unable to cope with 
the difficult problems of  the post-war period.  In the field of  bank- 
ing the amalgamation movement made rapid progress, but the Brit- 
ish banks continued their pre-war policy of  not developing close re- 
lations with industry.  Their financial position, as reflected in their FINANCE CAPITALISM 
deficiency of  capital was  not satisfactory.  The demand for capital 
in  the  post-war  period  was  heavy.  Unlike  the  post-Napoleonic 
era, the national government was unable to reduce its enormous war 
debt in the ensuing period, and the debt was all the more serious 
in view  of  its  unproductive  nature.  The local  governments also 
added to the total public debt throGgh a continuous flow of  new 
issues.  The corporate demand for capital was also large.  On the 
other hand the volume of  capital available for the security market 
was unsatisfactory due to the decline in real national income and the 
reduction in real saving.  Criticism of  British security capitalism was 
widespread  and was  directed particularly  against the Bank of  Eng- 
land  and the joint-stock  banks.  The difficulties of  the post-war 
period led the government to extend its control over the system of 
security capitalism.  The demand for capital was to a moderate ex- 
tent controlled by  the operations of  such agencies as  the National 
Debt Commission and the Public Trustee.  More important was the 
regulation  of  corporate practices  connected  with  the demand  for 
capital in the Companies Act of  1929.  Quantitative control of  the 
demand for capital was  exercised by  the embargo administered by 
the Treasury.  The Labour Party,  not  satisfied with  this  control, 
urged  the nationalization  of  the Bank  of  England, the joint-stock 
banks and the establishment of  a board for the control of  the flow 
of  capital. 
INSTABILITY  OF  FRENCH  SECURlTY  CAPITALISM 
French political conditions throughout the post-war period were 
ominated by the fiscal difficulties of  these years, and as a result one 
cabinet after the other was  forced out of  ofice.  Immediately after 
the close of  the War on the wave of  patriotic  feeling the National 
Bloc under the leadership of  Raymond Poincark crushed the Social- 
ist opposition.  Poincarb pursued a strongly nationalistic  policy  in 
directing France's relations with Germany, and in the dispute over 
reparations, sent the French army into the Ruhr.  In 1924 the Left 
Cartel, composed largely of  Socialists under the leadership of  Her- 
riot, took over the government.  The new ministry followed a more 
conciliatory policy toward Germany, and co-operated with England 
and the United States in formulating the Dawes Plan.  The Herriot 
government was  unable to solve the difficult financial  problems of 
France, and in  1926 gave way  to the National Union led by Poin- 
care and composed of  all  the political  parties  except  the extreme 
left.  From 1924 to  1932 the foreign policies of  France were guided 
by  Briand who sought to improve the relations between France and 
Germany.  Briand was fortunate in having the co-operation of  Gus- 
tav Stresemann, Germany's  foreign minister,  and for a time it ap- 
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peared that the two former enemy countries would come to an un- 
derstanding.  In  1932 the  Left Cartel, headed  by  Herriot  again 
returned  to power,  but with  the deepening depression  the finan- 
cial condition of the government became acute, and once more Her- 
riot was forced out of office.  Again in  1934, there was  a return to 
the National Union composed of  all the parties except the Socialists 
and Communists.  To counteract the radical elemeAts, a fascist or- 
ganization  known  as the Croix  de Feu  (Cross of  Fire) supported 
by the powerful financial and industrial interests grew in strength.58 
However, profiting from the unfortunate experience of  the radical 
parties of Germany and Austria, the Socialists and the Communists 
of  France formed a common front under Leon Blum for joint action 
against this threat  of  fascism  and the interests of  concentrated  in- 
dustry.  This United Front obtained control of  the government in 
1936 and continued  in power  even after the collapse of  the Blum 
ministry in June,  1937.  During this period the Croix de Feu was 
disbanded. 
INDUSTRIAL  RECOVERY 
Economic conditions in France in the post-war period were di- 
rectly influenced  by  the results of  the War.  The devastated  areas 
in northern  France had  to be rebuilt, and this work  was  a heavy 
economic  task.  Another  important economic  consequence of the 
War was  the acquisition  of Alsace and Lorraine  and also tempor- 
arily of  the Saar Valley which gave France large deposits of  iron and 
coal.  As  a  result  of  these  acquisitions  industrial  production  in 
France  increased  sharply  in  the  post-war  period  particularly  the 
output of  coal, pig-iron and 
During the period under review France encountered serious cur- 
rency difficulties, and, in  1926 and again  in  1936 the government 
was  forced to devaluate the franc.  These successive  devaluations, 
by reducing the gold value of the franc, brought losses to the holders 
of fixed obligations, and struck at the very foundation of  French se- 
curity capitalism. 
An important trend in post-war French  security capitalism,  was 
the conflict between the radical government and the Bank of  France. 
In the post-war period the various radical governments met bitter 
opposition from the Bank's Board of  Regents whose members were 
elected by the two hundred largest stockholders or the so-called "two 
hundred families."  The bitterness between the radical cabinets and 
the Regents was mainly political in that the Regents were generally 104  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
members  of  the  conservative  parties.  However,  the  immediate 
issue between the radical governments and the Bank of  France con- 
cerned the extent to which the Bank should grant accommodations 
to the national government.  On the one hand the government, hard 
pressed  by  its  budgetary  difficulties  demanded  liberal  advances, 
while  the Regents,  concerned  primarily  with  the solvency  of  the 
Bank, were reluctant to accede.  Hence the almost continual clash 
between the radical cabinets and the Bank. 
In 1924 the issue was sharply drawn when  Herriot, as leader of 
the Left Cartel, demanded liberal financial aid from the Bank, but 
in the end he was  defeated and later forced out of  office.  In 1935 
the government again attacked the Bank, and Premier Flandin re- 
moved  Governor  Mauret of  the  Bank  of  France  and placed Jean 
Tannery in charge.  The latter, however, followed  a conservative 
financial policy and joined with the Board of  Regents in resisting the 
efforts  of the government to obtain more liberal acc~mmodation.~~ 
Throughout the depression the Bank stood firm for a policy of  de- 
flation.  Unlike other central banks, it gave relatively little help to 
the  public  treasury  and  discounted  only  a  comparatively  small 
amount of  short-term notes.61  As an aid in carrying out its deflation- 
ary policy the Bank won the support of  the financial press by liberal 
distribution of  money. 
With  the  coming  of  the popular  cabinet  under  Leon  Blum 
in 1936, the attack on the Bank and particularly on the Board  of 
Regents became stronger.  The Board was bitterly indicted in the 
speeches in the Chamber of  Deputies, and the minister  of  finance 
declared that "the Government of  France is democratic and renew- 
able by  popular suffrage.  The economic and financial government 
of  the nation is hereditary,  oligarchic  and of  divine right."  As  a 
proof  of  these  charges  it was  pointed  out that  the two  hundred 
largest shareholders included the leading elements of  French secur- 
ity capitalism.  Of  the six banking members of  the Board of  Regents 
five were descendents of the leaders of  security capitalism during the 
First Empire.'j2  Five more seats were held by the leaders of  French 
industrial security capitalism such as Francois de Wendel, President 
of  the  powerful  ComitC  des  Forges.63  Together  twelve  Regents 
directly or indirectly were directors in ninety-five huge corporations 
which had grown out of  the war and post-war concentration move- 
ment.  These corporations were gigantic industrial units wielding 
extensive  political and economic power. 
The attack on the Bank of France as the symbol of  security capi- 
talism was conducted with the same ardor as the eighteenth century 
assault on the Bastile, the symbol of  the privileged aristocracy.  In 
July, 1936, the Parlement overwhelmingly voted reform of  the Bank. 
BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN CRISIS  10; 
The law provided that the Regents were no longer to be elected by 
the two hundred largest stockholders, but by  all, with one vote for 
each share irrespective of the number of  shares held.  The "finan- 
cial Bastile"  had fallen so it was  thought. 
CHANGES  IN  THE BANKING  STRUCTURE 
In the post-war period the banking structure underwent consid- 
erable change.  There was  a  movement  toward  banking  concen- 
tration through consolidation of  individual banks and through  the 
extension of  the branches of  the Paris banks over the country.  The 
number of  actual bank failures in France was small, but this appar- 
ently  satisfactory  result  was  achieved  through  the  absorption  of 
weaker  units  by  stronger  banks  and  through  government  assist- 
ance.= 
In the post-war period the distinction between the credit banks 
and the banque d'affaires became less  pron~unced.~~  Even  before 
the War the former had engaged in underwriting and in marketing 
securities,  and this  function  increased  considerably  in later years. 
At the same time the banque d'affaires, essentially investment insti- 
tutions, in  the pre-war period  expanded their  commercial  opera- 
tions and financed a considerable part of  French business. 
The French overseas banks became an important factor in the 
financial machinery of  the nation.  These banking institutions were 
of two  kinds.  Those which  operated  in the  French  colonies, as 
Indo-China and  Morocco,  were  called  colonial  banks,  and  those 
which operated in foreign countries, were outright overseas banks. 
The colonial banks had extensive powers which  included not only 
those of  deposit and discount, but also the right of  issuing notes for 
circulation.  The French overseas banks, operating in foreign lands, 
were usually owned or closely controlled by the large banks of  Paris. 
CHANGES  IN  THE CAPITAL  MARKET 
The capital market in the post-war period was dominated almost 
entirely by  the demands of  the national government.  The French 
national  debt rose enormously during the war  and post-war years, 
and the expenditure for debt service increased sharply."  The  bur- 
den of  this expenditure for debt service had always been high and 
in  1934 constituted over 54  percent  of  total  expendituresP  The 
volume  of  foreign loans  in the post-war period was much smaller 
than that  in the pre-war  period."  To  a  large  extent these  loans 
continued to be made for political reasons, and the members of  the 
Little Entente particularly were granted liberal financial support." 
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of  corporate financing in the post-war period.  Because of  losses in 
fixed-interest bearing obligations due to devaluation the French in- 
vestor favored stocks over bonds.  Bowing to this changing demand, 
French corporations modified their policy and issued a greater pro- 
portion of  stock than in the past. 
The supply of  capital  in the years  immediately  following  the 
close of the War was small.  The nominal value of  national income 
was  2o8,ooo,ooo,ooo francs in  1926, as compared  with  36,ooo,ooo,- 
ooo francs in 1913.  However, in view of  the fact that the index of 
commodity prices in  1926 was  812  as compared with  116 in  1913, 
therefore  the real value of  the national  income in  1926 was  only 
2g,6io,ooo,ooo  francs  or below  the  level  of  1913.  Similarly  the 
nominal value of  saving funds in 1926 was  i~,~oo,ooo,ooo  francs but 
the real value of  these saving funds in  1926 expressed in terms of 
the franc of  1913 was  only  2,200,000,000 francs as compared  with 
tj,8oo,ooo,ooo francs  in  igi3.'O  The proportion  of  new  securities 
to such saving over these years was  large, and was reflected in the 
high yields on government bonds which rose to 6.17 in 1926.~~ 
With the de facto stabilization of  the franc  in  1927 there was 
once more a growth in saving and an increase in the supply of  capi- 
tal.  National  income  rose  to  2~8,ooo,ooo,ooo  francs  in  1931 and 
then  fell  to  i78,ooo,ooo,ooo francs in  1934 but saving funds how- 
ever rose continually from  i~,~oo,ooo,ooo  francs in 1926 to 60,700,- 
ooo,ooo francs in 1934.''  Over this period total accumulated saving 
funds to national income rose from 7.5 percent to 34.1 percent.7s In 
the depression period the valume of  new securities declined sharply 
and the proportion  of  new  securities to saving funds  Thus 
the demand for capital was small in relation to its supply, and the 
cost  of  capital,  as  reflected  in  the  yield  on  government  bonds, 
dropped to 3.88 percent in 193.5.'~ 
CONTROL  OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
As  in the case of  England, the French government  exercised a 
veto power over the exportation of  capital.  However,  in the case 
of  France this power was exercised not by an informal embargo but 
as a result of a formal act of  the Chamber of  Deputies.  The listing 
of  foreign issues had to have the approval of  the minister of  finance. 
The exercise of  this power  to control foreign securities led  to the 
serious  political  scandal  of the Snia  Viscosa,  an  Italian  company 
manufacturing artificial silk.  This company was highly speculative 
in nature and its listing was  attained  through the bribery of the 
minister of  finance himself. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the post-war period the position of  French security capitalism 
was  unstable.  The political  ferment  of  the  post-war  years  was 
caused in a large measure by  the unsatisfactory  budgetary  position 
of  the national government.  The movement for business concentra- 
tion  made  rapid  headway  and the  leaders  of  this  new  industrial 
capitalism  were  also active  in French  politics.  This conservative 
force was  met in later years by a radical opposition, and so  France 
did not follow the path of  Germany in falling under the political 
control of  industrial capitalism.  The radical groups were even vic- 
torious in wresting control of  the Bank of  France from the influence 
of  the banking and industrial capitalists. 
French security capitalism was  confronted by  an almost intoler- 
able burden in the form of  an enormous public debt-the  heritage of 
the pre-war and post-war periods.  The  failure of  the attempts to col- 
lect full reparations  from Germany placed the burden of  the debt 
squarely on the French  people,  and notwithstanding the increased 
industrialization of the nation the load was very heavy. 
STRUGGLE  BETWEEN  GERMAN  INDUSTRIAL  AND  BANKING  SECURm 
CAPITALISM-POLITICAL  FERMENT 
The history  of  German  security  capitalism  in  the  post-war 
period can best be understood  in relation  to  the struggle between 
the  industrialists  and the bankers.  This conflict  passed  through 
three successive stages.  The period from  1920 to 1923 marked the 
ascendancy of  industrial security capitalism; from 1924 to 1929 the 
temporary victory of  banking security capitalism, and finally after 
1930 the triumph of  industrial capitalism. 
In the closing days of  the War the monarchy came to an end, 
and  in  1919, under the Weimar Constitution, the government  was 
formally declared a republic with Franz Ebert as provisional  Presi- 
dent.  The new  socialist government  made  commendable  efforts 
to establish  a  middle class democracy but was  beset  by  powerful 
political opposition both on the left and on the right.  In 1919 the 
Spartacists  actuated  by  the  principles  of  communism  rebelled 
against  the socialist government,  but  the  movement  was  crushed 
and  many  of  the  leaders,  including  Carl  Liebknecht  and  Rosa 
Luxemburg, were killed.  On the other side, the socialist govern- 
ment  was  faced  by  a  powerful reactionary  opposition  which  ex- 
Pressed itself in the uprising of 1920 headed by  General Kapp and 
that of  1923 in which General Ludendorf  and Adolph Hitler par- 
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crushing  of  the  communists  and  the  reactionaries,  the  German 
socialists continued to be seriously divided within their own ranks. 
The Independent Socialists at the party  Congress in 1920 voted for 
adhesion to the Third Internationale and accepted  the conditions 
dictated by  Moscow, calling for a rejection of  the revisionist social- 
ism of  Kautsky and Hilferding.  The Revisionist  Socialists did not 
agree  among themselves on their  policy  toward capitalism  and at 
their Congress at Cassel  in  1920 there was  a sharp clash  of  views 
between  those who urged  "full socialization"  or the complete con- 
version  of  private-owned  concerns into public-owned  corporations 
and those who argued for a system carefully controlled by  the gov- 
ernment but operated under private ownership. 
THE  CARTHAGINIAN  PEACE 
As in the case of  France after the close of  the Napoleonic Wars, 
Germany after the Great War was forced to pay  reparations to the 
victors.  Under the terms of  the Armistice of  1918, Germany agreed 
to  make  compensation  for  the  damage  wrought  on  French  and 
Belgian soil during the War.  In the following year in the Treaty 
of Versailles, Germany formally assumed sole responsibility for the 
War and agreed to pay  such damages as might be fixed by the Re- 
parations  commission.  The exact  amount  of  compensation  was 
not determined  by  the Treaty, and Germany  practically  signed a 
blank check.  The Conference  of  London held in  1921 wrote the 
sum of 132,000,000,000 gold marks into this check which Germany 
was  then asked to honor.  In vain,  Germany pointed  out the im- 
possibility of  paying this amount.  To  France the imposition of  this 
huge financial burden was  the means of  keeping her former enemy 
crushed under the terms of  a Carthaginian peace.  For a short time 
Germany paid the required sum, but in 1923 she defaulted and Allied 
armies occupied the Ruhr Valley, the industrial heart of  Germany. 
The results of  this effort to collect reparations at the point of  the 
bayonet proved futile for France but disastrous for Germany.  The 
German  mark,  which  had  already depreciated  because of  the un- 
balanced budget at home, now collapsed.  The conflict in the Ruhr 
threatened to bring about not only disorder in France and Germany 
but throughout the Continent. 
Banking security capitalism  in England and the United States, 
now  thoroughly  alarmed,  intervened.  In  November  1923,  the 
Reparations  Commission appointed  committees to  investigate  the 
problem and report their findings.  That, headed by General Charles 
E. Dawes, made the first attempt at a rational solution of  the repara- 
tions problem.  The Dawes plan, without fixing the total amount, 
provided for reasonable annual payment of  reparations to the Allies. 
The Dawes  plan  recommended  the transfer  of  the control of  the 
German railroads from the German government  to a  private cor- 
poration, and provided for Allied control over German industry and 
banking.  German political sovereignty over the Ruhr was restored, 
but the Allied armies continued to occupy part of the Rhineland. 
The  respite given by the Dawes plan enabled the Reichsbank under 
the leadership of  Dr. Schacht to stabilize the currency. 
EFFECTS OF CURRENCY DEPRECIATION 
The  currency depreciation over these years had significant effects 
on the various classes in German economic life as the industrialists, 
the bankers and the middle class.  The industrialists were the chief 
beneficiaries of  the collapse of  the mark.  From  1920 until the end 
of  192 3  industrial  production  rose  sharply.76 In financing  these 
operations most  of  the great  industrial  corporations shaped  their 
policies so as to take full advantage of the depreciation of  the cur- 
rency.  On the one hand they obtained liberal short-term loans from 
the banks,  and these loans were  paid  at maturity  in depreciated 
currency.  At the same time long-term debts, incurred in the pre- 
war  period  in gold  currency,  were  now  paid  off  in paper  money 
worth  only  a  fraction  of  the amount  originally  received.  Hugo 
Stinnes, a power  in the pre-war period, became the leader of  Ger- 
man industrial capitalism, and extended his control into the field of 
banking by seizing the Barmer Bankverein and by acquiring a third 
interest in the Berliner Handelsge~ellschaft.~~ 
By  the end of  the inflation period  the capital of  the large in- 
dustries had increased, while that of  the banks had decreased.  On 
the one hand the gold mark capital in 1924 as compared with  1913 
in the case of  the textile industries had increased by  124.5 percent, 
in the mining industries by  135 percent  and in the chemical  in- 
dustries by  189.5 percent.7s  On the other hand, the inflation of  the 
currency sharply reduced the capital of  the great banks.  The gold 
mark  capital  and reserves in  1924 as  compared  with  1913 of  the 
Darmstadter  Bank dropped to 29.9  percent, the Dresdner  Bank to 
38.2  percent,  the  Disconto  Gesellschaft  to  47.6  percent  and  the 
Deutsche Bank to 64 percent, or an average of 42.8 percent.7Q Un- 
questionably  many  individual  bankers,  particularly  the  private 
bankers,  personally  gained  by  the collapse of  the mark, but Ger- 
man banking as a whole suffered from the decline in the currency. 
The depreciation  of  the currency brought  ruin to the middle 
class including the small businessmen, professional persons, govern- 
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period this class had been the bulwark  of  German security capital- 
ism.  The middle class through  its frugality had accumulated sav- 
ings,  had  invested  them  in bank  deposits  and  in  securities  and 
thereby  had  supplied  funds  for  German  pre-war  industrial  ex- 
pansion.  The value of  these direct and indirect  investments was 
now largely swept away with the depreciation  of  the currency. 
The middle  class,  which  in the pre-war  period  had  been  op- 
ponents of  Marxism, not only continued its opposition but now de- 
veloped  a  new  and bitter hostility  to banking security capitalism 
which was held responsible for the collapse of  the mark and accused 
of  engaging in speculative  activities.  This attitude of  the middle 
class expressed itself in the formation of  the National Socialist Party 
which first became a political factor in the national elections of  1924. 
It was  naturally difficult for  the middle class to express  itself 
against  an abstract system, and so  it gave vent to its feelings con- 
cretely in its hostility to the Jews who, since the beginning of  the 
nineteenth  century,  personified  banking  security capitalism.  Un- 
questionably in the pre-war period the influence of  the Jews over 
security capitalism had grown out of  proportion  to their number, 
and in the post-war period their power continued to be extensive.  It 
was stated that in 1928 fifteen Jews held  718 directorships of  Ger- 
man companies and that in  1931 nearly  89 percent of  the Berlin 
stockholders were Jewish.B0 
POLITICAL  AND  ECONOMIC  RECOVERY 
From  1924 to 1930 German banking capitalism regained  some 
of  its former power due to more favorable political and economic 
conditions.  Over these years domestic as well as international  po- 
litical conditions remained relatively  quiet.  In 1925 on the death 
of  Ebert, the elections were won by  the monarchist groups headed 
by  General Von  Hindenburg who, however, loyally supported the 
republican form of  government.  Over these years Germany's foreign 
relations were skillfully handled by Gustav Stresemann with the co- 
operation of  Briand, and the Locarno Pact brought Germany back 
into the family of  nations.  Economic recovery was  rapid.  From 
the low level of  1923 industrial production rose sharply until the 
end of  1927.81 
With the stabilization of  the currency  the relative  positions  of 
banking and industrial capitalism were reversed.  On the one hand 
the  shrinkage of  bank  capital  came to an end, and bank deposits 
increased.  On the other hand the industrialists  found themselves 
without working capital due to the sudden deflation  following the 
revaluation of  the mark and to the fact that their  assets were im- 
mobilized in the form of  fixed  capital.  Industry again had to accept 
the dictation of the German banks, and for a while they were able 
to regain  some of their control over industry.  The great Stinnes 
concern suffered  severe reverses, and after the death of  Hugo Stinnes 
In  1923 his son Edmund was forced to give up most of  his business 
With the end of  the inflation movement in 1923, Germany was 
in  urgent  need  of capital  not  only  to  pay  reparations  but  also 
to  meet  the domestic  requirements  of  industry.ss  However,  the 
domestic supply of capital was  badly depleted.  From  19  13 to 1922 
there was  a  sharp drop in national  wealth,  national  income  and 
national  saving,  and the  proportion  of  saving  to  income  showed 
a marked decrease.84  Under these conditions Germany had to im- 
port capital. 
Throughout the nineteenth century nations with developed sys- 
tems of  security capitalism had obtained control over the economic 
systems of  undeveloped countries.  Now for the first time in history 
a nation with a developed security capitalism was in danger of being 
financially controlled by  other countries.  Imperialism  thus took a 
new  form and for a time there resulted  the exploitation of  not a 
backward but of a highly developed economy.  Due to the deprecia- 
tion  of  the mark,  investors  with  foreign currencies  were  able  to 
obtain large interests in German corporations with only a small in- 
vestment  of their  In  1932  it was  estimated  that  foreign 
capitalists held a total participation of 1,553,000,ooo marks  in cor- 
porations with nominal capital of 5,534,000,ooo marks.86  However, 
this danger of  alienation was overcome by various protective devices, 
as the issuance and retention by  the German management  of  pref- 
erence stock with multiple voting po~er.~' 
Between  1924 and 1930 Germany's  import of capital amounted 
to nearly three times the sum paid in reparations.  The greater part 
of these funds were applied to accumulate reserves in the form of 
working  capital  and  to  the  rationalization  of  German  industq 
through the application of  scientific management? 
DECLINE  OF  BANKING  CAPITALISM 
Notwithstanding  this financial assistance from abroad  German 
conditions became unsatisfactory as early as 1928 and were 
already desperate by  the coming of  the world depression.  General 
Production declined continuously from i 928 through I 932.  Unem- 
ployment rose from  16.7  percent of  the population  in  1928 to the 
staggering figure of  43.7 percent in lg31.~~  Again it became neces- 
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to support the weakening structure of  German capitalism.  An  in- 
ternational committee was formed under the leadership of  Owen D. 
Young,  and  composed  of  prominent  representatives  of  banking 
capitalism.  This committee made  an earnest  effort  to  overcome 
the political and financial difficl~lties  which  were confronting Ger- 
many.  The Young plan  ended the occupation  of  the Rhineland 
five  years  ahead  of  its schedule and also  terminated  the  irksome 
Allied control over German banking and industry which had been 
imposed by the Dawes plan.  The financial provisions of  the Young 
plan tvere likewise sensible.  The total amount of  reparations was 
fixed for the first time at eight billion dollars.  Provision was made 
for possible postponement of  payment of  part of  the debt if  circum- 
stances necessitated.  Furthermore, the Young plan established  the 
Bank for International Settlements to bring about more effective in- 
ternational  cooperation  among  the  various  systems  of  security 
capitalism. 
All this effort was doomed to failure as a result of  the deepening 
of  the depression.  Finally, in June 1931, President Von  Hinden- 
burg  personally  informed  President  Hoover  that:  "The  whole 
world lacks confidence in the ability of  the German economic sys- 
tem to work under the existing burdens."  President Hoover then 
proposed a moratorium which postponed both reparations payments 
by  Germany  as well  as the war  debt payments  by  the Allies.  In 
1932 the Lausanne conference made an effort at a further solution 
of  the reparations problem but in vain, for German banking security 
capitalism was doomed. 
The depression  ushered  in  the  third  and  final  stage  of  the 
struggle between  German banking and industrial  security capital- 
ism.  Already in the closing years of  the 1920's the contest between 
the two systems was being fought over economic, religious and po- 
litical issues.  In the economic field banking and industrial security 
capitalism  struggled to control  the United Steel Works, the great 
metallurgical trust of  Germany.  In this contest the forces of  bank- 
ing capitalism were led by the directors of  the Deutsche Bank and 
by  Otto Wolff, an industrialist of  the Rhineland, closely associated 
with  the banking  interests.Ol  The forces of  industrial  capitalism 
were captained by  Fritz Thyssen.02  The banking group was  will- 
ing to make concessions to the French steel interest, particularly the 
Schneider-Creusot and the de Wendel groups in order to attain closer 
cooperation among the continental steel companies.  The industrial 
group also realized the necessity for international cooperation, but 
insisted  that Germany  have  the dominant position  in  any such a 
continental  combine.  The two  opposing  forces carried  the fight 
into the religious and political  fields.  The Deutsche Bank repre- 
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sented the Jewish interests, and gave its backing to the republican 
parries.  Otto Wolf£ was a Catholic and supported the Center party 
uvhich  joined  with the republicans in a bloc  against both extreme 
right and left parties.  Thyssen and his associates gave active support 
to National Sociali~m.~~  In 1929 Thyssen brought  Adolph  Hitler 
to ~iisseldorf  and introduced him to several hundred leading in- 
dustrialists of the  Ruhr.%  With  this  support  Hitler  confidently 
entered the political campaign of  1930.  In the campaign of  that 
year  Hitler denounced all the past efforts of  international security 
capitalism at solving Germany's difficulties in the following searing 
words : 
. . . with  lies our  people were  led into  the  Dawes  Pact, with  lies  we 
were induced to sign Locarno, and lies, lies and pet more lies have now 
giver us  the Young Plan.  Germany has been  doped with illusion after 
illus~on;  Spa, Brussels, Versailles,  Geneva, Paris, London, Locarno,  the 
League  of  Nations,  and  now  the  Young  Plan-all  were  illusions, and 
under the curse of  these illusions Germany has lost her freedom, she has 
lost her  moral  prestige and, having no longer any political honour she 
has now  even sacrificed her economic substance.95 
While  National  Socialism  was  an  expression  of  mass  protest 
against  the unnecessary humiliation and the shortsighted  blow  to 
German national pride contained in the provisions of  the Versailles 
Treaty, the movement was  also  directed  against  banking  security 
capitalism.  National Socialism was  fundamentally anti-socialist in 
that it opposed international Marxism, but at the same time it was 
anti-capitalist in that it equally opposed  international banking se- 
curity  capitali~m.~~  The system  of  banking  capitalism  in  its de- 
veloped  stage naturally  becomes  international in nature.  In the 
pre-war  period  the  German  banks  therefore  had  developed  close 
relations  with  tile  banks  in  other  financial  centers,  particularly 
London, New York and Paris and in the post-war period the Ger- 
man banks were forced to renew this relationship with their former 
enemies.  This international aspect of  German banking capitalism 
became the target of  the bitter  attacks  by  the National  Socialists. 
The struggle between German banking security capitalism and Na- 
tional Socialism was  thus a conflict between  the necessary interna- 
tional relations of  modern capitalism and the nationalistic  charac- 
teristics of the new  party  which  sought to revert to the economic 
nationalism of individual capitalism. 
The elections  of  1930 recorded  the first  major  victory  of  the 
National Socialists, and again  in  1932 they  were  successful.  The 
Catholic-~iberal  group, which had  sought to retain control of the 
government under Dr. Briining, now turned to General Schleicher 
Who  it7as closely connected with Otto Wolff.  The  Schleicher govern- 1 14  FINANCE CAPITALIShI  BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN  CRISIS  115 
ment was short-lived, and in  1933 the National Socialists came into 
power.  The Reichstag then suspended the constitution and granted 
Adolph Hitler dictatorial powers.  At the same time control of  the 
United Steel Works passed into the hands of  the Thyssen interests.07 
This triumph of industrial capitalism was made complete by the 
collapse of German banking capitalism.  With the intensification of 
the depression the position of  the German banks became critical as 
may be seen in Table 11 showing their reserve position in 1929 and 
'931. 
TABLE  11 
RESERVE  POSITION  or GERMAN  BANKS,  1929  AND  1931.Qs 
(million reichmarks) 
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a In  percent. 
ITEMS 
Total deposits.. ........................ 
Cash. ................................. 
Rediscounts. ........................... 
Net cash (2 -3)..  ....................... 
......................  Due from banks.. 
Due to banks .......................... 
Net due from banks (5 -6)  .............. 
..................  Government securities. 
Guarantees. ........................... 
Reserve assets [(4+7+8) -91..  ........... 
Reserve assets to total deposits (10s  I)(°).  . 
From  this  table it is  seen that the cash  of  the German banks 
was more than offset  by rediscounts representing borrowings largely 
from the Reichsbank, and the balances due from banks were like- 
wise more than offset by  the balances due to banks mainly foreign 
financial  institutions.  As  a result the German banks had a deficit 
in  their  reserve  assets  of  3,679,000,ooo  marks  in  1929  and  of 
3,588,000,ooo  marks in 193  1.  The  ratio of  reserves to deposits shows 
a deficit of  29.84  percent  in  1929 and of  50.96  percent  in 1931, a 
condition  almost  without  precedent  in  banking  history.  The 
German  banks  made  every  effort  to  save  themselves,  but  un- 
fortunately adopted desperate policies which in the end only served 
to intensify their difficulties.  Most of the banks followed the policy 
of buying back their own stock, so that by  July, 1931, the Deutsche 
Bank  and the Disconto  Gesellschaft owned  36.8  percent  of  their 
own stock, the Dresdner Bank 55 percent and the Darmstadter Bank 
58.3 percent.OD 
The failure of the Darmstadter  Bank, and later the Dresdner 
Bank in 1931 signalized the collapse of the German banking struc- 
ture.  The government made drastic efforts  to aid these institutions, 
and contributed  funds extensively to the Darmstadter  Bank which 
was merged with the Dresdner  Bank, and also gave support to the 
Deutsche Bank which was merged with the Disconto Gesellschaft.lOO 
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1931 
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The National Socialists completely reversed the financial policies 
of the previous government.  The latter had followed  a policy of 
credit  which had resulted in a marked rise in the volume 
of unemployment. The National Socialists now entered upon a pro- 
gram of credit expansion, whose two-fold aim was reemployment and 
rearmament.  Under the National Socialist regime there was a marked 
recovery in industrial production ; unemployment was reduced and 
the first objective of  the Party's program was attained.lol  The  second 
fundamental aim of  rearming  Germany was  also achieved,  for the 
shackles of  the Versailles Treaty were shattered by  blow after blow, 
and after 1934 Germany entered upon a drastic program of  augment- 
ing her naval and military forces. As a result armament expenditures 
rose sharply, and the proportion of  armament to total expenditures 
increased?02  In consequence  the total  indebtedness of  the federal 
government  rose  from  i 1,992,000,000 marks  in  1932  to  20,833,- 
ooo,ooo marks  in  1936.1°3  This rearmament  program  in  a  large 
measure was responsible for the increase in production and the re- 
duction in unemployment.  The total public debt including that of 
the local as well as the federal government in 1937, was about 37,- 
ooo,ooo,ooo marks as compared with  27,000,000,000 marks in 1933 
and ~~,ooo,ooo,ooo  marks in 1914. 
There are varying conclusions as to the financial effects of  this 
program.  The German government contended that these  policies 
did not cause an excessive credit expansion, and in an official publica- 
tion  stated  that  "the credit  indebtedness"  in the sense  of  bonds, 
mortgages,  short-term credits, had  changed only slightly.'"  How- 
ever  these  official  figures were  disputed  by  outside commentators 
On  German finance.lo5 It is however probable that the total public 
debt9  although increasing, in 1937 was not a serious burden in rela- 
tion to Germany's economic and financial resources.  The one weak- 
ness in the public debt was the rapid increase in the short-term debt. 
Over these years there was an increase in national income and 
national  saving.  The official reports  indicated  a  rise  in national 
tnc0me from ~~,~OO,OOO,O~O  marks in 1932 to 6i,~oo,ooo,ooo  marks  '"  1936.1°6  This increase in income was largely caused by  the rise 116  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
in employment and the recovery of industrial producti~n?~~  How- 
ever an increasing proportion  of  national income was absorbed by 
taxation.  In addition, the German people paid so-called "voluntary" 
contributions  and semi-official taxes which  were  practically  forced 
levies upon national income.  Notwithstanding these payments the 
saving of  the German people  increased considerably.  Deposits in 
German saving banks rose from  11,400,000,000 in  1932 to  14,600,- 
ooo,ooo by  the end of 1936, and over the same period receipts from 
life  insurance  premiun~s  rose  from  ~49,000,ooo  to  g4o,ooo,ooo 
marks.lo8  This increase  in  saving  was,  however,  largely  accom- 
plished by  the conscious policy of the government  in limiting the 
standard of  living. 
CONTROL  OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The National Socialists extended the power of  the government 
over the various financial institutions of  security capitalism includ- 
ing the Reichsbank, the banks, the stock exchange, the capital mar- 
ket and the corporations.  The Reichsbank was  placed  under  the 
direction of  Dr. Schacht.  The granting of  credit to the government 
was  facilitated by  the extension of  liberal  security  loans.  These 
loans, important in the pre-war period, had been restricted  under 
the Banking law of 1924, but in lgyg were expanded so as to give 
the Reichsbank increased powers in dealing in the securities of  the 
German national, state and government railroads in the open market. 
As  a result  of the extensive government aid to the banks,  the 
Reich for a time owned over 70 percent of  the capital of  all the large 
German banks.  However,  by  1936, a  considerable  part  of  these 
bank shares were returned  to private ownership.log 
The National  Socialists appointed  a  commission  to study  the 
entire subject  of  banking.  The report of  this body  opposed  the 
nationalization  of  credit, but urged closer government supervision 
of  banking operations and also a separation of  the commercial and 
investment functions which had been jointly  exercised by the Ger- 
man banks from their  inception in the middle of  the nineteenth 
century.  The German banking law  of  1931 permitted  a bank  to 
carry assets in fixed property and investments, but such investments 
could not exceed its capital.  This law also recognized the necessity 
of  maintaining an adequate relation of capital to depreciable invest- 
ments.  Assets in the form of  securities, not quoted on the German 
stock  exchanges,  could  not  exceed  a  fixed  percentage  of  total 
capital.l1° 
The NationaI Socialists also extended the control over the stock 
exchanges by  a decree of  March,  1933.  Under this law the Berlin 
Exchange was placed under the supervision of  the Prussian state corn- 
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missioner and the Chamber of  Industry and Commerce of  Berlin and 
was  managed  by  a  board  of  directors  whose  members  had  to be 
approved  by  the  Chamber  of  Industry  and  Commerce.ll'  The 
capital market was closely controlled, and the government's consent 
had to  be  obtained  for  all  private  issues.  These  were  restricted 
mainly to corporations manufacturing materials needed by the ~OV- 
ernment. 
The National Socialists bitterly attacked the tvhole principle of 
incorporated business particularly its impersonality and the so-called 
"democratic7' system of  control of  management by  shareholders, and 
in  its  place  urged  the  principle  of  "personal  responsibility"  and 
"leadership."  National  Socialism  not content with  abolishing de- 
mocracy  in German political  life, also sought to eliminate "share- 
holders  parliamentarianism."  As  a result a law was  passed  which 
transferred the control of  German corporations from stockholders, 
and placed these powers in the hands of  salaried directorates.  Fur- 
thermore, the boards of  supervision, which in the past had controlled 
the affairs of  German corporations, were deprived of  all powers of 
manapement.ll2 
ATTITUDE  TOWARD  CAPITALISM 
There  was  a  difference  in  the  theory  of  National  Socialism 
toward capitalism and its actual policy toward  the system.  While 
National  Socialism  favored  the principle  of  private property, the 
increasingly  difficult  economic  conditions forced  the  government 
into a  policy  of  what  amounted  to  partial confiscation of  private 
property.l13  Although the means of  production were still privately 
owned, they were placed under rigorous state control, and the out- 
put of almost  all raw and semi-manufactured materials as well  as 
food  products  was  placed  under  government  supervisory  boards. 
The government also follorved a policy of  practically drafting capital 
whenever  funds were  needed  for  public  works  and rearmament. 
Companies were prohibited from paying dividends in excess of  6 per- 
cent, with certain exceptions when an 8 percent rate was permitted, 
and profits in excess of  this amount had to be turned over to the 
Golddiskontbank to be placed in government bonds for a period of 
years.l14  The  government also compelled the "investment"  of 
in  industries which were essential to the state even though 
in  operation.l15  Dr.  Dietrich,  Chief  of  Press of  the 
National Socialist Party stated that : "The capitalist system has been 
by  the National Socialist System." 116  This statement was 
incorrect for German capitalism was not "replaced  or "de- 
stroyed" but rather modified  in that there was  an increase in the 
Public or governmental  nature of  the system.  Security capitalism 
continued in Germany though under strict government control. CRISIS  OF WORLD  SECURITY CAPITALISM  119 
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CRISIS OF  WORLD SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
THE  PREVIOUS  chapter has traced the crisis of  security capitalism in 
England, France and Germany in the post-war period.  This chapter 
will continue the analysis of  the crisis by studying the leading trends 
in  Italy,  Russia  and  Japan  and  finally  the  general  movement 
of  world security capitalism. 
MODIFICATION  OF  ITALIAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The position  of  Italy  in the years  immediately  following  the 
War was highly unsatisfactory.  The territorial gains from the War 
were  disappointing, for the newly-acquired  lands did not provide 
the basis for profitable colonial expansion.  After the close of  the 
War industrial  disorders  became  widespread  and  the  nation  was 
faced with  growing radicalism.  Italy was  in a  state of  economic 
deadlock, as strikes increased in violence and disturbed the industrial 
and financial systems.  The  middle class of  Italy, with large holdings 
of  securities,  bank  deposits  and real  property,  had  a  pencuniary 
stake in the maintenance of  Italian security capitalism, and threw 
its support on the side of  the large industrial and banking interests 
to prevent the possibility of  a proletarian uprising.  The combined 
forces of the middle and upper classes formed the social basis of  the 
movement which beginning with the march  on Rome in  1922 was 
to sweep .Parliamentary government  away  and to replace  it  with 
Fascism.  Mussolini, as the leader of  Italian fascism, expressed very 
definite views on the evolution of  capita1ism.l  The system, he held, 
passed  first through the dynamic period  from 1830 to  1870, which 
marked  the beginning of  the factory system, short  wars, short de- 
pressions and an inactive government  motivated  by  the theory of 
liberalism. The  static period, he held, began in 1870 with the growth 
of  cartels and trusts, the end of  free competition and government 
intervention.  These conditions, he maintained, lead to the period 
of  decline, of  "decadence" and of  the crisis of  capitalism.  It was the 
purpose of  Fascism  to save Italy from a repetition  of  this cycle of 
capitalism. 
The Facist government now proceeded  to change the nature of 
Italian  security  capitalism.  Economic  and  financial  life  was  or- 
ganized into unions which in turn were bound together into national 
confederations in the various fields of  activity. 
The first serious problem of  Italian security capitalism was  the 
weakness of the banking structure, impaired by  the ravages of  war 
and p-war  finance.  As  in the case of  Germany, in Italy in the 
immediate post-war  period  there  was  a  struggle between  banking 
and industrial security  capitalism.  In the pre-war period  Italian 
banks had controlled many  of  the important industries.  However 
in the post-war period there were continual attempts by  the indus- 
trial interests to obtain control of  the leading banks by  purchasing 
their shares in the open-market and then forcing the banks to grant 
liberal credit accommodation.  Thus the Perrone interests acquired 
a dominant position  in the Banca  Italiana di Sconto, and also ex- 
panded their holdings in the Banca  Commerciale Italiano, and the 
Fiat Company sought control of  the Credito Italiano.  The Banca 
Commerciale  Italiano  and the  Credito  Italiano,  despite  efforts to 
protect  themselves, were  forced to compromise with the industrial 
capitalists.' 
As  in the case of  Germany, the Italian banks had to write down 
a large proportion of  their capital after the financial disturbances of 
the immediate  post-war  peri~d.~  By  192  1  the  banking  structure 
was  near  collapse,  the  Banca  Italiana  di  Sconto  failed,  and  the 
Banca di Roma was on the verge of  failure due largely to "specula- 
tive  investment."  The Fascist  Government had  to  grant liberal 
assistance to support this weakened banking structure.  It created a 
new bank out of  the Banca Italiano di Sconto and granted assistance 
to the Banca di Roma.  Notwithstanding this aid by the government, 
the Italian banking structure was not soundly reorganized and this 
defect was apparent in the crisis after 1930.  Once more the Italian 
government had to support the banks.  So serious was  the financial 
position of the Italian banks that in March,  1935 the shares of the 
four big banks were removed from the stock exchange list.5  Because 
of the weakness of  the banking system the government had to form 
a number  of public financial institutions for the purpose of  com- 
pleting  the  liquidation  of  ~veakened industries  and  re-establish- 
ing essential economic activities.  The Instituta de Constructional 
Industrial was  established to wind up companies which were insolv- 
ent and no longer necessary to the nation.  The Instityto Mobiliare 
Italiano pnted long-term loans for  the rebuilding of  important 
COncerns.6 
INCREASE  IN NATIONAL  DEBT 
The second pressing ~roblern  of  Italian security capitalism was 
'he  national debt.  Statistics on the Italian national debt vary widely. 
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g~,ooo,ooo,ooo  lire in 1923 to only  io6,~63,ooo,ooo  lire in the first 
quarter of  1935.~  These figures, however, did not present  the full 
national  debt, for  actually  it rose  much  faster.  Moody's  Invest- 
ment Service stated that the total internal debt rose from gi,ooo,ooo,- 
ooo lire in 1925 to i28,ooo,ooo,ooo lire in 1935.  In addition in 1935 
there was an external loan of  ~82,000,000  and also a small sterling 
10an.~ Dr. Salvemini, a sharp critic of  Fascist policies, but a well- 
known  student of  public finance, in his study of  Italian debt, con- 
tended that  it rose  from  g3,275,ooo,ooo lire in 1922  to  148,646,- 
ooo,ooo lire in 1934.~  Fortune in an article on Italy in 1934 placed 
the total debt at the higher figure of i7o,ooo,ooo,ooo lire, exclusive of 
war debts.1° 
The financial  position  of the government  was  aggravated  by  a 
continual deficit since 1931.  Thus for the fiscal year of  1935-1936, 
expenditures of  the ordinary budget amounted to 20,000,000,000 lire 
and resulted in a net deficit of  over 3,000,000,000 lire.  In a special 
budget the total expenditures of  operations in East Africa incurred 
in that year amounted to another g,ooo,ooo,ooo lire.ll 
REBUILDING  OF RUSSIAN  SECURITY CAPITALISM 
An important movement in modern history was  the destruction 
of  the old and the building of  the new  Russian capitalism.  The 
capitalism of  Imperial Russia was essentially the same in nature as 
that of  other countries.  However the system was  seriously shattered 
by  the War.  Kerensky with  his  moderate policies was  unable to 
maintain the tottering structure, and the revolution in 1  g  17 brought 
the nation under the control of  the Soviet government  headed  by 
Lenin, a devout follower  of  Marx, and an active critic of  private 
security capitalism.  The Soviet government  swept  away  the  old 
Russian  capitalism.  All  industrial  properties,  including railways, 
factories and mines, were confiscated and turned over to the state, 
and the obligations of  the Czarist government were repudiated. 
In place of  the old system an entirely new financial structure was 
established by  the reorganization of  the banking system and by  the 
restoration  of  the capital  market.  The Soviet government  devel- 
oped an entirely new banking system centered  mainly around the 
Gosbank or State Bank, the Prombank or Industrial Bank, and the 
State  Savings  Bank.lz  The Gosbank  operated  several  thousand 
branches and carried the short-term deposits of  the state industrial 
enterprises.13  The Prombank  was  a corporation whose stock was 
owned  by  the  Supreme  Economic  Council,  the  commissariat  of 
finance, or secretary of  the treasury and several other government 
institutions."  Russian  industries were required to pay  25  percent 
of their  into the capital funds of the Prombank and also had 
to keep their long-term accounts with this instituti~n.'~  The Bank 
in turn was empowered to grant loans up to a period of  four years, 
and the borro~vers  were required to amortize these loans after the 
first year.  The interest rate on these loans varied according to the 
rate of  return of the industry and ranged from six percent  for the 
oil industry to two percent for the coal industry. 
RESTORATION  OF THE CAPITAL  MARKET 
From  1918 to 1921 the Soviet Government struggled along with- 
out utilizing the capital market.  Over these years, the Soviet gov- 
ernment  employed  the crude mechanism  of  individual  capitalism 
by issuing paper  money  for the purpose of  financing itself.  As  a 
result,  by  1922,  the  financial  position  of  the  Soviet  government 
was  as evidenced by  the declining value of  its mone- 
tary unit and by  the increasing deficit in its budget.  In order to 
check these  unsound  tendencies  the government  made use  of  the 
capital market  in  1922  when  it issued  a  short-term grain  loan.16 
However, after the devastating influences of  the war and the post- 
war period the available supply of  capital in the hands of  the public 
was  negligible, and there was  no market for the issue.  The gov- 
ernment therefore had to follow a policy of  a compulsory distribu- 
tion of  the bonds among the populace.  Under these conditions, the 
cost of  the first loan was high.  Notwithstanding these difficulties, the 
mechanism of  security capitalism proved more satisfactory than that 
of  individual capitalism and in the following years the Soviet gov- 
ernment continued to secure funds to finance  industry by  issuing 
bonds instead of  paper money. 
The next step in the return to security capitalism was the aboli- 
tion at least in name of  the compulsory distribution of  bonds and 
the institution  of  a  so-called voluntary  distribution  of  securities. 
The commissar of  finance entered the market to regulate the price 
of government bonds by repurchasing them from unwilling holders 
and selling them to willing investors.  As a result the bonds rose in 
price until they reached  95 in 1926J7 
The  next step in the restoration of  the capital market came when 
the Soviet government, in spite of  its political  philosophy, realized 
'hat  saving had  to be encouraged in order  to mobilize  capital to 
meet the investment demands of  the state.18  Even under commun- 
ism there was machinery for the accumulation of  saving in the form 
the State Saving Bank with  20,000 branches including the local 
Post-offices.  Saving under private  security capitalism is essentially 
Yoluntary in nature and is undertaken by individuals and to a grow- 
lng extent by corporations.  Under public security capitalism, sav- 122  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
ing becomes involuntary in character and is undertaken by individ- 
uals  and  by  government-controlled  agencies  which  make  repay- 
ments  of  their  surplus to  the treasury;  these  two  forms may  be 
described respectively as private and social saving.l0 
Saving under a communist system must naturally be largely com- 
pulsory in nature, since there are not the same motives for saving as 
under private capitalism.  There is supposedly no need  to save in 
order to provide for old age or incapacity, since these contingencies 
are provided for by the state.  Furthermore there is no incentive to 
save  to  enter  business,  since  enterprise  is  publicly  controlled. 
Private saving is accomplished by  the direct investment in govern- 
ment  loans,  and by  indirect  investment  through  deposits  in sav- 
ings banks and through the purchase of  shares in co-operative or- 
ganizations.  To a  large extent  this private saving  is  compulsory 
rather than voluntary, since the purchase of  shares in the co-opera- 
tives  is  really  required, and the purchase  of  state bonds is made 
by  monthly deductions from wages.  Furthermore, state bonds can 
only be sold after permission is granted by government authoritie~.~~ 
Saving  deposits,  however,  are  superficially  voluntary  in  nature. 
The Soviet government followed a conscious policy of  encouraging 
saving banks  for  the purpose  of  increasing  the  supply  of  capital 
funds.  To this  end workers  in certain  factories were  paid  with 
deposit accounts in the saving banks.21 
As  a result  of  an intensive campaign to mobilize the saving of 
the people, from 1928 to the beginning of  1933 the number of  sav- 
ing bank depositors increased from 3,500,ooo to 24,000,000, and de- 
posits rose from 2 I 3,200,ooo roubles to almost ~,ooo,ooo,ooo  roubles. 
Over  the same  period  the number  of  state  loan  subscribers rose 
from 8,ooo,ooo, to 40,000,000, and the amount of  the bonds distrib- 
uted  among  the  population  from  4 i i ,ooo,ooo  to  5,442,000,ooo 
It was estimated that in 1937 there were 45,000,ooo Rus- 
sian bondho1de1-s.23 The internal holding of  the national debt rose 
from  1,422,000,000  roubles  in  October,  1928  to  22,s I 3,700,ooo 
roubles in January,  lgg;r.24 
Thus communism, after seeking to destroy pre-war Russian se- 
curity capitalism and after its unsuccessful attempt to revert to the 
financial  mechanism  of  individual capitalism  returned  to security 
capitalism.  The banking structure was rebuilt by  the formation of 
several powerful state banks.  Also the capital market was  restored 
through the issuing of  government securities and the encouragement 
of  saving.  Since all the banks were owned by the government and 
all the securities in the capital market were those of the government, 
the Russian system represented the extreme form of  public security 
capitalism. 
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RISE  OF JAPANESE  SECURITY CAPITALISM 
While  the  evolution  of  the  nations  of  western  Europe  from 
feudalism to security capitalism required several centuries, the same 
transition took  place in ,Japan in less than three-quarters of  a cen- 
tury.  In fact Japan really never passed through the stage of  indi- 
vidual capitalism  but evolved directly  from  fe,udalism to security 
capitali~n~.  Japan  therefore missed  the benefits of the  transition 
stage of individual capitalism which  in other countries led to  the 
growth of a middle class and provided a stabilizing force in the evo- 
lution of economic society.  For several centuries Japan continued 
in a stage of political and economic feudalism, and was governed by 
a military and agricultural aristocracy living on hereditary pensions 
and supported by the masses who were practically serfs.  The domi- 
nant political  figure was the Shogun, the head  of  the leading clan, 
the Emperor possessing little actual power.25 This feudal system was 
swept away by  the revolution of  1868 which was largely an alliance 
of the merchant class with one of  the feudal groups against the ruling 
clan.Z6 As  a result, the Shogun was  displaced and the Emperor re- 
stored to power.  Japan now entered the stage of  political  national- 
ism, and a strong central government sought to overcome the power 
of  the feudal nobles. 
A determined effort was made by the Emperor to introduce the 
political  and economic  institutions of  western  security  capitaiism. 
In the first  place he endeavored  to establish the system  of  parlia- 
mentary  government.  Voting  power was  first bestowed cautiously 
but in time culminated  in widespread  s~ffrage.~'  In  1871 Japan 
adopted the gold yen as  the nominal standard, although in actual 
practice  the  nation  continued  on  an  inconvertible  paper  basis. 
Japanese  security  capitalism  was  given  a  powerful  stimulus when 
the government began the practice of  giving bonds to the Samurai 
in payment of  their hereditary pensions.28 Thus their income under 
security capitalism consisted of  the return on these ~ecurities.~~  For 
most of the lower Samurai this new return was small, but for many 
of the upper group it was large.  In a number of  cases these bonds 
were used to provide the capital for founding banks, and as a result 
the banking system came into the hands of  the old aristocracy.  Thus 
Japanese security capitalism did not grow as a result of  natural evo- 
lution  but was  introduced  and  nurtured  largely  through  govern- 
mental action. 
SLOW  ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROGRESS  UNTIL THE WAR 
Economic progress was at first slow, and the transition from feu- 
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nineties.  The war with China brought about a rapid expansion of 
manufacture and foreign trade.3O  Railroad development came much 
later than in the other capitalist countries, for it was not until  1873 
that the first railroad  was  con~tructed.~~  Private  capital took  an 
active part in railway development in the eighties, but the govern- 
ment assumed leadership which became increasingly important after 
the  Russo-Japanese  war  so  that  in  time  the government  owned 
the trunk lines and the private corporations operated only the feeder 
lines.s2  After  1890 the textile  industry  made  pr0gress.3~ It was 
not, however, until after 1900 that the steel industry expanded.34 
In most countries, the coming of  security capitalism was  accom- 
panied by  an improvement  not only  in manufacture and in com- 
merce but also in agriculture.  However, in the case of  Japan agri- 
culture continued in an almost primitive state.35 
The period from the closing decade of  the nineteenth century 
until  the  Great  War witnessed  rapid  economic  expansion.  The 
number of factories increased from 9,234 in 1904 to 17,062 in 19 14; 
railway mileage rose from 2,118 miles to 7,074 miles from 1894 to 
1914; over the same period foreign trade rose from a gross value of 
235,000,ooo yen to 1,223,000,000 yen  and the number of  corpora- 
tions from 2,844 to i6,858.36 
THE FINANCIAL  SYSTEM 
The evolution of the financial system was  at first very halting. 
The government  established  a  central  bank,  the  Bank  of  Japan, 
modelled after the Bank of  Belgium, and also a banking structure 
in imitation of the national banking system of  the United States.37 
However,  these steps in financial organization at first  were uasuc- 
cessful due to the fact that they represented an effort to impose the 
banking institutions of  a developed security capitalism on a country 
which had scarcely passed out of  fe~dalism.~~  The system of  special- 
ized  investment  banking did not  develop, and the distribution  of 
securities was undertaken by the commercial banks.  Stock exchanges 
were established  in Tokio in 1877 and later in Osaka, but the se- 
curity markets made slow progress until the beginning of  the twen- 
tieth century.38  It was not until 1870 that the Japanese government 
floated its first bond issue.40 The wars with China and Russia led 
to further issues in the foreign markets, and as  a result  the total 
debt rose sharply.  U711ile most of  the proceeds of  the public debt 
were applied to war at the same time a part was productive in that 
it was used in railway expansion. 
It was not until 1890 that the state and local governments were 
organized  separately  and  exercised  their  debt-creating  p~wers.~l 
Municipal  borrowing first began  in  1899 when  the city of  Kobe 
obtained a small loan in London, but in later years the large cities 
floated  extensive  loans  in foreign markets particularly  for  public 
utility development.  Corporate borrowing  came late, and it was 
not until 1906 that the first corporate issue was floated in the foreign 
market.  While  Japan  made  progress  in  corporate  organization, 
many of  the large companies were owned and controlled by family 
interests which possessed large capital resources and had no need of 
obtaining additional funds from the security  market,^.'^ 
The domestic supply of capital in Japan was  small.  Defeated 
politically in 1868 the landowner class retained most of its economic 
power and commanded a large part of the domestic supply of capital, 
but very  little of this capital was  placed  in the security markets.48 
The scarcity of capital in Japan was evidenced by  the high interest 
rates which prevailed in the Japanese money markets.  As a result, 
the greater part of the Japanese public debt was  floated in foreign 
countries. 
EXPANSION  AFTER  THE  WAR 
In the post-war period there was considerable social unrest par- 
ticularly among the laborers, the farm hands and the intellectuals. 
This growing  radicalism  was  opposed  by  a  rising  tide of  fascism 
which represented  the revival  of  agrarian feudalism in its struggle 
against  industrial  and  banking  security  capitalism.  The fascist 
movement  made further progress in  1936 when  the military coup 
brought in the Hirota Government.14  However in the elections in 
1937 the anti-fascist parties increased their representation in Parlia- 
ment.  The demonstration of  the strength of  the labor party was 
favorably regarded  by the bankers who welcomed any  aid against 
the military power.46  The  World War gave a powerful stimulus to 
Japanese  industry which furnished the Far East not only with war 
supplies but with manufactured goods/6  Industrial production in- 
creased in the post-war period as evidenced by the rise in the output 
of pig iron, steel and to some extent coal, while the index of  general 
production  increased sharply  particularly after  1932 .la  From  i g  14 
to 1930 the number of  factories rose from 17,062 to 62,234, and the 
"Umber  of corporations from 16,853 to 5 1,910.~~ 
DEVELOPMENT  OF FINANCIAL  ORGANIZATION 
In the post-war period there was a marked trend toward banking 
Concentration as  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  between  igig  and 
!93Q9  the number of  banks decreased while the capital funds  (paid 
In capital  and reserve  fund) of  the remaining  institutions  rose." 
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the nation.51  There was also a growing concentration in the under- 
writing and purchasing of corporate bonds in the hands of  powerful 
syndicates composed of the larger banking  institution^.^^  It is esti- 
mated  that 62  per cent  of the bond  issues wcre  taken up by  the 
business banks,  15 percent by  the savings banks and the remainder 
by security dealers, trust and insurance companies and government 
Another estimate  claims that  go  percent  of all do- 
mestic issues were taken up by  institutions of  indirect inve~tment.~~ 
BY 1930 there were six security exchanges, of  which those in Tokio 
and  Osaka  were  the  most  important.  Some  of  these  exchanges 
continued  to deal  both  in securities and in produce  thus indicat- 
ing that the security markets had  not yet reached  the stage of spe- 
cialization of  operation characteristic of  developed security capital- 
ism.  The  operations of even the leading exchanges were small when 
compared with those of  other countries.65 
LIMITATIONS  OF THE CAPITAL  MARKET 
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The demand for capital came largely from the national and local 
governments.  Although  the  budget  of  the  national  government 
nominally showed surpluses the government continually entered the 
capital  market.56  The national  debt  rose  moderately  to  3,668,- 
ooo,ooo  yen  in  1920  and  then  continuously  to  g,G13,ooo,ooo  in 
1935.~~  In addition the debt of  the local governments reached 3,187,- 
ooo,ooo yen by  ig35.58 Corporate finance remained relatively unim- 
portant  in Japan.  The government owned and operated  the im- 
portant  public  utilities,  railways,  telegraph  and  telephones,  and 
through public monopolies administered the sale of  many necessities. 
Another  factor  which  further restricted  the  private  demand  for 
capital in the security market was  the fact that many of the large 
corporations were controlled by family interests, as the Mitsui and 
the Mitsubishi,  which  had  no  need  of  securing capital  from  the 
security market.58  In the post-war period the supply of  capital in- 
creased.60  National  saving funds rose  from  i,ijg7,ooo,ooo yen  in 
'92 1  to 5,157,000,000 yen  in  1  935.'j1  Capital was  largely  concen- 
trated in the hands of  a small proportion of  the population.  Japan 
lacks  almost  completely  a  middle class which  through  its  saving 
contributed to the supply of  new capital.  Although the income tax 
Was levied on all incomes above 1,200 yen there were only 569.046 
such taxpayers in igg i P2 Direct security ownership did not become 
Popular in Japan, and there was no wide diffusion of  securities as 
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MILITARY  CHARACTER  OF  JAPANESE  CAPITALISM 
The striking feature of  Japanese capitalism in recent years was 
the extensive application of  capital to war purposes.  The  budgetary 
expenditure for armament was 6.rjo,ooo,ooo yen in 1920, fell to 434,- 
ooo,ooo yen in 1926 then rose to 1,022,000,000 yen in 1935.~' The 
proportion  of  stated armament  expenditures to total  expenditures 
dropped from 48 percent in 1920 to 27.5 percent in 1926 but rose 
to 47.8 percent in 1935.~~  In addition to the stated budgetary appro- 
priations  for war,  it is  charged that there were also large  indirect 
expenditures  which  did not  appear  in the budget  as  armament 
itemse6 
The Japanese  government  placed  the  task  of  supporting the 
burden of  armament expenditure squarely upon security capitalism. 
The tax policy, as stated in 1936, was a "re-distribution of  the tax 
burden as equitably as possible over the whole nation so that the in- 
cidence may fall heavier on the urban rather than the rural popula- 
tion, on corporations than on individuals and on personal than on 
real  property."  67  As  a result  the government derived  its revenues 
essentially from income, inheritance and corporate taxes.68  In 1937 
the  struggle  between  the military  and financial  interests  became 
intensified.  On the one hand the military interests sought to revive 
the feudal system of  the Shogun abolished in 1868, while the bankers 
sought to retain  their influence through  remnants of  the nominal 
parliamentary  form of  government.  Since government bonds and 
corporate securities were almost entirely held by the large industrial- 
ists and bankers, they had the greatest stake in maintaining Japanese 
security capitalism  and supporting  the credit  of  the government. 
These groups therefore opposed  the extreme steps of  the military 
class.  In recent  years  the Mitsubishi  group favored  a  moderate 
policy, while the Mitsui gave some backing to the military class.  The 
former, in general, urged financial stability, while the latter was will- 
ing to lend an ear to inflationary policies.60 
CONCLUSION 
Because of  the rapidity of  the changes which occurred since 1868, 
the Japanese  economic  system  contained  the  survival  of  feudal 
characteristics as well as the features of  early and developed security 
capitalism.  This confusion in the economic system led to the adop- 
tion of national  and international political  and economic  policies 
which may prove serious in the coming years.  Japanese capitalism 
entered upon imperialism without having first developed the neces- 
sary institutions to support such a program.  Imperialism demands 
the continu~~6  export of large amounts of  capital.  Thus the ex- 
ploitation of  Formosa. Manchukuo and China demanded an enor- 
mous  flow of capital  from Japan which  has  not  even  a  sufficient 
to complete the financing of  her own industrial revoluti~n.~~ 
An incompletely developed security capitalism is thus being used as 
a mechanism to carry out an ambitious policy of  international  ex- 
pansion which threatens eventually to cause Japan serious economic 
and political difficulties. 
CRISIS  OF  INTERNATIONAL  SE.CURITY  CAPITALISM 
The  background of  world security capitalism following the Great 
War was entirely different from that after the Napoleonic IVars and 
throughout  the  remainder  of  the  nineteenth  century,  for  the 
political,  financial,  economic and philosophic  setting was  now  dis- 
tinctly  unfavorable.  Parliamentarianism  in a  number  of  nations 
lvas replaced  by  authoritarism in the form of  communism or fasc- 
ism.  The period  of  comparative  international peace  gave way  to 
international hostility which led to the Great War and in the post- 
war period to the French invasion of  the Ruhr, the Japanese occu- 
pation of  Manchuria and invasion of  China, the Italian conquest of 
Ethiopia and the Spanish civil war. 
In the Napoleonic period the great nations of  the World were 
still largely in the stage of  individual capitalism which constituted 
a relatively simple economy.  Wars were financed largely by the issue 
of  paper  money, and the financial  and economic resources  of  the 
nation were only partly mobilized so that the adverse effect on the 
economic system  was  relatively  small.  On the other hand,  in the 
period until the Great IVar, most of  the major nations had acquired 
the highly  complicated  structure of  developed  security  capitalism. 
The financial system  was  perfected  to a point  where most  of the 
resources of the nation could be fully mobilized  for war  purposes. 
The shock  of  war,  therefore,  was  far more  serious  to  the highly 
organized and integrated structures of  these nations.  The carefully 
wrought  interrelations not  only within  the national  economy but 
r+'ith other nations were seriously disturbed.  Furthermore, the def- 
icits of the national  governments  were now no longer financed  by 
issuance of  paper money. but through the flotation  of  govern- 
mental securities.  England had been the first nation to utilize the 
machinery of  security capitalism on a large scale to finance her wars, 
"nd  the  succesdul  conflict  against  Napoleon  was  made  possible 
through the sale of  governmental securities.  After the Napoleonic 
'Vars, a few of the Continental  nations also issued  securities, but 
were sold largely in the London market.  It was not until the 130  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
second half  of  the nineteenth  century that the system of security 
capitalism was  widely applied to war  financing.  As  noted  before 
security issues were utilized to finance the Franco-Prussian War and 
to maintain the vast armies in the years which followed.  The Great 
War  however  was  the  first  general  conflict  in  which  security 
capitalism, in addition to paper  money, was universally  employed 
by  the  belligerents  to  obtain  the necessary  purchasing  power  to 
maintain their armed forces.  The significance of  the system of  se- 
curity capitalism was not understood in 1914  by those who predicted 
the conflict would be short because of  the impossibility of  supplying 
sufficient financial means to continue a prolonged war. These proph- 
ets failed to realize that the perfection of the financial  machinery 
of  developed security capitalism, by fully mobilizing the resources of 
the  nations,  made  possible  the prolongation  of  modern  warfare. 
However this very prolongation in the end brought about an exhaus- 
tion which impaired not only the financial but the entire economic 
structure. 
UNSATISFACTORY  SETTING OF POST-WAR  CAPITALISM 
After  1918 every effort was made to rebuild the monetary foun- 
dation of pre-war security capitalism.  The gold standard, the mone- 
tary basis of nineteenth century security capitalism, was restored in 
England  and in most  of  the Continental countries.  The restored 
gold  standard, however, was  maintained  only  by  liberal  loans  of 
Great Britain and of the United States.  The depression forced the 
abandonment of the international gold standard, and most countries 
of the world adopted a system of controlled or managed  currency. 
The  monetary mechanism now became a weapon to be used by the 
nations of  the world in their political and economic struggles against 
each other. 
In the period of  the rise and development of  security capitalism 
world  production  stimulated  by  the  industrial  revolution  rose 
sharply, but after  1913 the rate of increase declined.?l  After  1934 
there was a recovery in production induced largely by  the activities 
of  the heavy industries to meet the needs of  increasing armament. 
While  this  artificial  stimulus had  an  immediate  favorable  effect, 
the ultimate results in bringing about a one-sided expansion and un- 
productive capital expenditure are bound to be serious. 
One of  the basic factors which  favored the progress of  security 
capitalism throughout the nineteenth  century was  the satisfactory 
adjustment between world ~roduction  and world trade, for the ex- 
pansion of  industrial production was absorbed by widening foreign 
markets.  In the post-war period, the neo-mercantilist policies involv- 
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ing quotas, tariffs and controlled exchange, all tended to check the ex- 
pansion of foreign trade.  In the period from 1932 to 1935 inclusive 
there developed a growing maladjustment between world production 
and world trade, as may be seen in table 13. 
PRODUCTION  AND TRADE  OF  THE WORLD,  1932-1935.7a 
(percent, 1929 =  loo) 
From  these  figures  it is  seen  that  production  of  the  world 
dropped to 69 percent  in  1932, and then  recovered  sharply to 95 
percent  in  1935.  On the other hand world trade dropped to 74 
percent in 1932, and showed little recovery in the following years. 
An important social difference between security capitalism in the 
post-Napoleonic period and to-day has been the change in the trend 
of  population.  In the early and developed stages of  security capital- 
ism, the population of  the world more than doubled.  After 1913 the 
rate of  increase in world population slackened.73 
In the pre-war period the attitude of  economic philosophy  was 
generally favorable to the development of  security capitalism.  The 
prevailing cIassical philosophy preached  laissez faire and in general 
favored the operation of  a system untrammeled by government regu- 
lation.  True, the growing Marxian philosophy attacked the entire 
system, but with the exception of  the disturbances of  1848 and of 
1871, the political structure of  security capitalism was never seriously 
menaced.  In the post-war period  there was  a complete change in 
the philosophic  attitude toward  security  capitalism.  Laissez  faire 
gave way  to a revival of  mercantilism which extended governmental 
regulation to almost every institution of security capitalism.  Fur- 
thermore, world security capitalism was now threatened by  militant 
international  Marxism.  As  noted  before  the revisionist  socialists, 
influenced by  the generally satisfactory conditions in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, had departed from the extreme views of 
the master and had even recognized the beneficial characteristics of 
security capitalism.  Another group had held uncompromisingly to 
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stage of  the latter nineteenth century was merely a passing episode in 
the evolution of  modern capitalism.  Revolutionary socialism found 
expression in communist philosophy expounded particularly by  Ni- 
colai Lenin. As the leading nations passed from the developed to the 
critical  stage of  security  capitalism, economic  crises became  more 
intense,  social  welfare  declined  and political  revolutionary  move- 
ments as  that in Russia  grew in severity.  These tendencies disil- 
lusioned the moderate socialists and strengthened the extremists. 
CHANGING NATURE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
The post-war period brought about drastic changes in the central 
banks, the private banks, the incorporated banks and the stock ex- 
changes.  A  leading tendency in European central banking in the 
post-war period  was  the initial relaxation  and the subsequent re- 
newal  of  regulation  bfr  the national  governments.  The necessity 
during the War of obtaining unlimited advances from the central 
bank naturally led to increased control by  the state.  Such control 
militated against the interest of  private security capitalism, and in 
the years immediately following the close of  the War a vigorous ef- 
fort was made to break the grip of  the governments over the central 
banks.  This attitude of international private security capitalism was 
expressed in the resol'u'tion of the Brussels conference of  1920 "that 
banks and especially banks of  issue should be  free from political 
pressure  and should be conducted solely on the lines of  prudent 
finance." 74  This policy was followed by the League of  Nations in its 
financial reconstruction of  Austria and of  Hungary and in the estab- 
lishment of  central banks in Esthonia and in Greece.  All these ef- 
forts were nullified with the coming of  the depression, and as a re- 
sult almost every central bank came to be closely controlled by the 
national government. 
In almost  every country  the financial  organization  of  the old 
individual capitalism was controlled mainly by the private banker. 
However, in the developed stage of  security capitalism the private 
banker was replaced by the incorporated bank.  The  post-war period 
swept away this vestige of  individual capitalism in the eclipse of  the 
private bank.  The Krueger and Toll Company, in its last annual 
report of  1931, claimed that one of  the dominating forces in the 
crisis was the "disappearance  of  the great merchant houses and pri- 
vate bankers who had a wide latitude in the choice of  their invest- 
ments, and the substitution for them of  industrial corporations, large 
deposit banks, and insurance companies more restricted in the use of 
their funds to clearly specified investments." 75 
In the post-war period the large joint-stock banks tended more 
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and more to perform the operations of  both commercial and invest- 
ment banking.  During the first post-war depression the banks, in 
order to recover their loans, were compelled to take over the control 
of many industries.  Due to the tardiness of  the recovery in the fol- 
lowing years the liquidation of  these frozen assets moved very slowly, 
and was only partially completed when the second post-war depres- 
sion began in 1928.'" 
The movement  for bank concentration made rapid headway in 
the depression period, since it frequently became necessary for the 
strong institutions to take over the weaker ones.  Thus in Belgium 
the SociCte Generale absorbed a number of  other Belgium  banks, 
and as a result controlled a major part of  the aggregate bank assets 
of the nati~n.~'  Throughout the depression there was  a sharp de- 
cline in the proportion  of  loans and discounts to total assets, and 
a  marked  increase  in  security  holdings.7s  With  the  growth  of 
public as compared with  private security capitalism, the banks by 
necessity were forced to take over an increasing proportion  of  gov- 
ernment securities, and so the financial position of  the banking sys- 
tem became dependent upon the credit of  the national government. 
Today  with  the  leading  banks  of  the  world  holding  so  large  a 
proportion of the national debts, the very future of  security capital- 
ism rests on the maintenance of  the soundness of  national credit. 
The stock exchanges of  the world held a less significant position 
in the financial organization.  Even before the War the importance 
of the stock exchange had been diminishing in a large measure due 
to the effect of banking concentration since the amalgamated banks 
cancelled out the buying and selling orders of securities within their 
own  organizations.  Throughout  the depression  period,  the stock 
exchange was  further weakened  by  the decline  in the amount of 
corporate financing for in many cases the volume of  security trans- 
actions was placed under an embargo in order to conserve capital re- 
sources for the government iss~es."~ 
FAILURE  OF CO-OPERATIVE  EFFORTS 
In  the post-war private security capitalism was confronted with a 
serious menace  in the form of  communism.  Not  only did com- 
munism capture Russian security capitalism, but, through its support 
of the Third Internationale, waged war against  security capitalism 
in other countries.  Thus the manifesto of  the Third Internationale 
in  1919 in summary stated that: 
Finance-capital which has flung mankind into the abyss of  war, has also 
Suffered. The complete deterioration of  paper money reflects the general 
deadly crisis of  capitalist  commodity  exchange.80 134  FINANCE  CAPITALISM  CRISIS OF WORLD  SECURITY  CAPITALISM  135 
In the face of  this threat the leaders of  security capitalism realized 
the  necessity  of  cooperating  to maintain  the  system  throughout 
Western Europe.  This motive was an important factor influencing 
the flow of  international capital in the years immediately following 
the close of  the War.  Thus Herbert Hoover in 192 i stated: 
The whole of  American policies during the liquidation of  the Armistice, 
was  to  contribute  everything it  could  to  prevent  Europe  from  going 
Bolshevik or  being overrun by  their armies.81 
Sir William Goode, British  Director  of  Relief  in Central Europe, 
in his official report declared: 
.  .  .  half of  Europe had hovered on the brink of  Bolshevism.  If  it had not 
been  for  the  £157  million  in  relief  credits  granted  to  Central  and 
Eastern Europe between  1919 and  1921, it would have  been impossible 
to  provide  food  and  coal  and  the sea  and  land  transport  for  them. 
Two and one-half years  after the Armistice the back  of  Bolshevism in 
Central  Europe  had  been  broken,  largely  by  relief  credits. . . The 
expenditure of  £137  million was  probably one of  the best  international 
investments from a financial and political point of  view  ever recorded 
in history.a2 
Through the League of  Nations,  international  security capitalism 
made drastic efforts to buttress the system of  private security capital- 
ism.  Loans were extended to Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, 
the Free  City of Danzig  and Esthonia,  under a  system of  drastic 
financial  control  by  the League.=  The immediate result  of  this 
international financial  cooperation  was  satisfactory.  However,  in 
the end the movement failed, for it served only as a basis for over- 
lending.  The  efforts  at cooperation were rendered ineffective by the 
unrestrained  competition among the international  money  centers. 
In the pre-war period  the investment  banks of  London, Paris, 
Berlin and later New  York  respected  each other's fields of  opera- 
tion.  In the post-war period  such  restraint  was  abandoned,  and 
unrestricted competition marked  the relations among the financial 
centers.  In a large measure this change of  policy was brought about 
by  the action of  the New York  banking houses in their efforts to 
conquer new fields abroad.  However, the Continental financial cen- 
ters also entered into the new competition, and Paris, Zurich, Am- 
sterdam and even Stockholm became serious competitors of  the Lon- 
don investment houses. 
In 1930 the leaders of  security capitalism made an effort to at- 
tain  closer  cooperation  among  the  central  banks  of  the  world 
through the formation of  the Bank for International Settlements.  It 
was hoped that this institution would play an important part in the 
development of  the system of  international security capitalism, since 
the Bank was given the right to issue not only short but also long- 
~bli~ations  and was  granted  extensive  open  market  powers. 
However, the nationalistic interests of the leading countries doomed 
this institution  to failure, and its  accomplishments  were insignifi- 
cant. 
With the intensification of the depression the struggle of inter- 
national security capitalism against the forces of  political nationalism 
became more serious.  The first ominous rift of  the international 
banking structure came with the failure of  the Austrian  Creditan- 
stalt.84 This bank along with other Viennese institutions, had been 
facing serious  difficulties for several  years.  However,  the extent 
of its  reverses  was  not  realized  by  the  general  public  until  the 
publication of  its financial statement in May  1931.85  Again, inter- 
national  security  capitalism  made  every effort  to prevent  the col- 
lapse of  the Bank, but in vain, for the political rivalry between Ger- 
many  and  France  nullified every  effort at  financial  cooperation. 
Throughout the depression and even in the recovery after 1932 in- 
ternational banking capitalism made little headway in attaining close 
cooperation among the great financial centers of  the world. 
INCREASING  CAPITAL DEMAND 
The demand for capital in the post-war period was heavy.  The 
requirements of  corporations  were  considerable in order to make 
up for postponed maintenance and also to modernize plants.  While 
it is true that the demand for capital for the development of  new 
countries and for the building of  railroads declined, nevertheless in 
view  of  the speeding up of  the tempo of  industrial activity  there 
was a heavy demand for capital to overcome obsolescence.  The  de- 
mand for capital by the governments, particularly after 1930, in al- 
most  every country was even greater than that of  private industry. 
The demand was caused first by  the increase in armament expen- 
ditures.  Modern armament, being essentially mechanized in nature, 
required large outlays of capital to pay  for heavy  artillery, battle- 
ships, tanks, and aeroplanes together with the auxiliary equipment 
in the form of  docks, hangars and landing fields. 
During the War period  armament  expenditures accounted  for 
the greater pan of  total  expenditures.  In the case of  England it 
amounted  to as much  as  89 percent  and  in the case  of  France  it 
reached 82  percent.86  The proportion  fell off  sharply in the years 
the War but after iggo the disbursements for armament 
amin increased very rapidly.  The report of the Bank for Interna- 
tional Settlements stated that "for the world as a whole, the level of 
armament  expenditure in  1936 was,  on a gold  basis,  three times 
than in lg13.9187  Due to the severity of the depression and 1  36  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
the serious social distress which  followed, the various governments 
were forced to use their credit to grant direct relief  to the unem- 
ployed  or to maintain  public works to supplement the declining 
activity of  private industry. 
As  a result of  this financing for armament and relief  purposes, 
the proportion of  government issues to the total of  security offerings 
in  most of  the  leading  capital  markets  of  the  World  increased 
sharply.  The proportion for England rose from 26  percent in 1929 
to 74 percent in 1933.  Over the same period the proportion for the 
United States rose from 7 percent to 96 percent.  For Germany the 
proportion rose from  1 percent in 193  1 to 60 percent in  1933.  In 
the case of  France over the period from 1930 to 1933, the proportion 
declined from 23 per cent to 14 
As a result the aggregate national debts of  the leading countries 
of  the world expanded from ~5,163,000,ooo  in 1898 to E24,408,ooo,- 
ooo by  1935.~~  The debt of Great  Britain, France, Italy  and the 
United  States particularly  rose.g0 
The burden of this national  debt may  be seen from Table 14 
which  shows  the decline  in the  extent  to which  wealth  covered 
national debt in the leading countries of  the world in the pre-war 
and post-war periods. 
TABLE  14 
CHANGES  IN  PROPORTION  OF NATIONAL  WEALTH  TO 
NATIONAL  DEBT  OF LEADING  COUNTRIES  g1 
(percent) 
r  1 
COUNTRY 
POST-WAR  *  I  '9'3 
1  I  I 
Explanation: 
* Post-War figure for 
England is 1928 
France is 1928 
Germany is 1928 
United States is  1930 
From this table it is seen that there was a decline in the extent 
to which  national  wealth  covered  national  debt  in  the  post-war 
period as compared with the pre-war period.  The largest drop took 
place in the United States where the coverage fell from qoo times to 
20 times.  In the case of England the coverage fell from  20 times 
to only a little over 2 times.  In the case of  France the coverage fell 
England. ......................... 
France. ..........................  ........................  Germany.  ....................  United States. 
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from 9 times to a little over  2  times.  Only in Germany was  the 
change relatively  small, with a decline from 60 times to 40 times. 
As  a result of these various forces, there was an increase in the 
public element in the security capitalism of  almost every leading na- 
tion, due to the necessity of financing the War, and later of  alle- 
viating the depression.  In the case of  some countries, as Russia and 
Germany, this public nature of security capitalism was  carried to 
an extreme form.  However, even  in other countries,  as  England 
and the United States which retained the democratic form of  gov- 
ernment, the necessities of the war and depression  similarly placed 
emphasis on the public aspect as evidenced by the increasing propor- 
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In the post-war period, there was a general extension of  the con- 
trol of  the government over the institutions of  security capitalism. 
There was  a  widespread  movement  to reform  the corporate law. 
New  statutes governing  corporations  were  passed  in almost  every 
These laws sought to protect  the investor in corporate 
securities by prohibiting stock watering, the issuance of  stock below 
par, and by requiring compulsory reserves.  In some cases corporate 
law was  liberalized to recognize such practices as the issue of  non- 
voting shares and convertible bonds. 
A complete change took place in the relation between the banks 
and the government throughout Europe.  Before the War the sys- 
tem of  government supervision, as developed  in the United States, 
was  practically non-existent in Europe.  This situation changed en- 
tirely in the post-war period, and the intimate relationship between 
banking and government became an important  feature of  present- 
day  world  banking.  This movement began  with  the outbreak  of 
the War, when the belligerent governments promptly exercised con- 
trol over all forms of  finance.  During the inflation period  which 
accompanied the War, governments made every effort to sustain their 
depreciated currencies by a system of  rigid exchange control which 
brought the operations of  the banks under direct supervision of  the 
government.  A  more serious form of  regulation  occurred in the 
first post-war reaction.  The depression  at first swept  away  many 
of  the  smaller  banks  in  several  countries,  but  as  the crisis  con- 
tinued, some of  the larger institutions were also threatened with fail- 
ure.  The amalgamation movement of  the preceding years had de- 
veloped institutims of such size that their downfall would have in- 
volved the financial structure of  the entire nation, and would have 
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necessary for the government to give financial assistance in one form 
or another.  In some cases it was accomplished by  the central bank 
extending liberal rediscounting  privileges  to the particular  banks 
in difficulty.  In other cases a special organization was formed as the 
Kreditkassen which helped embarrassed Swedish banks.  When the 
leading bank in Copenhagen failed, it was necessary for the Danish 
parliament to come to the rescue and guarantee a large proportion 
of the obligations.  A similar procedure had to be followed by the 
Norwegian  government which was forced to take over the liquida- 
tion of  the failed banks and guarantee their future obligations. 
In several countries the failure of  these big banks and the conse- 
quent danger to public credit brought about a change in govern- 
ment policy toward banking.  Whereas before the War the govern- 
ments had pursued a laissez-faire  policy, they now adopted a program 
of  supervision. 
During the depression in a number of  countries, the governments 
were again forced  to support  the tottering banking structure.  In 
Switzerland in 1932 the Federal government established a Caisse des 
PrCts for the purpose of  granting advances to illiquid banks.  The 
government purchased the stock of  a number of  banks in order to 
provide them with the necessary capital to write off  assets.g3 Simi- 
larly the Swedish government, in 1932 had to assist the Scandinavian 
Credit Corporation which had suffered serious reverses through the 
failure of  Ivan  Krueger.  The Austrian  government,  and foreign 
creditors, became the joint  owners of  the Creditanstalt.  The Aus- 
trian government was  also compelled  to give financial assistance to 
other Viennese  banks,  through  the formation of  a trust company, 
to purchase the frozen assets of  the banks and to furnish them with 
new capital.g4 
As  a result  of  the depression  of  the thirties  control over  the 
financial system was further extended.  The legislation on banking 
was  based on the orthodox  theory  which  sought to attain greater 
liquidity and to separate commercial from investment banking op- 
erations. The Swiss bank law of  1934 provided for a fixed minimum 
proportion  of  reserve assets to short-term  liabilities; the law  also 
sought to increase solvency by  prescribing a minimum  percentage 
between capital funds and total liabilitieso5  The Swedish bank law 
was amended in 1934 to forbid banks to acquire shares in industrial 
concerns  except when such  acquisition  is necessary  to protect  the 
bank from loss.  The Finnish bank law of  1933 limited the extent 
to which banks could participate in industry.86 
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CONCLUSION 
world security capitalism, which had passed through its rise and 
development  in the nineteenth  and the early  twentieth centuries, 
now faced its critical period in the post-war years.  The background 
of security  capitalism  was  distinctly  unfavorable  with  the rise  of 
dictatorships, the growth  of international  hostility, the decline  of 
I,roducti~n  and trade growth, the slackening of  the growth of world 
population,  the  rise  of an  aggressively  hostile  economic  philos- 
ophy, the failure of international  banking cooperation and the ex- 
pnsion of  unproductive  national  debts  unsupported  by  national 
production or national wealth.  The critical hour of  world security 
capitalism had arrived. Tart II-  Evolution of  American Security 
CHAPTER  10 
RISE  OF  AMERICAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
UNTIL  the end of  the second decade of  the nineteenth century the 
United States remained in the stage of  individual capitalism.  In 
fact  the period  of  colonial  economy lasted  until after the second 
war with Great Britain, for the economic life of  the American people 
continued to be dominated by  its relations with England and with 
the Continent.  Financial organization until the end of  the second 
decade of  the nineteenth century was simple in nature, and only in 
the large cities as  New  York,  Philadelphia and Boston  was  there 
the semblance of  a banking structure.  Capital was invested mainly 
in local  business  enterprises, and before  1815 eastern  capital  was 
not applied to the settlement of  the West and the development of  its 
resources?  Although  the corporate form of  organization  had  re- 
ceived legal recognition  in the eighteenth century,  its application 
was  limited to a small number of  what we would now call public 
utility corporations as turnpike and canal c~mpanies.~  There were 
a  few  industrial  corporations,  but these were  small  in size.  The 
volume of corporate securities in the hands of  the public was there- 
fore insignificant, and the security market played an important part 
in the economic life of  the American people. 
While there was  investment  in land and commodities,  federal 
government bonds were about the only form of  security in~estment.~ 
Due in a large measure  to the policy  of  Alexander  Hamilton the 
credit of  the federal government was  placed on a sound basis.  His 
proposal  that the federal government assume not only its own do- 
mestic and foreign  debts but also those  of  the states, and refund 
them  by  means  of  federal bonds was  an important step from the 
standpoint of security capitalism. 
By  giving  the powerful  minority  of  wealth  in  the  country  a 
financial  stake  in  the continuance  and maintenance  of  a  strong 
central government, Hamilton felt that he had insured the survival 
of  the government at a very inexpensive  price.  This view  was  ex- 
pressed by a contemporary publication in the statement that ". . . 
we hope that all true friends to our republican union will  do all 
they can to extend the system of  banks, insurance companies, canals, 
turnpikes, bridge companies and all other such useful commonwealth 
associations with  small   share^."^  Elsewhere,  however,  Hamilton 
seems to have cautioned against excessive debt and urged a policy 
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of  debt reduction  in the following words:  "as  the vicissitudes of 
beget  a perpetual  tendency  to the accumulation of  debt, 
there ought to be,  in every government,  a perpetual, anxious and 
unceasing effort to reduce that which at any time exists, as fast as 
cllall be practicable, consistently with integrity and good faith." 5 
The financing of the federal government during the War of  1812 
clearly showed the extent to which the United States was still in the 
stage of  individual capitalism.  The securities  of  the federal gov- 
ernment were sold not to the general public but mainly to a small 
number  of wealthy  individuals.  In 1813 the federal government 
was able to place with the public only $6,ooo,ooo of  its $16,00o,ooo 
issue, and the remainder had to be purchased by individual capital- 
ists as Stephen Girard, John Jacob Astor and David Pari~h.~ 
THE WESTWARD  MOVEMENT 
The rise of  security capitalism in the United States falls in two 
phases, interrupted by  the Civil War, namely  from about  1820 to 
1860 and from  1865 until  1873.  The vital  factor which  brought 
about the rise of  security capitalism in the United States in the first 
period was the westward movement which, although in progress for 
a number of  years, gained momentum only in the second quarter of 
the nineteenth  century.  The economic  life of  the United  States 
now changed its entire course, and turned from Europe to the West. 
This movement marked definitely the end of economic colonialism 
and the beginning of  nationalism. 
The westward movement was facilitated by the improvement in 
transportation which was no longer a local matter, but was now un- 
dertaken on a national scale.  Turnpikes, canals and railroads were 
extended from one state to another.  So rapid was the expansion of 
the railroads that by  1843 the United States had 3,688 miles of road 
as against 2,069 miles in Great Britain.?  In the following years until 
the  Civil  War  the  mileage  in  the  United  States  was  increased 
eight  fold.*  The steamboat was  also an important instrument in 
the opening of  the interior waterways, and helped to bring the West 
into closer communication with the Atlantic seaboard.  The inven- 
tion of the telegraph  further improved communication by  making 
Possible the expansion of  the railroad system and by bringing about 
=loser relations between the business men of  the new western towns 
and those on the Atlantic seaboard.0 
An  important social effect of  the westward movement  was  the 
growth of  the total population, for the opening of  a vast new area 
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increase in the concentration of  population in urban areas.  While 
in 1830 only 6.72 percent of  the population lived in communities of 
more than 8,000  inhabitants, by  1850 the proportion  had risen to 
12.49 percent.1°  While  the total  population  rose  85 percent  be- 
tween  1840 and 1860, that of  New York City increased 300 percent. 
and that of  Philadelphia increased  166 percent."  Thus by  the out- 
break of  the Civil War, the United States had developed a consid- 
erable urban population  which  is an essential characteristic of  se- 
curity capitalism.  The concentration of  thousands  of  persons  in 
cities made necessary the assumption of  municipal functions requir- 
ing fixed capital, such as street lighting and water supply, and these 
undertakings were largely financed by the issue of  bonds. 
The settlement of  the West brought with  it the rise of  Jack- 
sonian democracy which became an aggressive opponent of  security 
capitalism.  The Whig party  on the other hand was  the political 
organ of  the new security capitalism of  the Northeast.  These years 
were marked by considerable social unrest, as evidenced by the Dorr 
rebellion in Rhode Island, and the Anti-rent troubles in New York. 
There was a scattered movement of  communism as seen by  experi- 
ments as Brook Farm which had the active support of  Emerson and 
Hawthorne and New  Harmony, where Robert Owen attempted to 
apply his utopian socialism.  The first labor party in world history 
was  formed  in Philadelphia  in  1828.  In  1835 the Equal  Rights 
party,  later known as the Loco Focos, was  formed, and forced the 
New  York legislature to pass the banking act of  1838 which  estab- 
lished a general banking incorporation law, shattering the previous 
banking m~nopoly.'~ 
Paradoxically enough, this measwe, demanded by the opponents 
of  security capitalism, contributed greatly to the growth of  the sys- 
tem before the Civil War.  This "free" banking act, as it was known, 
provided for a bond-secured currency.  Any banker who wished to 
issue bank notes would have to deposit an equal amount of  bonds 
with the state comptroller.  If  the banks failed the bonds were sold 
by the comptroller and the proceeds used to pay off  the note-holders. 
By  1850 sixteen states had adopted this system which  became  the 
model  for the National  Bank Act of  1863.  A widespread  market 
was thereby opened for securities, particularly state bonds and their 
quality tended to deteriorate.  Thus a measure originally intended 
to break up banking monopolies  provided a very great stimulus to 
security  investment  and aided  the development  of  security capi- 
talism. 
It was  not until the second quarter of  the nineteenth  century 
that the corporation attained its present-day characteristics.  Thus 
the Massachusetts trust as a quasi-corporation had legal recognition 
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as early as 1827.''  The practice of securing bonds by mortgages de- 
veloped some time between the close of the eighteenth and the end 
of the second decade of the nineteenth century.14  So widespread had 
the acceptance of the principle of the limited liability of corporate 
become  by  the middle of the century, that it was  a 
subject of  special comment by  the British commissioners returning 
from the New York exposition in 1854.16 
EARLY  FINANCIAL  ORGANIZATION 
The financial organization of  the United States in this early pe- 
riod consisted of  the Second Bank of  United States which acted as a 
kind of central bank ;  a group of  private bankers who, besides their 
mercantile operations, were mainly concerned in obtaining foreign 
capital by  selling American government securities abroad ; a grow- 
ing number of  state-incorporated banks which, in addition to their 
extension of  credit for mercantile transactions and land speculation, 
in part financed the operation of  American  security capitalism by 
investing in securities and by furnishing credit for security specula- 
tion; and finally several stock exchanges located  in the more im- 
portant financial centers on the Atlantic seaboard.  The dominant 
institution was the Second Bank of  the United States.  Because of 
its rapid expansion, the West was primarily  interested in a liberal 
credit policy which the Bank's conservative directors and officers in 
the East were unwilling to follow.  The  struggle between the West- 
ern interests and the Bank, crystallized in the Jackson administration, 
became the dominant issue in the election of  1832.  Clay, with the 
support of  Biddle and the Northeastern Whigs, defended the Bank 
against  the attacks  of  the  Jacksonian  Democrats,  but  was  over- 
whelmingly defeated.  The Bank's charter expired in 1836 and was 
not renewed.  Thus from 1836 to 1913 there was no central bank 
in this country.ld 
The private banks were an important element in the financial 
System, and in the beginning performed a wide range of  operations 
as  engaging  in lotteries,  in foreign  exchange  as well  as  in stock 
brokerage.17  In 1837 George Peabody founded the private banking 
which was later to be J. P.  Morgan and Company.  George 
Peabody  was  at first  mainly  concerned  in creating a  market  for 
Maryland securities, and it was largely through his efforts that the 
nRessary  financial support for the construction and expansion  of 
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was obtained.  Alexander Brown 
and Sons of  Baltimore  was  also an important house  engaging in 
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ton  there were several prominent  banking  firms as  Corcoran  and 
Riggs which floated the $i6,ooo,ooo issue of  the federal government 
in 1848.  Another prominent house was E. W. Clark and Company 
with whom Jay Cooke was associated in his early years.lg 
As a result of  the dependence upon British capital the financial 
organization of  the United States was  influenced by  that of  Eng- 
land.  Barings were agents for the United States government until 
1835  when  Rothschilds  took  over  this  function.20  Rothschilds 
operated their own offices  in New  York, Boston, Philadelphia and 
Baltimore.  The close relation  between  American  and British  se- 
curity capitalism  was  described by  a  member  of  Congress in the 
observation  that "the  barometer  of  the American  money  market 
hangs up at the stock exchange in L~ndon."~~  Another American 
commentator, in discussing the Bank of  England, declared that : 
This immense engine of  finance is  now  so  intimately connected with 
monetary  matters  in  our  own  country  that  the  slightest  throb  of  its 
quickening pulse has a controlling influence on movements in State or 
Wall Street.22 
Incorporated  commercial  banks  increased  rapidly  in number 
with  the adoption  of  the principle  of  "free"  banking  which  per- 
mitted any group of  persons to apply for a charter under the general 
banking law of  the state.  In theory the incorporated banks were 
supposed  to confine their activities  to commercial  operations, and 
the economic literature of  this period accepted with little question 
the orthodox theory of  the function of  the commercial bank.as  In 
actual practice  the banks performed  both commercial  and invest- 
ment operations, for they held not only state and municipal bonds 
but also stocks.  The proportion of  such securities to the total assets 
of  the banks over this period averaged somewhat over 7 per~ent.~' 
The incorporated banks also granted a large volume of loans based 
on security collateral.  In fact  the system of  call  loans existed  in 
New  York  before  1837,  for  in  that  year  a  special  committee of 
the New York legislature presented a report opposing such 10ans.~" 
The bank commissioners of  Massachusetts in their report for 1837 
also scored the practice of  banks in making call loans.26  After the 
panic  of  1857  security loans were  again  severely criticised.  One 
writer considered the "treacherous  resources of  call  loans delusive 
alike to the banks and to the public"  as "the  great panic-making 
power."  Throughout this entire period there was no distinct group 
of  investment bankers, for this specialized form of  banking was unde- 
veloped until the large bond issues of  the federal government during 
the Civil War made necessary the creation of  such specialized finan- 
cial machinery. 
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Over these years security markets developed  in the large eastern 
cities  as  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Boston  and  particularly  New 
york.28  The New  York  Stock  Exchange  organized  in  1816 soon 
became  the  leading  security  market.  Trading  on  the  security 
was  at first confined largely to dealings in the federal and 
the state debts, for there was only a very small volume of  corporate 
securities in existence,  mostly shares of bank  and insurance com- 
panies.  Later, there were transactions in the stocks of  canal and gas 
light companies, but it was  not until the listing of  railroad stocks 
that corporate  security  operations really  became  important.  The 
volume of trading was very small, as for example on March 16, 1830 
when only 31  shares changed hands and $3,470.25 was sufficient to 
buy all the stock.2e 
PUBLIC  NATURE  OF  CAPITAL  DEMAND 
The demand for capital over these years was  mainly public in 
nature and came from the federal, state and municipal governments. 
The War of  1812 was financed partly by  public credit, and by  1820 
the federal  debt  amounted to $gi,ooo,ooo.  The debt  reduction 
policy formulated  by  Alexander  Hamilton was  carefully  followed 
by  the national government, and by  1835 the debt was  entirely ex- 
tinguished.  However, the Mexican War was financed by credit, and 
so by  1850 the debt rose to $63,000,000.S0 
State debt increased rapidly over these years, in view of  the fact 
that the states engaged extensively in public enterprises.  The strict 
interpretation  of  the  constitution  barred  the  federal  government 
from participating  in internal improvements.  The assumption  of 
such powers by  the state governments was also due to the weakness 
of the structure of  private security capitalism over these years.  The 
expansion of  the West made necessary the development of transpor- 
tation  and  of  internal  improvements,  but  these  undertakings  re- 
quired a large amount of  capital which could not  be obtained  by 
private corporations, since their financial position had not yet grown 
a point where they inspired the confidence of  either domestic or 
foreign investors.  Capital  in large amounts for  internal  improve- 
ments therefore could be obtained only on the credit of  the state 
governments in the form of  their own direct obligations or of  their 
indirect  obligations  created  by  guaranteeing  the bonds  of  public 
Cor~orations. This situation  was  well  stated  in  a  contemporary 
that: 
public are now  firmly convinced that, in the United States, where 
the fortunes of private individuals are limited in amount, great public 
can  only  be  accomplished  by  the  expenditure  of  the  public 
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The era of  such state borrowing began on a large scale with the 
New  York  State bond  flotation  for  the purpose  of  financing  the 
state-constructed and state-owned  Erie Canal.  Between  18  17  and 
1825 a large amount of  these bonds were sold,32  and after the con- 
struction of the Canal, revenues from it accumulated so rapidly that 
in 1834 the state, in retiring its bonds, was forced to pay a premium 
of from 5 to g percent.33  This financial success of  the Erie led to 
the construction of  other trunk canals in the middle, southern and 
western  states.  Maryland, with  the aid of  George  Peabody, gave 
support to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal in order to maintain the 
prestige of  Baltimore.  Pennsylvania likewise aided the building of 
canals to assist  Philadelphia  in its competition against  New  York. 
The Southern states also entered the race for internal improvements. 
In 1838 the Governor of North Carolina admitted that the people 
of his state were too poor to finance internal  improvements from 
their own resources,  but urged  the sale of  the state securities  in 
foreign markets on the ground that this policy held "no higher ter- 
ror to a mind of enlarged and patriotic views."  In the case  of 
Kentucky, notwithstanding the fact that the state program  would 
result in a debt of  $6,ooo,ooo the governor declared : "What  is this 
sum to the resources and wealth  to the State of  Kentucky whose 
taxable  property  is now  valued at $275,ooo,ooo."  35  The Western 
states, particularly  Michigan, Ohio and Illinois entered  upon  the 
unrestrained building of  internal improvements.  The proceeds of 
these state loans were applied to a variety  of  purposes, canals con- 
stituting the most important single purpose especially in New  York 
and Pennsylvania.  The creation of  banks, next in importance, was 
confined to the Southern states.  These were essentially land banks 
of  which the most important was  the Planters Bank of  Louisiana. 
In most  cases the stock was  subscribed by  local  planters,  and the 
bonds, guaranteed by the state, were sold in the East and in London. 
The state loans for railroads were  well  distributed  among almost 
all the states, while the debts incurred for turnpikes were confined 
almost entirely to Pennsylvania, Kentucky and Indiana."  In general 
the New  England states had the smallest debts while the Southern 
states had the largest.37 
The demand  for  capital by  the  municipalities  remained  small 
until  the  close  of  the  third  decade  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
Washington placed a loan in Amsterdam  in 1830, and philadelphia 
and Boston obtained capital from London in 1833.  New York City 
was the largest borrower and accounted for $1  3,000,000 of  the total 
of  $~7,5oo,ooo  of  aggregate municipal debt in  1842.38  From  1840 
until the Civil War the increase  in urban population necessitated 
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considerable  local borrowing, and by  1560 municipal indebtedness 
was estimated at $200,000,000.30 
In the early part of the period under review, the volume of  cor- 
porate investment remained unimportant.  Most corporations were 
small in size, and these were largely public or semi-public utilities, 
as banking, insurance, water, steam boat, turnpikes, bridge and 
canal companies.'O  Corporate financing in the capital market did 
not become important until about the middle of  the century when 
the railroads were able to float their issues.  By  1858 the sum of 
$~o,ooo,ooo  had  been  invested  in  26,000  miles  of  railway.41  Cor- 
porate financing took  the form of bonds, common  stock and even 
preferred  stock.  Preferred stock  was  issued  as  early  as  1836 for 
financing railroads,  canals and for industrial   enterprise^.'^ 
SUPPLY  OF  CAPITAL 
Capital  for these various undertakings  of  governments  and of 
came  in  part  from  domestic  sources  but  also  from 
abroad.  The supply of domestic capital over these years was  un- 
questionably increasing, as evidenced by  the rise in national wealth 
and in national in~ome."~  Domestic capital for the security market 
came mainly from the merchant and the manufacturing classes of 
the North.  The merchant class included both the small storekeep- 
ers of  the interior and the wealthy importers of the seaboard who 
placed  a  considerable  proportion  of  their  saving  in  securities. 
The manufacturers of  the Northeast derived large profits from their 
operations as evidenced by the high dividends which they were able 
to dec1are.a  In fact some of the manufacturers themselves financed 
the building of railroads.  Thus Connecticut  brass manufacturers 
financed the  Naugatuck  Railroad  as an auxiliary  to  their  enter- 
prises, and the owners of  mills  on the Merrimac River  promoted 
the railroad from Boston to L~well.'~  The profits of  the industrial 
revolution  led to the accumulation of  large individual   fortune^.'^ 
The rapid  increase  of  wealth  in the northeastern  states  is evi- 
denced by the increase in the value of  taxable property in the larger 
States and cities of  this section.  Valuation  of  real  and personal 
Property  in New  York  State  rose  from  $io1,160,046  in  1825 to 
S235~960.0q7  in  184417  The value of  taxable  property in Massa- 
chusetts rose  from $153,545,171  in  1820 to over  $299,880,338 is 
1840.4s  However, capital accumulation in the South was small in view 
the limited returns on cotton planting4.  In the Northeast there 
IYaS  also a growing diffusion  of  capital ownership as evidenced by 
the IYidespread  holdings of  bank deposits and of  securities.  In 1860 
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amounting to over $58,ooo,ooo, were held by  over 273,000 persons, 
and total savings deposits in  Massachusetts, exceeding $3g,ooo,ooo, 
were held by over 205,000  depositor^.^^  The stock of  the Merrimac 
Company  of  New  England  was  held  by  390  people  including 68 
"females,"  52 retired business men, 40 clerks, students and unspeci- 
fied, 18 physicians and 15 farmers.51 The  securities of  the New York 
Central railroad were held by  2,445 investors.52 
Notwithstanding the increase in the supply of  domestic capital, it 
was  insufficient to meet the pressing demand for capital to finance 
the industrial revolution  of  the period.  Early  American  security 
capitalism was therefore forced to look for funds from abroad.  The 
greater part  of  this foreign capital went into governmental  rather 
than corporate securities.  In 1828 $14,00o,ooo of  the federal debt 
was held by British investors, and $5,ooo,ooo was held by Continental 
investors.53 Most of  the state debt was held abroad, while municipal 
securities were largely owned  in this country.  American  corporate 
securities found little favor abroad, and the stock of  both the First 
and the Second Bank of  the United States was the earliest important 
form of  American corporate investment of  British  capital.54  Even 
as late as 1840 only about a dozen American corporations had been 
able to place their securities abroad."  The unfortunate investment 
experience of  British investors in American public securities in the 
thirties restricted the subsequent flow of  British capital into Ameri- 
can corporate securities, and so the financinq of  American railroads 
attracted little foreign capital before the Civil War.  In the fifties 
a few railways such as the Erie and the Illinois Central were able 
to place their securities in the British  market.  In 1854 the secre- 
tary  of  the  treasury  presented  a  detailed  statement  of  American 
government and corporate securities held abroad, and according to 
this report almost one-half of  the federal debt and well over one-half 
of the state debt was  held  abroad, while only about a quarter of 
the municipal debt was in foreign hands.  Only a very small amount 
of  the capital  for  railway,  bank,  insurance,  canal  and navigation 
financing came directly from foreign sourcesP6 
CRISES  UNDER  EARLY  AMERICAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The  financial structure of  early American security capitalism, al- 
though containing several elements of  weakness, was generally sound. 
The  credit position  of  the federal government was high as seen by 
the low per capita debt, the declining proportion of  debt service to 
total expenditures and the large coverage of  wealth to debt.57  On 
the other hand the financial position of  the states varied consider- 
ably.  The financial position  of the northeastern states was strong, 
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tvhile that of  the southern and particularly of  the western states was 
uncertain.  The municipal debt was  contracted  on a sound basis, 
and in the entire period before the Civil War there were only four 
important municipal defaults, namely those of  Mobile in  1839, De- 
troit in  1841 and Chicago and Philadelphia during the depression 
of  1857." 
The corporate structure of early  American  security capitalism 
was  The industrial corporations of  the Northeast made 
large profits and were  soundly  capitalized.  The railroads  in  the 
East were likewise on a firm financial basis, if  the present-day finan- 
cial standards are applied.  Thus the railroads of  Massachusetts in 
iSq6 had a net income of 6.89 percent on their total capitalization as 
with an average of 5.2  percent for the Class I railroads for 
1890-~g2g.58 In 1859 the Massachusetts railroads had 29.5 percent 
of debt to total  capitalization which  was low  compared with  61.5 
percent  for the Class I railroads from  1890-1929.~~  On the other 
hand many  western  roads were  not soundly financed,  and due to 
hasty  construction  through  sparsely  settled  territory  the  earning 
power was frequently insufficient to meet the interest on the debts. 
The early stage of American security capitalism was marked by 
financial crises  in  1837,  1857  and again  in  1860.  The crisis  of 
1837 was  particularly  serious for the new  system, and in the five- 
year period from 1837 to 1841 state securities depreciated $loo,ooo,- 
ooo  and corporate securities $~O,OOO,OOO.~~  During the depression 
following the  panic  of  1837  early  American  security  capitalism, 
based  largely on the creation of  public debt held mainly  abroad, 
was  badly shaken as one state after another including even Pennsyl- 
vania defaulted on its debt.  In most cases the taxing capacity of  a 
state was  insufficient to meet  the debt  service and default  was  in- 
evitable.  At times the default was defended by the local officials on 
high  moral  principles.  Thus Governor  McNutt of  Mississippi,  in 
vetoing legislative resolutions which recognized the validity of  a par- 
ticular state bond issue, declared that : 
The Bank  [i.  e.-of  the  United  States] . . . has  hypothecated  these 
bonds,  and  borrowed  money  upon  them  of  the  Baron  Rothschild. 
The blootl of Judas  and Shylock flows in his  veins,  and he unites  the 
qualities of both his  countrymen . . . He has  advanced money  to  the 
Sublime Porte, and taken as  security, a mortgage on  the Holy  City of 
Jerusalem and  the Sepulchre of  our  Saviour.  It is  for the people to 
whether he shall have a mortgage on our cotton fields, and make 
Serfs of our children.62 
An effort was made to induce the federal government to assume 
the state debts.  This proposal arose out of  the difficulties of  Nicolas 
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the idea in a letter to Barings and then induced Daniel Webster to 
sponsor the assumption proposal.63  AS a result  of  correspondence 
with Webster, Barings issued a circular urging such assumption by 
the Federal government.  The proposal was supported by  the Whig 
newspapers, as  the New  York  Herald, while the Democratic press 
branded  the proposal  to transfer  the defaulted states debts to the 
national government  as a devious  plot  between  Barings and Web- 
~ter.~*  The assumption  plan  became  an issue  in the elections  of 
1840, and Harrison was accused of having the support of  the British 
banksB6 A  House committee  presented  a  report  in favor  of  the 
assumption plan, but it was not approved by Congress. 
The  repudiation of  state debts and the failure of  the assumption 
plan for a time weakened the credit of  even the federal government 
in the European capital markets.  In 1842, when the federal govern- 
ment sent its representative to Paris to negotiate a loan, he was told 
by  Baron  Rothschild to report that the man who was the head of 
the finances of  Europe had said "you  cannot borrow a dollar not a 
dollar."  66  The London  Times,  consistently  hostile to the United 
States, declared:  "The  people  of the United States may  be  fully 
persuaded  that  there  is  a  certain  class  of  securities  to which  no 
abundance of  money however great, can give value and that in this 
class their own securities stand pre-eminent."  B7 
The second  financial  crisis in the early  stage of  American  se- 
curity capitalism occurred in 1857.  The sudden discovery of  gold 
led to an overexpansion of  credit used  for speculation on the stock 
market and brought about a rapid rise in security prices.  In the be- 
ginning of  1857 the stocks of  the new railroad system showed weak- 
ness, but the real crash came in August with the suspension of  the 
Ohio Life  Insurance Company.  It had  conducted  large financial 
operations in the West and in New York, and had made extensive 
loans to the Western railroads.  By  the end of  the year, a number 
of  the leading railroads, including the Erie, Reading, Illinois Cen- 
tral and Michigan Central, failed to meet their obligations and as 
a result security prices virtually collapsed.  Because of  these condi- 
tions the New York Tzmes described the New York Stock Exchange 
as an "enormous gambling establishment." 68 
The third financial crisis came at the outbreak of  the Civil War 
when  the South repudiated  its debt to the northern  capitalists." 
The London Economist stated that: 
many  voices  have been  heard  clamoring for secession as  an  excuse  for 
repudiating the debts, private and commercial, as well as public, which 
they owe  to the wealthier classes of  the North.7o 
Because of  these successive crises the trend of  both government 
and corporate security prices were very irregular.  The 6's of  1862 
of the United States Government rose from par in 1841 to 124 in 
and then sold off to a low of log in 1857.  The prices of  the 
bonds of the state governments showed wide variation.  On the one 
hand the 5's of Massachusetts sold as high as 117, and the 6's of  New 
krork and of Ohio sold at high prices but were very irregular.  On 
the other hand the bonds of Pennsylvania sold down to 40, Mary- 
land to below 50, Kentucky to 67, Indiana to 17% and Illinois to 
169/4.  However  all these issues recovered  their values in the later 
years.71  The trend of equities over these years  is reflected  in the 
prices of the stocks of banks, and railroad companies.  In general 
bank shares were fairly stable, while railroad shares fluctuated mark- 
edly and their trend was generally downward.72 
CRITICISM  AND  CONTROL  OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The rising system of  security capitalism was the subject of  sharp 
criticism.  The opposition  to corporations was  exceedingly  bitter. 
The labor press contended that capital was  unduly favored by  the 
granting of  "charters for monopolizing companies,"  while the "in- 
terests  of  labor"  were  not  sufficiently recognized  by  1egislato1-s.73 
The corporation was condemned in the economic theory of  the day. 
Thus, Daniel Raymond, whose Tlzoughts on Political Economy pub- 
lished in 1820 was  the first book of  its kind written in the United 
States, declared that : 
Every  money  corporation  is  prima  facie  injurious  to  national 
wealth,  and  ought  to  be  looked  upon  by  those  who  have  no  money 
with  jealousy  and suspicion.  They are, and ought to be considered, as 
artificial engines  of power,  contrived  by  the  rich  for  the  purpose  of 
increasing their already too  great ascendency and calculated to destroy 
that  natural  equality among men  which  God has  ordained and which 
government has no right to lend its power in destroying.  The tendency 
of such institutions is to cause a more unequal division of property and 
a greater inequality among men  than would otherwise take place.74 
Incorporated  banks  in particular  were  singled  out for attack. 
The New  York  Working Man's  Advocate  stated that the bankers 
'ere  "the greatest knaves, imposters and paupers of  the age."  A 
meeting of  "mechanics and other working men"  declared that the 
banks 
Under the  administration  of  their  present  directors  and  officers  and 
by  the  concert  of auctioneers  and  foreigners,  aided  by  custom  house 
Fred1tS, form a monopoly that is hostile to the equal rights of the Amer- 
Ican  merchant  manufacturer,  mechanic  and  laboring  man;  and  the 
"newal  by  the legislature, of  the charters prayed for, will  confirm and 
an aristocracy which  eventually may  shake the foundations 
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The  opposition to rising security capitalism came not only from 
the working class of the North, but also from the landed class of  the 
South.  In general the South continued in the stage of  agrarian capi- 
talism  throughout  the first half  of  the nineteenth  century.  Thus 
within the United States there were two different economic systems ; 
in  the  South  a  developed  agrarian  capitalism  largely  based  on 
slave labor and in the North  mainly  a rising  security  capitalism. 
The issue between these two systems was defined with truly remark- 
able insight by  one commentator in 1837 as "whether  cotton shall 
control exchanges and importations or whether the banks and the 
stock interest shall do it."  This commentator added "The struggle 
is for ascendancy .  . .  break down the swindling of  bankers, and the 
capitalists of the South will control the confederacy.  Drive out to 
a great extent paper credits, except upon bona fide capital, and cot- 
ton will do the exchanges of the commercial  world. . . The capi- 
talists  of  the North have by  their corporations concentrated  their 
power as in one man. . . The  South will be more prosperous under 
cotton at ten cents, and no banks connected with the government, 
lending its credit and power to the stock interest than we would be 
under the latter at thirteen cents, and the reverse of  these things." 77 
This conflict  of  interest  between  the agrarian  South  and the 
industrial  North  was  reflected  in  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme 
Court in the period before the Civil War.  In its early years domi- 
nated by  the Federalists the Court merely upheld the will and in- 
tent of  the founders of  the Constitution.  They had set out to con- 
struct  a government  which  would  protect  property  from the on- 
slaughts of  radical agrarian majorities bent upon debtor and agrarian 
legislati~n.~~  John Marshall, in his long career as Chief Justice, with 
irrefutable logic carried out the intent of  the framers of  the Consti- 
tution to the letter.  In a series of  notable decisions he aided  in 
building a strong central government capable of  protecting property. 
He ordered the State of  Georgia to fulfill a land sale, put through 
by a bribed legislature because he was unwilling to permit a state to 
engage  in a breach  of  contract.  As  a recent commentator accur- 
ately noted : "It was at the power of  the States, not that of  Congress, 
that he struck with all the weight of  remorseless logic and unbend- 
ing will."  Contrary to popular opinion, in the course of  his en- 
tire career only one act of  the federal government was declared un- 
constituti~nal.~~  In his seventy-seventh year  in  1832, wearily  sur- 
veying his accomplishments and grimly speculating on the future, 
he wrote : "I yield slowly and reluctantly to the conviction that our 
constitution cannot last . . . the Union has been prolonged thus far 
by  miracles.  I fear they cannot continue."  In 1837 the number 
of justices on the Court was increased from seven to nine.  During 
the course of his two administrations Jackson had the opportunity 
to  fill six  vacancies  on the  Court.  A  social  lag came to an end. 
Federalist domination, which in the legislative and executive branch 
had ended with Jefferson's election, was driven from its last outpost. 
The Supreme Court fell to the agrarians, and their forces controlled 
all three branches of the government until the Civil War.  Wildcat 
banking flourished, tariffs were reduced, slavery upheld.  Manifest 
destiny and "black  imperialism"  added vast  additional  territories 
and though  less united there came to be more states.81 
Over these years there was little attempt by either the federal or 
state governments to regulate the financial  institutions of  security 
capitalism.  Among the few instances of  government regulation of 
security  capitalism was the law of Massachusetts passed in 1837 which 
authorized a  specified list of local securities as investments for some 
of the funds of  life insurance companies.  In 1849 New York, and a 
vear later Wisconsin similarly prescribed the investments of  life in- 
surance companies.82 In order to restrict the growing security opera- 
tions of  the banks, New York State passed a law stipulating that in- 
corporated  banks should  "not  directly or indirectly  deal  or trade 
in . . . buying  or selling any stock created  under any Act  of  the 
United  States or any  particular  State unless  in  selling  the  same 
when truly pledged by way of  security for debts due." 83  New York 
State in 1855 established a State Board of Railroad Commissioners 
who were empowered to regulate railroads, but the railroad interests 
proved too powerful and in 1857 the Board came to an end.84 As a 
result of the excessive expansion of state debt, restrictions were em- 
bodied in the constitutional provisions limiting the amount of  debt 
that might be contra~ted.~~ 
Thus in the second quarter of  the nineteenth century and until 
the Civil War, the United States as a whole passed from colonialism 
to nationalism ; the Northeast  from individual to security  capital- 
ism; while the South continued in the stage of  agrarian capitalism. 
In time the West became more and more interrelated with the new 
form of capitalism of  the Northeast. 
The years immediately following the Civil War until the pariic 
of  1873 marked a continuation  of  the rise  of  security capitali~m.~~ 
The economic policies of the na~ional  government underwent dras- 
tic changes, particularly in relation to tariff, currency, banking, pri- 
vate property and railroads.  Northern security capitalism victorious 
in the Civil War, was determined to reap the full fruits of  its victory 
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protective  tariffs  were  passed  successively  over  these  years,  and 
these  acts safeguarded  the home  market  for  the products  of  the 
northern industrialists.  Notwithstanding strong pressure from vari- 
ous groups,  Congress with  hesitating  feet  moved  along  the  path 
which led to sound currency.  This policy had the support particu- 
larly of  the bankers.  Thus financial history repeated  itself, and as 
British  banking influence  in the period  immediately after the Na- 
poleonic  Wars was  successful  in forcing a sound  currency  policy 
on England, so a half a century later in the postcivil war period 
American banking security capitalism likewise threw its influence on 
the side of  sound currency.  In the throes of  the Civil War Congress 
enacted the National Bank Act primarily as a temporary measure to 
provide a market for United States Government bonds.  While this 
purpose was not well attained during the War, nevertheless the Act 
accomplished  the more  permanent  aim of  supplying  the  United 
States with the framework for developing a national banking struc- 
ture.  Economists have generally been over-critical of  the limitations 
of the National  Banking  system  as  established  under the Act  of 
1863, and have been too ready to point out its weaknesses, particu- 
larly the inelasticity of  the currency, the difficulty of  mobilizing re- 
serves  and  the  costliness of  the exchange system.  However,  the 
National Banking system over the years created a safe and uniform 
currency in place of  the diversified and generally unsafe state cur- 
rency of  the pre-civil war period.  The Act also established  stand- 
ards of  banking as to capitalization, and provided for a national sys- 
tem of  control in the form of  examinations and reports. 
The fourth  important economic  policy  of  the federal  govern- 
ment was the passage of  the fourteenth amendment and its applica- 
tion by  the Supreme Court to the protection of  private  property. 
It is not clear whether the framers of  this section sought merely to 
protect the rights of  Negroes or whether they had a broad economic 
view  in  mind.B7  Whatever  may  have  been  the  motive  behind 
this  constitutional  change,  its actual  effect  was  to give  extensive 
protection to private property interests and to provide a firm legal 
foundation for security capitalism.  Without this legal  protection, 
it is  doubtful whether the rapid flow  of capital  into corporate se- 
curities over this period would have been possible.  A further im- 
portant economic policy was  the liberal aid given to the railroads 
in  the  form  of  lands and subsidies.  Railroad  development  was 
helped by extensive land grants and public subsidies. 
The industrial  revolution  swept  over  the  United  States  and 
touched  all  fields of  economic  activity,  including  manufacturing, 
agriculture, foreign trade.  The factories of  the Northeast  turned 
out their goods in ever-increasing volume.  Agriculture in the mid- 
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die  western  states,  under  the influences  of  machine methods,  in- 
creased its produce many times over.  The frontier was pushed west- 
ward, and new lands were brought  into cultivation.  During these 
years  there was  little concern  about  overproduction, and  the in- 
creased output of  American factories was  absorbed at home, while 
surplus farm products found outlets in the foreign markets.  Trans- 
portation bound the various parts of  this new economic empire, and 
moved the enormous agricultural surplus to the eastern seaboard for 
shipment  to foreign markets.  Population in these years increased 
rapidly. 
In this period the United States had not yet developed an eco- 
nomic  philosophy  of  its own.  In this respect  the  early  stage  of 
security capitalism in the United States was  unlike that of  British 
security capitalism which had a well developed economic philosophy 
as expressed by  the classical economic writers of  that period.  For 
a number of years American  economic  policy followed  closely the 
classical school of laissez faire and of  individualism.  This tendency 
found expression  in the absence of  federal regulation of  economic 
activity  outside  the  banking  field.  The federal  government  re- 
frained from active interference and adhered to the classical doctrine 
of  laissez faire in the relation between the state and industry. 
EARLY  INDUSTRIAL  CAPITALISTS 
In the period following the Civil War the corporation came to be 
more widely  used  in organizing business  enterprise  and therefore 
led to the creation of an ever-increasing volume of  securities,  par- 
ticularly of railroads.  This activity was directed not by the banker 
but by  the industrial  capitalists as  Cornelius Vanderbilt,  Leland 
Stanford and Collis Huntington.  They had large personal resources, 
but even these were inadequate to finance their enormous expansion 
programs, and so it was necessary to attract the funds of  the public. 
The security market  therefore became  the institution which  sup- 
plied these  industrial capitalists with the necessary  funds for their 
vast undertakings. 
The  operations of  this early security capitalism was not altogether 
beneficial to the investing  public,  as  its  interests  in the railroads 
exceeded that of the speculative capitalists.  A number of the latter, 
as Daniel Drew and James Fiske, came to realize that greater 
could be won by clever security manipulation than by sound 
Operating management of  the railroads.  This choice of  policy led 
to overcapitalization. 
The  Erie was an illustration of  the unsound railroad financing of 
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ized from $17,00o,ooo to $78,ooo,ooo.  In one case of  Erie financing 
Daniel Drew and his "brother  directors"  purchased  for themselves 
a worthless road, the Buffalo, Bradford and Pittsburgh, for $250,- 
ooo, and then  in the name  of  this  company  issued  bonds  to  the 
amount of  $z,ooo,ooo.  The road was thereupon leased to the Erie 
for  499  years,  and the latter  agreed  to assume the bonds of  the 
former.88  Because of  such operations, the property of  the Erie rail- 
road was poorly maintained, and according to an official report to the 
Railroad Commission of  the New York State legislature: 
the  iron  rails  have  broken  and  laminated and  worn  out beyond  all 
precedent  until  there is  scarce  a mile  of  your  road,  except  that  laid 
with  steel  rails,  between  Jersey  City  and Salamanca or Buffalo,  where 
it is  safe to run a train at the ordinary passenger  or  train  s  eed, and 
many  portions of  the road can only be traversed safely by  re  ucing the 
speed of  all trains to  12 to  15 miles per  hour . . .  d 
Jay  Gould in testifying as to the value of  Erie stock, was therefore 
undoubtedly correct  in stating that "there  is  no  intrinsic  value to 
it probably ;  it is speculated in here and in London and it has that 
value." 
Another instance of  railway  overcapitalization was  the case  of 
the New York, West Shore and Buffalo.  This road was built along 
the west bank of  the Hudson River in order to give it a "nuisance 
value"  against  the New  York  Central.  The West  Shore failed in 
1884 with a capitalization of  $qo,ooo,ooo of  stock and $~O,OOO,OOO  of 
bonds based on a non-paying line of  475 miles.g0  Such operations 
were  bitterly  scored  in the financial  press.  The Nation claimed 
that the cause of  the panic of  1873 was the closing of  the English 
markets  to American railway  securities  under the influence of  re- 
peated cases of  American ra~cality.~~  The London Statut held that 
"no railroads in the world have the earning power of  the American, 
and none have been from first to last such scandalously bad invest- 
ments."  O2 
JAY  COOKE 
In American  financial history  the regime  of  Jay  Cooke repre- 
sents  the  passage  of  the  control  of  security  capitalism  from  the 
speculative capitalist to the investment banker.  Jay Cooke was the 
outstanding security  banker  of  what  we  may  describe as  the pre- 
Morgan  period  in American  security ~apitalism.~'  His distinctive 
service to American finance was the successtul flotation of  the united 
States  Government  bonds  during the Civil  War.  It was  largely 
through his efforts that in the difficult days of  the War the govern- 
ment was  able to find a market for  its bonds in this country and 
abroad.  To  the ringing slogan that a "national  debt is a national 
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blessing,"  he  sold  government  bonds  in every  part  of  the North 
and even in Europe.84 Jay Cooke unquestionably was the father of 
the system of  American security banking, for he was  the first to in- 
troduce the modern methods of  purchasing and distributing securi- 
ties.  He noted the underwriting syndicate in France when he was 
negotiating the sale of  Northern Pacific bonds in European markets 
and used this financial device in the purchase and sale of  new  is- 
sues.95  In selling securities,  Cooke used  a large  number of  sales- 
men.@''  An extensive  sales force was  also used  in the sale of  the 
Northern  Pacific bonds, and in this campaign, clergymen,  lawyers, 
storekeepers and postmasters acted  in communities  which  did not 
have banking facilitie~.~~  The  efforts of  these agents were personally 
by  Cooke  who  gave  them  generously  of  his  counsel. 
d&~old  levees," he advised, "as  I do every afternoon with the brokers 
and bankers of  the street and go into a thorough explanation after 
a thorough  reading  oE  the documents.  Spread out your  maps  so 
that  they  can  see  them."  At  times  he  himself  would  take  the 
field to reinforce  the efforts of  his  agents,  and would  frequently 
address  small  groups of  local bankers and capitalists.  Cooke also 
enlisted the services of  financial journalism;  "I have great faith in 
being kind to editors,"  wrote Cooke.  In the summer of  1871 he 
organized a party of  journalists  including Charles A.  Dana of  the 
New York Sun and other leading writers of  the larger papers.  These 
individuals  took  part  in an editorial  excursion  to look  over  the 
property of  the Northern Pacific, but the group was  unable to go 
beyond the Red River Valley since the secretary of  war would not 
agree to provide an escort any further due to the danger of  Indian~.~~ 
The essential  function of  the conservative  investment  banking 
houses even before the Civil War was  to facilitate the importation 
of  foreign capital.  Cooke, therefore, sought to extend his financial 
empire abroad, and so  formed the firm of Cooke,  McCulloch  and 
Company in London by  taking the former Secretary of  the Treas- 
ury  as  a  partner,  since his  name  "suggested  an alliance with  the 
government which was likely to impress Europe very  favorably." 
Cooke tried to locate his London branch near the Bank of  England, 
but failing in this effort he nevertheless had the consoling thought 
''that it was not farther away from the 'Old Lady' than Morgans' or 
Barings*.w  loo 
Cooke developed  close  relations  with  the political  powers  in 
Washington.  His name was  prominent on the circular of business 
men and bankers in 1872 urging the continuation of  Grant's admin- 
istration and warning the public that the election of Horace Greeley 
bring "widespread  ruin." lo'  The secretary of  the treasury 
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bonds or any other security to cover these deposits.  The firm also 
made liberal loans to some of  the leading political figures of  the day 
without  requiring any  security.  Blaine obtained a loan from Jay 
Cooke which was not adequately covered by collateral, and in cor- 
respondence on this subject Cooke stated: 
Blaine will be a hard nut to crack.  He ought certainly to pay  the note 
as the loan was  too much on such a property.  But you will have to be 
very  careful not to offend him.  He is figuring for the Presidency.  Has 
he paid his interest? loP 
Fresh  from  his  triumphs  in  the sale  of  the federal  securities 
Cooke sought other worlds to conquer, and in 1869 he undertook 
the financing of  the Northern Pacific which was to bring his firm to 
its end in the crash of  1873.  The Northern Pacific had been char- 
tered  during the Civil  War,  and had  obtained  from  Congress  a 
grant of  over 47,000,ooo acres of  public lands or an area about the 
size of  New England.  The original speculators lacked the financial 
resources to carry through the development of  the road, and Cooke, 
by  making  a  small  advance,  was  able  to  obtain  the business  of 
financing the road and selling its securities.  Notwithstanding the 
extensive selling organization both in this country and abroad, the 
distribution  of  the securities of  the Northern  Pacific encountered 
increasing difficulties.  The  advice of  his more conservative partners 
was disregarded, and Cooke plunged deeper and deeper.  The firm, 
unable to carry the burden of  the Northern Pacific, finally crashed 
on September  18,  1873.  That night the Fifth Avenue Hotel, the 
social' center of  the financial world, was crowded with "all the mag- 
nates in the commercial, financial and political world,"  and Presi- 
dent Grant with his Secretary of  the Treasury, Richardson,  made 
their headquarters there to relieve the financial emergency.lO"he 
Philadelphia press wrote the following obituary on the firm of Jay 
Cooke : 
The most  enterprising and  renowned  of  American  monetary  institu- 
tions, its name was  everywhere the synonym  for strength and solidity. 
An  hour before its doors were closed, the Bank of  England was not more 
trusted.  The disaster was  as unexpected as an earthquake is to-day.lo4 
SUPPLY OF AND  DEMAND FOR CAPITAL 
During the Civil War the volume of  governmental and corpor- 
ate security investment  developed  rapidly.  Over  these years  the 
leading form of  security investment was  the United States Govern- 
ment bonds.  These issues, however, became smaller in amount after 
the Civil War and the net total of the national debt declined stead- 
ily.  The borrowings of the state governments were relatively un- 
important.  The volume of municipal  financing increased  rapidly 
and by  1870 the municipal debt rose to $iji6,00o,ooo.~~~  Over this 
industry, except for petroleum, was financed largely by entre- 
preneur capital, and so the volume of industrial securities was small. 
Likewise utility financing, with the exception of  the Atlantic Tele- 
graph and other international cable companies, was still in swaddling 
clothes.  Railroad securities dominated the capital market through- 
out this entire period. 
The supply of domestic capital available for security investment 
grew  rapidly  during the third quarter of the century.  Profits in 
the North were considerable during the Civil War, and in the en- 
suing  period  these  accumulated  funds sought  investment  in  the 
security  market.  National  wealth  and national  income  in these 
years rose rapidly.lo6  Capital accumulation was  fairly  widespread 
as  evidenced  by  the increasing number  of  individual  investors.107 
The import of foreign capital to the United States revived, and came 
both from England and from the Continent.  The total amount of 
foreign capital in 1869 was  estimated  at $1,465,000,000 of  which 
$i,ooo,ooo,ooo was placed in the United States Government bonds, 
$243,ooo,ooo in railroad securities, and the remainder in miscellane- 
ous public and private securities?08 
RESULTS  OF  SECURITY INVESTMENT 
Judged from the standpoint of  the investor, the financial results 
of security capitalism  over  these years were  mixed.  On the one 
hand the securities of the national government brought large returns 
to the holders.  These bonds were issued at prices at times to yield 
7 percent and even  higher.  From  the levels of the dark days of 
1863, they rose in value with the successes of the Northern army. 
The instability of  the currency  caused  sharp fluctuations  in the 
price of  the bonds, but they finally reached par and even rose to a 
premium.  The  obligations of the Northern and Western states gen- 
erally were free of default.  During the Civil War the governments 
of the Southern states and of the Confederacy expanded their debts 
'0  finance the secession movement.  These debts were  abrogated 
and their payment prohibited by the fourteenth amendment to the 
Constitution.  In the reconstruction  period, the carpet-bag govern- 
ments in a number of the Southern states expanded their debts which 
were generally repudiated on the overthrow of  these governments. 
The period immediately following the Civil War was marked by 
extensive  municipal  defaults.  A  number  of  Southern  cities  ex- 
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obligations were later repudiated.  A number of  Western cities like- 
wise  increased  their debts for  the purpose  of  granting aid to the 
railroads and subsequently defaulted.  By  1870 one-fifth of  all the 
municipal  indebtedness of  the United States was  in default.lo9  In- 
glis  Palgrave  warned  the  British  investing  public  that  American 
municipal  securities were  "hardly  in  a  position  which  renders  it 
desirable for private persons to invest in them.  . . A small munici- 
pality in the West has apparently no idea of  what credit means or 
how  vital  it  is  to  stand  in  good  credit.  Investors  find  to  their 
annoyance  that there is  apparently no idea  in  the minds of  those 
responsible that it is necessary to be up to date in the payment of  the 
coupons or the bonds." 11° 
The domestic and foreign holders of  American  railroad bonds 
at times fared poorly due to the depredations of  the security specu- 
lators.  Bond yields were high until 1876 due to the uncertainty of 
the currency.  In these years bonds were necessarily speculative  in 
nature, for the railroads, which were the largest issuers of  these se- 
curities, had not yet established themselves on a sound credit basis. 
As  a result yields ranged from 7 to g and even  lo percent.lll  The 
obligations of  even the best roads were on about a 7 percent basis.'la 
CONCLUSION 
In the period from the close of  the Civil War to the early seven- 
ties the American economic system acquired more definitely the char- 
acteristics of  security capitalism.  Its growth Was  aided by  govern- 
mental  policies particularly  those relating to money  and banking. 
Unfortunately the new  system fell under the control of  the specu- 
lative capitalist.  The first effort of  investment banking to dominate 
the new system ended in disaster with the failure of  Jay Cooke.  The 
tendencies in the form of  security investment were parallel to those 
in England  in the early stage of  security  capitalism following  the 
Napoleonic War.  In the case of  both  countries a severe war had 
increased the public debt, but in the post-war period the debt was 
reduced and the funds thus released were absorbed in the financing 
of  railroad development.  As  in England  speculative  excess  was  a 
characteristic of  early American security capitalism.  Despite the ir- 
regularities in the new security capitalism, there was almost no move 
for control by the federal government which scrupulously followed 
the policy of  laissez faire. 
CHAPTER  11 
DEVELOPMENT OF  AMERICAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
THE  years following the panic of  1873 to the crisis of  1907 marked 
the  developed  stage  of  security capitalism  in this country.  The 
period may justly be called the Morgan Era for over these years the 
House of Morgan  came to dominate the financial system.  In gen- 
eral, the economic tendencies operating in the previous period con- 
tinued over these years.  American  manufacture increased  its out- 
put, and technical  improvements transformed both production and 
consumption.  Free land was still available, and thousands of  new 
acres were brought into cultivation.  Foreign trade changed in na- 
ture, for, where formerly exports consisted largely of  raw materials 
and foodstuffs, there was now a growing increase in the proportion 
of  manufactured goods.  In the railroad field, the great trunk lines 
were formed. 
The struggle  for  a  gold  currency  continued,  and  the  sound 
money program supported by  Eastern bankers was  finally adopted 
by  Congress.  In the words of  the secretary of  the treasury, on the 
day of the resumption of  specie payment "By  five o'clock the news 
was  all over the land and the New York bankers were sipping their 
tea in absolute safety." l  However, in the ensuing years the support- 
ers of sound money were hard pressed  to hold their gains.  Uncer- 
tainty  as to the future of  the currency,  due to the passage  of  the 
Bland-Allison Act in 1878 and the Sherman silver legislation in 1890, 
continued over this period, and at times checked the flow of  capital. 
At  the height of  the political  campaign of  1896 the Chronicle 
observed that : 
There has been  no lack of investment funds any  more  than  there has 
been  a lack  of capital to engage in reproductive enterprises.  The real 
trouble has  been  that  in  view  of  the  ending uncertainty-an  uncer- 
'alnty  at once menacing the standard o  values and  threateninp .to  de-  P 
range all values-neither  the investor nor the capitalist was  willing to 
tle up his money or to let it go  far out of his reach.a 
The Gold Standard Act of  1900 placed the United States on a sound 
money basis where it remained until March  iaaa. 
dOO~ 
In this period the social opposition to security capitalism became 
and the system was attacked in granger acts, and also federal 
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the critical review of  the Supreme Court, which, by weakening the 
impact of  the Sherman Act, restricting the operations of  the Inter- 
state Commerce Commission and the Federal  Trade Commission, 
limiting federal  taxation  and railroad  legislation,  became  a  most 
important  bulwark  protecting  developed  security capitalism  from 
the attacks of  its enemie~.~ 
DEVELOPMENT  OF CORPORATE  ORGANIZATION 
While the corporation had existed in the period before the Civil 
War and had developed in the years immediately following, it was 
however  only  after  the panic  of  1873 that  this form  of  business 
organization came not only to dominate the economic structure but 
to be "the master institution of  civilized life."4  Corporate financ- 
ing was stimulated by the development  of  bond issues secured by 
the  corporate  mortgage.  This instrument now  included  careful 
provisions for foreclosing on pledged property in case of  default and 
for enabling  a  company  to  redeem  its bonds  prior  to maturity 
through the use of call features, and by  the nineties the corporate 
mortgage reached  its modern form." 
Another important change in corporate practice was  replacing 
the individual trustee by the corporation, generally a trust company 
organized specifically for this purpose.  The  unreliability of  an indi- 
vidual as a transfer agent for bonds was demonstrated in the heavy 
reverses  suffered  from  fraudulent  transactions,  and  the investing 
public lost confidence in individuals as tr~stees.~  There was also a 
growing practice  of  issuing collateral  trust  bonds  supported  by  a 
block of  stocks or bonds which had to be deposited with a trustee 
acting in behalf of  the  bondholder^.^  Individual trustees were there- 
fore replaced by corporate trustees. 
Another development in corporate organization was the growing 
use of  the holding company.  This legal  device had already been 
used in railroad finance as early as  1833, but the first pure holding 
company in the modern sense of  the term was developed between 
1868 and 1872 by special acts of  the Pennsylvania legislat~re.~  These 
companies were given "full power and authority to hold and own 
securities of  any form, either as collateral or otherwise, and to dis- 
pose of the same at pleas~re."~  A number of  these holding com- 
panies played an important part in the railroad and the utility in- 
dustries.  The  Pennsylvania Company was formed to aid the financ- 
ing of  the Pennsylvania  Railroad system, and the United Gas and 
Improvement Company developed the first permanent gas and elec- 
tric system.  The State of Massachusetts also granted a special char- 
ter for the formation of  the American Bell Telephone Company.'' 
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~olding  companies were created by special legislative acts until 1889 
when New Jersey amended its general corporation law  permitting  ,  ~or~oration  to hold  the stocks of other companies,  and in time 
other states followed the same practice."  The significance of  this 
measure is well stated by  Meade: 
For momentous consequences, this statute of New Jersey is hardly to be 
equalled in the annals of legislation . . . the little state of  New  Jersey, 
containing 2  percent  of the population and  1  and g/loths  percent  of 
the wealth of the United States, by  the simple act of  amending its =or- 
pation law, nullified the anti-trust laws of every State which had passed 
them.la 
The growing intricacies of  corporate practice  developed a class 
of lawyers who specialized in this field.  John B.  Dill began his lec- 
ture at  the Harvard  Law  School  with  the statement that  "I  am 
the  lawyer  for a  billion  dollars  of  invested  capital."13  William 
Nelson Cromwell, of Sullivan and Cromwell, in the biography which 
he prepared for Who's  Who stated that he was an "officer  or counsel 
of  more than twenty of the largest corporations of  the United States 
and one of the organizers of  the United States Steel Corporation" 
and that he had "reorganized  Northern Pacific Railway and many 
others and put a11  on a paying basis."14  Another  important cor- 
poration lawyer was Joseph  Choate who performed  what was then 
considered a great service for security capitalism in presenting the 
arguments in favor of  invalidating the income tax.16 
OPPOSITION  TO SECURITY CAPITALISM 
The period was  marked by widespread  social unrest, and prob- 
ably at no time in American history was the class struggle sharper. 
The opposition  to security capitalism  expressed  itself  in national 
politics.  Bryan was  the leading spokesman of  this opposition, and 
at the Democratic convention of  1896 his ringing words, "You shall 
not press down upon the brow of  labor this crown of  thorns.  You 
shall not crucify mankind on a cross of  gold," were aimed probably 
at the corner of Wall and Broad Streets.le  The  campaign was fought 
Over  the issue of  financial concentration as  well  as that of mone- 
tary policy.  Singling out the United States Government bond issue 
of 1895, Bryan declared, "the people will vote against bond syndi- 
cates and trusts."  Wall Street was quick to take up the challenge. 
On the Saturday before the election  an anti-Bryan  demonstration 
Of  80,000 persons marched from morning until night.  Wall Street 
Was  bedecked with flags. and the Morgan banking house "made the 
and most  ornate show." l8  One section  of  the parade con- 
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stand there was a cry "where is Pierpont Morgan?" but he was not 
in the parade.l9  Bryan's defeat was an important political victory 
for security capitalism.  In 1900 Bryan was again a candidate for the 
presidency, but this time he was crushingly defeated. 
The system encountered its most aggressive foe not in the ranks 
of  the Democratic party but in the Republican party in the person 
of  Theodore Roosevelt.  Drawing a distinction between "good"  and 
"bad"  trusts, he exerted every effort to effect governmental control 
over the giant industrial corporations then being  formed.  He di- 
rected his shafts particularly against J. P. Morgan, and between these 
two personalities there was a bitter feud.  An attempt was made to 
bring them together at the Gridiron Dinner in 1906, but this effort 
at reconciliation  failed  dismally  when  Roosevelt,  after explaining 
his policy of  business control, shook his fist in the banker's face and 
shouted : "if  you  don't let us do this, those who will come after us 
will rise and bring you to ruin." 20  Wall Street made a vain effort 
to set up Mark Hanna in opposition to Roosevelt for the Republi- 
can nomination in  1908, but Hanna died a few months before the 
conventi~n.~~  The New  York  Sun  expressed its  choice of  Roose- 
velt over Alton B.  Parker in the following words: "We prefer the 
impulsive candidate of  the party of  conservatism to the conservative 
candidate of  the party which the business interests regard as perma- 
nently and dangerously impulsive." 22 
The Democratic  convention  of  1912 was  the scene of  a bitter 
assault on security capitalism.  Bryan, still smarting from his past 
defeats, forced through a resolution that : 
As  proof  of  our fidelity to the people, we  hereby declare ourselves op- 
posed to the nomination of  any candidate for President who is the repre- 
sentative of  or  under  obligation  to  J. Pierpont  Morgan, Thomas  F. 
Ryan, August  Belmont, or  any  other member  of  thepvilege-hunting 
and  favor-seeking class.  That  we  demand  the  with  rawal  from  this 
convention of any delegate or delegates constituting or representing the 
above-named  interest^.^^ 
This resolution  was  passed  by  an overwhelming vote,  and August 
Belmont and Thomas Fortune Ryan, at whom the above resolution 
was  directed, were expelled.  The convention under Bryan's guid- 
ance  then  nominated  Woodrow Wilson  who  was  to continue the 
work of  Theodore Roosevelt as the leader of  the political opposition 
to concentrated security capitalism. 
INTERNATIONALIZATION  OF AMERICAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The  United States was evolving from the stage of  purely national 
to that of  international capitalism, and in consequence  its foreign 
political relations were becoming more important.  It is generally 
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held  that the stage of international  economy of  the United States 
began  during the Great War, but actually it was  under way  two 
decades earlier.  Even  before the turn of  the century the United 
States entered upon a policy of overseas expansion which extended 
its power to the Caribbean and to the Pacific.  American security 
capitalism, similar  to British  security  capitalism, did not  stand to 
gain from an aggressive foreign policy.  In 1896 the United States in 
supporting the Monroe Doctrine came close to conflict with British 
internationalism  over Venezuela.  American banking security capi- 
talism  strongly  opposed  the belligerent  stand  of  its  government. 
Commenting on Cleveland's ultimatum to Great Britain, J. P. Mor- 
gan said: 
I  have labored to  build  up  such  relations  of  confidence  between  the 
United States and the money markets of  Europe that capital from there 
could be  secured in large sums for our needs, and here is a threatened 
disaster that  will  put an end  to  our borrowing. 
Fortunately the clash was averted.*' 
Following the Spanish-American War, the American government 
took  an active part  in the  financial  affairs of  Cuba.  The Platt 
amendment provided  that the Cuban government  was  not to con- 
tract any public debt if  its ordinary revenues were inadequate, and 
also  that the United  States  Government  could  intervene  for  the 
preservation of  Cuban independence in the maintenance of  a gov- 
ernment  adequate  for  the protection  of  life  and  property.  The 
amendment  gave  the  United  States  control  over  the  finances  of 
Cuba, and this power was exercised on several occasions.  Likewise 
the United States Government intervened in Santo Domingo in 1907 
when  its finances were  in a  demoralized condition.  The United 
States Government facilitated the flotation of  a loan by the National 
City Bank to the government of  Haiti, and also took a hand in the 
reorganization  of the finances of  Nicaragua.  In almost  every case 
American intervention resulted in a settlement of  the financial diffi- 
culties of the country and in the improvement of  the credit position 
of the  nation.  Unlike  the policies  of  the European  powers,  the 
Protectorates  established  by  the  United  States over  foreign  teni- 
tories were temporary.  In the Far East, American banking capital- 
ism came near being seriously involved in an imperialistic venture 
but fortunately did not carry the policy through.  In the period 
immediately preceding the Great War, the State Department for a 
time took  an active  interest  in regulating  the flow  of  American 
capital to China.  "That diplomacy"  noted one writer, "represents 
the maximum  point  to which  diplomatic assistance to private  in- 
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CHANGING  FUNCTION  OF COMMERCIAL  BANKING  GROWTH  OF  THE  STOCK  EXCHANGE 
The trend  of  commercial  banking  in this period may  best  be 
traced by  studying the changing financial position  of the national 
banksz6  The national  banks  at  first  made  extensive  use  of the 
privilege of issuing circulating notes permitted under the National 
Bank Act, and these notes constituted about 20 percent of  the total 
liabilities  of  the  national  banks.27  However,  the proportion  de- 
clined sharply, and by  1910 was only about six percent of  the total 
liabilities.  The  deposits of  these institutions were almost entirely in 
the form of demand deposits.28 In 1905 the comptroller of  the cur- 
rency ruled that national banks were not prohibited from operating 
savings departments, but little advantage was taken of  this ruling.29 
The proportion  of  securities to total earning assets reached a high 
figure in  1870 due to the large holding of  government bonds after 
the Civil War; the proportion dropped until  1890, and thereafter 
moved  irregularly upward.30  A  growing  proportion  of  the loans 
of  the  national  banks  were  based  on stocks and  bonds  as  col- 
lateral.  By  1892 security loans constituted  29.72  percent of  total 
loans, in 190 1 they reached a peak of  41.47 percent and then receded 
but by 1910 still accounted for 37.17 percent.31  The exact propor- 
tion of  the security investment assets in the form of  direct security 
holdings  and security  loans  of  all  the commercial  banks  of  the 
United States to their total assets in the period before the passage of 
the Federal Reserve Act has been variously estimated.  Dr. Ander- 
son in his study of  bank earning assets for  1909 estimated that, ex- 
clusive of  real  estate loans, more than one-half of  bank credit was 
applied to the purchase of  bonds or the granting of  loans on stocks 
and bonds.32  Writing in  1914, C. W.  Barron, a  financial editor, 
claimed that twethirds of the funds extended by commercial banks 
were used for investment purposes and only one-third for commer- 
cial transactions.83  It is thus clear that even before 1914, as a result 
of  the changing nature of the entire financial system, the so-called 
commercial bank was broadening its function and was becoming an 
important institution of  developed security capitalism. 
American economists and bankers themselves generally accepted 
the orthodox theory of  banking which maintained that commercial 
banking must be conducted separately from investment ~perations.~ 
However,  A.  Barton  Hepburn,  Chairman  of  the  Chase  National 
Bank, as far back as 1893 properly stated that "the purely commer- 
=ial function as formulated  in text  books  and laid down  by  the 
course as the business of  the bank, fails fully to describe the bank- 
ing of  today.  Banks  of  discount and deposit  have  become  large 
owners of securities." 
Over these years the stock exchanges also expanded rapidly.  The 
successful  opening of  the Atlantic cable in 1866, the adoption of  the 
stock ticker in 1867, and the installation of  telephones on the floor 
of the New York Stock Exchange in 1878 were mechanical improve- 
ments which accelerated  the growth  of  security capitali~m.~~  The 
Open  Board  of  Brokers  was  formed in  1864 as a competitive  or- 
ganization to the New  York  Stock Exchange,  and there  was  also 
a Government Bond Department which  traded in the securities of 
the federal government.  In 1869 the Exchange,  the Open Board 
and the Government Bond  Department, all merged  into the New 
York Exchange.  The Exchange now grew in importance, and from 
1870 to igio the number of  stocks listed on the Exchange rose from 
143 to 426, while the number of bonds increased from 200 to 1  ,o I 3.37 
The volume of  trading on the Exchange, although small when com- 
pared with that of  later years, nevertheless, showed a rapid increase. 
The volume for a single day rose to an early peak of  700,ooo shares 
on November  28,  1879.  In December  1886 the million-share mark 
was  attained, and on April  30,  1913 the volume rose to 3,281,226 
shares, a record that was to stand until 1916.~~ 
In addition to the New York Stock Exchange there were several 
other security markets in New York City.  The New York  Mining 
Stock Exchange traded in mining and other stocks from 1876 to 1883 
when it became the New York Mining and National Petroleum Ex- 
change of  New York.  This financial market later added other se- 
curities as those of  the railroads, and by the nineties its business was 
about a third of  that of  the New York Stock Exchange.  The  Curb 
Exchange also expanded its volume of  business.3g 
Unlike European financial centers, New  York in the period of 
developed security capitalism did not absorb the interior stock ex- 
changes and  these  have  continued  in  importance  particularly  in 
Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia and San Franci~co.~~ 
RISE  OF  INVESTMENT BANKING 
The most  important  change in financial  organization  occurred 
in the field of investment banking.  The significant  trend of  this 
period  was  the transfer of  the control of  American  capitalism in 
many  fields from speculative  capitalists to banking capitalists.  In 
this respect  American  differed  from  British  security  capitalism, 
and partook rather of  the nature of  German security capitalism.  To 
a large extent this difference was due to the relative extent of  the 
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the early years to finance the needs of  industry, which obtained its 
funds largely from the resources of  individual entrepreneurs.  On 
the other hand, in Central Europe and in the  United  States, the 
financial resources of  the industrialists were insufficient to meet the 
needs of the vast enterprises being formed.  It was therefore neces- 
sary for the investment banker  to mobilize  not only the funds of 
the public  but  also  to  contribute  a  proportion  of  the  necessary 
capital  out of his  own resources.  Under  these  conditions,  it was 
inevitable that the banker should obtain extensive control over the 
managerial  policies of  the enterprises in which he placed his own 
funds.  Thus close relations between industry and investment bank- 
ing became at first a dominant  feature of  American security  capi- 
talism in the developed stage. 
The course of  security capitalism in the years immediately after 
the Civil War was marked by the private wars of  the Fiskes and the 
Drews which may be likened to the anarchy prevailing under feud- 
alism of the Middle Ages, with the distinction that, whereas under 
the feudal system the people lost their lives, under security capital- 
ism they lost their money.  The investment banker brought a sem- 
blance of order out of  this chaos, and for a time was able to restrain 
the ruthless feuds of  security  capitalism.  The transfer  of  control 
from the speculative capitalist to the investment banker meant the 
transition from financial feudalism to financial nationalism.  As the 
growth of nationalism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ended 
the private wars of  the barons,  and at least within the confines of 
the nation brought law and order, so the coming of  banking capital- 
ism  in the eighties  instituted a system  of  stabilized  finance.  The 
captains of  industry were no longer sovereigns in their own right 
but now ruled by the grace of  the higher power of  the investment 
banker. 
This close relation between industry and finance brought about 
the combination movement in both fields. The expansion of  indus- 
try was made possible by the development of  intercorporate relations 
through  agreements,  pools,  interlocking  directorates, voting  trusts 
and holding companies.  At  the same time, to raise the funds for 
these  giant  corporations it was  necessary to mobilize  the financial 
resources  of  the  nation  into  concentrated  financial  combina- 
tions.  This combination movement was brought about not so much 
by concentration, that is, the fusion of  like units in the form of a 
number of  investment banks, but rather by  a policy of  integration 
or the development of  a close relation among unlike financial units. 
Thus the large investment banking houses extended their influence 
over insurance companies  and trust companies  in order to obtain 
dominance over  capital  resources  and over  commercial  banks  to 
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direct their credit resources.'l  By  1  g 12 integration had progressed 
to the point where 180 individuals representing 18 investment bank- 
ing houses, commercial banks and trust companies, through holding 
34  1 interlocking directorates controlled  i i 2  corporations with total 
resources of over $22 ,000,000,000.42 
A number of investment banking houses gained in strength over 
these years.  Palgrave, writing in the New York Forum, recognized 
in addition  to the Morgan  firm  the importance of  other houses, 
as Kuhn Loeb, Speyer, J. Pc W. Seligman and Brown Brothers, in the 
comment that "there  is  a considerable moral fibre in the United 
States, and it would be difficult to find higher examples of  business 
yalities than among its first-rate men." 
RISE OF THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 
Until almost the end of  the seventies the house of  Morgan was 
conducted as an old-style private banking e~tablishrnent.~~  Its pri- 
mary function was to place American securities among foreign in- 
vestors.  At home it participated in the various  syndicates which 
handled  United States Government bonds,  but in these groups it 
was still a follower and not yet the leader.  The Morgan firm was 
unsuccessful against Jay  Cooke in bidding for the issue of  United 
States Government bonds in 1871.  But in 1873 it broke the Cooke 
monopoly  by  forcing the secretary of  the treasury  to provide  for 
equal participation in the flotation of  the loan between the Morgan- 
Morton syndicate  (including Barings) and the Cooke syndicate  (in- 
cluding Rothschilds).  It was thus a Morgan victory, since the house 
had asked only for equal participation while Jay Cooke had opposed 
any division.46  In 1877 the house  of  Morgan took part  in the re- 
funding of  the  Government  bonds,  but  the  banking  group  was 
known  as the "Belmont  Syndicate." 46  This transaction  was,  how- 
ever, important in that Drexel, Morgan took the place of  Jay Cooke, 
and became the American associate of  Rothschilds. 
The eighties however, marked the early preeminence of the Mor- 
gan firm.'"  In addition to its normal banking operations, the firm 
now initiated policies which were to influence the entire economic 
system of the United States. 
INFLUENCE OVER  SUPPLY OF CREDIT AND CAPITAL 
The  broad significance of  Morgans in the development of  Ameri- 
can security capitalism can best  be understood by noting the two 
underlying policies of  the house.  The first policy advanced  its in- 
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financial  system;  the  second  policy  extended  its  influence  over 
the sources of  the demand  for capital.  While a  growing propor- 
tion  of  the capital  of the American  investing  public  was  placed 
directly  in securities, most  of  these resources  continued  to be in- 
vested  indirectly  through  investment  institutions  such  as savings 
banks,  commercial banks,  trust companies and life insurance com- 
panies.  For the most  part, the Morgan firm made little or no at- 
tempt  to tap the capital resources  of  the savings banks  and they 
generally  remained  independent  of  investment  houses.  However, 
other institutions of  indirect investment, as commercial banks, trust 
companies and life insurance companies, came under the influence of 
the Morgan firm.  This relationship was aided by the fact that the 
American financial system in practice followed the Continental sys- 
tem of  mixed rather than the British  system of  specialized finance. 
In the course of time, trust companies extended their activities to 
include both commercial as well as investment banking operations, 
and life insurance  companies  in turn, through buying control  of 
trust companies and of  commercial banks, indirectly performed the 
operations of  these institutions.  This mixed financial system there- 
fore made possible the extensive integration of  the structure which 
took place in the closing decade of  the nineteenth century.  Influ- 
ence over  these  institutions of indirect  investment  was  needed to 
give the investment banker the assurance of  a market for new issues, 
and syndicate  subscriptions  were  allotted  to  these  financial  insti- 
tutions. 
It was particularly advantageous  for investment houses to gain 
control of  commercial banks and trust companies.  These institu- 
tions were  important not  only  because  they  possessed  capital  re- 
sources but also credit facilities essential for carrying securities until 
finally marketed.  Influence  over the banks was  exercised through 
interlocking directorates.  J. P. Morgan  became vice-president and 
director of  the National  Bank  of  Commerce,  and thereby gained 
close contact with that institution.  This bank  in t,urn was  closely 
interlocked  with  the  First  National  Bank  headed  by  George  F. 
Baker an ally of  Morgan.  The Morgan firm through stock owner- 
ship and interlocking directorates also obtained an interest  in the 
Chase, the Liberty, the Hanover and the Astor National Banks, and 
in addition  developed a considerable interest  in a number of  out- 
of-town   bank^."^  Interest was also extended to a group of  important 
trust companies.  J. P.  Morgan & Company had representation  on 
the boards of  directors of  the Union, the Commercial and the Fidel- 
ity Trust Companies, and in addition organized the Bankers Trust 
Company.  Through the First National Bank a close relation with 
the  Manhattan  Trust  Company  was  maintained.4g  In  1909 the 
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Morgan firm obtained an interest in the Guaranty Trust Company 
which was then added to the Morgan group. 
To  meet the government attack on the security operations of the 
national banks connected with Morgans and other investment banks, 
separate companies known as affiliates were  formed.  In 1908 the 
First National Bank, the keystone of  the Morgan system of commer- 
cial banks,  organized  the First Securi'ties  Company by  declaring a 
dividend of loo percent which was issued in the form of  stock in the 
securities company.  The two  organizations were  bound together 
under an organization agreement between George F. Baker on behalf 
of the trustees and J. P.  Morgan acting for the stockholders.  In 
similar manner in 191  1 the National City Bank formed the National 
City Company by  paying a 40 percent dividend to the stockholders, 
and thus providing $io,ooo,ooo of  stock in the new instituti~n.~~ 
The great life insurance companies were veritable reservoirs of 
financial resources, and the large investment houses made every ef- 
fort to develop close  contacts  with  these  companies.  Because of 
this resultant  intimate relationship the insurance  companies were 
described as "the financial annexes to Wall Street interests"  in the 
"Armstrong Report" on insurance companie~.~~  The  house of  Mor- 
gan  developed  connections with  the Mutual Life Insurance  Com- 
pany, and acquired an interest  in the New York Life Insurance as 
well as in the Equitable Life Assurance C~mpany.~~  The latter in- 
stitution had been controlled by Thomas F. Ryan who, in the words 
of  the biographer of  Dwight Morrow, "was not considered a man of 
sufficient calibre  to execute so large a responsibility."  63  Morgan, 
therefore, assisted by George Baker and James Stillman, took over 
Ryan's interests.b4 
INVESTMENT  BANKING  AND  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT  FINANCING 
The  investment banker is primarily a middleman, or a merchan- 
diser of securities and thus he desires to obtain as large a supply of 
securities as he can market.  The Morgan firm, therefore, developed 
relations with three sources of  demand, the United States Govern- 
ment, the railroads, and industry.  As  mentioned before, the firm 
took an active part in the flotation of  the various issues of the federal 
government after the close of  the Civil War.  The influence of  the 
Morgan  firm  in floating  federal government  securities  became  in- 
creasingly important with the passing of the years, from its compe- 
tition against Jay Cooke, its secondary position  in the Belmont syn- 
dicate to its leadership in the critical federal financing of  the nine- 
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The relations between the Morgan firm and the federal govern- 
ment in the famous "gold loan of  189.5"  were the subject of  bitter 
controversy.  From the perspective of  over forty years it is now pos- 
sible to view the episode objecti~ely.~~  The panic of  1893 was fol 
lowed by one of  the worst depressions in American history.  Unem 
ploymerlt gripped the industrial centers, a large number of  the rail 
roads were in receivership and the confused currency legislation of 
Congress raised serious doubt as to the ability of  the United States 
to maintain the gold standard. 
Financial conditions abroad were unsatisfactory as an aftermath 
of the Baring failure, and Europe was  drawing heavily on our sup- 
ply of gold.  Throughout 1894 the gold reserves of  the treasury  at 
various times were seriously depleted.56  In order to replenish  the 
government's gold stock, the treasury  throughout  1893 sold several 
bond issues to the public, but they were not xvell received.57 These 
public issues gave no relief since they did not replenish the govern- 
ment gold fund, and the gold supply fell to the desperately low level 
of  only $~2,ooo,ooo  in February, 1895.  In this crisis President Cleve- 
land and Secretary Carlisle were forced to decide whether to obtain 
the necessary financial  relief  through  another public loan  sold to 
the investors at large or through a private loan by  a banking syndi- 
cate.  The  latter policy alone would give the assurance of  obtaining 
the necessary gold from abroad.  The government in despair turned 
for help to Morgan who rushed to Washington to confer with Cleve- 
land and Carlisle.  As  a result of  these negotiations Morgan agreed 
to raise a private loan of  $50,000,000 with the understanding that 
the payment should be made in gold of  which half was to be obtained 
from abroad.  Morgan was aided by  the Deutsche Bank, by August 
Belmont  and by  James  Stillman,  President  of  the  National  City 
Bank.58 
When  the details  of  the negotiations  were  announced,  bitter 
criticism was levied at both Cleveland and Carlisle.  In these negotia- 
tions one senator saw  "the  iron band of contraction wielded at the 
dictation of  England," and the New  York World held that the syn- 
dicate was made up of Jews and non-Americans.  It was particularly 
charged that the terms of  the loan were ex~rbitant.~~ 
The  actual terms of  the issue were on a 3.75 percent basis, while 
the outstanding bonds of  the United States Government were selling 
on a  3  percent  basis.  The issue however was  conditioned by  the 
requirement  that  one-half  of  the gold  had  to  be  obtained  from 
abroad."  The action of the Morgan syndicate enabled the federal 
government  to  avoid  the  step  of  suspending  gold  payment  and 
abandoning the gold standard.  Cleveland and Carlisle on their part, 
in seeking to maintain the gold standard, had no alternative but a 
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private loan from the banking syndicate.  The fact that the country, 
at that time, had no central bank, made it necessary to deal with a 
banking syndicate having sufficient foreign support to import gold. 
REBUILDING  OF RAILWAY FINANCE 
The  original reason for Morgan's active participation in railroad 
finance was primarily due to his realization of  the need of  protecting 
the interests of  the investors, particularly foreign investors, in Amer- 
ican railroad securities.  Throughout the seventies losses were heavy, 
and  in 1876 39 percent of  all the railroad bonds were in default, 
while in 1879, 65 roads with capitalization of  $234,ooo,ooo were sold 
under forecl~sure.~'  As  a result of  these conditions, the European 
market for American railway  securities was  practically  closed, and 
the free flow  of  capital from Europe to America  was checked.  A 
German banker stated that an American railroad bond could not be 
sold "even if  signed by an angel."6Z 
In this emergency the house of  Morgan determined to take the 
leadership in the financial reorganization of  the railroads.  In the 
end this policy was  to lead the house not only to take  merely  an 
external  financial  interest  in the railroads  but also to participate 
actively in the managerial policy of  many of  the systems.  Through- 
out the sixties the railroads were mainly controlled by the specula- 
tive capitalists.  The only important invasion of  this field by bank- 
ing interests was the ill-fated venture of  Jay Cooke in obtaining con- 
trol of  the Northern Pacific.  For years Gould and Fiske not only 
ruled their own railroad domains absolutely, but even made success- 
ful forays into the territories of  other powerful railroad barons,  in- 
cluding that of  Cornelius Vanderbilt, who notwithstanding all his 
financial strength was forced to give ground.  The  conservative bank- 
ers of the East  strongly  disapproved  of  these  financial raids,  but 
lacked  the courage  to check  them.Bg  Morgan,  however,  was  de- 
termined  to meet force with  force,  and with  his  intervention  the 
Gould-Fiske interests  were  thoroughly  whipped  in the battle  for 
control of  the Albany and Susquehanna Railr~ad.~'  The defeat of 
the  Gould-Fiske interests brought  relief  to harassed  security  capi- 
talism, and this contest ivaged not only by litigation but by  force of 
arms made  Morgan  the acknowledged  leader of  the new  banking 
capitalism.B6 The  victory of  the security banker over the speculative 
security capitalist was decisive, and the latter now disappeared as an 
important factor in the railroad field. 
With his  influence  over a  number of  eastern lines now  estab- 
lished, Morgan gradually extended his sway over the western roads. 
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extent this condition was due to the economic feudalism which per- 
mitted ruthless competition among systems dominated by separate 
railroad presidents acting as lords over their respective  territories. 
There was  urgent need of replacing this chaos with order, and the 
strong hand of  Morgan forced many of  the railroad barons to accept 
his sovereignty.  In January  1889 the leading railroad  presidents 
assembled in the Madison Avenue home of  Morgan, and at the con- 
clusion of  this meeting Morgan made the following significant pub- 
lic announcement : 
I am  authorized  to  say,  I think, on behalf  of  the banking houses 
represented here that if  an organization can be formed practically upon 
the basis submitted by  the committee, and with an executive committee 
able to enforce its provisions, upon which  the bankers shall be  repre- 
sented, they  are prepared  to say  that  they  will  not negotiate, and will 
do everything in their  ower to prevent the negotiation of, any securities  P  for the construction o  parallel lines, or the extension of  lines not ap 
proved  by  that  executive  committee.  I  wish  that  distinctly  under- 
~tood.~ 
The financial press of  the time referred to this meeting as "the 
bankers'  triumph and the presidents'  surrender."  This conference 
signified the transfer of  the control of  the railroads from the hands 
of the industrial capitalist to those of  the investment banker.  Not 
only  were  the finances  of  many  of  the railroads  to be  directed 
by the bankers but also the management of  these vast systems passed 
into their hands.67 
STRUGGLE  WITH  HARRIMAN 
The supremacy of banking security capitalism  in the railroad 
field  met  its most  serious challenge  from  Edward  H.  Harriman. 
There was a vast difference  between the speculative capitalist as Fiske 
and the industrial  capitalist  as  Harriman.  The former used  the 
railroads merely  as a convenient  vehicle  for deriving profits from 
the manipulation of the securities of  the roads on the stock  ex- 
change.  Although they dominated and controlled the management 
of  these roads, the speculative capitalist gave little attention to main- 
taining satisfactory operations.  Harriman, on the other hand, pos- 
sessed  all  the virtues  of  the industrial  capitalist,  and sought  his 
profits  mainly  from  the more efficient  management of  the roads 
under his control.  Moody in commenting on this point stated that 
Harriman "had  early adopted the theory that the first duty of  rail- 
road  management  was  to maintain  the character  of  the physical 
property.  . . Thus in the management  of  the Illinois  Central he 
never 'skinned' the road to pay dividends, he never allowed the road- 
bed or equipment to become inefficient."  The struggle between 
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~~~~iman  as the protagonist of  industrial capitalism in the railroad 
field and Morgan as the leader of  banking capitalism was waged in 
three successive battles over the Illinois Central, the Erie and finally 
the Northern  Pacific.  In the  skirmish  over  the Illinois Central, 
Harriman,  with the aid of  Stuyvesant Fish, defeated Drexel,  Mor- 
gan & Company.6B The  next battle was fought over the Erie.  This 
road went into the hands of  the receiver during the panic of  1893, 
and in the following year Drexel, Morgan & Company proposed  a 
plan of reorganization.  Harriman was the owner of  a small block of 
the junior  securities  of  the road,  and opposed  the  Morgan  plan 
for reorganization  on the ground not only that the holders of  the 
junior  securities were forced  to make  heavy  sacrifices, but on the 
additional basis that the plan was financially unsound.  Harriman, 
together  with other holders of  securities, including Kuhn, Loeb & 
Company, August Belmont and representatives of  the Astor  estate, 
sent a scathing protest to Morgan  & C~mpany.~~  This protest was 
ignored and the original reorganization was approved at a meeting 
of the Erie stockholders.  Harriman, however, refused to deposit his 
bonds  and  brought  suit  to the  Supreme  Court  which,  finally, 
denied his appeal.71  However, the Erie defaulted on the payment 
of  the very first  coupon of  the new  bonds,  and so  demonstrated 
the truth of the criticism of  Harriman and his associates that the 
Morgan plan was unsound.  The  new reorganization plan recognized 
the criticism  of  the protesting ~ommittee.?~ 
The  supreme struggle between Harriman and Morgan was waged 
for the  control  of  the  Northern  Pacific.  This road  had  come 
under the management of  James J. Hill, the "Empire Builder," and 
was  largely financed by Morgan & Company.  Harriman, aided by 
Kuhn, Loeb & Company, leading rival of Morgans in the investment 
banking field, and the National City Bank, strongest competitor of 
Morgans in the commercial banking field, carried the offensive into 
the enemy camp.  Harriman mobilized his own capital by  drawing 
upon the cash resources of  the Union Pacific Railroad.  Altogether 
the sum of  $78,ooo,ooo was needed to purchase the control of  $155,- 
ooo,ooo of  the stock of  the road in the market.7Vn the beginning 
the market campaign was so cleverly handled by the Harriman in- 
terests that they were even able to purchase  io,ooo shares of  stock 
directly from J. P. Morgan & Company itself, and 13,000 shares from 
the Northern Pacific C~mpany.?~  The  rise in the price of  the stock, 
however, stirred  the suspicion  of  Hill who personally  confronted 
Jacob  Schiff  and then communicated with J. P.  Morgan.76  The 
Morgan  interests,  now  aroused, entered the market, and the com- 
petitive bidding of the opposing camps forced the price of  Northern 
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depressed the prices of other securities.  The  struggle, according to 
the Chronicle,  caused  "one  of  the most  serious and yet most  un- 
necessary panics New York has ever experienced."  78  In the end the 
Morgan  interests retained control of the common stock, while the 
Harriman forces gained a majority of the preferred stock which had 
equal  voting  power  with  the common.  However,  the  board  of 
directors of  the Northern  Pacific had the right to retire the pre- 
ferred stock, and threatened to take this step in order to maintain 
control.77  At  this point the two forces reached  a  settlement and 
agreed  to leave the composition of  the Northern  Pacific board  in 
the hands of  J. P.  Morgan personally.  The settlement made by 
Morgan created five vacancies on the board of  directors of the North- 
ern Pacific and the new appointees included both Hill and Harri- 
man but the control of  the board was retained by Morgan.le 
THE  NEW  HAVEN  DEFEAT 
The  most serious reverse suffered by J. P. Morgan in the field of 
railway finance came toward the close of  his career in the unsatis- 
factory results of his plan to combine the transportation system of 
New England.  Morgan had been a director of  the New York, New 
Haven and Hartford Railroad  for a  number of  years,  and under 
his guidance the road prospered until the close of  the century.  Mor- 
gan then decided to apply his policy  of  railroad combination suc- 
cessful in the past  in other territories to the entire New  England 
area.  To  carry out the plan the resources of  the New Haven, then 
in an .excellent financial  position, were used.  All  forms of  trans- 
portation, including railroads, steamship lines and trolley lines were 
bought up.80 The  most important acquisition was that of  the Boston 
and Maine which was soundly capitalized and efficiently managed.s1 
On the other hand, worthless  property  was  also purchased.  One 
railroad operating at a loss, was acquired at a cost of  $i,500,ooo.~~ 
The effect of  these operations may be seen in table 15 on page 
177 showing the financial position of  the New Haven in 1903 and 
in igog. 
From this table it is seen that in 1903 the financial position of 
the New Haven was excellent, with the ratio of  funded debt to total 
capitalization at a low of  7.93 percent and with fixed charges fairly 
well covered at 184.2 1 percent.  By  1909 the funded debt had been 
increased to $234,goo,ooo, and consequently the ratio of  funded debt 
to total capitalization rose to 52.15 percent while fixed charge cover- 
age fell to 149.08 percent.  Dividends on the inflated stock were at 
first paid from surplus, then from short-term borrowings, were later 
reduced and finally suspended altogether.  The press and the Inter- 
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TABLE  15 
FINANCUE  POSITION  OF  THE  NEW  HAW  RMLROAD.~~ 
(1903 and 1909) 
Explanation: 
For meaning of these items and ratios see pp. 370-371. 
(a)  includes rents for leases. 
("  includes capitalization of leased rentals at rate of 6 per cent. 
state Commerce Commission were bitter in their denunciation of the 
Morgan policy.  The critical but calmer conclusion of  Professor W. 
Z.  Ripley on the New Haven episode was as follows: 






The New  Haven disaster goes  far to justify  the popular distrust of  any 
...  undue concentration of  power,  Once and for all in New  England 
the  question  seems  to  be  settled  that  even  an  honest  transportation 
monopoly is inimical to the best public interest.84 
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In addition to the extension of  influence over the forces of the 
demand for capital in the field of  national government and of  rail- 
road financing, Morgan & Company also extended its power to cer- 
tain fields of industrial financing, particularly the steel business.  In 
this field Morgan encountered another powerful leader of industrial 
capitalism in the person of  Andrew Carnegie who was a firm believer 
in the competitive system, and who entered into bitter competitive 
fights.  In a memorandum to his partners Carnegie wrote : 
Put  your  trust  in  the policy  of  attending to your own  business in 
Your  own way  and running your mills full, regardless of  prices and very 
little trust in the efficacy of artificial arrangements with your competi- 
tors,  which  have  the  serious  result  of  strengthening  them  if  they 
Strengthen you.  Such is my  advice.s5 
(PER  CENT) 
Total income to fixed charges. .......... 
....  Funded debt to total capitalization. 
Total income to total capitalization.. ... 
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Carnegie threatened Morgan with competition not only in steel 
but in railroads,  for  he instituted  surveys for his own  road  from 
Pittsburgh to the Atlantic seab~ard.~~  Morgan then determined to 
buy out Carnegie.  After considerable negotiation, Carnegie agreed 
to take  $447,ooo,ooo for  his  pr~perties.~~  Th.us a  leading  indus- 
trialist capitalist passed from the scene.8B The Carnegie properties 
now formed the basis of  the billion-dollar United States Steel Cor- 
poration, whose board of  directors included  a large representation 
of Morgan   interest^.^^  This deal was another victory for banking 
capitalism over industrial capitalism, and was  so recognized by  the 
press of  the day. 
Outside of the steel business Morgan & Company in these years 
made little effort  to penetrate the other major  fields of  industry. 
The  petroleum industry by this time was dominated completely by 
John D. Rockefeller.  An industrial capitalist he differed from Car- 
negie  in that the latter believed  in competition while the former 
aggressively pushed the policy of  monopoly.  The enormous profits 
from the petrole,um industry furnished sufficient resources to finance 
the expansion of  the Rockefeller interests,  and thus they were in- 
dependent of the bankers.  The Rockefeller interests even entered 
the banking  field,  and obtained  a  substantial  interest  in  several 
financial organizations,  particularly  the National  City  Bank.Oo 
Henry Clews paid tribute to the financial power of  the Standard 
Oil group in the statement that "This combination controls Wall 
Street almost absolutely.  Many of  the strongest financial institutions 
are at their service in supplying accommodations when  needed."  O1 
Rockefellers and Morgans, as the respective leaders of  industrial 
and banking capitalism, at times had conflicting interests and came 
close to open warfare, particularly during the fight over the North- 
ern Pacific, but in every case an open clash was avoided. 
In this period Morgan and Company made little effort to finance 
the new industries which were then coming into existence.  For ex- 
ample, in 1908 the Morgan firm was offered the financing of  William 
C.  Durant  who  was  a  leader  in  the  new  automobile  industry. 
Durant was seeking additional capital and asked Morgan and Com- 
pany to underwrite $5oo,ooo for which loan he offered stock in his 
company as ~ollateral.~~  Durant fell into a controversy with E.  L. 
Stetson,  counsel  for  Morgans,  and  with  George  \U.  Perkins,  an 
active partner of the firm.  In the conversation  Durant stated that 
the time would come when  500,000 automobiles would be sold an- 
nually.  Perkins commented : "If  he has any sense he'll  keep such 
notions to himself  if  he ever tries to borrow  money."  The under- 
writing was therefore denied.  In the course of  time the stock which 
Durant offered as collateral for the loan was to pay  $35,ooo,ooo in 
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dividends and was to attain a value of  over $2oo,ooo,ooo.  Durant 
in later years founded the General Motors Company and became its 
President.  However, during the difficulties of  1920 control of  the 
company  passed from Durant to the DuPont interests."  Even  in 
the pre-war period Henry Ford became the leading industrial capi- 
talist in the automobile field.  In the post-war period he not only 
retained his independence of banker control, but even extended his 
influence over certain major banking institutions.  Like  Carnegie, 
Henry Ford was an outspoken critic of  banking capitalism. 
GROWING  DEMAND  FOR  CAPITAL 
The demand for capital came to some extent from the federal, 
state and municipal governments but largely from the railroad, in- 
dustrial and utility corporations and from real estate.  The trend 
of  the  national  debt over  these  years  was  generally  downward.Q4 
This decline was checked by the financing of  the Spanish-American 
War, the indemnity to Spain and the construction of  the Panama 
Canal.  All told, however, the national debt increased but slightly. 
Table 16 shows the trend of  state government debt from 1870 to 
1913.06  The  debt structure of  the state governments was very sound. 
The unfunded debt showed no increase and the proportion of  the 
unfunded to gross debt was  never high.g7  The net debt generally 
declined  and showed little increase  until the turn of  the century 
when  it began  the rise which  continued throughout the war and 
post-war period.gs  However, population  also  increased  over these 
years, and as  a result the net  debt per capita remained  at a  low 
figure.se The  state governments always had a goodly amount of  assets 
which could be deducted from their gross debt, and the proportion 
of such deductions to the gross debt was always high.loO The  statis- 
tics on the amount of  the tax base or the assessed valuation of  the 
property on which  taxes could be levied  are incomplete, but they 
indicate the rapid increase in assessed valuation of  such taxable prop- 
erty.lol  As a result of  the more rapid increase in the tax base com- 
pared  with the increase in the net debt of  the states, the tax base 
covered the net debt at a rising ratio.loa  Thus the various trends 
in the finances of  the state governments were very satisfactory. 
Municipal debt rose sharply.  In 1870 the total debt was $516, 
ooo,ooo and by 1880 it had increased by $~o~,ooo,ooo,  but over the 
next decade municipalities adapted a pay-as-you-go policy and debt 
rose only by $105,00o,ooo.  After 1890, however, municipal borrow- 
ing rose sharply and by 1902 the total debt was $i,6~o,ooo,ooo. The 
1912 figures showed a municipal debt more than double that of 1902 
Or  $~,~~6,000,000.10a 180  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
Explana~ion: 
(a) Total of  current and floating debt. 
(b) Sinking fund assets. 
Unfunded and funded debt less sinking fund assets.  (*  Assessed  valuation  of  all  property  subject  to ad  valorem  taxation.  U.S.  Census 
Bureau Wealrh, Debt and Taxation, 19x3, Vol.  I, p.  747. 
Currency not gold basis. 
1890. 









FINANCIAL POSITION  OF THE RAILROADS 
The  volume of  railroad financing was by far the most important 
form of  corporate investment  over  these years.  The statistics on 
American railroads before  1890 are incomplete, and owing to dif- 
ferences in the methods of  keeping accounts,  it is unwise  to com- 
pare the financial statements before and after this date.  The  follow- 
I 
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ing ratios show the financial position of  the railroads from 1880 until 
1889. 
TABLE  17 
RAILROAD  FINANCE,  1  880-i88g.1°4 
(percent) 
From 1880 to 1890 the financial position of  the railroads was not 
satisfactory, as may be seen by the fact that the total income to in- 
terest declined.  The proportion of the funded debt to total capitali- 
zation increased  and the property protection of  their funded debt 
declined. 
The trend of railway  finance  may  be studied more accurately 
after 1890, for after that date the Interstate Commerce Commission 
presented annual figures for all the Class I railroads.lo5  Due to the 
rapid  extensive  development  of  the  United  States  the operating 
revenues of  the railroads from  1890 to 1910 expanded to 261 per- 
cent, while operating expenses were at about the same level  (263 per- 
cent) and so the ratio of operating expenses to operating revenues 
remained  fairly satisfactory at an average  of  66.2  percent  for the 
period.lo8  Also the ratio of operating income to operating revenues 
was maintained at the high average of  33.7 percent for the period.lo7 
This ratio indicated  that the roads had the satisfactory sum of 33 
cents of  operating income left over from the revenues after paying 
for all operating expenses.  Total income rose to 244.9 percent or 
greater than the upswing in fixed charges which rose to only 159.3 
percent.los  As a result the ratio of the total income to fixed charges 
rose from  132.6  percent in 1890 to 204  percent in 1910 which was 
very satisfactory.loB Also the amount of  net income or the balance 
left over after fixed charges rose more sharply than operating reve- 
nues and so the ratio between  these two items increased from 9.6 
Percent in 1890 to 18.8 percent in 1  g  This ratio signified that 
operating revenues could  fall  18.8 percent  before the coverage of 
the fixed charges was impaired and indicated a satisfactory margin 
of safety.  While net income, or the balance available for dividends, 
' 
. 
(MILLION  DOLLARS) 
35,338 
69453 
13  213  222  :g 
1897  14  222  236  28  208 
1900  It  253  264  29  235 
rgor  10  261  33  228 
67  278  39  239 
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rose to 51 1.9  percent, the dividends actually paid by the roads in- 
creased to 402.8 percent, and so the ratio of  net income to dividends 
paid rose from 127 percent in 1890 to 147 percent in 1910.'~'  This 
ratio shows that the roads more than earned their dividends over 
these years. 
It was fortunate that the course of  earning power was satisfactory, 
for the trend of  railroad capitalization over these years was unsound. 
From  1890 to  1910 the  roads  increased  their  funded debt  from 
$4,462,ooo,ooo to $io,388,ooo,ooo, their total debt including capi- 
talized  leased  rentals  from  $~,g78,ooo,ooo  to $i2,638,ooo,ooo  and 
their total capitalization from $io,i57,ooo,ooo to $20,~oo,ooo,ooo.11~ 
As a result of  the greater increase in the total debt as compared to 
total capitalization, the ratio between these two items rose from 58.8 
percent in 1890 to 61.0 percent in 1910.~~~  By  1890 the proportion 
of  debt to total capitalization was already high but increased further 
in the years which followed.  Fortunately the total income increased 
rapidly and it was possible at the time to carry the heavy debt with- 
out serious difficulty. 
In part, the increase in total capitalization was due to the need 
of  funds for the construction of  additional operating mileage which 
rose from  163,597 in 1890 to 240,831 in 1910.~~~  The total stated 
value of  railroad property over these years rose from $7,~tjtj,ooo,ooo 
to $ 14,387,000,000.116 
FOREIGN  FINANCING 
The trend of the capital movement between the United States 
and foreign countries began to change in the early eighties.  'The 
first  important foreign loan  was  made  in  1879 when  an issue of 
$~,OOO,OOO  was granted to the Province of  Quebec.ll8  Between the 
years 1896 and 1900 $ioo,ooo,ooo of  American capital was exported 
to Canada.l17  In 1899 Morgans floated a loan to the Mexican Gov- 
ernment and there was  also considerable American  investment in 
Mexican rai1r0ads.l'~  In the early years of  the century the New 
York market granted loans to various continental countries as Ger- 
many, Russia  and Sweden.llB  The most  important single  case  of 
foreign financing in these years was  America's  extensive  participa- 
tion  in  the  flotation  of  the  British  government  loans  issued  to 
finance the Boer War.  During  1900 and 1901 Morgan  and Com- 
pany  floated successive loans in large amounts for this purpose.lZ0 
Later  England bought back  a large part  of  her securities, and by 
1903 the Chronicle expressed the opinion that "practically  all these 
securities have gone back to England." lZ1 
After the beginning of  the century  the United States took  an 
active though generally unsuccessful part in financing the Far East. 
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Kuhn Loeb and Company and Edward Harriman participated  ex- 
tensively in financing Japan during its conflict with Russia.lZ2 Har- 
riman apparently had  a grandiose plan  of  a round-the-world rail- 
road, and for this purpose negotiated  with  both  the Japanese  and 
Russian  Governments.  In  1905 Morgan  and Company took  over 
the Belgian interest in the American China Development Company, 
but later  the entire American  participation  in  the  Company was 
bought out by  the Chinese Government.lZs  An American banking 
group headed by Morgan and Company, including Kuhn Loeb, the 
National City Bank and Edward Harriman, on the insistence of  the 
state  department,  and even  of  President  Taft personally,  gained 
its admission into the international banking loan to China in 19  1 1  .I2' 
In 1  g 13 President Wilson withdrew all official support of  American 
banking in its far-eastern financial operations and thus forced  the 
American group to retire Erom this field.lZ6 
CHANGING  SOURCES  OF  CAPITAL  SUPPLY 
Throughout this period foreign capital in the United States con- 
tinued large in amount but of  declining importance.  While foreign 
capital had a large and even a majority interest in the leading rail- 
roads in the early nineties this participation was sharply reduced by 
1905.~~' 
In the last quarter of  the century the supply of  domestic capital 
increased rapidly, coming both from the profits of  the wealthy class 
and particularly  from the growth in the material prosperity of  the 
middle class.  As  in other countries this group formed the social 
foundation of developed security capitalism.  National wealth rose 
from $43,6oo,ooo,ooo in  1880 to  $6~,ooo,ooo,ooo  in  1890 to $88,- 
500,000,000 in  igoo and to $i86,~oo,ooo,ooo  in  1910 and likewise 
national income rose from $~,~OO,OOO,OOO  in 1880 to $31,40o,ooo,000 
in ig10.~~'  Estimates of the total volume of  saving are always diffi- 
cult but the trend  may  be seen  in Table  18 which  indicates the 
total assets of the financial  institutions of  the United States from 
1873 to  1911.  The assets  of these institutions including banking 
institutions as  national  banks,  savings banks,  private  banks,  loan 
and trust companies and also life insurance companies, rose slowly 
from a total of  $g,og i ,ooo,ooo in 1873 to only $3,8 17,000,ooo in 1880. 
However by 1890 the total rose to $7,og6,ooo,ooo, by 1  goo it was $12,- 
528,000,ooo and by  1  g  10  it reached  $26,326,000,000.1Z@  These in- 
stitutions of  indirect investment over the years transferred a growing 
proportion of  their assets into security investment.  The total for 
all the financial  institutions rose from  18 percent in 1890 to 24.7 
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TABLE  18 
TOTAL  ASSETS  OF  FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS,  1873-1911.* 
(million dollars) 
A growing proportion  of  individual  investors  turned from in- 
direct  to direct investment  and from  real  estate  mortgages  to se- 
curities.  Until the end of  the nineteenth century only fragmentary 
figures on the distribution  of  security  holdings are available.  In 
1880 it was  estimated that the public debt was  held  by  71,587 in- 
divid~als.'~'  The shares of  the national banks in 1886 were held by 
223,583 persons of  whom  I 17,974 or more than one-half  held ten 
shares or 1e~s.l~~  In 1597 war loans of  $2oo,ooo,ooo issued by  the 
United States Government were taken up in 320,000 separate allot- 
ment~.'~~  The first extensive figures on security holdings,  as com- 
piled  in  1899, showed that 54 railroad companies reported 282,160 
stockholders and 56 industrial companies showed 338,824 stockhold- 
ers or a total of  1 lo corporations with 626,983 stockholders.'"  The 
number  of  bookholders  of  corporate shares  in  the  United  States 
rose from q,qoo,ooo in 1900 to 7,500,ooo in igi3.'s6  Over the same 
period the average number of  one hundred dollar par value shares 
per  stockholder declined  from  140 shares  to  87  shares.18e  These 
figures indicate the growth of  the popularization of  security capital- 
ism in the pre-war period. 
There was  also  a  widening  of  the  geographic  distribution of 
security  holdings.  This distribution of  security  holdings  was  no 
longer  confined  to the East, but began  to spread  throughout the 
West.  Frank  A. Vanderlip,  as vice-president  of  the National City 































The whole  great  Mississippi  Valley  gives  promise  that  at  some  day 
distant perhaps it will be another New  England for investments.  There 
is  a developing bond market  there which  is of  constant  astonishment 
to Eastern dealers.*I 

























































Public interest in security investment varied with the course of 
security prices, but since the general trend of  security prices over 
these years was upward, a favorable public attitude towards security 
capitalism was created. 
As a result of the rapid conversion of  the assets of  the institutions 
of indirect investment into securities, and the growth  of  direct in- 
vestment  in securities  by  individual  investors,  the proportion  of 
securities to total  wealth  rose  sharply.  It was  estimated  that the 
outstanding securities amounted to one-third of  the total national 
wealth.138  This proportion was about equal to that of  the leading 
nations of  Europe and thus the United States, by the beginning of 
the century, had reached about the same maturity in the evolution 
of security capitalism as these older countries. 
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RESULTS  OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The developed stage of  security capitalism brought with it the 
usual evils of overcapitalization of assets, deterioration in the quality 
of the  securities based  on  these  assets,  the  issuing  of  fraudulent 
Statements, consequent security price depreciation, intermittent mal- 
adjustment between saving and investment with the resultant sharp 
security price fluctuations and financial panics. I 86  FINANCE CAPITALISM  DEVELOPMENT  OF  AMERICAN  CAPITALISM  187 
In the case of certain specific railroads there was  serious over- 
capitalization.  Within a seven-year period the bonded  debt of  the 
Chicago and Alton was  raised  from $33,goo,ooo to $1 14,00o,ooo.~~@ 
Within a ten-year period the bonds of  the Cincinnati, Hamilton and 
Dayton  were increased  from $12,00o,ooo to $48,ooo,ooo, while  the 
unfunded debt  rose  from $2oo,ooo  to  $ i o,ooo,ooo.140 In neither 
case was there any corresponding increase in earnings to justify the 
higher  capitalization.  In fact,  the underlying  assets  often  depre- 
ciated in value and as Sterne declared: 
The original  bonded  indebtedness,  representing  ties  that  have 
rotted, rails that have been sold, cars that have broken up, bridges 
and engines that have disappeared, remains a charge upon the road 
in the shape  of  bonds bearing interest."' 
Overcapitalization  was  also a characteristic of  much  of  the in- 
dustrial  financing  of  the late nineteenth  and early  twentieth cen- 
turies.  In the case of  the so-called "Sugar Trust," the outstanding 
bonds of  $io,ooo,ooo were based on plants estimated at $7,740,000 
and  the  additional  capital  stock  of  $75,000,000  represented  no 
tangible va1~e.l'~ 
A further illustration was  the United States Steel Corporation 
which had a total capitalization of  $1,403,450,000 consisting of  $303,- 
450,000  in bonds, $55o,ooo,ooo in preferred stock and $55o,ooo,ooo 
in common stock.  The physical valuation  of  the property, as esti- 
mated in the report of  the United States commissioner of  corpora- 
tions,  was  placed  at  $682,ooo,ooo which  did  not  even  cover  the 
bonds and preferred  stock.ld3  This corporation  is a good  illustra- 
tion of  the interpretation  of  overcapitalization as  given  in the in- 
troductory chapter.  It was  there stated that the test of  overcapital- 
ization is whether or not the future earning power of  the corpora- 
tion is adequate to support the volume of  securities which have been 
issued.  During the early years the earnings of  the  United States 
Steel Corporation were insufficient to justify the heavy capitalization. 
However, in time the expanding profits of  the Corporation were 
sufficient to place even the common stock on a satisfactory earning 
basis.  Judged therefore by  actual earnings the United States Steel 
Corporation eventually was  not overcapitalized.  The conservative 
financial press was strong in its denunciation of  overcapitalization, 
and the Chronicle stated that : 
the floating of  many of  these concerns, however, at enormously inflated 
valuations and  the issue of  stocks upon  such  fictitious basis  cannot be 
too  strongly  condemned-a  more forceful  objection  to  these  combina- 
tions  can  be  found in  the  extravagant  overcapitalization adopted  by 
the promoters.  In most  of  the schemes offered  to  the public  for  sub- 
scription the bonded  debt  and  preferred  stock  are fully  equal to, and 
often in excess of, the real value of  the property represented, while the 
common stock is simply a bonus which is divided between the promoters 
and  the original proprietors.14' 
The  course of a security boom is generally marked by a deterioration 
in the quality of new securities and the widespread speculative trend 
of these years was no exception.  Conant writing in 1904 stated that : 
In the case  of  industrial securities issued on  the American market, the 
character of  those issued has  tended in many  cases  to become worse as 
the issues  have increased.  When  this  demand  for  new  securities  was 
small, it was  necessary  that  they  should be  of  the highest  character to 
find a market; when  the demand became apparently insatiable, it was 
natural  that  shrewd  and sometimes unscrupulous promoters should set 
themselves to provide  a s~pp1y.l~~ 
Financial statements in this period were unreliable, and the issu- 
ing of  untrue earning statements was  a common  practice.  When 
the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe went into receivership in 1894, 
an independent audit revealed that while the statements from 1891 
to  1894 showed satisfactory surpluses, actually the books had been 
falsified to cover an average annual deficit of  over  $1,2tjo,ooo for 
these years.146 
As a result of  unsound financial practices there were frequently 
serious losses to the holders of  securities. 
Losses were especially heavy in oil and in mining stocks.  Marvin 
Scudder who compiled lists of  obsolete and extinct securities stated 
in  1904  that  "out  of  something  over  one  million  face  value  of 
such old mining stocks which have come to hand from estates in the 
past ten years, I have recovered  exactly $12  on one certificate." 
Real estate bonds also brought heavy losses.  One company placed 
on its bonds in large letters, the words : "United States of  America" 
and in even larger letters the words "savings bonds."  The company 
even employed clergymen  to sell its bonds, and when it failed the 
receiver was not able to find sufficient money in the treasury even 
to retain an accountant to go over the b00ks.l'~ 
In the last quarter of  the nineteenth century a number of  cities 
overexpanded their debt and in many cases defaults followed.  After 
the panic of 1873 Houston, Pittsburgh, Elizabeth and Rahway  de- 
faulted on their obligations.  The panic of  1893 again precipitated 
extensive municipal default but from that year until 1926 the volume 
of municipal default was relatively small.  There was also a marked 
drop in municipal defaults arising out of  acts of  invalidity  due to 
technical  legal  irregularities.  In the seventies  and  even  eighties 
many  municipalities took  advantage of some small  irregularity in 
the issuing of their bonds subsequently to declare their obligations 
void.  However, these acts in time decreased and by  the beginning 
of  the century  the practice  was  negligible.  As  early  as  1885 the DEVELOPMENT  OF AMERICAN  CAPITALISM  189  188  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
American  investor  began  to  suffer  losses  on foreign  government 
bonds and the Chronicle for that year bemoaned the fact that :  "For 
the first time a large body of  American investors find themselves af- 
fected in purse by  the action of  a foreign government."  "9 
Notwithstanding  their considerable losses  on individual securi- 
ties, the holders  of  American  issues  as  a class derived  a net  gain 
over these years.  The value of  common  and preferred  stocks ap- 
preciated  markedly over  these  years.  An  investment  in the stock 
of  the average corporation which had both common and preferred 
stocks listed on the leading stock exchanges showed a growth in value 
from loo in 1886 to 1,102 for common stocks and to 822 for preferred 
stocks by  1910.~~~ 
RELATION  BETWEEN  SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT 
The trend of  the relation between saving and investment in the 
United  States in general followed  the  same movement  as  that in 
other countries in the developed stage of  security capitalism.  While 
the demand for capital continued very strong, there was a relative 
increase in the supply.  The  increasing supply of  capital is reflected 
in the almost  continuous  decline of  interest  rates throughout the 
eighties and nineties.  Between  1875 and 1890 railroad bonds with 
7 and 8 percent coupons were refunded at 4 and 5 percent, and in 
1901 and 1902 issues were emitted with 31/2  percent coupons.15*  One 
railroad had the opportunity to put out an issue on a 3%  percent 
basis for a  loo-year period but preferred to issue 25-year bonds in 
the belief  at the end of  that period they would be able to refinance 
on a 3 percent basis.15= 
As close a student of  finance as Jacob H. Schiff  made the follow- 
ing forecast : 
To me it appears almost certain that the rate of  interest on investments 
such  as  a conservative corporation will  be willing to  make,  must  fur- 
ther  decline.  The  amount  of  available  railroad  bonds  which  have 
heretofore offered so  large a field  to draw  upon for investment, is  be- 
coming more and more reduced, and the new  railroad construction t~ 
be  undertaken  in  the  future will  not  be  very  considerable and  will 
almost entirely be  done in the way  of  extensions to existing companies. 
I have very  little doubt  that the rate  of  interest on  such  investments 
will, before long, decline to 3 percent, while upon state and municipal 
bonds this has already become the top rate.lS8 
However,  the opening of  the century brought  a change in the 
money market.  Money rates moved upward, and even the soundest 
corporations and municipalities were  forced  to borrow  at higher 
rates.  New  York  City in 1902 borrowed on a  3.194  basis,  but by 
1905 was forced to pay 3.499.15'  The income on the bonds of  twenty 
leading cities rose from 3.00 percent in 1900 to 3.40 percent in 1905 
and to 4.00 percent in ig10.'~~ 
This trend, as  in  foreign countries,  was  a  direct result  of  the 
world-wide maladjustment between the force of  investment and sav- 
ing.  Recognition  of  the fact  that the American  financial market 
was  suffering from overinvestment  may  be  found in the financial 
press of  the day.  J. P. Morgan described the unsatisfactory condition 
as due to "undigested  securities,"  and James J.  Hill modified  the 
terminology  by  calling  it  a  case  of  "indigestible  securities."lJ6 
After a number of unsuccessful issues, the Chronicle complained of 
the "apathetic  investment market," 15'  Alexander Noyes writing In 
the Forum commented : "The public absolutely refused to subscribe 
for  the new  securities,  and the reckless  underwriters  accordingly 
found themselves compelled to take up millions upon millions of 
securities  whose  salable  value  was  entirely  uncertain."lS8  The 
Chronicle added that "there was no surplus capital available to sup- 
port a further expansion and advance." lS8 
PANICS  OF  1903 AND  1907 
By  the beginning of the century it was hoped that the integrated 
financial  structure of  developed  security capitalism would  be able 
to safeguard the economic system against the recurrence of  panics. 
This thought was  expressed at a dinner given in igoi in honor of 
J. P. Morgan when John B.  Claflin was quoted as saying: 
With a man like Mr. Morgan at the head of  a great industry, as  against 
the old plan  of  many  diverse interests in it, production would  become 
more regular, labor would be  more steadily employed  at better wages, 
and  panics  caused  by  over-production would  become  a  thing  of  the 
past.lao 
However, the panic of 1903 marked the first check encountered by 
the house of Morgan.  The large volume of  new securities,  "undi- 
gested" or "indigestible,"  could not be absorbed, and it was  neces- 
sary  for  Morgans  to mobilize  all  possible financial  resources,  and 
every ally had to be pressed into financial service.lm 
The panic of  1907 further demonstrated  the inability of  even 
highly  organized  finance  to control  the conditions which  leadeo 
boom  and subsequent  collapse.  By  active  support  of  the stock 
market  the financial  interests did succeed in checking the drastic 
liquidation of  securities and these interests took  over  large blocks 
of securities held in weak hands, such as the stock of  the Tennessee 
Coal, Iron and Railroad  Company.  This stock had been pledged 
by Moore and Schley, a leading brokerage house, which was being 
hard pressed for cash by  the banks holding their collateral.  It was 1 90  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
a critical moment, for the failure of  Moore and Schley would prob- 
ably have carried down  other brokerage houses  weakened  by  the 
already sharp drop in security prices.  In this emergency the Ten- 
nessee Company was merged with the United States Steel Corpora- 
tion.  The deal was  first presented by  Elbert Gary and Henry C. 
Frick to President Roosevelt who stated that he "felt  it no public 
duty . . . to interpose any objections." le2 
There was  a widespread  popular belief  that the panic of  1907 
had been brought on by  the great financial interests to crush their 
opponents, and the above transaction was frequently cited as proof 
of  this assertion.  The  opposite view was expressed by Horace White, 
that : 
The Samsons of  Wall Street did not pull down the temple of  finance on 
their own heads in order to slaughter a countless number of  Philistines. 
They suffered mortal terror while the panic continued, and they did not 
escape wounds and bruises, which  some of  them are still carrying.163 
Although organized  financial power was thus able to check the 
extent of  stock market liquidation and prevent the sharp downward 
course of  security values, nevertheless, the same power was  unable 
to bring about a revival of  economic activity.  Concentrated finance 
could stabilize conditions after a panic but could not bring about 
an upturn.  The  years immediately following the panic of  1907 saw 
little business revival  and production  remained  at a  low  level  as 
compared with the previous years.  It was not until 1915 when the 
Great War gave the United States an artificial prosperity that busi-  - 
ness again revived.ls4 
The panics of  igog and  1907 are generally  regarded  as  minor 
flurries in the financial history of  the United States but considered 
in the perspective of  the evolution of  security capitalism in other 
countries, these  disturbances  take  on a  more  serious  significance. 
The British  crisis of  1890 and the American  panics  of  1903 and 
particularly  of  1907  have  several  striking  characteristics  in  com- 
mon.  Both marked a turning point in the economic and financial 
life of the respective countries. 
CRITICISM  OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
As noted before, the period was marked by intense social unrest 
and class feeling against security capitalism.  Thus Mary E. Lease 
declared  that : "Wall  Street owns the country.  It is  no longer a 
government of  the people, by  the people and for the people but a 
government of  Wall Street, by Wall Street, and for Wall Street."ls5 
The Knights of  Labor conceived the economic conflict as a struggle 
against  the "money  power"  rather  than  against  employers,  and 
declared in its preamble : 
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The recent alarming development and aggression of  aggravated wealth, 
~hich,  unless  checked, will invariably lead  to  pauperization and hope- 
less degradation of  the working masses, render it imperative if we  desire 
to  enjoy the  blessings  of life, that  a check  should  be  placed  upon  its 
power  and upon unjust accumulation. , 
The organization  according  to  its  by-laws excluded  permanently 
from membership only "bankers, lawyers, stockbrokers, gamblers and 
those making or selling intoxicants."  Actually, the banker capitalist 
was  generally  more  willing  to see  the public  aspect  of  the labor 
question than the industrial capitalist.  This difference of  view  be- 
tween  the banker  capitalist  and the industrial  capitalist  was  illu- 
strated in the coal  strike of  1902.  George  Baer,  famous  for  his 
statement on the holding of  property by  divine right, as the leader 
of  the coal  operatives  adamantly refused  to  arbitrate  with  John 
Mitchell and the representatives of  the unions.  The Morgan firm, 
on  the  other hand,  made  strenuous  efforts  to  bring  about  such 
=rbitration, and J. P.  Morgan himself  went to Washington to dis- 
cuss the matter with President Theodore Roosevelt.lW  Some of  the 
so-called literature of  exposure which crowded the journals  of  this 
period was based on an emotional appeal and had little substance.16" 
There were however, a number of  thoughtful works such as Henry 
George's  Progress  and  Poverty,  Edward  Bellamy's  Looking  Back- 
ward, Henry Demarest  Lloyd's Wealth against  Commonwealth, and 
Ida Tarbell's History of the Standard Oil Company.  The  most pene- 
trating  criticism  of  security  capitalism  was  that  of  Louis  D. 
Brandeis  who  evidenced  a  clear  understanding  of  security  capi- 
talism  and  the various  institutions  connected  with  the system.168 
The monumental study of  the United States Industrial Commission, 
which gave Thorstein Veblen material for his comments on institu- 
tional change, stands as a most important source book on the devel- 
opment of  American security capitalism. 
The governmental attack on security capitalism began in the ad- 
ministration of  Theodore Roosevelt. In 1904 the administration took 
active step against the system in dissolving the Northern Securities 
Company.  Advance information of this move was  kept secret even 
from the cabinet, and the announcement was a complete  surprise 
to Morgan and Company and to Wall Street.  The security market 
acted badly, and the Detroit  Free Press stated that "Wall  Street is 
paralyzed at the thought that a President of  the United States would 
sink so low as to enforce the law.'' liO  Roosevelt was bitterly attacked 
by New York corporation lawyers on the ground that he "had shown 
lack of  respect for the Supreme Court since the legal device on which 
the Northern Securities Company was based, had already been held 
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legislation to regulate trusts and his bitter speeches against financial 
concentration were blows at developed  security capitalism.  These 
attacks on the trusts were regarded in the financial press as the cause 
of  the uncertain condition in the stock market in the early years of 
the new century.  "Hail, Caesar, we who are about to bust, salute 
thee,"  proclaimed the New York Sun.lT2 "Many  investors have al- 
ready lost much,"  said the Chronicle, "and not knowing what Mr. 
Roosevelt may do or say next, are getting extremely nervous, afraid 
if  they  hold on much  longer they may  see the little of  value left 
vanish." 
Roosevelt replied to this criticism in the following words: 
. . .  You  say  that the fear of  investors in railway securities must be dis- 
pelled; and you  say  that  the people now  have the impression that the 
greatest business  interests  (those of  railroads) are imperiled.  I am in- 
clined to think that this is the case.  If  so, the responsibility lies primarily 
and overwhelmingly upon  the railway and corporation people-that  is, 
the  manipulators of  railroad  and  other  corporation stocks-who  have 
been guilty of  such scandalous irregularities during the last few years.174 
Elihu Root tried to assure Wall Street that they had nothing really 
to fear from Roosevelt, in the statement to the Union League Club 
in 1904: "You  say  Roosevelt is an unsafe man.  I tell you he is  a 
great conservator of  property and rights."  The President himself 
made his position clear in a letter to Jacob Schiff, in the following 
words : 
It is difficult  for me to understand why  there should be this belief  in 
Wall  Street  that  I  am  a  wild-eyed  revolutionist.  I  cannot  condone 
wrong, but I certainly do not intend to do aught save what is beneficial 
to the man of  means who acts squarely and fairly.lTB 
With the passing of  Theodore Roosevelt  as President the attack 
on security capitalism continued but was given added impetus under 
Woodrow Wilson.  In some of his statements while still in the aca- 
demic world he had adhered closely to the classical theory of laissez 
faire and had condemned government regulation of  business as so- 
cialistic in nature."'  However, by  1908 he was an outspoken critic 
of  security capitalism.  As President of  Princeton University,  in an 
address to the American  Bankers Association, he stated : 
For the first time in the history of  America there is a general feeling that 
issue  is  now  joined,  or  about to be  joined,  between  the power  of ac- 
cumulated capital and the privileges and opportunities of  the masses  of 
the people.  The power  of  accumulated capital is  now,  as  at all other 
times  and in all other circumstances, in the hands of  a comparatively 
small number of  persons, but there is a very widespread impression that 
those persons have been able in recent years as never before to control 
the national development in their own  intere~t.1~~ 
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As President of the United States his attacks became even more 
bitter, and in this capacity he proclaimed that : 
The great monoply in this country is  the monopoly  of  big credits.  So  long as  that exists, our old variety and freedom and individual energy 
of development are out of the question.  A great industrial nation is con- 
trolled by  its system of credit.  Our system of  credit is  concentrated.l79 
THE  PUJO  COMMITTEE 
The high tide of  the criticism of security capitalism came in the 
hearings held by the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 
popularly known as the Money Trust Investigation, headed by  Ar- 
sene Pujo of Louisiana.  The inquiry was authorized by a resolution 
of  the House "to obtain full and complete information on the bank- 
ing and currency conditions of  the United States for the purpose of 
determining what regulation is needed." lS0 The resolution called 
for  an inquiry into the charges  against  the  "management  of  the 
finances of many of  the great industrial and railroad corporations of 
the country."  The attack  of  the  Pujo  Committee  was  directed 
mainly against the combination movement which extended the con- 
trol of banking security capitalists over industry and finance.ls1  The 
chief  investigator  of  this committee was  Samuel  Untermyer,  and 
before him appeared J. P. Morgan, George Baker and other leading 
representatives  of security capitalism.  The pages of  these hearings 
are replete with the clash of  conflicting financial philosophy.  The 
significance of  this report has been underestimated in financial lit- 
erature, for it constitutes one of  the most important documents in 
American financial history. 
The Committee attacked  the system of  affiliates by  which  the 
investment houses had extended their control over the commercial 
banks and in its report stated that : 
The national banks  in  the great  cities are exceeding their  charter 
powers  in the character of  the business  they  are conducting and  from 
which  their  principal  revenues  are derived.  They  are acting as  pro- 
moters,  underwriters, and houses  of  issue for the securities of  railroad 
and industrial corporations.~~z 
Formation of  security affiliates was  also  attacked  by  Frederick W. 
Lehman, then solicitor  general of  the United States.  His opinion 
rendered  to the attorney general,  held  that the formation  of  the 
National  City Company was  in violation  of  the existing law.  In 
the hearings of  the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in 
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DEFENSE  OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
The financial press made desperate efforts to battle against this 
rising tide of  popular disapproval.  The public was assured that : 
Wealth and production are good, and the law  should do for them  the 
best  it can, namely, let them alone.  Rich men are valuable in any com- 
munity, and they are more and more disposed to treat their wealth as a 
public trust; it is  short-sighted to  discourage that.  Property is  a good 
thing; let everybody respect it and do his best  to get  it for himself.lB4 
Regulatory legislation was condemned as "revolutionary" lS6  and "so- 
cialistic,"  and  the  Chronicle  added:  "Every  man's  property  is 
threatened ; all securities are under a ban." lss  Prominent spokes- 
men made every effort to defend the institutions of  security capital- 
ism.18'  Otto Kahn, a leading member of  Kuhn, Loeb and Company, 
stated that there were  "very  few  financial  houses of  great wealth. 
All of  the very greatest fortunes of  the country, and in fact most of 
the great fortunes have been made, not in finance, but in trade, in- 
dustries  and inventions."laa  In another  speech  he  described  the 
New York Stock Exchange as "the most efficient and best conducted 
organization of  its kind in the world." lSV 
GOVERNMENTAL  CONTROL  OF  DEMAND  AND  SUPPLY  OF  CAPITAL 
Over this period there was a strong public demand for the ex- 
tension of  control by  the state governments.  Such control was  ex- 
ercised .over the demand for capital, or the flow  of  security invest- 
ment, by regulating new issues of  corporations and governments, and 
also over the supply of  capital and credit, or the direction of  saving, 
by  supervising the operations of  the financial  institutions.  There 
was  a  determined move to regulate  the financing of  the railroads 
which were then the largest issuers of  corporate securities.  Certain 
states, as New York, sought to regulate the issuance of  securities by 
public  utilities  corporations  under  their  respective  jurisdictions. 
For a number of  years there had been agitation for such control in 
order  to check  the  large  volume  of  watered  stock  and  fictitious 
securities which had brought heavy losses to investors.1B0 Finally in 
1905 the Gas Commission of  New  York  State was  given  power  to 
regulate the securities issued by gas and electric companies under its 
juri~diction."~ In 1906 Nerv  Jersey  created a state  public utility 
commission which was empowered to control the flotation of  securi- 
ties issued by public utilities within the state, and the scope of  the 
original law was later extended by an act ~assed  in 1910.~~~y  1917 
every state, except Delaware, had such a commission.  About one- 
half of  the states conferred upon  these  commissions the power  to 
regulate the issuance of public utility securities.lD3 
There was  an extension of state control also over the financial 
operations of local governments.  A number of  states either through 
their constitutions or their statutes placed restrictions on the debt- 
creating  power  of their municipalities.  Most  of  these  limitations 
imposed a maximum percentage  of debt in relation to the assessed 
valuation of local property.lB4 
The state and federal governments also extended their control 
over the direction of the supply of capital and credit of  the financial 
institutions, as the life insurance companies, the trust companies and 
the commercial banks.  The investment operations of  the insurance 
companies were subjected to close scrutiny in the Armstrong insur- 
ance investigation of  lg05?~~  The investigation disclosed certain 
practices which were technically against the law.  For example, the 
New York Life Insurance Company in order to conduct its business 
in Prussia  was required officially to state in its annual report that 
"the company does not invest in stocks of  any kind."  Nevertheless, 
the company invested in stocks by making a loan of  $1,857,000 to a 
bond clerk and another loan of  $i,i5o,ooo to a messenger.los  Again 
the New  York  State insurance law  (section  35)  provided  that  "a 
director who derived a profit by  selling or aiding in the sale of  any 
stocks or securities to or by such a corporation shall forfeit his posi- 
tion -and  be disqualified  from thereafter holding any such  office 
in any insurance company."  Notwithstanding this law, d,uring the 
years that Mr. Jacob Schiff  was a director of the Equitable Life As- 
surance Company, it purchased from Kuhn, Loeb and Company, of 
which Mr. Schiff was a member, securities to the value of  over $47,- 
000,ooo.~~~  Also the New York Life Insurance Company, on whose 
board of  directors were members of the Morgan firm, subscribed to 
International Mercantile Marine bonds, which were floated by Mor. 
gan and Company.les 
REGULATION  OF BANK INVESTMENTS 
In the northeastern states the mutual  savings banks developed 
rapidly and became the leading institutions for receiving the saving 
of the mass of  the population.  For a time practically no restricti~n 
was placed on them.  As  a result of  unsatisfactory experiences most 
of the northeastern states placed  drastic restrictions on the invest- 
ment of  their savings banks.lVv During this period of  severe restric- 
tion the state laws permitted the mutual savings banks to invest only 
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which a bank was located and of  the municipalities within the state. 
These limitations, while assuring safety, at the same time restricted 
the scope of  legal investment.  The field was  further narrowed by 
the policy  of  the federal government and of  many  of  the eastern 
states in reducing their debts.z00 Thus there was need of  widening 
the investment base and a number of  states began to liberalize their 
laws on savings bank investments.  In 1893 New York permitted its 
savings banks for the first time to invest in municipal securities out- 
side the state but under careful restrictions.*O1  During the panic of 
1893 the savings banks of  New York were forced to meet heavy with- 
drawals of deposits, and at the same time found it difficult to market 
their holdings of  municipal bonds.202 The Savings Banks Associa- 
tion of the State of  New York urged the enlargement of  the security 
list so as to permit the investment in railroad bonds which were con- 
sidered more marketable.  Subsequently New  York  permitted  the 
investment  of  savings funds in the securities of  railroads located 
within the state.203 
Until the opening of  the century, most  states prohibited  their 
savings banks from investing in street railway bonds.204 However, in 
1902 Masachusetts passed a law permitting its savings banks to  invest 
in the first mortgage bonds of  street railway companies.205 
Over this period a number of  states also extended their control 
over the investment operations of  the commercial banks within their 
jurisdiction.  Several states sought to check the policy of  combining 
both commercial and investment operations within the same institu- 
tion~.~~~  New  Hampshire adopted the principle of  segregating sav- 
ings deposits from the ordinary deposits of  commercial banks.  The 
law required that the savings deposits of  trust companies should be 
segregated into a separate department and these  funds were  to be 
invested only in securities which were legal for mutual savings banks 
of the state.  The Michigan Bank Act for a number of  years had 
specified  the securities  which  were  eligible  for  the investment  of 
savings deposits, and in 1899 the Act was  further amended so that 
"all the investments relating to the savings department shall be kept 
separate from the other investments of  the bank.""'  The ~rinciple 
of  segregation  and specified  investment  for  savings  deposits  was 
adopted in Connecticut in 1907, in Massachusetts and Rhode island 
in 1908 and in Texas and California in 1909.  California adopted 
the principle of  segregating banking operations by  dividing institu- 
tions within its jurisdiction  into commercial banks, savings banks 
and trust companies.  A bank was  permitted  to ~erfom  all three 
functions  but each class of  business  had  to be kept  separate and 
distinct. 
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ANTECEDENTS  OF THE FEDERAL  RESERVE  SYSTEM 
The federal government made no effort to regulate the invest- 
ment operations of  the national banks, but there was a determined 
move to reform the entire commercial banking system.208 The de- 
fects in the commercial banking system became more and more ap- 
parent with each recurring financial panic and ensuing business de- 
pression, and so toward  the end of  the nineteenth century the de- 
mand for a revision  of the banking system became  insistent.  The 
panic of  1893 particularly demonstrated  the inelasticity  of  the na- 
tional bank currency.  The first step in the movement toward bank- 
ing reform was  taken in 1894 by  the American Bankers Association 
at its convention in Baltimore.  This meeting adopted the so-called 
"Baltimore Plan"  which proposed  the issue of a new currency pro- 
tected by a joint  guaranty fund to which all the issuing banks were 
to make a contribution.  The  plan, however, was not adopted. 
Internal and external political events in the next few years drew 
public attention away from the pressing need for banking reform. 
At home there was a battle between the advocates of  cheap money 
marshalled by William Jennings Bryan and the supporters of  sound 
money  led  by  William  McKinley.  This  conflict  attracted  the 
public mind to the more spectacular issue of  a currency standard 
rather than the technical but fundamentally more important matter 
of  banking reform.  It was further forgotten in the excitement over 
the war with Spain. 
However, the movement for banking reform made progress with 
the work of  the Indianapolis Currency Commission, which had been 
appointed at a convention of  business organizations for the purpose 
of undertaking a broad and scientific study of  the entire banking 
problem.  The Commission  made  its  report  in  1898 and recom- 
mended not only the adoption of  the gold standard but in addition 
made an important contribution to the movement for banking re- 
form by proposing that bank notes should be secured by commercial 
paper rather than by bonds. 
The next important step was  the passage  in  1900 of  the Gold 
Standard Act  which  placed  the  United  States on  a  monometallic 
basis.  While this legislation  itself  did not  directly  effect any im- 
provement in the banking structure, nevertheless, it was important 
in that, by  settling the question of  the monetary standard and by 
removing this issue from public attention, the passage  of  the Act 
cleared  the way  for  the consideration  of  banking reform.  Then 
came several years of  inaction due to the general prosperity of  the 
country. 
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bank currency, a scattering of  reserves and consequent bank failures 
throughout the land, at last focused public attention upon the urgent 
need for reforming the banking system. The psychological time for 
action had at last arrived.  In the following year,  Congress passed 
the Aldrich-Vreeland Act which created an emergency currency in 
the form of  bank notes to be secured by state and municipal bonds 
and even  by  commercial  paper.  The new  currency was  created 
solely as a temporary means of  overcoming the shortage of  circulating 
currency arising out of the panic of  1907.  It was hoped that its use 
would  give  the nation  time to analyze more carefully  the entire 
banking  problem  with  a  view  of  solving  it by  carefully  planned 
federal legislation. 
For this reason  the Aldrich-Vreeland Act also provided  for the 
establishment of  the National  Monetary Commission composed of 
members of Congress.  The Commission was  to make a  scientific 
study sf  currency and banking conditions not only at home but also 
abroad, and, based on these studies, was to recommenrd suitable leg- 
islation.  The Commission under the chairmanship of Senator Ald- 
rich conducted extensive investigations,  had monographs compiled 
by financial experts, heard testimony  of  leading bankers and econ- 
omists, and issued a forty-five volume report.  This report gave a 
careful  and painstaking  analysis of  the banking  systems of  almost 
every civilized nation of  the world, and is today a classic in banking 
literature since it has retained  for posterity  a well-etched  picture 
of  the financial systems of  Europe at a time when they had attained 
their  highest  development  just  before  they  were  destined  to be 
shaken.by the Great War.  While the report of  the Commission has 
thus today  an important historical  interest, it had little practical 
value at the time in the movement for American banking reform, 
since few of  its recommendations were followed by Congress. 
The Commission gave its support to the Aldrich bill which was 
sponsored by  Senator Aldrich  and presented to Congress in  19  1  1. 
This bill proposed a reorganization of  the banking system along the 
lines of  the best  European models described in the report of the 
Commission.  The plan, as presented  in the bill,  ~rovided  for  a 
National  Reserve Association with  the main office  in Washington 
and branches in the leading cities of  the United States and so pre 
posed what was practically a central banking system.  The ~ldrich 
plan was indorsed by many individual leaders in banking and busi- 
ness, but found little favor with  the public which  viewed central 
banking  as  un-American  and remembered Senator Aldrich  as the 
father of a none too popular tariff act.  AS a result the bill was never 
reported  out of the congressional committee.  The significance of 
the plan, however, is not to be underestimated.  Modeled after the 
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German banking system the proposed central bank was to have con- 
trol over all phases of the financial structure.  Not only commercial 
banking, but also investment banking and stock market credit opera- 
tions were to have been subject to central  banking control.  Thus 
the financial  system would  have  been  well  integrated,  and official 
leadership over financial resources firmly established. 
Public  opposition  to banking centralization  was  further inten- 
sified in  1912 by  the findings of  the Pujo Committee.  The same 
year saw  the passing of national political power  from the Repub- 
licans to the Democrats, and the new administration under President 
Wilson  gave  prompt  and serious consideration  to the subject  of 
banking reform.  Leadership  in  the movement  was  taken  by  the 
Banking and Currency Committee of the House of  Representatives 
of which  Carter  Glass was  the dominant figure.  He was  assisted 
by  a committee of  experts headed by  Dr. H. Parker Willis which 
analyzed the mass of  financial data already assembled.  The com- 
mittee finally drafted a measure which was amended and passed by 
Congress and became  known as the Federal  Reserve Act  of  1913. 
In contrast to the Aldrich plan, the Federal Reserve System was em- 
powered to control only the commercial banking system.  The  ortho- 
dox theory of  banking was accepted and written into central bank- 
ing practice.  There was to be little or no control over investment 
banking and investment operations.  Operations of  the Federal Re- 
serve banks were to be confined to the financing of  short term loans, 
used largely, as was discovered later, by the consumer goods indus- 
tries.  There was a definite attempt to divide existing financial funds 
and resources equitably between investment and commercial bank- 
ing.  Later, the justice  of  this distribution  was  questioned, and a 
further allotment was made to the investment interests.  Some at- 
tempt was made in the Reserve Act to prevent these interests from 
absorbing, as they had frequently in the past, the free financial re- 
sources of  the community, but aside hom this rather nebulous nega- 
tive restriction, no attempt was made to regulate, supervise or control 
investment credit.  The consequences of this failure to provide for 
central banking control of investment banking and investment opera- 
tions  was  to become  tragically  apparent in the late twenties  and 
early thirties. 
REGULATION  OF  THE  STOCK  EXCHANGE 
The stock exchange conducted  its operations with  little inter- 
ference by the state or federal governments.  In 1881 the legislature 
of  the State of  New  York  gave serious consideration  to taxing se- 
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by  the New  York  Stock Exchange,  and the  Chronicle, expressing 
financial sentiment, made the following threat : 
We might proceed further and trace the practical effect of  this raid on 
brokers, by  showing how  evidently its tendency would be to drive busi- 
ness  from the State and drive brokers into the business of  evading the 
tax.  If a title to a stock cannot be perfected without a stamped transfer, 
it can be transferred in Boston, or perhaps it could be dated at Jersey 
City.21o 
Governor  Hughes of  New  York  State appointed  a  committee for 
the purpose of  determining what recommendations "were advisable 
in the laws of  the state bearing upon speculation in securities and 
commodities,"  and the following year the committee submitted an 
extensive report on the entire field of  stock  exchange  regulation. 
The committee held  extensive  hearings  and considered  the  sub- 
ject  not only from the standpoint of  financial  practice  but also of 
public welfare.  It conceded that a substantial part of  the transac- 
tions on the stock exchange were virtually gambling, yet the report 
added that speculation "in some form is a necessary incident of  pro- 
ductive operations," and "when carried on in connection with either 
commodities or securities, it tends to steady their prices." zll  It  con- 
cluded that : 
We  are unable to see how  the State could distinguish by  law  between 
proper and improper transactions, since the forms and mechanisms used 
are identical.  Rigid statutes directed against the latter would seriously 
interfere with  the  former.  The experience of  Germany  with  similar 
legislation is illuminating.  But the Exchange, with the plenary power 
over members and their operations, could provide correctives.212 
Because of  this favorable view of  the New York Stock Exchange, 
the committee made practically no recommendations for legislative 
action.  However, the Exchange itself took recognition  of  some of 
the irregular practices brought out in the committee hearings,  and 
undertook  a number of  internal reforms such  as  the abolition of 
the unlisted department,"=  and the amendment of  its constitution 
so as to give the law committee the power to scrutinize the dealings 
of  anv member and the order forbidding members to have rela- 
tions with bucket shops.214 
The federal government in general adopted a laissez faire atti- 
tude toward the stock exchanges.  For revenue purposes during the 
Civil War brokers had to pay a license fee and also a tax on all sales 
of  securities.  This legislation, however, was discontinued after the 
close of  the Civil War.'15  It  was not until a half  century later that 
the federal government gave serious consideration to regulating the 
security markets.  The Pujo Committee made drastic recommenda- 
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tions  for legislative control of  the stock  exchanges, such  as  their 
incorporation under state laws, complete reports of  corporations ap- 
 lying for listing of their securities, and the requirements of  margins 
--  0----  of  at least 20  percent.  In 1914 most of  these recommendations were 
incorporated in a bill introduced by Senator Robert Owens.  The 
bill was  opposed  by  a  number of important witnesses,  while  Mr. 
Untermyer supported the bill particularly the proposal  to incorpo- 
rate the stock exchange."'  The bill failed to pass, but Mr. Unter- 
meyer continued his campaign for several years for the regulation of 
the stock exchange.  In vain Untermyer pleaded that : 
. 
The time will come,  and before long, after regulation has been  en- 
forced, when those who are now  bitterly assailing the champions of  this 
legislation in the vain hope of  thereby diverting the issue will find that 
it has  marked  the dawn of a new  era of  usefulness  and prosperity  for 
them, and that the Exchange will feel grateful to those who have pointed 
the way.217 
However the coming of  the War turned the attention of  the nation 
from financial reform.  With the return of  prosperity, due to orders 
from abroad, energies were concentrated upon earning higher profits 
or receiving higher wages. 
CONCLUSION 
With the close of the Civil War, the nation was ready to enter 
the stage of  economic maturity.  Its vast natural resources were open 
to development.  Its  manufactures  expanded  and  the search  for 
world  markets began.  The railway  system became  a spidery net- 
work  encompassing  the  entire  nation,  knitting  together  distant 
regions  and  opening  the  whole  domestic  market.  The railroads 
were among the first enterprises financed by  the system of  security 
capitalism.  In the beginning the roads fell into the hands of  specu- 
lative capitalists who were concerned only in the attainment of  quick 
profit  from the market manipulation of  the securities of  these en- 
terprises.  The first efforts  of  banking capitalism to finance the rail- 
roads ended in the failure of  Jay Cooke.  Once more the speculative 
capitalist was  free to continue his exploitations with disastrous re- 
sults in ruinous competition among the roads,  their  physical  de- 
terioration and serious financial consequences as overcapitalization, 
defaults on bonds  issues, and eventual receivership.  The railway 
system of  the nation suffered from the worst sort of  financial feudal- 
ism.  Out of  this chaos the house of  Morgan brought some degree of 
order; and the security capitalists were  routed, and the financial 
rehabilitation of  the railroads was attained. 
American  industry  turned to  large scale production  and con- 
sequently required an enormous amount of  credit and capital.  In 202  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
some fields, as petroleum and steel, these financial resources were 
furnished by  powerful  industrial  capitalists who  in turn financed 
themselves by the mechanism of  security capitalism.  However, the 
demand for  credit and capital  was  largely  met  in most  fields by 
the banker capitalist who gave to these enterprises not only his own 
funds but also the mobilized resources of  the investing public.  In 
the case of  both the railroads and some of  the industries, the house 
of Morgan replaced competition with monopoly, and instability with 
stability.  For this purpose the house extended its influence over the 
various institutions of  indirect investment as the life insurance com- 
panies  and the credit  institutions, including national  banks,  state 
banks and trust companies.  The Pax Morgana was  extended over 
both the forces of  the demand and the supply of  capital.  This ex- 
panding power of  banking capitalism encountered opposition from 
leading industrial capitalists.  Some were overcome ; others, if  not 
conquered, had to recognize the imperial edicts.  However, on the 
hinge of  the Empire remained  the unconquered  Parthians of  in- 
dustrial security capitalism, the Rockefellers. 
By  the opening of  the twentieth century the extensive develop 
ment of  the United States was passing.  The very  rapidity of  the 
development brought with it new economic and financial difficulties 
which impeded progress.  The panics of  1903 and 1907 were mani- 
festations of  these maladjustments, 
CHAPTER  12 
AMERICAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM AND THE 
WORLD WAR 
AFTER  the financial disturbances of  1907 the United States experi- 
enced a period of unsatisfactory business activityel  Steel production 
little advance  and industrial production  moved  uncertainly, 
while only the new  industries  as automobile manufacture  moved 
forward.2  The formal statement of  Morgan and Company, made in 
1936 to the Senate Committee, summarized conditions immediately 
before the outbreak of war in the comment that :  "Business through- 
out the country was depressed, farm prices were deflated, unemploy- 
ment was serious, the heavy industries were working far below ca- 
pacity, bank clearings were ofi." 
Within a few months after the outbreak of  the Great War in 
1914, these conditions were entirely changed.  The prices received 
by  the farmers for their agricultural  products rose  sharply as  re- 
flected by  the increase of  the index of  farm purchasing power, in- 
dustrial  production  expanded  sharply  and  in  consequence  wages 
in~reased.~  This prosperity was  built essentially on the sharp rise 
in American exports which became more and more confined to the 
Allied  c~untries.~  The War thus lifted the United States from a 
condition of depression  to that of  prosperity.  Only a  small part 
of the American people questioned the fact that this prosperity was 
based  on the destruction  of  human life and of property  and the 
great mass rejoiced  only that the depression  was  over.  This war 
trade was  financed at first  by  the shipment of gold  from  London 
to New  York  and by  the sale of  American securities held abroad 
and their repatriation  to the United States.  In time these  means 
were exhausted and the trade ultimately had to be financed by the 
resources  of American  security capitalism mobilized  by  American 
bankers.  Before the War American  banks had developed financial 
relations with the banking systems of England and of  France as well 
as  Germany,  but  the  ties  with  the  Allied  countries  were  much 
 loser.^  The members of  the Morgan firm, due to their close con- 
tracts with  the British  banking system  for  almost  a century, were 
naturally strong supporters of the Allied cause.  Henry P. Davidson, 
a member of Morgans declared : "Some  of us in America  realized 
that this was our war from the very start."  As European nations 
declared  war  against  each  other  and mobilized  their  forces,  the 
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Rothschilds of  Paris suggested to Morgan, Harjes, the Paris office 
of  Morgans, that a hundred million dollar loan be issued in New 
York to pay for purchases by the French government in the United 
 state^.^  Morgan, Harjes immediately cabled this request to Morgan 
and Company of  New York which, however, replied that : 
conditions here make transactions suggested quite impossible for present. 
United States Government strongly disinclined send more gold abroad. 
We  are using every effort assist in this and therefore could not properly 
undertake  transaction  indicated.  Believe,  however,  after  little  while 
might be very  pos~ible.~ 
On August eighth the Paris office of  Morgans again pressed the New 
York  office  for  the establishment  of  a  French credit, and added: 
"fear  that  if  we  do not  forestall  others,  it is  probable  that  such 
houses as  Kuhn, Loeb and Company may try to do something for 
other nation." lo  The Netv York office thereupon took up the mat- 
ter with the State Department, and asked whether there would be 
any objection  to their making a loan to the French  Government. 
UNCONDITIONAL  FINANCIAL  NEUTRALITY 
Bryan,  then Secretary of State, referred the request to Robert 
Lansing, at that time counsellor  to the Department,  who  replied 
that he knew of no legal objection to the loan.ll  Bryan, not satis- 
fied with this legalistic opinion, presented the matter to President 
Wilson and urged that the United States Government "take the posi- 
tion that it will not approve of  any loan to a belligerent nation." l2 
In support of this proposal, Bryan argued that : "money is the worst 
of all contrabands because it commands everything else" and added 
that "I know  of  nothing that would do more to prevent war than 
an international agreement that neutral nations would not loan to 
belligerents." 
He then applied this general thesis to the immediate position of 
the United States in the reasoning that "we  are the one great nation 
which  is not involved  and our refusal  to loan  to any  belligerent 
would naturally tend to hasten a conclusion of  the war."  A further 
reason  advanced  by  Bryan  for his  proposal  that  the  government 
disapprove  foreign  loans  was  the  prophetic  statement  that  "the 
powerful  financial interests which would be connected with these 
loans would be tempted to use their influence  through the news- 
papers to support the interests of the government to which they had 
loaned because the value of the security would be directly affected 
by the result of  the war." 
President Wilson apparently accepted Bryan's proposal for a ban 
on all loans,  for on August  15th Bryan  replied  to Morgans  that 
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"there is no reason why loans should not be made to the Govern- 
ments of  neutral nations, but in the judgment of  this Government 
loans by  American bankers to any  foreign nation which  is  at war 
are inconsistent with the true spirit of  neutrality." l3  Lansing at the 
time, was apparently in full agreement with this position for Bryan, 
in  the postscript  of his  letter  to the President, added that : "Mr. 
Lansing calls attention to the fact that an American  citizen  who 
goes  abroad and voluntarily  enlists  in  the army  of  a  belligerent 
nation loses the protection of his citizenship while so engaged, and 
asks  why  dollars,  going  abroad  and  enlisting in  war,  should  be 
more protected." l4  In its statement of  August  15, 1914, the United 
States Government therefore banned all forms of  loans by American 
bankers  to belligerent  nations  and took  the position  of  uncondi- 
tional financial neutrality.  Thus in the tirst tilt over financial neu- 
- -- 
trality  Bryan  was  victorious  against his  arch-enemy,  Morgan  and 
Company.15 
CONDITIONAL  FINANCIAL  NEUTRALITY 
In October, 1914, came the first retreat of  the American Govern- 
ment from its original stand on financial neutrality.  The need of 
obtaining the means  to finance the flow  of  munitions and of  raw 
materials from this country to the belligerents was pressing.  The 
urgency of  the matter was presented in a letter to Lansing from the 
National City Bank pointing out that manufacturers, who were cus- 
tomers of  the Bank, and in "some  cases representatives of  the for- 
eign governments," were requesting the Bank "to provide temporary 
credits for these purchases."  The letter stated that it was  "the de- 
sire of  the National City Bank to be absolutely in accord with the 
policies of  our own Government,"  but added "the Bank is disposed 
to grant short time banking credits to European governments, both 
belligerent and neutral."  The letter concluded with the statement 
that "this  business was deemed necessary to the general good"  and 
that the Bank would "proceed along the lines indicated unless it is 
objectionable from the Government standpoint."  l6 
On October 23, 1914, Lansing, apparently ignoring his superior, 
since there is no mention that Bryan  was  consulted,  took  up the 
matter of  "loans and bank credits to belligerent  governments''  di- 
rectly  with  President  Wilson.17  According  to Lansing,  President 
Wilson now held that : 
There is a decided difference between an issue of Government bonds, 
which  are sold in open market  to investors,  and an  arrangement  for 
easy  exchange in meeting debts incurred in trade between a government 
and American merchants. 
- 
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chasers of bonds are loaning their savings to the belligerent government,  --- 
and are, in fact, financing the war. . . 
The acceptance of  Treasury notes or other evidences of  debt in pay- 
ment for articles purchased in this country is merely a means of  facilitat- 
ing trade by  a system  of  credits which  will  avoid  the clumsy  and im- 
practical method of  cash payments.  As  trade with belligerents is legiti- 
mate and proper it is desirable that obstacles, such as interference with 
an  arrangement  of  credits or  easy  method  of  exchange, should be  re- 
moved.18 - 
The original position of the government of  unconditional finan- 
cial neutrality which placed a ban on all loans was now qualified by 
drawing a distinction between a so-called publicly offered bond and, 
privately-granted  bank  credit.  While  the  former  was  still  pro- 
scribed, the latter was now permitted.  Thus Bryan's position of un- 
conditional financial neutrality of  August 15, 1  g 14 was superseded by 
Lansing's  stand for conditional financial  neutrality of  October  23, 
'9'4. 
MISAPPLICATION  OF  THE  BANKERS'  ACCEPTANCE 
The fallacy in the fine distinction between a loan and a credit as 
drawn by  President Wilson  becomes clear  from the review of the 
actual transactions which were undertaken by  the American banks 
as a result of  the new position of  the government.  With the virtual 
approval  of  the national  government, the large  New  York  banks 
extended liberal credits to the Allied governments.lS  Within a few 
months these credits became so large that it was no longer possible 
for the New  York national  and state banks to continue them for 
both legal and practical reasons.  National and also most state banks 
were limited by  law as to the maximum  amount of  credit which 
they could extend to any one borrower.  Besides, it was becoming 
unwise  financially  for  the New  York  banks to extend so large a 
proportion of  their funds to one interest. 
In order to relieve  this situation, a move was  made to spread 
the financial burden from the New York institutions to the entire 
banking system of  the nation.  The vehicle for such a transfer was 
the bankers' acceptance or time draft drawn on a banking institution 
and accepted by it.  This instrument had been introduced into the 
United States with the formation of  the Federal Reserve system, and 
students of  finance had hoped  thereby  to improve  the quality of 
American commercial  paper.  The Federal Reserve Act had estab- 
lished careful  regulations  as  to the characteristics  of  the banker4 
acceptance with respect to its purpose, security and maturity.  The 
acceptance under the provisions of  the Reserve Act was to be created 
only  for  a  strictly  productive  purpose,  as  financing  the  sale  of 
readily marketable staples from seller to buyer, or aiding a manu- 
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facturer who would work up the raw materials into finished goods 
of higher value.  The acceptance was to be secured at all times by 
the  underlying  goods.  Furthermore,  the  acceptance  was  to  be 
limited to  a  period  of not  more  than  three months and was  not 
to be renewed.  The bankers' acceptance was  therefore to serve a 
commercial purpose, be fully secured and limited as to its maturity. 
The practical  application of this instrument in the war  period 
proved to be one of the worst perversions of  a sound mechanism to 
an unsound use in all the history of finance,20  for the bankers'  ac- 
ceptance was  utilized  in such a way  that each sound characteristic 
mentioned above was  grossly violated.  The instrument in actual 
practice was employed for the commercial purpose of  financing the 
export of  munitions and supplies to belligerent  nations.  The se- 
curity  underlying  the  instrument  was  a  shell,  torpedo,  tank  or 
other supply either subsequently  sent to the bottom  of  the ocean 
or more productively  liquidated on the war front.  The acceptance 
nominally had a maturity of  three months, but actually it was now 
allowed to run for several periods of  three months, since each mem- 
ber of  the banking group would generally take up the acceptance of 
another bank at maturity.  Furthermore the acceptance became an 
investment  instrument  which  was  distributed  through  syndicates 
among banks  seeking to invest their surplus funds and no longer 
bore any resemblance to a commercial credit.  The bankers' accept- 
ance in fact became a bond, and partook  of the characteristics  of 
the proscribed bond as defined in the very words of  President Wil- 
son's statement of  October 23,  1914,  since the acceptance was  "sold 
in the open market  to investors,"  while the banks  purchasing such 
acceptances were  "loaning  their savings to the belligerent  govern- 
ment" and so were "in  fact, financing the war."  2a 
ABANDONMENT  OF  FINANCIAL  NEUTRALITY 
For almost  a year  the government  followed  the policy of  con- 
ditional financial neutrality by maintaining this official distinction 
between a credit and a loan.  However, in the summer of  1915  the 
government completely abandoned financial neutrality.  By this time 
the financial position  of  the Allied countries  experienced  definite 
signs of  strain.  Sterling exchange dropped sharply during the latter 
part of August and this decline, by requiring more British pounds 
to purchase American dollars, threatened to reduce the volume of 
American  goods that could  be  purchased  by  the Allie~.~'  Under 
these  conditions it  now  became  necessary  to  mobilize  additional 
financial resources through the public sale of the bonds of  the Allied 
governments issued directly to American investors.  However, such a AMERICAN  CAPITALISM  AND WORLD WAR  009 
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direct public offering of  bonds had been banned by  the American 
government  in its statement of  October  23,  1914. 
The leading members of  the cabinet as McAdoo,  Secretary of 
the Treasury and Lansing, who by this time had replaced Bryan as 
Secretary  of  State,  now  urged  President  Wilson  to  change  this 
Lansing in a letter to President Wilson reviewed the eco- 
nomic position of  the United States since the outbreak of  the War 
and added that : 
If  the European countries cannot  find  means  to  pay  for  the  excess 
of  goods sold to them over those purchased from them they will have to 
stop buying  and our  present  export  trade will shrink proportionately. 
The result  would  be  restriction  of  outputs, industrial  depression, idle 
capital and idle labor, numerous failures, financial demoralization and 
general unrest and suffering among the laboring classes. 
Both he and Secretary McAdoo were convinced that "there  is only 
one means of  avoiding this situation which would so seriously affect 
the economic conditions in this country, and that is the flotation of 
large bond issues by the belligerent governments."  24  President Wil- 
son thus pressed by his closest advisers agreed to this proposal, for in 
his reply he wrote :  "I have no doubt that our oral discussion of  this 
matter yesterday suffices.  If  it does not, will you let me know that 
you would like a written reply." 25  Thus the government first com- 
mitted itself to a policy of  financial neutrality by banning all finan- 
cial assistance to the belligerents,  later conditioned this stand by 
distinguishing  between  credits  and  loans,  and  then  completely 
abandoned its original position of  financial neutrality by permitting 
the public offering of  the bond issues of  the Allied  governments. 
ALLIED  BOND  FLOTATIONS 
For several months before this change in the policy of  the Ameri- 
can Government toward publicly-offered bonds, Morgan and Com- 
pany had been  preparing for such an event and had sounded out 
the probable  attitude of the investing public.  However, such  in- 
quiries "about  the street, especially among the bond  houses, had 
not  shown any great enth~siasm.'"~ The First  National  Bank  of 
Chicago notified Thomas Lamont that "the middle West would take 
little, if  any of  such loan." 27  Lee Higginson and Company informed 
Morgans that "after  a campaign of  education the bonds could be 
sold but without such a campaign they would be unwilling to make 
firm  commitment  to  any  amount  whatever." 28  Nevertheless  the 
opinion of  Lee Higginson was that the loans should be made, even 
though  it would take a little time,  "owing  to the importance of 
filling in the lacks of  education, in the central and western part of 
this country."  Discussion of the loans  continued, and an Anglo- 
French financial mission headed by Lord Reading came to New York 
to complete the  arrangements.  The American  government  itself 
took  a part in these negotiations  for McAdoo requested Lansing's 
,id  in making the work of the mission a success.Zs  After negotiat- 
ing  with  the  mission,  Morgans  floated  the  Anglo-French  loan 
of 1915 which was an issue of $~OO,OOO,OOO  at 5 percent interest with 
a maturity of 5 years.  The issue was purchased  by  the buying syn- 
dicate at a price of 96 and was sold to the public at 98. 
Then came the task of placing the issue with the investing pub- 
lic.  For  this  purpose  Morgans  formed a  syndicate  consisting of 
1,570 members, the largest in American financial history until that 
time.30  Of the total  amount $g8,0oo,ooo  or about one-fifth  was 
placed  among  individual  manufacturers  and  industrial  corpora- 
tions which  were selling war  s~pplies.~'  The greater part  of  the 
issue, however, was  placed with the investing  The issue 
met with strong opposition from the German and Irish elements in 
the population  particularly  in the Middle West.s3  Partly because 
of this opposition and partly because of  the lack of  organization of 
the American security market at that time, the issue proved one of 
the most difficult that the house of Morgan ever attempted to place. 
In the following months a United Kingdom loan amounting to 
$~oo,ooo,ooo  was offered and was well received, for by this time in 
the words of Lee Higginson "the lacks of education"  of  the public 
had been filled.  Other Allied loans followed in quick s~ccession.~~ 
Even  the Imperial Russian  Government was  able to float a  bond 
issue  in  1916 with a  prospectus  which  stated  that:  "These  bonds 
are the  direct  general  credit  obligation  of  the  Imperial  Russian 
Government whose faith and credit are pledged to the prompt pay- 
ment of principal and interest when due." 35  By  December  1, 1916, 
the total loans to belligerents reached $I ,~g4,00o,ooo.~~ 
ATTEMPTED  RETURN  TO  FINANCIAL  NEUTRALITY 
In the closing months of  1916, the administration made a be- 
lated effort to return to its original position of  unconditional finan- 
cial neutrality by checking the granting of  financial aid to both bel- 
ligerents.  Kuhn, Loeb was planning the flotation of  a public bond 
issue  for Germany, but on November  24.  1916 President  Wilson 
Personally advised against the issue.  At  the same time the admin- 
istration took action ;gainst  the granting of  further assistance to the 
Allies.37  In November  Lloyd  George  informed  Morgans  that the 
British government needed $300,000,000 a month for the next five 
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would be forced to suspend their purchases in America.  To meet 
this demand the American banking houses decided to place issues of 
short-term treasury bills, and on November 24, 1916 Morgans made 
a public announcement "that the British and French  Government 
Treasuries had each authorized the sale in this market of a limited 
amount of their short-term bills running at various maturities from 
thirty  days  to  six months."  These short-term treasury bills  were 
to be drawn in dollars and at maturity were to be met by  the issue 
of new bills.  It was planned to place these bills among the banks 
throughout the country.  They however, would absorb the bills only 
if  rediscountable  at  the  Federal  Reserve  banks.38  However,  on 
November  29th, the Federal  Reserve Board  issued  a  public state- 
ment squarely opposing such purchases, declaring "the board deems 
it therefore its duty to caution the member banks that it does not 
regard it in the interest of  the country at this time that they invest in 
foreign treasury bills of  this character."  39  This statement was a seri- 
ous blow to the whole structure of  Allied financing in the American 
market.  It was not only an official notice that the Federal Reserve 
system would not rediscount the treasury bills but was really a pub- 
lic pronouncement barring the Allies from American  financial re- 
sources including both  private bank acceptance credits and public 
bond issues, since in the face of  a hostile Reserve Board the interior 
banks would not be likely to absorb further issues of  either credits 
or 
This position of  the Federal Reserve Board nvas  probably part of 
President  Wilson's  effort to force peace  upon the belligerents, for 
in the.next month he issued his famous peace message.41  This state- 
ment resulted in the most violent slump in the New York Stock EX- 
change since  igo7.*'  The index of  stock  prices  in  December  fell 
from 99.26  to  83.88,  and  Bethelehem  Steel  a  favorite war  stock 
dropped 72 points in one day."  If  the government had returned to 
its original  position  of  unconditional  financial  neutrality  and had 
prohibited all forms of  American aid to finance the export trade, this 
policy would have brought about a major economic recession in the 
United  States.  At  the same time had  the United States returned 
and adhered to this policy, it is quite probable that the War would 
have come to an end in 1917.  Andre Tardieu, later French High 
Commissioner  in  the United  States, observed  that  if  the ~ederal 
Reserve Board had maintained its position toward the British treas- 
ury bills "the defeat of  the Allies would have been merely a question 
of  months,  as  they could  neither have  supplied  their  armies nor 
fed their peoples."  The  weakening of  the credit of the Allied gov- 
ernments was reflected in the change in the financial market from 
1915 to  1916.  While the 1915 loans were unsecured  and bore an 
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interest rate of 5 percent, the I 9 16 issues were secured by collateral 
and bore a rate of 5%  per~ent.'~  Unquestionably  the fiscal  posi- 
tion of  the Allies, embarrassed in 1914, strained in 1915, was serious 
by the end of 1916. 
ENTRANCE  INTO  WAR 
During the early months of  1917 the United States took the fate- 
ful  steps which lead to the abandonment of  political neutrality.  On 
March  5, 1917 Ambassador Page who, as well stated, "was  less in- 
terested in his own country than in the success of  what he supposed 
to be a crusade for civilization,"  warned the Department of  "inter- 
national conditions most alarming to the American financial and in- 
dustrial outlook." 46  He added that unless the United States granted 
financial assistance "there may be a world wide panic for an indefi- 
nite period,"  and expressed the opinion that "the  pressure  of  this 
approaching crisis has gone beyond the financial ability of  the Mor- 
gan financial agency for the British and French governments.  The 
need  is becoming  too  great  and urgent  for any private  agency  to 
meet."  He therefore urged "that our going to war is the only way 
in which our present preeminent trade position can be maintained 
and a panic averted"  and urged this policy on the ground that we 
should "thus reap the profit of  an uninterrupted, perhaps an enlarg- 
ing trade over a number of  years."  47 
This letter of  Page stated exactly the position in which the United 
States found itself at the opening of  1917.  Since August,  1914, the 
United States had been experiencing a prosperity based essentially 
on  exports to  the Allied  governments.  These exports  had  been 
made possible largely by private bank loans and public bond issues 
based on the credit of  the Allied governments.  The credit of  the 
Allied  nations as judged  by  their ability  to command  purchasing 
power in the United States was practically exhausted, for both Amer- 
ican banks and American investors were unwilling to grant further 
financial assistance  to the extent necessary for the continuance of 
vast purchases in this market.  Such continued purchases by  the Al- 
lies  and the resulting  prosperity  for  the  American  people  could 
have been sustained only  by  the employment of  the credit of the 
United States Government itself through the sale of  its own obliga- 
tions to American banks and investors.  The use of  such credit was 
possible only if  the United States cast aside its position as a political 
neutral  and itself  became  a belligerent  on the side  of  the Allies. 
This was the economic factor which brought about the entrance of 
the  United  States into the War."  No clearer recognition  of  the 
economic cause of  our entrance into the War can be found than in 
the triumphant paens of  the New York financial press at that fate- 212  FINANCE CAPITALISM  AMERICAN  CAPITALISM AND WORLD WAR 213 
hl  moment, when President Wilson was about to call the nation to 
war.  The New  York Sun declared : "leading  bankers  expect that 
the entrance of  the United States into the War will result in a ma- 
terial  increase  in orders  placed  here  for  shells  and other muni- 
tions.  . .  Munition companies which have been closing their plants 
and discharging employees by  the thousands are expected to resume 
operations on a large scale."  The Wall Street yournal  added that 
"the coming loan of  the United States government has put new life 
into the War order companies." 4a 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding  review  seems to  indicate that entrance of  the 
United States in the War was  not the result of financial machina- 
tions of a small group of bankers, but came about because the great 
mass of American people had acquired an important economic in- 
terest in the success of the Allied cause.  Their desire for the con- 
tinuation of prosperity arising from the sale of their goods abroad 
made it difficult for the administration  to take  those  steps which 
though insuring neutrality would have brought on depression.  Once 
the exports to the Allied nations assumed a large volume, they had 
to be financed by the United States, and to maintain financial neu- 
trality, as was attempted in the Bryan declaration of  August,  1914, 
was  politically  and economically  impossible.  The economic  pres- 
sure for the maintenance of  the purchasing power  of  our foreign 
market therefore nullified  every  effort  to  maintain  financial  neu- 
tralit~.~O  This pressure drove the administration to recede step by 
step from its original policy of  unconditional  financial neutrality, 
from the futile distinction between a credit and a loan, which per- 
mitted the banking system ultimately to extend financial assistance 
by  means of  bankers'  acceptances which were practically loans, and 
in time forced the abandonment of  the distinction entirely by sanc- 
tioning the public issuing of  the bonds of the Allied governments 
directly to the American  public.  Finally  when  the credit of  the 
Allied nations was  no longer sufficient to continue their purchases 
in the American  market, the United States entered the war  as  an 
actual belligerent and so made possibIe the utilization of  its credit 
to finance  a  continuation of  the war  prosperity.  It is  doubtful 
whether the American  people,  who as a whole  in  1916 and  1917 
favored  the continuation  of  political  neutrality,  would  have  sup- 
ported the maintenance of American financial neutrality in view of 
the economic  sacrifices which  such  a policy would have involved. 
However, in the end the abandonment of financial neutrality, dic- 
tated by  economic considerations, made impossible the maintenance 
of political neutrality. 
The lesson to be learned from the study of  these events is there- 
fore clear.  In any major international conflict in the future it will 
be again impossible for the United States to maintain political neu- 
trality,  for the inexorable sweep of events will  successively break 
down economic, financial and later political neutrality.  All efforts 
to stem the tide of these events after the outbreak of  a World War by 
such ~olicies  as mere financial neutrality are bound to be futile.  It 
is therefore  necessary for the United States to realize that positive 
measures must  be  taken in  advance  to  prevent  this country  from 
once more being drawn into the next conflict.  President Wilson 
was  only too right in his statement made  in the fall  of  1916 that 
"this  is the last War of this kind or of  any kind that involves the 
world that the United States can keep out of." CRISIS  OF AMERICAN  SECURITY CAPITALISM  2 15 
CHAPTER  13 
CRISIS OF  AMERICAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
IN  THE  years immediately following the World War political con- 
servatism  dominated  the mind  of  the American  people  and the 
period of  political crusading for the time was  over.  The Socialist 
party, shaken by  the War, showed little strength  in the post-war 
period,  for  Eugene  Debs  and  later  Norman  Thomas  obtained 
small popular votes.  The Communist Party, led by William Z.  Fos- 
ter, likewise received little popular support.  Thus over the period 
the parties  of  protest  were completely  ineffectual.' 
The period was one of  general self-satisfaction, and social unrest 
was largely local in nature.  The Sacco-Vanzetti case aroused curi- 
osity among the American public which, however, remained some- 
what  apathetic and was  quite mystified  at the commotion  which 
the case of  the two condemned men aroused in foreign countries. 
The troubles in the textile mills of  Gastonia, North Carolina, and 
in the coal mines of  Harlan County, Kentucky, resulted in no popu- 
lar action.  Organized labor made little progress in this period.  The 
American public over these years were thus not class conscious. 
TRIUMPH  OF  LAISSEZ  FAIRE 
In the post-war period laissez faire dominated the minds of  the 
American  people from  Main  Street to Pennsylvania  Avenue.  He 
who dared propose that the government extend its control over se- 
curity capitalism was  a  prophet  crying  futilely  in the wilderness. 
Professor William Z.  Ripley pointed out that corporate statements 
were inadequate, and maintained that the Federal Trade Commis- 
sion had power  to require the filing of  more  satisfactory reports.' 
However, the "spokesman" of  President Coolidge promptly put the 
Professor in his place by stating that: 
Mr.  Coolidge is  not  convinced that  the Federal Trade Commission 
has the power  to control reports of  corporations doing inter-State com- 
merce, even though they have control of  the products in inter-State com- 
merce. 
In the opinion of  the President it is  difficult  to determine what is 
a good or a bad stock.  Publicity as  to the financial strength of  coxpora- 
tions, he thinks, has  usually  been  left to  the jurisdiction of  the States, 
many  of  which have blue-sky laws which assure the public adequate in- 
formati~n.~ 
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The chief counsel of the Federal Trade Commission considered 
Professor Ripley's proposal "too sweeping."  This position was sup- 
ported by  state officials, and the special deputy attorney general of 
New York declared that the application of  the state blue-sky law was 
"the best argument in favor of President Coolidge's contention that 
State  laws  best  protect  the  American  investor  in  securities  and 
bond and stock swindles and a timely answer to Professor 
Ripley."  However some of the states, as California, even weakened 
their laws regulating new corporate securities on the ground that : 
it does not prevent fraud as  intended, that there is no provision for the 
extension of  its  scope  or jurisdiction  to  regulate corporations  issuing 
securities or to the development of  a prosecutions department of research 
and public relations, that it is actually burdensome and harmful to or- 
ganizations coming under its scope and has actually driven financial and 
corporate business in huge amounts from the state and that it has created 
unnecessary barriers to new  business  and modern financial operations.5 
ECONOMIC BACKGROUND-MALADJUSTMENT  OF AMERICAN  AGRICULTURE 
By  the beginning of  the twentieth century the last western fron- 
tier had  been  conquered.  In the post-war period  American  agri- 
culture suffered the cumulative blows of  a  war-shaken world eco- 
nomic system.  The historic cause of  the troubles of  the American 
farmer may be found in the unwise expansion in the nineteenth cen- 
tury.  The  federal government had acquired public lands amounting 
to millions of acres which were sold too rapidly and without classi- 
fication, and this unsound policy placed too many acres in cultiva- 
tion.  The adverse effects of  those events bore down upon the Amer- 
ican farmer with all the heavier weight in the post-war period when 
as an aftermath of artificial agricultural expansion other unfavorable 
factors began  to extend their baneful  influences. 
There was a growing discrepancy between  the prices of  agricul- 
tural and of  manufactured products.  Both  tended to fall, but the 
drop  of  the  former  was  more  rapid  than  that  of  the  latter. 
Because of  this greater decline in the prices received by the farmer 
as  compared  with  the prices  paid  by  the  farmer, his purchasing 
power  de~lined.~  Even  before  the  depression  the  woes  of  the 
farmer were further accentuated by the contraction in the domestic 
and foreign markets for agricultural products.  The change in trac- 
tion power from the horse to the automobile substituted a demand 
for gasoline instead of  oats and grain, and changes in the food styles 
of American people reduced the demand for meat and for wheat. 
Far more serious was the decline in the foreign demand for American 
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for Europe as well as the United States.  With the close of  the War 
and the rehabilitation of  European agriculture, the foreign demand 
fell off sharply, but this drop was not followed by a curtailment of 
American production.  In addition the depreciation in the value of 
foreign currencies and the consequent appreciation in the value of 
the dollar required the payment of  more dollars for American food- 
stuffs and led to a decline in the demand for them. 
DECLINE  IN THE RATE  OF  INDUSTRIAL  EXPANSION 
The industrial  production of  the United States remained high 
in the post-war period.  The relative importance of  the leading in- 
dustries underwent  considerable change,  for the motor-vehicle in- 
dustry gained on the iron and steel industries, and the petroleum in- 
dustry expanded.  Automobile  production  was  one of  the main- 
stays  of  the  prosperity  of  the  post-war  period  and  the  output 
rose  sharply.  The steel  industry  likewise  increased  its  produc- 
tion  enormously  over  these  years,  and petroleum  production  ex- 
panded without interruption, while exports, particularly of  manu- 
factured goods, rose sharply.  In order  to overcome  the housing 
shortage resulting from the cessation of  building activity during the 
war years, there was a sharp recovery in building constru~tion.~ 
Notwithstanding the industrial expansion over the post-war years 
the rate of  growth showed evidence of  decline when compared with 
previous periods in the industrial history of  the nation.  The Stand- 
ard Statistics index of  the secular trend of  general industrial produc- 
tion showed a general declining rate of  gro~th.~  Cotton consump- 
tion which had expanded at the rate of  4 percent yearly from 1885 
to igoo showed a yearly expansion of  only 2  percent from  1915 to 
1925.~ Coal  production, which  had  grown at a rate of  5 percent 
from  1900  to  1910  and  4  percent  from  1910  to  1920,  showed 
practically no growth after 1920.  The annual rate of  growth of pig 
iron, which  was  6 percent  until 1900, thereafter fell to 3  percent. 
The automobile industry which expanded at the rate of  35 percent 
from  1905 to 1910, and 18 percent from 11)i5 to 1920, showed the 
reduced rate of  8 percent for the decade ending 1930.1°   ailr road 
freight traffic, increased  at an annual rate of  7  percent from  1890 
to 1910, 6 percent from  1910 to  1920 but only one percent in the 
following years.ll  In general the leading manufactures grew at the 
decennial rate of  about 6% percent yearly until 1890, at the rate of 
5 percent until 1920 and at 4%  percent until 1930.'~ Clearly Amer- 
ican security capitalism in the post-war period was experiencing the 
same declining rate of industrial expansion as occurred in ~n~land 
in the fourth quarter of  the nineteenth century. 
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DECLINING  RATE  OF  POPULATION  GROWTH 
The growth  in the population  of  the  United  States has been 
one  of  the  most  significant  social  movements  in  world  history. 
From  1840 until 1920 the general rate of  growth of the population 
was  about 2.3 percent annually, but from  1920 to 1930 the rate of 
growth was only 1.5 percent.13  This change in the rate of  popula- 
tion growth was  a social factor of real economic significance.  The 
continuous development of railroads, the expansion of  the electric 
light and power companies and the output of  manufacturing con- 
cerns  in the past  had  consciously or unconsciously been  based on 
the  assumption  of  an  ever-increasing  rate  of  population.  This 
premise could  no longer  be  accepted  for the future.  Overequip- 
ment  and overproduction  were  problems  which  now  had  to  be 
anticipated.  Also real  estate valuation  had  to be adjusted to the 
theory  that the ever-increasing rate of  population  would  not con- 
tinue.14 
The drift of population in the past had been toward the cities. 
Immigration had further contributed to the increased population of 
American  cities  but it was  now  checked  by  restrictive legislation. 
The drift  of  population  was  partly  halted  by  certain  economic 
forces.  Inter-connected electric systems were able to carry power 
long distances, and small localities could obtain power at rates which 
were almost as low as those charged in large cities.  The disappear- 
ance of  this differential advantage and the increasing costs of  produc- 
tion in large cities l5 tended to check the rate of urban growth. 
UNSATISFACTORY  LABOR  CONDITIONS 
The trend in the ~osition  of  labor, when analyzed by  itself, im- 
proved  in the post-war period.  The index of  employment and of 
payrolls rose, and wages paid  by  the manufacturing industries in- 
creased moderately.16  However, this improvement was not as rapid 
as the increase in production as may  be seen in Table ig showing 
the increase in the indices of  industrial production as compared with 
those of  labor from  192 1 to 1929. 
From these  figures it may be  seen  that, with  the exception  of 
only two, the indices of  production rose much faster than the indices 
of labor.  Unemployment, until the close of  the nineteenth century, 
Was  not a pressing problem.  After the Civil War the United States 
had  experienced  intermittent  waves  of  unemployment  caused  by 
cyclical  movements  beginning  particularly  in  1873 and  in  1893. 
Added to such periodic cyclical unemployment, with the twentieth 
century there came continual technological unemployment brought FINANCE CAPITALISM 
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INDICES  OF LABOR  Sources  I,  Ig2g  I  I  PERCENT  I 
Employment. . 
Payrolls. ...... 
Wages paid by 
............................  '3  ............................ 
all manufacturing industries. ..I  :: 
--  - 
INDICES OF PRODUCTION 
I  I 
I  I 
Numbers refer to columns in Appendix VI. 
.....................  Industrial production..  ....................  Automobile production. 
Steel ingot production. .....................  ..........................  Coal production.. 
Petroleum production.. ..................... 
Building contracts awarded.. ................ 
Building expenditures.. ..................... 
about by the introduction of labor-saving machinery, the extension 
of scientific management, the growth of  mergers and the changing 
whims of  consumers'  demands.17  For  a  time, workers  discharged 
as a result of  these forces found employment in the new industries 
as the automobile, radio, aviation and motion picture fields and in 
service employment as gasoline workers.  However, unemployment 
in the depression of 1921 rose to 5,500,ooo and in May  1929 at the 
height of industrial activity, it was estimated that 2,000,000 persons 
were out of  work.18  Meagre savings were  insufficient to meet  the 
emergency  of  unemployment  in the case  of  many  families,  for a 
large proportion of  the workers did not receive sufficient income in 
good years to build up adequate surpluses for the bad years.  To 
make  up this deficiency, recourse  was  had to private  charity, but 
this method of  relief  proved  inadequate. 
The  volume of  consumption expanded rapidly from the close of 
the nineteenth century and for the first two decades of  the twentieth 
century, and in consequence the standard of  living of  the American 
people  in general rose sharply.  In the third decade consumption 
was held up by various artificial supports.  Installment selling gave 
a  temporary  fill-up to domestic  purchasing  power.  Paper ~rofits 
from the rising stock market created a false sense of  prosperity, and 
since the public felt rich it spent more freely.  Over-liberal foreign 
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and  sustained  exports  over  these  years,  but  these  foreign  sales 
crumbled when the export of American  capital ceased. 
VOICES  OF CRITICISM  AND  OF OPTIMISM 
Here and there a few farseeing individuals at the time noted these 
unsatisfactory trends.  In 1927 Melvin A. Traylor, Chairman of the 
First National Bank of Chicago and an able leader of  banking capi- 
talism said: 
Every  kind  and  character  of  combination  and  consolidation  was 
made, regardless of economic advisability or the possibility of  econolnics 
in management or increased profits therefrom.  Little or no  considera- 
tion was  given to the nature of  the business  involved: in one instance, 
for example, soaps and  candles were  united.  Such  combinations and 
mergers were  promoted and securities were  sold on the theory that tern- 
orary earnings derived from  a false demand would not only  continue, 
Eut would forever increase. ..  Was  such financial leadership calculated 
to inspire confidence or make  for  an economic  stability which  insures 
social welfare ? 
I believe that without the proper education and direction of  human 
conduct, economic  depressions will  inevitably  continue to  recur  with 
ever-increasing social  and  political disaster.le 
However, the general chorus struck a note of  continuous optim- 
ism.  Otto Kahn maintained that there was  "widely diffused pros- 
perity,  percolating  through  all  sections of the country, benefiting 
the people, adding to the contents not merely of  their pocketbooks, 
but of  their lives." 20  E.  H.  H. Simmons, President  of  the Stock 
Exchange stoutly declared "I cannot help but raise a dissenting voice 
to statements that we are simply living in a fool's paradise, and that 
prosperity  in this country must necessarily diminish and recede  in 
the future." 21 
PANIC  OF  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
September, 1929, marked the high tide of the stock market and 
the closing months of the year witnessed successive collapses of  se- 
curity  prices.  The methods  of  1907  were  applied  on  an  even 
grander scale and banking support, which had in the past checked 
security price declines, was once more mobilized.  October 24,  1929 
was one of  the landmarks in the history of  security capitalism.  SO- 
called "air pockets"  developed in the market, and there was no bid 
for some of  the most active stocks.  The heads of  the leading New 
York  banks met  in the office  of  Morgan  Company and formed  a 
banking  pool  with  recerves  in excess of $nqo,ooo,~oo.~~  This or- 
ganized financial power was, however, unable to check the decline 
in security prices, and accomplished nothing more than a rear guard 220  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
action which covered  the none-too-orderly retreat of  American  se- 
curity capitalism.  About $ ioo,ooo,ooo of  securities were purchased, 
and for a time were placed in the portfolios of  the security affiliates. 
By  February,  1930, the banking pool was  dissolved and all  the se- 
curity holdings were liquidated without loss to the banking 
The latter part of  1930 dragged along wearily with complete lack 
of  profit  for agriculture, manufacture and transportation  through- 
out the world.  This discouraging economic situation laid the basis 
for the banking troubles serious even before  1929.  By  the end of 
the year  New  York  City  experienced  a serious  disturbance when 
the Bank  of  United States failed.  Only half-hearted  efforts were 
made to save this institution, and today, with  the benefit of  after- 
sight, it is clear that the full salvaging of  this institution by  other 
New York banks should have been the course pursued if  only in self 
interest.  The year  1951 was  marked by  widespread  banking em- 
barrassment abroad.  In May  the Austrian  Creditanstalt closed its 
doors.  This failure was  practically  unnoticed by  Wall Street, too 
deeply engrossed in reading the ticker recording  the security price 
changes of  the moment.  By July, the German banks were tottering; 
the British  financial interests made desperate efforts to check  the 
collapse of  the German financial  system only to become  involved 
themselves;  by  September the Bank of  England would no longer 
pay  out gold for its notes, and by  December the United States was 
shaken by numerous bank failures throughout the country.  In the 
summer of  1932 the United States experienced an incipient indus- 
trial revival which, however, was checked by  the uncertain political 
trend of  the early fall and now the very props under American se- 
curity capitalism began to give way. 
Agriculture, industry, trade and labor were all suffering griev- 
ously.  From 1929 to 1932 the index of  farm purchasing power fell 
from 95 to 61.  Industrial production declined from 108 to 54; auto- 
mobile production from 5,622,000 cars to i,qgi,ooo cars; steel pro- 
duction from 56,400,ooo gross tons to 13,700,ooo gross tons; the out- 
put of  petroleum from i,oo7,rjoo,ooo barrels to 785,200,ooo barrels; 
the index of  building contracts from 89 percent  to  17 and exports 
from  $rj,nq i ,ooo,ooo to  $1,6  1 1 ,ooo,ooo.  In consequence  employ- 
ment  fell  from  104 to 64  percent  in  1932; payrolls  from  109 to 
46.1  percent  and wages  in the manufacturing  industries were  cut 
from  $1 i,62o,ooo,ooo  to  $4,rj25,000,000.~* Agriculture  was  weak- 
ened by  thousands  of  foreclosures,  industry  discouraged  and con- 
suming  power  slashed  by  millions  of  unemployed,  the  banking 
system  impaired  by  the failure of  thousands  of  institutions, com- 
merce decimated by the collapse of  exports, the capital market at a 
standstill, over two thousand municipalities in bankruptcy, a large 
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number of  the railroads in receivership and commodity prices, na- 
tional income and national wealth were sharply reduced. 
The  cumulative  effect  of  these  combined  blows  brought 
American  security capitalism  to the brink  of  collapse  by  March, 
1~~3.  The investor lost faith in his security investments and in the 
entire system of security capitalism, and in open revolt withdrew his 
funds from the banks and from the security markets.  The darkest 
hour in the history of security capitalism had struck.  American se- 
curity capitalism, the bulwark of world security capitalism, was  in 
panic.  A few more days and the entire machinery of  commercial 
banking would have been unable to meet the demand for the with- 
drawal of deposits, and the investment system would have been un- 
able to withstand the pressure of  the flood of  securities thrown upon 
the market.  In this crisis it was  necessary for  the government to 
act and to act quickly.  On a bewildering March noon, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt the incoming President in his first  official utterance  de- 
nounced security capitalism in these searing words : 
Primarily  this  is  because  the rulers of  the  exchange of  mankind's 
goods  have  failed  through  their  own  stubbornness and  their  own  in- 
competence, have admitted their failure and abdicated.  Practices of  the 
unscrupulous  money  changers  stand  indicted  in  the  court  of  public 
opinion, rejected by  the hearts and minds of  men. 
True, they have tried, but their efforts  have been cast in the pattern 
of  an outworn tradition.  Faced by  failure of  credit, they have proposed 
only the lending of  more money. 
Stripped of  the lure of  profit by  which  to induce our people to fol- 
low  their false leadership, they have resorted to exhortations, pleading 
tearfully for restored confidence.  They know only the rules of  a genera- 
tion of self-seekers. 
They have no vision, and when there is no vision the people perish. 
The money  changers have fled from  their high  seats in the temple 
of our  civilization.  We  may  now  restore  that  temple  to  the  ancient 
truths.25 
In the succeeding weeks and months the Roosevelt Administra- 
tion proceded to enact the New Deal legislation which checked the 
panic but which at the same time modified American security capi- 
talism. 
RECOVERY  AND DEPRESSION 
After  1932, notwithstanding relapses, there was  a general  eco- 
nomic recovery.  In this period  prices received by the farmer rose 
more rapidly than prices paid by the farmer and as a result the index 
of farm purchasing power increased.  There was a similar improve- 
ment in general production ;  automobile, steel ingot, coal and petro- 
leum output rose and the index of building contracts increa~ed.'~ 222  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
As a result of  this improvement, labor benefited as evidenced by the 
fact that the indices of  employment and of  payrolls mounted and 
wages paid in manufacturing industries increased sharply.27  How- 
ever, by  1937 this upward movement had been in operation for five 
years and was in its advanced stages.  In 1937 there was evidence of 
the approaching end of  the cycle, and the harbingers of  the coming 
depression were already visible.28 
CONCLUSION 
From this review of  the background of  American  security capi- 
talism  in the post-war period,  it is clear that there was  a  definite 
change in the broad economic and social forces which had brought 
about  the rise  and development  of  American  security  capitalism 
until the beginning of  the twentieth century.  The maladjustment 
of  agriculture, the declining rate of  industrial growth after the turn 
of the century and the drop in the rate of  the growth of  population 
were similar to the trends which were in evidence in England in the 
closing years of  the  nineteenth  century.  Furthermore the uncer- 
tainty of  security prices, the inability of  banking capitalism to sta- 
bilize the financial system, and the uneven nature of  economic activ- 
ity in the post-war years all gave evidence of  the crisis confronting 
American security capitalism. 
Tart III-  Troblems of American 
Security ~apiGism 
CHAPTER 14 
FINANCIAL  ORGANIZATION 
THIS  chapter will trace the evolution of  the financial organization 
of  American  security capitalism  in the  post-war period  with  par- 
ticular reference to commercial banking, the Federal Reserve system, 
investment banking and the stock exchange. 
CHANGING  NATURE  OF  COMMERCIAL  BANKING 
The development of  commercial banking in the post-war period 
can  best  be  understood  by  continuing the study of  the financial 
position of  national banks as presented in Chapter  11 which traced 
their development from 1870 through  19 13.  In the post-war period 
the national banks reduced the volunle  of  their circulating notes, 
and the proportion  of  such notes  to their  total  liabilities  became 
almost  negligible.'  Another  significant  tendency  was  the decline 
in the proportion of  demand deposits and the consequent growth of 
the proportion of  time to total depo~its.~  The deposits of  national 
banks  were  almost  entirely payable  on demand  until  the end of 
19 I 3, when the Federal Reserve Act permitted national banks legally 
to accept  time  deposits and fixed  lower  reserve  requirements  for 
them.  Economists are not in agreement on the causes of  this increas- 
ing proportion of time deposits.  It is held by some that this tendency 
was  due largely  to mere  bookkeeping  entries caused  both  by  the 
expansion of  bank credit and by the transfer of  corporate accounts 
from a demand to a time basis in order to take advantage of  the 
higher interest rate allowed on the latter.3  It is believed  by others 
that the increase in time deposits over these years reflected the  rise in 
the actual saving of  American people.' 
The rise in time deposits was one of  the factors which  in turn 
induced the banks to increase the proportion of their assets in the 
form of securities and of loans on securities.  For the national banks, 
the proportion of  securities, including both United States Govern- 
ment and other securities, to total earning assets rose considerabl~.~ 
Similar to national banks, most of the other classes of  financial insti- 
tutions, as  state banks,  private banks, savings banks and insurance 
companies, increased the proportion of their security investments to 
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INCREASE  1N  SECURITY  LOANS 
Not only did the direct security investments of  banks increase, 
but their indirect investments in the form of  loans on securities also 
rose.  The proportion of  the security loans of  national banks to their 
total loans and discounts rose from 22.5 percent in 192 1 to 36.2 per- 
cent in  1928.'  The increase in security loans was  not confined to 
banks  in New  York  City  but was  general  throughout the United 
States.  From the beginning of  1921 to the beginning of  1930 in 
the Federal Reserve district of  San Francisco security loans rose 133 
percent, in Chicago 129 percent, in Dallas 126 percent and in Boston 
121 percent  which  exceeded the  loo percent  increase  in the New 
York district, while the average for the United States was  98  per- 
cent.B  It is thus clear that the entire banking system of  the United 
States, and not merely  the financial center, was  influenced by  the 
rapid expansion of  security capitalism in the post-war period. 
This increase in security loans was sharply attacked, and various 
arguments were presented  by  the critics of  this phase  of  security 
capitalism.  It was frequently contended  that security loans lacked 
marketabilit~.~  As a matter of  fact in the two financial crises in the 
post-war period, security  loans possessed  a high  degree of  market- 
ability for in the 1920-192  1 crisis when commercial loans were gen- 
erally frozen and again  in the 1929-1930 crisis banks were readily 
able to convert their security loans into cash.1°  By  the end of  1930, 
even after the drastic reduction of  these security loans and after the 
sharp recession  in the market  value  of  the underlying collateral, 
only 4 percent of all the customers' security loans of  18 large New 
York City banks and only 6 percent of  such loans of  26  large banks 
elsewhere were  secured  by  collateral whose market  value  was less 
than i lo percent of  the amount of  the loan.ll 
The second criticism leveled against security loans was that they 
absorbed bank credit needed for the financing of  legitimate business 
activity.  Various  economists as  Rogers,  Calvin  Hoover,  Reed and 
Roelse, attempted to refute these charges.12 
TREND IN LIQUIDITY  AND SOLVENCY 
A further pronounced tendency  in the national banking system 
was the trend in liquidity.  The liquidity of  a bank, or its ability 
to meet current liabilities, is tested by the proportion of  its reserve 
assets  to deposit  liabilities.  Such  reserve  assets  include cash  and 
other assets convertible into cash quickly and without loss of  value.13 
In the post-war period the ratio of  such reserve assets to total deposits 
increased  sharply.14  Notwithstanding this  increasing  reserve ratio 
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and  liquidity of the system as a whole, the national banks 
a continuous series of failures not only in the depres- 
sion years but throughout the entire period of  the twenties.16 
The fundamental cause of the bank failures over these years was 
rather the lack of solvency.  This term refers to the capacity of  a 
bank  to meet  losses  arising  from the depreciation  in the market 
value of  its assets.  The solvency of  a bank  is determined by  the 
of  its net capital to its depreciable assets.I6  In the post- 
war  period  many  banks  followed  unwise  policies  regarding  their 
capital  funds in the form of  their capital, surplus and undivided 
profits.  They failed to build up adequate surplus and undivided 
profits, but instead  paid  out overliberal  dividends, and applied a 
large proportion of  their capital funds to the erection of  elaborate 
bank  buildings.  These beautiful Greek  temples of  the nineteen- 
twenties frequently became lugubrious mausoleums in the nineteen- 
thirties.  As a result of  these unsound building and dividend poli- 
cies, there was  a sharp decline in the proportion of  net capital to 
the gross capital funds of  the national banks.17 
This immobilization prevented the banks from having adequate 
net capital to meet losses arising from the depreciation in the value 
of their assets particularly their  direct security investments.  The 
decline in the market value of  commodities, securities and real estate 
impaired a large part of  the collateral underlying the loans of  the 
banks, but this loss was carried primarily by the customers and only 
secondarily by the banks, and as seen on p. 224 their losses on loans 
collateraled by securities were small.  However, the depreciation in 
the value of  their direct security investments fell squarely upon the 
banks themselves. 
As  a  result  of  the relative decrease  in net capital  and of  the 
increase  in holdings  of  securities,  the proportion  between  these 
two  items  declined  sharply.18  The proportion  of  net  capital  of 
national banks to their securities other than United States Govern- 
ment bonds dropped from 118.23 percent in 1920 to 91.26 percent in 
1923 and to 56.06 percent in 1932.  In other words, by  1932 the na- 
tional banks  as  a whole  had  only  $56.06  to meet  losses resulting 
from the depreciation on every $loo of their securities other than 
United States Government bonds.19 
It is thus clear that the commercial banking system, as evidenced 
by the national banks, continued to operate on the theory that its 
Protection rested solely on the maintenance of  liquidity.  This was 
the traditional  policy  of  commercial  banking  in  England  in the 
eighteenth and early  nineteenth  centuries.  This policy, however, 
was  inadequate  under  a  system  of  developed  security capitalism 
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which  usually  remained  relatively  stable in value  to long-term se- 
curity investment assets which continually fluctuated in value.  Un- 
mindful of  this change in the nature of  their assets the commercial 
banks failed to realize the importance of  the principle of  solvency, 
and possessed inadequate capital resources to meet the possible losses 
on their security assets.'O 
EXPANSION  OF INVESTMENT AFFILIATES 
Not only did the commercial banks to an increasing extent be- 
come investors in securities but many  also became dealers in such 
securities through  operating  either  bond  departments or separate 
investment affiliates.  In describing the evolution  of  security  capi- 
talism  in  the  United  States,  the  growth  of  affiliates  before  1914 
was traced.  In subsequent years these institutions increased rapidly 
in number  and in  importan~e.~~  The importance of  the affiliate 
in the post-war period  may  be  seen  in  the  increasing proportion 
of the originations and participations in new  security issues floated 
by  the  commercial  banks  to  the  total  flotations  in  the  period 
from 1927 to  1930.  The commercial  banks, either through  bond 
departments or affiliates, in  1927, accounted for  22 percent  of  the 
originations of new issues, and by  1930 the proportion had risen to 
44.6  percent  or almost  one-half  of  the total.  Similarly,  the com- 
mercial  banks in 1927 accounted for 36.8 percent of  the participa- 
tions in new issues and by  1930 the proportion had increased to 61.2 
percent  or over  three-fifths of  the total.  Thus by  1930 the com- 
mercial banks had taken over the greater part of  the mechanism of 
issuing new  securitie~.~~ 
At first the affiliates confined their activities  to the flotation  of 
bonds, but in time they also sold preferred stock and later common 
stock.  In the course of  time  they  extended their  operations  and 
began  playing the market  on their own account, purchasing shares 
which were considered low in price, and hoping to sell at a higher 
figure.  The affiliates even went to the extent of  speculating in the 
stock of  their parent banks.23  It was  the practice  of  certain com- 
mercial banks,  when  asked  for  disinterested investment  advice b~ 
their customers, to refer them to their affiliates,  and these institutions 
at times unloaded their own securities on these applicants  instead 
of  providing the unbiased information sought.z4  Time and again 
the banks  granted to their affiliates loans which were  not justified 
either as to the amount or as to the quality of  the collateral ~ledged 
for  the loans.  In general,  however,  the securities issued  by  the 
affiliates were no worse than those of  other investment houses.25 
While the commercial  banks thus increased  their  extension of 
investment credit, they  did not at the same time strengthen their 
over  Therefore although  the American  banks 
followed  the same  policy as  the German  banks  in  increasing the 
amount of  investment credit extended to industry, they did not ob- 
tain domination over industry.  The probable reason for this differ- 
ence in policy was the fact that in Germany, as mentioned on pages 
68-69,  the scarcity of capital  gave the industrialist in the pre-war 
period little choice but to accept the sovereignty of  the banker, while 
in the United States in the later period the abundance of  available 
capital enabled the industrialist to retain his independence. 
Not by  any conscious policy  on the part of  the bankers  them- 
selves, but by  the relentless  force ol changing capitalism therefore 
did  the so-called commercial  banking system  alter  its function  by 
reducing its commercial and increasing its investment assets, and by 
engaging in investment as well as commercial operations.  American 
banking thus became essentially mixed rather than specialized.  In 
actual practice it departed far from the classical or orthodox theory 
and followed the anti-classical or liberal theory.27 The  liberal theory 
realistically expressed the actual  function of  the commercial  bank 
under the security capitalism of the present, while the older ortho- 
dox theory  defined the function of  banking under the individual 
capitalism of  the past. 
EFFECT  OF CHANGING  BANKING FUNCTION  ON THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
The Federal Reserve system, as established in 1913, was based es- 
sentially on the orthodox theory of commercial banking.  The origi- 
nal act restricted rediscounts by member banks to commercial paper 
and carefully  defined the paper  acceptable  as security for Federal 
Reserve notes.28  However, the changes in the assets of  commercial 
banks in the post-war period had a direct effect on their rediscounts 
with the Federal Reserve system.  There was a steady decline in the 
holding of  paper eligible for rediscount, and in the case of the na- 
tional  banks  eligible  paper  to total  loans  and discounts dropped 
from 30.2 percent in 1923 to 15.9 percent in 1933 from which there 
was  a rise to 19.2 percent in  1935.~~ 
GROWTH  OF  COMPETITION  IN INVESTMENT BANKING 
Investment  banking  in the United  States since the  Civil War 
passed  through  three  successive  stages which  may  possibly be de- 
scribed as  the pre-Morgan, the Morgan  and the post-Morgan eras. 
The  later part of  the pre-Morgan period was marked by the activities 
of the speculative capitalists and the rise and decline of  Jay Cooke. 
In the second stage, the house of  Morgan came to dominate the syc 228  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
tem of  security capitalism, and the supremacy of  the firm was corn- 
plete until the third decade of  the twentieth century.  Over these 
years the Appian Way of  finance led to the corner of  Wall and Broad 
Streets, and the Pax Morgana gave stability to the financial world. 
Investment banking was in the hands of  a few large houses and even 
these were bound in close alliances with Morgans.  Kuhn, Loeb and 
Company alone was  in a position to dispute the way of Morgans, 
but, with the exception of  the aid given to Harriman in the battle for 
the control of the Northern Pacific, open warfare between the two 
houses never materialized. 
As is seen in Chapter 11 the preeminence of  the Morgan firm was 
due largely to influence over the supply of  capital through its rela- 
tions with institutions of  indirect investment  as commercial banks 
and life insurance companies.  Although there was  an increase  in 
the amount of such indirect investment after the beginning of  the 
century, there was  relatively greater increase  in the volume of  di- 
rect investment by individuals in stocks and later on in bonds.  This 
popularization  of  security  investment  was  the  underlying  factor 
which  weakened  the relative control  of  Morgans  over  the supply 
of  capital.  The firm followed a policy of  selling not to the general 
public but rather of  distributing securities to wholesale houses or 
to a small group of  large individual or institutional  buyers.  The 
distribution of  securities under the Morgan regime rested primarily 
on the system of  indirect investment where the investor entrusted his 
saving  to  institutions  which  in  turn  invested  these  accumulated 
funds.  The growth  of  direct  investment  resulted  in diffusion  of 
security ownership, and so made it more difficult for one firm, even 
though powerful, to influence the investment of  funds.  The  Morgan 
group of  banks,  including J. P. Morgan  and Company,  the  First 
National Bank, Guaranty Trust Company, Bankers Trust and Bon- 
bright & Company, together accounted for $15,6g3,00o,ooo or only 
14.73 percent of  the total of  $io6,567,ooo,ooo of  new issues placed by 
leading syndicates over a period from  1927 to 1932 inclusive.30 
The growth of  direct security investment in turn brought about 
a complete transformation in the organization of  investment bank- 
ing.  In place of  a few  large houses located  mainly  in New  Yqk, 
Boston, Chicago and Philadelphia, there were now many investment 
banks operating in almost every city of  any size from coast to coast- 
The increase in the number of  investment concerns may be seen in 
Table 20 showing the membership in the Investment Bankers'  As- 
sociation of  America. 
Table 20 shows that the total of  the main office and branches of 
members of  the Investment  Bankers  Association rose  from  277  in 
1912 to 810 in 1991.  By  1928 the total had risen to  1072 and to 
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TABLE  20 
MEMBERSHIP  IN  THE  INVESTMENT  BANKERS  ASSOCIATION,  1g12-1g3fj.al 
(number of members) 
1902 by  1929 due to the expansion of  branch offices.  In the depres 
sion period many of  the branch offices were closed, and so the total 
dropped to 945 in 1933 but after that year the total again rose to 



























RESULTS OF  OVERCOMPETITION 
This increase in the number of  investment houses brought about 
significant changes  in the two  essential  operations  of  investment 
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governments and the selling of these  securities to investors.  The 
new  competitive  condition  brought  about  unsatisfactory  conse- 
quences in the underwriting of  securities such as in the relation of 
investment banking  to  corporations  and governments, the growth 
of  irresponsibility of the investment banks for their issues, the in. 
crease in bond defaults and the overissue of  new securities. 
The growth  in the number of  new  investment houses resulted 
in  a  change  in  their  relations  to corporations  and  governments. 
British and generally continental investment bankers recognized and 
avoided each other's territory.  Likewise in the pre-war period the 
large American  investment houses were  usually  careful to respect 
the financial relations which each firm had established over the years. 
Corporations and even governments in most cases developed a closed 
or continuous relationship with one investment house which came 
to know intimately the financial position of the particular corpora- 
tion or the government, and was  able to offer constructive advice 
on the latter's general financial policy.  In Congressional investiga- 
tions, this relationship was  bitterly attacked, and every effort was 
made to break up what was considered a monopolistic arrangement. 
The Interstate  Commerce  Commission  particularly  made  serious 
efforts to force competitive bids  for the financing of  the railroads, 
but this field continued  to be handled  by  the leading investment 
However, in other fields of  financing the former closed relation 
of  investment houses to corporations and governments gave way  to 
open competition.  There followed a mad scramble for business be- 
tween the older  investment houses and the new.  No  longer was 
there any respect for each others' field, but instead investment houses 
offered corporations and governments almost any inducement to win 
them away from long-established contacts with the older firms.  The 
competition for new issues was particularly severe in the rush for do- 
mestic utility and for foreign government  financing.  For example 
the representatives of  fifteen American banking houses, with  their 
respective retinues, taxed the limited hotel capacity of  Belgrade in 
the rush to obtain the Yugoslavian government finan~ing.~' 
A further result of  the overcompetition among investment bank- 
ing houses was  the revival  of  the speculative capitalist.  He now 
found himself  happily  besieged by a horde of  investment  bankers 
who  forced  upon  him  financial  resources  entirely  unjustified  by 
his  true credit  position.  Thus AlEred  Lowenstein  obtained  the 
means of  financing his ill-fated venture into international power?4 
Likewise the operations of Ivan Krueger and of  Samuel Insull were 
made  possible because  of  the competition  among the investment 
houses which pressed funds into the hands of  these individuals to 
finance their speculative enterprises. 
The  shift from the closed to the competitive or open relation also 
led to a change in the responsibility on the part of  the investment 
banker  for the issues which  he had financed.  In the past  the in- 
vestment banker had generally continued his interest in the securi- 
ties which he had floated.  J. P. Morgan, son of  the elder Morgan, 
in his testimony  before the Committee on Banking and Currency 
in  1933, stated: 
If he  (the banker) makes  a public sale and puts his  own  name  at the 
foot of the prospectus he has  a continuing obligation of  the strongest 
kind  to  see, so far as  he can, that nothing is  done which will  interfere 
with the full carrying out by  the obligor of  the contract with the holder 
of the 
This old-fashioned philosophy was discarded by the new investment 
bankers.  In many cases they made no effort  to see that the corpora- 
tions  or governments  which  they  financed  continued  in a  sound 
financial condition.  Not only did investment houses fail to exercise 
control over  the financial  policy of corporations  and governments 
whose securities they had issued, but at times did not even continue 
to keep on file current information on the financial position of  these 
corporations and governments.  An  individual  investor  who  had 
purchased securities and who applied to the issuing house for infor- 
mation was frequently unable to obtain it, for the simple reason that 
the issuing house once having put out the loan was no longer inter- 
ested in it. 
DECLINE  IN QUALITY  OF  SECURITIES 
Under these conditions of  overcompetition and irresponsibility, 
the  purchasing  function of  investment  banking  was  poorly  per- 
formed.  Capital was frequently raised for corporations and for gov- 
ernments whose  financial position  did not  warrant such  financial 
assistance.  The inevitable consequence of  overcompetition among 
investment houses in these years was the deterioration in the quality 
of the bonds which they issued.  As a result a large proportion  of 
the issues floated in these years went into default in the depression 
period.  The author made a study of  the investment experience of 
th 4,398 bonds listed in the Fitch Bond Record in the critical mar- 
ket at the close of  December,  1931.  The results of  the study ap- 
pear in Table 2 I. 
The  table shows that of  the bonds issued in 1927, 1928 and 1929, 
31  percent were  in actual or pending default by  the end of  1931 
as compared with a much lower percentage  for the bonds issued in 232  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
TABLE  21 
DATES  OF  ISSUE  OF  DEFAULTED  BONDS,  DECEMBER  1931.~6 
previous years.  In contrast to the general trend the issue credit of 
Morgans  continued to remain high.  In the nineteen  twenties in 
the railroad field Morgan and Company  floated 77  issues of  which 
5 went into default.  The firm floated 23 utility issues and 11 indus- 
trial issues without a single default.  It floated 40  foreign issues of 
which two, the German loans of  1924 and 1930, went into defa~lt.~' 
OVERISSUE OF NEW SECURITIES 
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A fui-ther unsatisfactory result of  the intense competition among 
investment banking houses was the overissue of  new securities.  In 
1924 the municipal  bond market  became  overexpanded,  and  the 
Clzronicle complained that the favorable money market conditions 
had "led  dealers to take more and larger  issues from smaller com- 
munities  than  conservative  financing  would  warrant."ss  In  1927 
there was a particularly serious congestion in the bond market, and 
it was  estimated that in June of  that year nearly a billion  dollars, 
of  new securities held by dealers remained unsold.sD Again in 1929 
the bond market was  so  heavily overloaded with  securities that it 
was necessary for the dealers to make "a  concentrated drive resulting 
in wholesale  liquidation of  unsold  newly  issued  sec~rities."~~  A 
financial writer in February, 1929, estimated that from lo to 20 per- 
cent of  brokers'  loans was extended to carry undigested securities?' 
In March of that same fateful year the amount of  undigested secur- 
ities was estimated as high as $6oo,ooo,ooo as compared with a nor- 
mal amount of  from $2tjo,oo0,000 to $~OO,OOO,OOO.~~ 














UNSOUND SELLING  PRACTICES 
The  transition from the Morgan-dominated system of  investment 
banking era to the competitive system of  the post-Morgan era led 
also to the employment of unsound selling  practice^.'^  The disposi- 
tion of a large issue of new securities required the formation of  a 
syndicate or group of investment  banks.  Such a group had  only 
an informal legal nature and was bound together by a mere syndi- 
cate agreement.  Frequently the intensity of  the competition among 
the investment houses induced them to violate their pledged word. 
Under these syndicate agreements they promised not to sell an issue 
to the public below a stipulated price.  However, price cutting, both 
direct and indirect, was  a frequent practice.  Thus an investment 
house would agree to take a customer's old bond in exchange for a 
new issue at a valuation of  1/2 point above the market price of  the old 
bond, and in this way the customer would really obtain 1/2 point con- 
cession on the new bond.  Another violation of  the syndicate agree- 
ment was "beating the gun,"  or offering customers a new issue be- 
fore it had been released for actual sale by the syndicate manager.44 
The erring syndicate participant  therefore  obtained an unfair  ad- 
vantage for himself, since he was thus able to obtain orders for the 
issue in advance of  other syndicate members who were more scrupu- 
lous in observing the terms of  the agreement but who therefore un- 
fortunately found that the demand for their bonds had already been 
met by their less ethical associate. 
Another  unsound  practice  in the sale of  securities over  these 
years was "pegging"  the market for new issues.  In the pre-war pe- 
riod in the United States and in England investment houses gener- 
ally followed the policy of  permitting new issues to find their true 
market level whether above or below the issuing price.  After the 
War the frequent overissues of securities led to weak markets, and 
investment bankers followed the practice of  trying to stabilize the 
market for new issues at a fixed price by means of  supporting orders. 
Syndicates generally supported their issues for a period of  a month, 
but when market conditions were unfavorable the support was con- 
tinued for as long as six months.45  Otto Kahn defended this policy 
on the ground that it was  the duty of  the originating banker  to 
make a market "for  a reasonable length of  time for the people at 
large, including distributors, to make up their minds whether these 
bonds are really definitely placed." 46  He further added that : 
a bond issue is not placed to our satisfaction or to the satisfaction of  the 
corporation until it has found its level in the hands of  ultimate investors, 
and  that  sometimes takes  a little time,  and sometimes you  have  over- 234  FINANCE CAPITALISM  FINANCIAL  ORGANIZATION  235 
estimated  the  market  value  which  is  properly  placeable  upon  these 
bonds, and sometimes conditions change.  We are not pegging, we  are 
not supporting, we  are trying to aid the distribution of  bonds which is 
our  duty  as  agents for  the corporation, and  it is  our  duty  toward  in- 
vestors, to help them, if  need be, to get those bonds placed that for one 
reason or another, they may  try to get rid 
However,  this  manipulation  or  rigging  of  the  market  created  a 
fictitious  price,  and gave the appearance of  a stable market which 
deceived no one except the individual investor  unacquainted  with 
the technique of  security distribution.  Sometimes this support pre- 
vented the temporary undervaluation in the market of  a sound issue 
which later rose in price.  But, in many cases, after "the pulling of 
the peg"  or the withdrawal of  artificial support, the issues declined 
to low levels/8  In general the results of  the practice of pegging se- 
curities in the post-war period proved not only unsatisfactory to the 
investing public but frequently unprofitable to investment banking 
itself. 
CHANGE IN RELATION  OF BANKER TO SECURITY  PURCHASERS 
The new  competitive  system also changed  the relation  of  the 
investment banks to the purchasers of  securities.  Formerly the bank- 
ing house of the old type rarely solicited new accounts, and bonds 
were sold to a selected ,group of long-standing customers who were 
invited  personally  to purchase  the securities.  Many  conservative 
houses objected even to sending out typewritten letters for fear that 
their clients would  infer that the need of  selling was  due to pres- 
sure, and so letters were generally written in long hand and signed 
by the senior partner.  In this letter the customer was informed that 
the firm had carefully investigated  a new issue and would be glad 
to discuss its terms personally  at the office  of  the banking house. 
Every effort was made to keep the business upon a basis of  strictest 
integrity,  absolute straightforwardness and unimpeachable respect- 
ability. 
In the new era these old fashioned methods were discarded ando 
were  replaced  by  the rapid-fire, high-speed  sales  program  which 
aimed to sell out an issue on the day  of  its flotation.  The new 
investment  banking house organized  a corps of  security  salesmen 
often recruited  from the graduating classes of  prominent  colleges. 
These recruits were then given a brief training in security selling, 
and were turned loose on the investing public.  These salesmen were 
frequently directed to sell the issues regardless of  their merit.  Thus 
the instructions  of  a large New  York house to its salesforce on a 
certain  date read : 
we anticipate a reasonable supply  of new  issues.  Some  of  them  will 
be easy  sellers and some will  be  difficult,  but for us  to do our full duty, 
it is  essential that we  be  prepared  to sell  any  issue  of  securities which 
this  company  buys,  regardless  of whether  it is  hard  to  sell or easy  to 
TWILIGHT  OF THE  GODS 
In brief in the post-war period, the supremacy of  Morgans in the 
investment field was shaken on the one hand by governmental oppo- 
sition to banking concentration and on the other hand by the sys- 
tem  of  direct  investment which led to the formation of  new  firms 
and  the expansion  of  the  older  firms.  In the financial  Valhalla 
there came to be too many  Gods, and a large number turned out 
to be Lokis. 
DECLINE  OF  THE  STOCK  EXCHANGE 
The growth  of  indirect  investment  and the popularization  of 
the ownership of  stocks as well as of  bonds led to a rapid increase 
in  the  volume  of  the transactions  on  the stock  exchanges.  The 
number of  different stocks listed on the New  York Stock Exchange 
mounted from 612  in igig to a peak of  1,308 in  1931, and bond 
listings from  1,131 to 1,607 over the same period.50  Notwithstand- 
ing this rapid increase, the New York security market never attained 
complete domination over the national security market as in the case 
of  the other leading metropolitan exchanges of  security capitalism. 
Thus in 1935 the New  York security market accounted for 1,483,- 
ooo,ooo  of  3,213,000,000 shares  listed  on the registered  national 
security exchanges, or 46 percent.  It accounted for $24,4~3,00o,ooo 
bonds at par value out of $31,478,00o,ooo listed on all the exchanges 
Or  78 percent.51 
As in Europe, with the coming of  the depression the importance 
of the stock exchange in the financial  system  of  this country de- 
~lined.~~  The volume of  new  financing,  particularly  of stocks de- 
clined because of  the unwillingness of  the investing public, mind- 
ful of its past losses, to absorb such issues.  The number of  stock 
listings fell from  i ,308 in 193  1, to 1,185 in 1936, while the number 
of bond listings declined from 1,607 to 1,463.  The volume of  tran- 
sactions dropped from the peak  of  1,124,608,g  10  shares of  stock in 
'929  to 323,845,634 shares in 1gg4.5S CORPORATE  INVESTMENT 
CHAPTER 15 
CORPORATE INVESTMENT 
THE  next two chapters undertake a qualitative analysis of  the trend 
of  corporate and of governmental security investment  in the post- 
war period.  This chapter will trace in order, the trend in railroad, 
utility,  industrial, real  estate,  holding company  and trust  invest- 
ment.  Consideration  will  be  given  to each  field of  corporate se- 
curity investment as a whole to observe whether the application of 
capital was sound or unsound.  In order to pass judgment with any 
degree of  accuracy on the trends of  security  investment  in these 
respective fields, exact tests of  measurement will be utilized and the 
methods of  applied finance will be employed in this study of  social 
finance.l 
TREND  OF  RAILWAY FINANCE 
Until the second decade of the century, the unsound trend of  the 
debt structure of  the railroads had been overcome by the satisfactory 
course of earning power.2  However, after 1910 the trend of  earning 
power gradually reversed itself, and became less and less ~atisfactory.~ 
Operating revenues continued to rise from ig  i i to 1926 when they 
turned downward, but operating expenses rose more sharply from 
ig  i i to 1923 and thereafter were somewhat reduced.'  Throughout 
the entire period the increase in operating expenses was greater than 
that of  operating revenues, and as a result the ratio of  operating ex- 
penses to operating revenues was less satisfactory in the period from 
191  1 to 1929 averaging 75.2 percent than it was in the period from 
1890 to  1910 when  it averaged 66.7  per~ent.~  This unsatisfactory 
trend in operations was further reflected by the drop in the ratio of 
operating income to operating revenues.  For the period from 1911 
to 1929 the average was only 24.8 percent as compared with 33.5 per- 
cent for the years from 1890 to 19 10.~ 
The trend in the protection of  the fixed charges of  the roads in 
the period from i gi i to 1929 requires careful analysis.  Over these 
years the ratio of  total  income to fixed charges moved  irregularly 
upward and attained an average of  200 percent as compared with 
155.3 percent  in the period  from  1890 to  1910.~ Superficially it 
would seem that the fixed charges of the roads were being protected 
at a rising and even  more satisfactory margin but this  traditional 
test failed to show the real lack of  improvement in the protection of 
236 
the fixed charges of  the railroad system.  The real condition is re- 
flected in the absence of  an advance of  the ~ro~ortion  of  net income 
to operating reven~es.~  This ratio showed an average of  12.6 per- 
cent from 1890 to 1910 and remained about the same, roughly  13 
percent, from i g 1  1 to 1929.  Thus the net income, or the balance 
after fixed  charges,  as  the  margin  of  protection  for  these  fixed 
charges, failed to. show improvement.  Contrary to the general im- 
pression the dividend policy of  the railroads continued sound.  Net 
income rose more rapidly than dividends paid and so the ratio of  net 
income to dividends paid was well maintained?  The trend of  the 
capital structure of  the railroads in the post-war period was also con- 
trary to the generally-stated view.  Even careful students of  railroad 
finance have failed to realize that the increase in railroad debt was 
not  a recent but a long standing trend.  Thus a member of  the 
Interstate Commerce Commission said : "I think probably one of  the 
worst things that has happened since 1920 to railroad finance, one of 
the most disastrous things, has been the increase in debt on the rail- 
road as a whole."  lo  Actually the total debt of  the roads, as compared 
with  1890 as a base, increased from 224.5 percent in 1920 to only 
249.6 percent in 1~~29.~~  Total capitalization likewise showed only a 
small increase  of from  203.8  percent in  1910 to 220.4  percent  in 
1929.1~ AS a result of  these various changes in both items, the ratio 
of  total debt to total capitalization rose only slightly from 61 percent 
in 1910 to 62.8 percent in 1920 and to 63.4 percent in 1g2g.13  How- 
ever, the high level of  debt accumulated  before  igio became top- 
heavy in the period after 1  g  10 when the operations of  the railroads 
and their consequent earning power became less satisfactory.14 
In the depression after 1929, the unfavorable  tendencies in the 
operating  results  of  the  previous  twenty  years  were  accentuated. 
Compared with  igio as a base,  operating revenues  dropped more 
rapidly than operating expenses, and the ratio between  these two 
items was at the unsatisfactory high average of  75.1 percent for the 
period from  1930 to 1934.1~ Also  operating income  to operating 
revenues remained at the low average figure of  below 25  percent.16 
The drop in operating revenues cut deeply into total income which 
fell sharply, while fixed charges could not be reduced.'?  As a result 
of the fall in total income and the inflexibility of  fixed charges, the 
Proportion of total income to fixed charges dropped precipitously.ls 
More significant was the collapse in the ratio of  net income to operat- 
ing revenues which disappeared entirely, and the margin of  safety 
of the fixed charges of  the railway system as a whole was wiped out 
in  the  depression.le  Although  the  roads  cut  dividend  payment 
sharply after 1930 even these were not covered by net income,20  and 
were paid out of  surplus.  There was little effort to reduce the debt 238  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
of  the railroads during the depression period, and the ratio of  the 
total debt to total capitalization remained at the high level of  pre- 
vious years.21  The fundamental  mistake  in the railroad field was 
the assumption that a high ratio of  debt to total capitalization could 
be maintained due to the assumed stability of  earnings.  Since earn- 
ings in the railroad field, however, fluctuate directly with business 
activity,  the assumed stability never  actually materialized, and the 
debt proved far too large.  In industry, as shown on page 241, debt 
held to a low level, since the instability of earnings in this field was 
clearly  recognized.  In the railroad  field, early recognition  of  the 
character of  earnings would have avoided eventual difficulties. 
TREND  OF  PUBLIC UTILITY  FINANCE 
Public utilities, as the term is used in limited investment termin- 
ology, include electric  light  and power,  traction, gas,  water,  tele- 
phone and telegraph companes.  Consideration will be given only 
to the electric light and power and the traction utilities.  There is 
herewith  given  an abbreviated form of  the consolidated financial 
statement of electric light and power companies from 1912 to 1931. 
Table 22 shows clearly the trend of  the capitalization of  electric 
light and power companies, but the items and ratios deserve careful 
study.  The items themselves show that funded debt, total capital- 
ization  and  propertyZ3 all  experienced  considerable  increases  in 
amount from I g  12 to 193  1, and these increases would normally indi- 
cate debt, capital and property inflation.  However, the actual trends 
are seen when these increases are compared to the fundamental item 
of earning power as expressed by total income.  Thus, from 1912 to 
193  1 the funded debt increased to 535.05 percent, total capitalization 
increased  to 602.28  percent  and property  increased  to 585.99 per- 
cent.  Nevertheless over the same period, total income increased t~ 
658.18 percent, or more than any of  the previous items.  Thus the 
increase  in funded  debt, total  capitalization  and property,  while 
superficially showing corporate inflation, did not actually constitute 
inflation because the increase  in these items was  based on a more 
than corresponding rise in earning power.  A further indication of 
the absence of  corporate inflation is seen in the fact that the total 
income  covered  interest  requirements  satisfactorily and even  pro- 
vided increasing protection in the period under review.=  Further- 
more,  the satisfactory trend of  electric light and power  finance is 
seen in the reduction of  the proportion of the funded debt to total 
capitalization and the increase in the extent to which property pro- 
tected the funded dekP5  The only indication of  overcapitalization 
is evidenced in the trend of  total income to total capitalization which 
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TABLE  22 
ELECTRIC  LIGHT  AND POWER  FINANCE,  191  2-1931  .22 
Explanation:  '"  Technically known in utility finance as "  net earnings prior to fixed charges." 
'b'  Technically known in utility finance as "  plant investment." 
rose from 5.7 1 percent in 1912 to 8.47  percent in 1922 and then fell 
to 7.03 percent in 1929 and to 6.24 percent in 1931.'' 
In sharp contrast to the financial trends of  the electric light and 
power companies are those of  the electric railway companies as seen 
in Table 23. 
The  table shows that the funded debt, the total capitalization and 
the  property  of  the  traction  companies  were  reduced  in  dollar 
amounts from 1922 to 1931.  These reductions might on the surface 
reflect trends toward debt, capitalization and property deflation.  Ac- 
tually  in  these  respects  there was  resultant  inflation  for  the total 
income  declined  much  more rapidly.  The further unsatisfactory 
trend in traction finance is seen in the decline in the coverage of 
interest by total income and in the protection of  the funded debt by 
property.28  This trend is demonstrated by  the decline in the ratio 
of total income to interest which dropped from  164.76 percent  in 














































ITEMS (MILLION  DOLLARS) 
I.  Total income (a). .......... 
2.  Interest.. ................ 
............  3.  Funded debt.. 
......  4.  Total capitalization.. 
..............  5.  Property (b). 
(PERCENT,  1912  =  100) 
............  I.  Total income.. 
................  2.  Interest.. 
............  3.  Funded debt.. 
......  4.  Total capitalization.. 
................  5.  Property. 
RATIOS  (PERCENT) 
A.  Total  income  to  interest 
.................  (I  '2). 
B.  Funded debt to to:al  capital- 
..........  ization (3s4). 
C.  Property  to  funded  debt 
(5'3).  ................. 
D.  Total  income  to total capi- 
.......  talization (1+4).. 
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funded debt fell from 252.16 to 165.32.~~  There is also evidence of 
a trend toward overcapitalization in the proportion of  total income 
to total capitalization which dropped from 4.80 percent in 1912 to 
3.07  percent in 1931.31 
ITEMS  (MILLION  DOLLARS) 
.............  I.  Total income. 
2.  Interest.. ................ 
............  3.  Funded debt.. 
......  4.  Total capitalization.. 
...............  5.  Property.. 
(PERCENT,  1912  =  100) 
............  I.  Total income.. 
................  2.  Interest.. 
............  3.  Funded debt.. 
......  4.  Total capitalization.. 
...............  5.  Property.. 
RATIOS  (PERCENT) 
A.  Total  income  to  interest 
.................  (I  +I). 
B,  Funded debt to total capital- 
..........  ization  (3'4). 
C.  Property  to  funded  debt 
(5+3) ................. 
D.  Total Income to total capi- 
........  talization (1f4). 
INDUSTRIAL FINANCE -  CAPITALIZATION OF MANUFACTURING 
CORPORATIONS 
In the field of applied finance, industrial securities include those 
of corporations engaged in extractive operations as coal and oil pro- 
duction ;  transportation operations as steamship companies and car- 
riers other than steam and electric railroads ;  manufacturing opera- 
tions as automobile and textile making and trading corporations as 
chain and department stores. 
The two  most  important  groups  are  the  manufacturing  and 
trading corporations  and their financial  position  will  be  studied. 
The financial trends of  manufacturing corporations in the post-war 
period are presented in Table 24. 
1912 
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TABLE  24 
















Table 24  shows  that the fixed  charges of  manufacturing  cor- 
porations were well covered except  in 1g31.3s  The proportion  of 
the funded debt to total capitalization was at a very low figure, and 
so was sati~factory.~~  Property covered  the funded debt at a very 
high level even though it declined somewhat over the period.35  The 
total income to total capitalization was high at 9.26 percent in 1924 
and 9.96 percent  in 1929, but fell  sharply in the depression years 
due to the drop in earnings.36 Considering these figures as a whole 
the capital structure of  manufacturing companies was sound. 
CAPITALIZATION OF TRADING COMPANIES 
- 
ITEMS  (MILLION  DOLLARS) 
............  Total income.. 
...........  2.  Fixed charges.. 
3.  Funded debt.. ............ 
4.  Total capitalization.. ...... 
5.  Net property.. ............ 
RATIOS  (PERCENT) 
A.  Total income to fixed charges 
(1t2)  .................. 
B.  Funded  debt to total capi- 
........  talization (3 t  4). 
C.  Net property to funded debt 
(5'3).  ................. 
D.  Total income to total capi- 
















The financial trend of trading companies is presented in Table 
25.  The  capital structure of  trading corporations was less satisfactory 
than that of the manufacturing companies.  While the fixed charges 
of the trading corporations were well covered in 1924 and igng,a8 
there was a deficit in 193  1.38  Fortunately the ratio of  funded debt to 
total capitalization was low, although the level rose somewhat in the 
depression year~.~"roperty  covered the funded debt at a high level 















































In presenting the trend in railroad and in utility finance consid- 
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TABLE  25 
TRADING  FINANCE,  1924-1 933." 
relation to earning power.  In industrial finance, consideration must 
be given  not only to the problem of  the relation of  capitalization 
to earnings but also that of the maturity of  debt.  The debt of  a 
corporation may  be  either unfunded  or funded  depending upon 
whether  it matures before  or after the period  of  one year.  Un- 
funded debt consists largely of  bank loans and of  bonds which have 
been issued in past years but which have less than a year to their 
date of payment.  The  railroads and the public utilities, since their 
operations are largely  non-seasonal and are on a  cash  basis,  have 
little need of  obtaining loans from commercial banks.  On the other 
hand, the operations of  industrial corporations generally are seasonal 
in nature and to a large extent are conducted by granting credit to 
their castomers.  Thus industrial corporations have in the past been 
large users of  bank credit. 
However, an important tendency in the post-war period was the 
decline in the volume of  such bank credit used  by  industrial con- 
cerns.  This significant trend was due largely to changes in the busi- 
ness organization and in the management policies of  industrial con- 
cerns.  The corporate form of organization completely dominated 
the railroad and the public utility fields almost from the very start 
due to the need of  capital in so large an amount that it could not 
be raised by individuals but had to be obtained from the investing 
public through the sale of  securities.  On the other hand until the 
end of  the nineteenth century the industrial field continued to be 
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ITEMS  (MILLION  DOLLARS) 
I.  Total income.. . .  .  . .  . .  . .  .  .  . 
2.  Fixed charges.. . .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  . 
3.  Funded debt.. .  . .  . .  .  . .  . .  .  . 
4.  Total capitalization.. . .  . .  . . 
5.  Net property.. .  . .  . . .  . .  . .  .  . 
RATIOS  (IN  PERCENT) 
A.  Total income to fixed charges 
(1'2)  .................. 
B.  Funded  debt to total  capi- 
talization (3+4).. . .  .  . .  . . 
C.  Net property to funded debt 
(5 +3). .  . . . .  .  .  .  - . .  .  .  .  . .  . 
D.  Total income to total capi- 
talization (I  '4).  .  .  .  .  .  . .  . 
organized in the form of the individual ownership, the partnership 
and to some extent the small-scale corporation.  Thus individual 
capitalism continued as a factor in the field of  industry long after 
security  capitalism  had  dominated  the  other  fields  of  business 





















However, after the turn of  the century large-scale corporations 
began to attain domination in the industrial field.  In 1904 all cor- 
porations, both large and small, accounted  for 73.7  percent  of the 
volume of the products of manufacture ; in 1914 this figure rose to 
83.2 percent and by  1929 it was 92.1 percent.42 Moreover, the larger 
corporations shared to a greater extent than the smaller corporations 
in the expansion of the post-war period.  In 1923 the 1,240 largest 
manufacturing companies received 69.4 percent of  all corporate net 
income, while in 1929 the 1,289 largest corporations accounted for 
75.6 
This growth of  large-scale corporations in industry had a direct 
effect  on the method of  financing in this field, and particularly upon 
the relation between the industrial concern and its bank.  The small 
firm since it could not sell its securities  in the capital market by 
necessity continued to borrow  from its local bank.  On the other 
hand the large corporation, since it was able to sell its securities in 
the capital market, generally utilized  this means  of  financing and 
reduced  its bank  loans.  There was  thus a  definite  tendency  for 
large corporations to replace bank funds with capital funds.  The 
method of  corporation finance changed from a temporary to a more 
permanent form, and the obligations of  corporations were converted 
from short-term bank loans into long-term bonds or even into stock. 
A further factor in reducing the volume of  bank credit employed 
by industrial concerns was the change in their management policies. 
After the financial disturbances of  1920, business firms followed the 
policy of  carrying small inventory and so there was a less demand for 
bank credit.44  For years it had been customary for business  firms 
to carry large inventories of  goods to meet the needs of  their cus- 
tomers.  This policy brought heavy losses in 1920 when prices fell 
sharply, and merchandise depreciated in value.  To  preventma  recur- 
rence  of such events, business  firms followed  a  policy  of  carrying 
small inventories sufficient to meet only current needs.  They were 
aided  in this policy by  the improvement in transportation  which 
made  possible prompt  delivery of  goods when ordered by  dealers 
and retailers, and therefore they had less need of  bank credit.  An- 
other change in managerial policy was the attempt to reduce seasonal 
peaks in industrial production and merchandising by spreading busi- 
ness over the entire year.  With a reduction in seasonal peaks came 
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The large  corporatioils  also made  less  use  of  the commercial 
paper  market."  In consequence  the volume of  commercial paper 
outstanding  in the New  York  market  declined  from  the peak  of 
$i,oig.ooo,ooo in January,  1920, to a low  of $60,10o,ooo in May, 
1933."  By  1936 the market for bankers' acceptances also declined, 
and the American Acceptance Council, which  for  many years had 
sought to propagandize the instrument, was diss~lved.'~ 
This decline in the use of bank credit, by reducing the unfunded 
debt of  the borrowing corporations, had a beneficial effect on their 
financial position as may be seen by contrasting their position in the 
depression of  1920-192  i with that in 1929-1934.  The current debt 
of  large  industrial  corporations  had  risen  from $8,544,000,000  in 
1913 to $i6,75o,ooo,ooo in 1920.~'  When the financial crisis broke 
in 1920, many industrial corporations, notwithstanding their under- 
lying soundness, faced serious financial difficulties due to the large 
volume of  their unfunded debt.  Had the depression been of  longer 
duration many would have been  forced to the wall.  Profiting by 
this  experience  industrial  corporations  generally  followed  a  con- 
scious policy of  reducing their bank debt out of  the proceeds derived 
from the sale of  their securities.  As  a result,  from  1921 to 1932 
the unfunded debt of  a large group of  industrial corporations  fell 
from $1  ~,~oo,ooo,ooo  to $io,8oo,ooo,ooo and funded debt rose from 
$~,~~O,OOO,OOO  to $io,qoo,ooo,ooo.  The ratio of  unfunded debt to 
total  debt dropped from  74  percent  to 51  percent.50  As  a result 
of  this  policy,  most  of  the  large  industrial  corporations  entered 
the crisis of  1929 with  a much sounder capital structure from the 
standpoint of  maturity, and few  were  forced  to reorganize.  It is 
therefore clear that the debt structure of  American industrial cor- 
porations improved considerably  because of  the policy of  financing 
by  the sale of  securities rather than by bank loans.  It would there- 
fore be  financial folly for industrial corporations to return to the 
outmoded system of  bank loans and surrender the more beneficial 
policy of  financing through securities.  Unquestionably  the rapid 
development  of  security capitalism  in the post-war period  greatly 
improved the debt structure of  American industry. 
REAL  ESTATE  FINANCE 
Individual capitalism obtains most of its financial assistance for 
short-term periods from bank loans and for long-term periods from 
mortgage  loans.  Until  recent  years  real  estate  operations  were 
financed by  the single mortgage whereby the funds were advanced 
by one mortgagee to one mortgagor.  Thus this important financial 
activity lay within the field of  individual capitalism and outside of 
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the scope of security capitalism.  However, by  the beginning of  the 
century the erection of large buildings in urban communities began 
to be financed by means of the multiple mortgage held by a number 
of persons who joined in the investment, and their participation was 
evidenced by real estate bonds as instruments of  security capitalism. 
These bonds were  handled  by  financial houses which  were  really 
investment banks  specializing in the flotation of  real  estate securi- 
ties, and generally confining their business to the financing of  large 
urban properties. 
Various methods were used in real estate security finance.  One 
method was for the real estate bank, acting as a dealer in the same 
capacity as an investment bank, to buy an issue of  bonds floated for 
the purpose of  providing funds to erect a building and to sell the 
bonds  to individual investors.  For these bonds the real estate in- 
vestment  bank  assumed  no  legal  obligation, but  since  the bonds 
were sold on the reputation of  the bank, it really gave its implied 
or moral guarantee to the issue.  A second method of  real  estate 
finance was for the bank, acting as guarantor, to assume the liability 
for the mortgage, and thus to become legally the secondary obligor 
of the certificates of  participation in the guaranteed multiple mort- 
gage. 
A third method was  for the real  estate bank,  acting as  an in- 
vestment  trust, to issue its own bonds based  on real  estate as col- 
lateral,  and  so these collateral  mortgage  bonds  became  the direct 
obligations of  the real estate bank.51 
The application of  these methods of  security capitalism brought 
about a complete change in the capitalization of  real estate in gen- 
eral  as may  be seen  in the following  table showing  the trend  of 
urban real estate finance from 1913 to 193  1. 
Table 26 presents the trends in the funded debt, property value 
and rentals of urban real estate.  In 1913 the amount of  the funded 
debt represented only  13.1 percent of  the total value of urban real 
estate.53  By  1921 the amount of  the funded debt had  in~reased,~' 
but likewise had the property value of  urban real estateb5  and the 
ratio between  the two remained roughly  about the same.56  Over 
this period the index of  rentals had increased to 159 percent as com- 
pared with  an increase to  174 percent for the funded debt, and to 
164  percent  for  property value.57 Thus the funded debt was  still 
fairly well  protected  by  both  rental power  as well  as by  property. 
However, by  1929 the amount of  the funded debt rose to over $27,- 
61G,ooo,ooo while the value of urban real estate rose to $73,7oo,ooo,- 
000  and the proportion  of funded debt to property value rose  to 
37.5 percent.58 However by  1929 the index of  rentals had declined 246  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
TABLE  26 
URBAN  REAL  ESTATE  FINANCE,  1  g  13-1 93  1.62 
to 154 per cent while funded debt remained almost the same for the 
next two years and the value of  property dropped.  The ratio of 
funded debt to property value rose to 44.9  percent,68  and the index 
of  rentals declined to 142 percent.60  As a result 60 percent of  the 
outstanding real estate bond issues were in distress." 
HOLDING  COMPANY  FINANCE 
ITEM 
I.  Funded debt.. .  .  .  .  . .  .  . 
2.  Property value.. .  .  .  . .  . 
3,Indexofrentals  ....... 
4.  Index of  funded debt. .  . 
5.  Index of  property value 
6.  Funded  debt  to 
eny value (1 +2)'fPp: 
Expansion  and concentration  of  business  in the United  States 
led to the development of  various forms of  intercorporate relation- 
ships a's the trade association, the trade agreement, the pool, the trust, 
the community of interest, the holding company, the lease of  assets, 
the sale of  assets, the merger and amalgamation.  The trade asso- 
ciations,  the simplest  form  of  intercorporate  relations,  developed 
in the post-war period  in many fields for the purpose  of  perform- 
ing statistical  research,  financial  and legislative  services for mem- 
ber~.~~  Trade agreements also were extensively employed to main- 
tain uniform prices, limit output or restrict the marketing area of 
the parties involved.  In the post-war period pools were revived to 
regulate output, territory, distribution  of  income among the mem- 
bers  and to provide for the common use of  patents.=  The trust 
based on a trust agreement as a device for effecting relations among 
corporations had been generally  outlawed and was not widely em- 
ployed.  The  community of  interest which brought about close rela- 
tions through placing the same directors and the same officers on the 
boards of  the various corporations, despite legal restrictions, in many 
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relations  were attained through the leasing of  properties,  the out- 
right  sale of  these properties  and finally consolidation or the com- 
plete  fusion of  the companies  into a  single  unit  either  through 
merger or amalgamati~n.~' 
However, the most important agency employed  in the post-war 
period for accomplishing close intercorporate relations was the hold- 
ing company.  It was empIoyed in railroad, industrial and banking 
finance, but in the post-war period it was most extensively applied 
in utility finance. 
In the post-war period this instrument of  corporation finance was 
used particularly to bring together electric light operating companies 
all over  the  United  States.  Critics  of  the holding  company fre- 
quently failed to see the possible benefits which  could be derived, 
and at times were derived, from well-managed holding companies. 
The  holding  company  could  make  avaible  to  operating  com- 
panies certain definite financial and technical services.  Holding com- 
panies with efficient administrators could enable operating companies 
to finance their needs at more reasonable interest rates than the latter 
could have obtained from issuing their own securities in local capi- 
tal markets.  Also a holding company with a well-trained staff could 
furnish operating units within its system with valuable technical aid 
in solving  the complicated  engineering construction and manage- 
ment problems which arise in such a rapidly expanding industry as 
electric light and power. 
However, these benefits, actually extended by well-managed hold- 
ing companies,  were  only  too  often offset  by  the unsound  finan- 
cial  and  technical  policies  of  unscrupulous  holding  companies. 
There was  no field in which overcapitalization was carried further 
than in the financing of  public utilities by  holding companies in the 
post-war period.  The holding companies competed with each other, 
and in the mad  scramble for operating properties paid  prices  far 
above true value based on earning power.  These properties were 
then  written  up to  the high  purchase  prices,  and such  overrated 
assets were used as the basis for issuing the securities of  the holding 
companies.B5 In many cases holding companies were dominated by 
super-holding companies, and through the issuance and sale to the 
public of preferred and common shares with non-voting power, con- 
trol  was  retained  by  a  small  block  of  closely  held  voting stock. 
Thus several million dollars of  common stock frequently controlled 
an entire system with  a capitalization  of  several hundred million 
dollars.  The effect of  such pyramiding through holding companies 
may be illustrated by  tracing the relationship of  a single company 
in the Insull system.  The top holding company was  Middle West 
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companies, of  which one was National Electric Power Company.  In 
turn  it controlled  National  Public Service Corporation  which  in 
turn controlled  Seaboard  Public Service, which  in turn controlled 
Georgia Power Company, the only operating company in the entire 
chain  so  far mentioned.  As  a  result, one  dollar  invested  in the 
common stock of  Middle West Utilities Corporation controlled $350 
of Georgia Power common stock and controlled $1,750 of  its a~sets.6~ 
Another way of  illustrating the control over vast operating company 
assets through  a small holding company investment is to compare 
the amount of  the controlled assets with the dominating investment. 
Thus the vast Associated Gas and Electric Company system in 1929 
was  controlled  by  an investment of  only  $298,318.87 Another  un- 
sound practice was the unwise use of  the sound credit of  the operat- 
ing company to support the weakening credit position of  the holding 
company, particularly during the depression years.68 
A  further  unsound  financial  policy  was  the "milking"  of  the 
operating subsidiaries by the transfer of  their accumulated surpluses 
to embarrassed holding companies which temporarily tided over such 
concerns but depleted  the working  capital  of  the operating com- 
panies.  That is in order to maintain the tottering structure of  the 
holding company,  the operating companies were  frequently forced 
to pay  out dividends not covered by  actual earnings but obtained 
from  the  surpluses  accumulated  in  past  years.  As  a  result  the 
financial resources of  these operating companies were often seriously 
weakened. 
The  relation between the holding companies and the investment 
banks which handled their securities was frequently marked by seri- 
ous itregularities."  The promoters  of  the Insull  Utilities Invest- 
ment  Corporation  from  the  time  of  its  organization  followed  an 
over-liberal policy of  distributing free stock to insiders.  For  pur- 
chasing the debentures of  Insull  Utilities, one investment firm re- 
ceived 57,000 shares of  common stock for which it paid nothing.  If 
all the stock of  the Insull Company had been sold in the market at 
prevailing prices from December,  1928, when  it was  organized, to 
August, 1930, the Company would have received $23 1,387,442 while 
actually it realized only $101,845,293.~~  On August 2,  1929, several 
months after the corporation was formed, the stock sold for $149 a 
share, and its shares had a market value of  $302,044,754, which Was 
794 times the amount of the capital actually placed in the Company. 
To  earn even 6 percent on this market value, the Company would 
have  had  to show  a  net  income of  more  than  $18,00o,ooo which 
would have  been  44 percent of  the actually invested capital.  Ac- 
tually the net income of  the Company  for the entire year of  1929 
was only $1,948,265.~~ 
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INVESTMENT  TRUST  FINANCE 
In theory the investment trust was to bring to the American in- 
vestor the advantage of  safety through diversification of  risk and the 
benefit of  expert  knowledge  in  the  selection  of  the  securities  in 
the portfolio of  the trust.  In practice just  the opposite results were 
frequently attained, as illustrated in the case of  one trust which had 
been  formed by  an investment bank.  The  officers of  these two in- 
stitution~  became favorably  impressed in the fall of  1929 with  the 
outlook for the railroads, and together they determined to acquire a 
substantial holding of  railroad stocks.72  This joint  account termi- 
nated on November  9,  1929, and by  that  time  securities costing 
$10,891,578 had been acquired both by the investment trust and by 
the  banking  house.  On  November  11,  1929, two  days after  the 
of  the joint  trading account, the investment trust pur- 
chased from the investment  bank,  13,700 shares of  Chicago, Rock 
Island and Pacific Railway common stock at $1 14.25 for $1,565,225 
and  16,050 shares  of  St.  Louis  and San  Francisco  Railway  com- 
mon stock at $1 11.25 for a total of  $1,793,587.73 On December  31, 
1932, the investment trust had in its portfolio 45,000 shares of  Chi- 
cago, Rock  Island and Pacific  Railway  common stock at a cost  of 
$5,566,366 and St.  Louis and San  Francisco common  at a cost  of 
$5,820,883.~' The average price paid by  the investment  trust  for 
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific was $138.36 and the average price 
paid  for  St.  Louis  and  San  Francisco  was  $130.39.  These roads 
eventually went into default.75  These two holdings represented al- 
most  twenty  percent  of  the entire capital of  the investment  trust, 
and so violated  the principle of  diver~ification.~~  In the post-war 
period investment trusts were too often used as a convenient dump- 
ing ground by investment banking houses for securities which could 
not be marketedaT7  The loading charges imposed for organizing an 
investment  trust  frequently  were  very  high.  During the  Senate 
hearings,  in reply  to a criticism of  the excessive profits to organ- 
izers, one banker testified, "We could have  taken  loo percent, we 
could have taken all of  the profit.  We could have bought all of  the 
common  stock for five  million  dollars" ; to which  one of  the in- 
vestigating senators replied, "Do you remember that Lord Clive said 
'Ivhen I consider my opportunities, I marvel at my moderation.' "  78 
In general  the  financial operations of  investment  trusts  were 
unsatisfactory.  Even after the sharp break in the security markets in 
tile fall of  1929, the net assets of the leading investment trusts showed 
a further decline of over 62  percent in the years from  1930 to  1932 
inclusive, and despite the rise after 1932 their assets for the entire 
period from 1930 to 1936 showed a net decline of  over 23 percent.7s 250  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has now reviewed the trend of  corporate security 
investment in the post-war period in the field of  railroad, utility, in- 
dustrial, real estate, holding company and investment trust finance 
and particular attention was given to the problem of overcapitali- 
zation.  In the railroad field there was no trend toward  overcapi- 
talization,  although  the  general  financial  position  of  the  roads 
became less satisfactory particularly in the depression.  In the case 
of  the public utility operating companies,  little evidence of  over- 
capitalization was found in the field of  the electric light and power 
companies, but it was noted that the traction field, due to declining 
earnings, was overcapitalized.  The  application of security capitalism 
to industrial  finance had satisfactory results,  since this field had a 
sound capitalization and a satisfactory debt structure.  However, the 
intrusion of  security capitalism into real estate finance was disastrous. 
Furthermore while  utility operation  itself  was  sound, the applica- 
tion of the holding company to utility finance led to serious over- 
capitalization.  The financial operations of  investment  trusts were 
generally unsound. 
CHAPTER  16 
GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT 
THIS  chapter continues the examination of  the trends of  security 
investment in the post-war period, and presents a qualitative analysis 
of the tendencies in federal, state, municipal and foreign  govern- 
ment financing in the American security market.l  In analyzing the 
trend  of governmental finance, this study  will  group the various 
governments on the principle of legal classification into sovereign 
governments, including, the true sovereign government as the United 
States, the quasi-sovereign government as the state governments and 
the non-sovereign bodies or municipalities, including primarily cities 
and other local governments, such as counties, towns, villages and 
tax distri~ts.~ 
FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT  FINANCE 
In 1916, the year before the entrance of  the United States into 
the World War, the financial  position  of  the federal government 
was e~cellent.~  The budget was balanced and expenditures for debt 
service amounted to only $2z,goo,000.~ This small sum was the re- 
sult of  the almost continuous  policy  of  debt contraction followed 
after the Civil War, so that the gross debt was only $i,znrj,ooo,ooo in 
1916.  To offset even this small gross debt the federal government 
had  accumulated sinking funds of  $i,o52,ooo,ooo so  that  the net 
debt of  the Federal Government was only  1  73,000,000.6  Meantime 
the tax base of the United States as expressed  in national  wealth 
had risen to over $25  1  ,ooo,ooo,ooo.O As a result of  these trends, the 
expenditure for debt service amounted to only 3.1 percent of  total 
expenditures, and national wealth covered the total debt of  the fed- 
eral government over  1454 times.l  These figures show clearly the 
satisfactory condition of  the finances of  the federal government until 
the coming of  the War.  The United States, with a minimum na- 
tional  debt  1%  1916,  had  approached  the  millennium  of  public 
finance. 
Then came the stage of  debt expansion which covered the period 
from  1917  to  igig inclusive.  The deficit  in the budget  in  1918 
amounted to over $g,ooo,ooo,ooo and in  1919 to over $13,ooo,ooo,- 
000.'  The gross debt reached  a  record  figure for those  years  of 
over  $~~,ooo,ooo,ooo  which,  by  deducting  the sinking fund accu- 
mulated in past years, was reduced to a net debt of about $24,000,- 
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ooo,o~o.~  By  1920 national wealth covered the total debt 20 times. 
Thus in the short period of three years the financial position of the 
federal government was changed from soundness to uncertainty from 
which it never fully recovered.1° 
In the period  from  1919 to  1930, the Republican  administra- 
tion made strenuous efforts to correct this unsatisfactory condition. 
Expenditures were reduced from $ 18,5~3,00o,ooo  in 1919 to $3,795,- 
ooo,ooo in  1922 and were  held  well  below  the four billion mark 
until  1931."  Revenues were maintained about up to four billion, 
and as a result  there was  a continuous surplus over these  years.12 
The  large debt of the federal government required a heavy payment 
of interest  which  rose  to over a  billion  dollars  in  1923.  At the 
same time the administration undertook a drastic reduction of the 
debt as reflected in the large item of  public debt retirements which 
ranged from $422,30o,ooo, in 192 1 to $554,ooo,ooo in 1930.13  Con- 
sequently the expenditures for debt service rose to $1,45g,ooo,ooo 
in 1923 and remained at a high level throughout the period.  This 
item  constituted  about  one-third of  the total  expenditures.14  As 
a result of  this large allowance  for debt retirement, the net debt 
was  reduced  from  $24,298,000,000 in  1920 to $15,7g7,ooo,ooo in 
1930.  Most of  this reduction was in the unfunded debt which was 
cut from $8,5~i,ooo,ooo  in  igig to $3,8cj4,ooo,ooo in 1g31.15  This 
decline in the unfunded debt was reflected in the drop in the pro- 
portion  of  unfunded debt to gross debt from  34  percent  in 1920 
to 23 percent in 193  I.'~  By  1930 the national wealth again covered 
the total debt 20 times?? 
In the period from  1930 to  1936 the financial position  of  the 
federal government fell back into the uncertain position which had 
prevailed  at the close of the War.  Since these unfavorable  trends 
began in 1930 under the Hoover administration and were continued 
under the Roosevelt administration, the period must be considered as 
a unit regardless of the political  change which  occurred  in  1933. 
Revenues declined sharply  from  1930 to 1933, while expenditures 
increased and the deficit rose from $go~,ooo,ooo  in 1931 to $3,9899- 
ooo,ooo in 1934, after which year  the deficit was reduced through 
an increase in revenues?*  Expenditure for debt service increased* 
but not in the same proportion as in the rise in the debt, due to the 
abnormally low rates prevailing in the money market.  During the 
Hoover administration gross debt increased from $16,185,000,000 in 
1930 to f2o,g35,0oo,ooo by  March I, 1933 and during the ~oosevelt 
administration the gross debt reached $g3,545,000,00o in  1936. 
The increase occurred particularly  in the unfunded debt which 
rose from $4,673,ooo,ooo in 1930 to $15,876,000~0~0  in 1935-1B The 
ratio of  unfunded to gross debt rose from 28.9 percent  in 1930 to 
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55.3 percent in 1935.~~  In addition, the federal government assumed 
the obligations of  a group of  quasi-public corporations, as the Re- 
construction Finance Corporation, the Federal Land Banks, and the 
Home Owners Loan Corporation.  This indirect debt added another 
$4,  I 5  1  ,ooo,ooo to the federal debt.z1  Quasi-government obligations, 
although  extensively  used  by  continental  countries as  well  as  by 
Great Britain, were practically unknown in the United States until 
the post-war period.  For a time because of  the unfamiliarity of  these 
obligations, there was  a wide  differential  between  their yield  and 
that on the direct obligations of  the national  government.  How- 
ever, Congress by  successive legislation  placed both  the direct and 
the guaranteed obligations on the same basis in almost every respect. 
Guaranteed obligations were made eligible as collateral for advances 
from  Federal  Reserve  banks, legal  as  security for trust  funds and 
exempt  as  to  both  principal  and interest  from federal,  state and 
local  taxation  except  sur-tax, estate,  inheritance  and  gift  taxes. 
The greater part of  the assets of  these public corporations will prob- 
ably prove to be sound, and so it is unlikely that the federal govern- 
ment will be called upon act.ually to assume much of  this indirect 
debt.  Thus these  obligations  are contingent  rather  than  actual. 
Due to the more  rapid increase  in total  expenditures than  in 
debt service, the proportion  of  the latter to the former declined.22 
The coverage of  national wealth  to  total  debt declined  from  20 
times in 1930, to g times in 19.35.~~  By  1936 the net federal debt 
increased to $33,~75,ooo,ooo  as a result  of  the cumulative force of 
both war and depression finance.  It is essential to realize that, while 
the original  Liberty  loans  were  gradually  retired  through  repay- 
ment and through refunding, only about one-third of  these war loans 
were completely retired.  The remainder was merely transformed as 
to maturity.  Therefore $i~,872,ooo,ooo  or about 47  percent of  the 
direct debt of  the federal government even in 1936 was attributable 
not to the depression but to war finance.  The trend of  the federal 
finances, weakened  as  a  result  of  the  War,  showed  further mal- 
adjustment because of  the cumulative force of  the depression. 
STATE  GOVERNMENT FINANCE 
The trend of  state government finance is indicated in Table 27. 
From this table it is seen that revenues and total expendituresz5  of 
State governments increased rapidly over these years, but generally 
remained nearly balanced.  The proportion of  the interest on debt 
to total expenditures remained at a low figure,28  never going higher 
than 4.8 percent for 1926.  It is thus clear that the budgetary policies 
of state governments as a whole were satisfactory. GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT  255  354  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
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Likewise,  the state  debt structure was  generally  sound.  The 
proportion of  unfunded debt to gross debt which rose to the level 
of  19.7 percent in 192 1, was  held to below  lo percent by  1930.~' 
Also the proportion of  deductions in the form of  sinking fund assets 
to the gross debt was  high from  17.9 percent in 1922 to 20.3 per- 
cent in 1926.~~  This figure indicates that about one-fifth of  the debt 
of the state governments was covered by  assets and could actually 
be reduced by that amount.  The  net debt of  the state governments 
was well covered by the debt base in the form of  the taxable prop- 
erty.28  It should however, be noted that the ratio of  this coverage 
declined  from  178 times  in  1915 to 69 times in 1932, due to the 
more rapid increase of  net debt as compared with the debt base.30 
Also the net debt rose faster than the increase in population and so 
the per capita net  debt moved  from  $4.31  in  1915 to $19.07  in 
1932.~' Thus the budgetary position and the debt structure of  state 
governments  showed  satisfactory  trends  in the  war  and  post-war 
MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  FINANCE 
The trend of  municipal government finance may be traced  in 
Table 28. 
In contrast to state government finance the trends in city govern- 
ment finance  were unsati~factory.~~  Revenues were  generally  ex- 
ceeded by total expendituresa5  and so over the period there were al- 
most continual deficits.36  This  unsatisfactory budget situation is also 
shown by  the low ratio of  revenues to total expendituresa7 which 
was continually below  loo percent,  except  in  1933, due to drastic 
reductions in expenditures.  The proportion of  interest on debt to 
total  expendituresa8 was  high, and averaged  about  lo percent  as 
compared with an average of  about 4 percent for the state govern- 
ments.  The budgetary position of the cities became critical in the 
depression when they were confronted by the added problem of  tax 
delinquencies.  Cities could order tax levies, but it was another mat- 
ter actually to collect them.  Many taxpayers did not pay their bills, 
and there was thus a sharp rise in tax delinquencies.  The percent- 
age of such delinquencies of  total tax levies rose from lo percent in 
1930 to a high of 26 percent in 1933 and then fell to 18 percent in 
1935.5'  The debt structure of  the cities also showed unsound ten- 
dencies.  The proportion  of  the unfunded debt to the gross debt 
was generally high, and rose from 5.9 percent in 1927 to 12.3 percent 
in 1933.  A number of  cities followed the imprudent policy of  in- 
creasing  their  unfunded debt by  issuing  short-term  notes  in the 
anticipation  that these  would be replaced  at maturity with  long- 
tenn  bonds.  However,  unsatisfactory  conditions  in the  money FINANCE  CAPITALISM  GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT  257 
market during the depression made it frequently impossible to carry 
out such refunding operations, and a number of  cities faced serious 
financial  cmbarrassrnent.  The net  debt per  capita  rose  sharply 
from $75.56 in 1915 to $169.70 in 1933.~~  The unsound  position 
of city debt is also seen in the fact that the coverage of  the net debt 
by  the debt  base  dropped  from  11  times  in  1922  to  8  times  in 
1933."  In the depression  period in the case of  certain cities there 
was a particularly sharp decline in assessed valuati~n.~~ 
In this study consideration  has been given only to the debt of 
cities.  The same unsatisfactory  trend of  debt expansion  occurred 
in the case of  all classes of  municipalities, including counties, towns, 
villages and school districts.  The net debt of  all municipalities rose 
from $3,476,ooo,ooo in 1912 to $15,2 16,000,000 in 1932.'~ 
These unsound  trends  in municipal  finance  inevitably  led  to 
widespread  defaults.  Even  before  the coming  of  the  depression, 
there were two important series of  defaults, for in 1926 and 1927 in 
the State of  Washington 55 municipalities were forced into arrears 
on special  assessment bonds  which  they  had  issued  for street  and 
road   improvement^.^^  The year  1927 marked  the default on the 
bonds  of  a  number of  Florida municipalities which  had  over-ex- 
tended their debt in relation to a debt base contracted by  the col- 
lapse of  real estate values.  These two sets of  defaults were merely 
the preliminaries of  the more serious impairment of  municipal credit 
which occurred in the depression years.  By  1934 municipal defaults 
amounted to $~,ooo,ooo,ooo  out of  a gross municipal bonded debt of 
$i8,~oo1000,000  45  and involved 2,000 out of  a total of  175,000 local 
governments.  In addition to these actual defaults, there were numer- 
ous cases of  municipal insolvency since local governments all over the 
United States frequently committed technical defaults in using sink- 
ing funds to meet current expenses or in failing to turn over funds 
which were due to other go~ernrnents."~  However, unlike previous 
municipal defaults, there were few cases of  outright repudiation, and 
most  of  the cities made commendable  efforts to rehabilitate  their 
financial position.  After 1934 there was an improvement in munic- 
ipal  finance for  the recovery  in general  business  and the partial 
restoration of  former real estate values enabled municipalities again 
to collect  taxes.  Also  the cities  generally  made  serious efforts to 
balance  their budgets  and to bring about a better adjustment be- 
tween expenditures and revenues.  The improvement in the capital 
market also enabled many cities to meet their maturing obligations 
and to convert their short-term notes  into long-term issues at low 
rates of  interest.  These low rates, however, were the expression of  an 
artificial money market and not the reflection of  an actual improve- 
ment  in municipal  credit.  In fact,  American  municipalities had 
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not learned the lesson of  the post-war and the depression years, for 
many cities again plunged into a new period of  debt expansion and 
continued the same unsound tendencies which led to the difficulties 
after 1929. AS  a result, the way has been prepared for an even greater 
collapse  of  municipal debt in the coming years.  Considering all 
these facts it is clear that the municipalities constituted one of the 
weakest elements in the debt structure of  the United States. 
TREND  IN  FOREIGN  FINANCE 
As noted in Chapter 1 1 the United States had invested in foreign 
securities as early as the last quarter of  the nineteenth century, and 
by the beginning of  the twentieth  century it had purchased a con- 
siderable  volume.  During  the  Great  War  the American  capital 
market absorbed  a large volume  of  European  government  bonds, 
and in the decade of the twenties the volume of foreign investment 
was heavy.  In various fields these investments did not bring losses. 
Canadian investments, outside of certain local issues, brought good 
returns, and, with  the exception of  China, the investments in the 
Far East as Japan and in Australia proved satisfactory.  In general 
our  security  investments  in the  Scandinavian  countries  likewise 
proved safe, and those in France, Belgium and even Italy gave the 
holders a good return.  On the other hand the security investments 
in Central and Eastern Europe and South America brought heavy 
losses to American holders.  Since the financial position of  the lead- 
ing  European  countries were  studied  in  Chapters  8  and g,  con- 
sideration will  be given  only to the quality of  the investment  in 
South America.  The quality of  such  investments may  be judged 
from Table 29 which presents the financial position of  leading South 
American countries for the period from 1920 to iggo when most of 
our investments were made. 
In general Argentina was the soundest of all the South American 
governments  which  borrowed  in the  American  security  market- 
However, there were several flaws in the financial position of even 
this country.  Total expenditures  48 increased faster than revenues:' 
showing a chronic deficit in the budget.  The  proportion of  expendi- 
tures for debt service to total expenditures was  large.'O  A further 
weakness was the large unfunded debt to total debt."  Although the 
government reduced the proportion  from  36.8  percent  in 1920 to 
27.8  percent  in  1930, the unfunded  debt was  still  excessive and 
caused embarrassment in the depression when a considerable pa"  of 
this debt matured.  However a fairly diversified economy and the 
large  white population  enabled Argentina  to bear  the heavy  per 
capita debt. 
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(changes in iggo in percent as compared with 1920 
as  base = loo). 
I  I  COUNTRY  1 
STEMS  I  I  I  I  I 













Bolivia  had the poorest  credit of  any South American  govern- 
ment.  The budgetary  situation, unsatisfactory  from the start, be- 
came worse as total expenditures"  rose faster than  revenue^.'^  Be- 
cause of  the increase in the debt, the expenditures for debt service 
absorbed over 38 percent of  total expenditures by  1930."  Over the 
Same period  the total debt  65  more than doubled to 212.9  percent, 
while national  wealthM rose  only to  120 percent.  The debt per 
capita rose  to $62.86  which  was  a serious load  for an almost im- 
Proverished population. 
Brazil  had  an uncertain  financial history  as a  borrower  even 
before it entered the New York security market.  However, in the 
Post-war period Brazil increased  its debt service to 270.2  percent =' 
as  against  an increase in  revenues  to only  198.3 percent.58  Debt 
Service,  which  had  been  responsible  for  18.4  percent  of  total  ex- 
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penditures in 1920, accounted for 25.8 percent in 1930.~~  A further 
unsound tendency was  the growth  of  the unfunded debt to 476.0 
percent,60  causing the proportion of  the unfunded debt to total debt 
to rise from 7.8  percent to ~g.1  percent.&= The per capita debt in 
1930  reached  the  high  figure  of  $~39.44.~~  These  unfavorable 
tendencies were already apparent by 1926 and at that time the finan- 
cial position  of  Brazil was doubtf~l.~~ 
Chile  for  many  years,  had  an excellent  record  in  meeting  its 
obligations.  However, in the decade from 1920 to 1930 it expanded 
its total  debt to 341  percent,&' while national  wealth  rose only to 
i 15.4 percent.es  The per capita debt reached the abnormally large 
figure of  $1,040.70 by 1930 and default soon followed.66 
The statistics on the national government of  Colombia do not 
indicate the true financial position of  the country, due to the heavy 
financing undertaken by  the provinces and cities.  While the posi- 
tion of  the national government was fairly satisfactory, the local gov- 
ernments borrowed without reason and so impaired the entire struc- 
ture of  Colombian credit. 
Peru represented a flagrant case of  overborrowing.  While reve- 
nues increased only to 176 percent,"  expenditures for debt service 
rose to 430.5  and by  1930 accounted for 23.7  percent of 
all  expenditure^.^^ 
In general South American financing, undertaken mainly in the 
New York capital market  in the nineteen-twenties, resulted in un- 
sound debt expansion.  Interest charges on these debts were so heavy 
that in most cases they could not possibly be met from revenues and 
were maintained for a time only by new loans from abroad.  When 
the  flow  of  new  capital ceased default  on the old loans was  in- 
evitable. 
CHAPTER  17 
SECURITY  POLICIES 
THE  two previous chapters undertook a qualitative analysis of the 
trends of  the demand for capital by  corporations and governments 
in the post-war period.  This chapter presents  a  qualitative study 
of  the trends of the supply of capital in the post-war years as ex- 
pressed in the security policies of  investors.  Consideration will be 
first given to the distribution of the various types of  securities among 
the several classes of investors, to their investment policies and finally 
to whether these policies were  successful in maintaining the prin- 
cipal of  these investments. 
DISTRIBUTION  ACCORDING  TO SECURITIES 
The distribution of  securities among investors may  be studied 
according to the securities and according to the investors.  Accord- 
ing to securities, the distribution may be analyzed first by the various 
classes of  securities, as those of  the railway and public utility corpora- 
tions or the federal and local governments, and by  the form of  se- 
curities as stocks or bonds.  Statistics  on the distribution of  the 
classes of  stocks are not available but data on the distribution of  the 
classes of  bonds are obtainable.  Table 30  shows the distribution of 
the holdings of the funded debt of  various classes of  issuers as of 
1932. 
From this table it is seen that the banks held about one-half of 
the federal  debt  in  1932.  Large  holders of  state,  city  and local 
governmental bonds were  the banks which  naturally grant liberal 
advances LO their own local governments.  Individuals with net in- 
come above $5,000 also were large holders of local government bonds 
because  of  their  tax-exempt  features.  Life insurance  companies 
owned the largest proportion of  railway bonds, banks came next in 
importance,  and a  considerable  portion  of  the railroad  debt  was 
held in trust funds.  Trust funds accounted for the largest propor- 
tion of utility bond holdings, while banks and insurance companies 
held  almost  the  same  amount.  The proportion  of  the total  of 
utility bonds held by  the banks and life insurance companies was 
much  smaller than the proportion  of  the total  of  railroad  bonds 
held  by  these institutions.  In the case of  each class of  bonds, the 
issuers themselves possessed a portion of their own obligations.  The 
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agencies. 
'C)  State, local government and public trust funds. 
(d)  Railways other than issuing companies.  '" Public utilities other than issuing companies. 
0  Public welfare foundations and educational institutions. 
TABLE  30 
DISTRXBU~ON  OF HOLDINGS  OF FUNDED  DEBT  IN THE UNITED  STATES,  1932.1 
(percent) 
(g) lncludes investments of states and municipalities. 
I'f'  Individual trust accounts.  '"  Figure for 193 
(9 Legal ~eservetife  Insurance Companies holding 91  percent of -ta  of dl  1-d 
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federal government invested a large part of  its surplus funds in its 
own obligations, the state, city and local governments, particularly, 
purchased  a large volume of  their  own bonds  especially for their 
sinking funds, and the railroads held a considerable volume of the 
securities of  other roads, while utilities had only a small proportion 
of  their funds in utility bonds. 
The changes in the distribution of  security holdings from year 
to year may be traced in the case of the bonds of  the federal govern- 
ment, and these changes indicated in Table 31 show the distribution 
in the holdings of  the United States government bonds from  1917 
Explanation: 
As of June 3o,rg3q. 
(a)  Funds adm~nistered  by the Treasury and held by governmental corporations and credit 
7.  6'd) 
19.6 
23.3 




to 1934 in percent of  the total. 
This table groups the holders of  United States Government " 








5.  I  ........ 
........ 
I 4.4 
40.  g 
100.  oo 
HOLDERS 
.............  Issuers themselves. 
Mutual  savings,  national  and 
other banks. ................ 
.....  Life insurance companies'l). 
Other insurance companies. ..... 
....  Philanthropic inst~tutions(~). 
..*................  Trust funds. 
Individuals  with  net  income 
...............  $5000 or over. 
..............  Unaccounted for. 
..................  Total. 
banks and "others"  or non-banking  holders  which  include  indi- 
viduals,  corporations,  and non-banking  investment  institutions  as 
life insurance companies.  From these figures it is seen that the dis- 
tribution  of  the  holdings  of  the  federal  debt  from  1917 passed 
through three successive stages, namely from 1917 to 1920, 1920 to 
1930 and from  1930 to 1935.  During the first stage, the debt was 
FED- 
ERAL(") 
5.  68'b) 
48.83 
4.07 
I.  70 
.34 
.85(g1 
6.85  'i' 
31  .68 
100.  oo 
TABLE  31 
DISTRIBUTION  OF  HOLDINGS  OF  UNITED  STATES  GOVERNMENT  BONDS, 
1917-1934. 
(percent of  total) 
Explanation:  '" Includes national banks,  state banks, loan and trust companies, stock savings, mutual 
savings, private banks in the United States and possessions. 
'b) Obtained by deducting holdings of Federal Reserve banks and of banks from the total. 
YEAR 
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held mainly  by  non-banking investors.  During the War the fed- 
eral government distributed its issues as widely  as possible.  The 
first loan had 4,000,000 subscribers but by the fourth the number 
of subscribers had increased  to z~.~oo,ooo.~  As  a result,  in igzo 
almost  85 percent of  the federal debt was held by  investors other 
than the banks and the Federal Reserve banks. 
The second stage in the distribution of  the federal debt came 
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declined from 1920 to 1929, there was relatively little change in the 
holdings by the Federal Reserve banks, while non-banking investors 
reduced and banking institutions increased their holdings. 
The third stage in the distribution of  United States Government 
bonds in the post-war period came after 1930.  While there was an 
increase in the dollar amount of holdings by  non-banking investors, 
the percentage held by  this group dropped after  1930, the amount 
held by the Federal Reserve banks and particularly by banking insti- 
tutions rose sharply.  In other words, the enormous increase in the 
federal debt after 1930 was largely absorbed by the banking institu- 
tions of  the country.* 
SECURITY  DISTRIBUTION  ACCORDING  TO  FORM 
The distribution of  securities may be viewed not only from the 
standpoint of  the various classes of  issuers but also from the stand- 
point  of  the form of  securities,  as stocks or  bonds.  The direct 
investment by individuals in stocks developed rapidly after the be- 
ginning of  the century.  It was estimated that the number of  book 
stockholders in the United States increased from 8,600,000 in 1917 
to iz,ooo,ooo in 1920 and to iH,ooo,ooo in 1928.~  These figures con- 
tain a margin of error, for the same individual may appear a number 
of  times as a stockholder in different companies.  Joseph S. McCoy, 
actuary in the United States Treasury Department, made an esti- 
mate based on income tax returns in 1924 that only 2,358,000 sepa- 
rate individuals owned  st0cks.O  Another estimate placed the num- 
ber of  actual stockholders at the higher figures of  from 5,000,000 to 
6,000,ooo in 1927 and from g,ooo,ooo to 1 i,ooo,ooo in  1930.~ 
These direct holdings of stocks were widely diffused among the 
American  people and were owned not only by  persons with  large 
incomes  but  also  by  those  with  moderate  incomes.  Warshaw 
claimed that persons with incomes under $~o,ooo  in 1921 were re- 
ceiving  53.2  percent  of  dividends paid  by  corporations.'  McCoy 
estimated  that persons with  incomes of  less  than f 12,900 in  1924 
owned 50 percent of  all the corporate sto~k.~  Although there is thus 
a difference in maximum income figures, it would seem from both 
studies  that  the  middle  class  in  economic  society  in  the  ~eriod 
preceding  the  depression  possessed  about  one-half  o~~nership  in 
American corporations, and this movement constituted an important 
change in the history of  property ownership.  The trend toward the 
diffusion of security ownership continued in the period after  1929- 
R. G. Dun 81 Company in a study of  the trend in security ownership 
from the fall of  igzg to 1932 for more than qoo corporations sho~tled 
that the holders of  the common stock of  these companies increased 
SECURITY POLICIES 
by  more than 40 percent?O  'In the case of  50 leading corporations 
the number of  book stockholders increased about loo percent from 
1929 to 1932." 
The holding  of  bonds  was  less  diffused  than  that  of  stocks. 
McCoy estimated that only 1,300,000 persons held bonds in  19~4.~~ 
In the  depression  period  the  study  of  R.  G. Dun  &  Company 
showed that the number of registered bondholders decreased.15 
SECURITY  DISTRIBUTION  ACCORDING  TO  INSTITUTIONAL  HOLDERS 
The distribution of  securities in the post-war period may  also 
be  studied by  viewing  the subject from the standpoint of  the in- 
stitutional holders of  the securities, as trustees, philanthropic  insti- 
tutions,  national  banks,  savings banks,  and insurance  companies. 
Not only was security investment becoming more widespread among 
individual holders but also among institutional investors.  With the 
exception of  the mutual savings banks, financial institutions includ- 
ing national  banks,  state banks,  loan and trust companies, private 
banks, stock savings banks, increased the proportion of  security in- 
vestmeiits to their total assets.  The proportion for all these financial 
institutions rose from 25  percent in 1920 to 42  percent in 1g3j.14 
The  proportion of  security investments to the total of  trust funds 
of a large group of  trusts rose from 82 percent in 1920 to 97 percent 
in  i931.l5  These trusts for the years  1919 to 193  1 on the average 
placed 27.2  percent of  their total investments in bonds, 7.0  percent 
in preferred stock, 33.5 percent  in common  stock  18.7  percent  in 
real  estate obligations,  i 1.0  percent in real  estate directly and 2.6 
percent  in miscellaneous  assets.16  The obligations  of  the federal 
government composed only 3 percent of  their total investments while 
state and municipal bonds averaged g percent, railroad bonds 7.5 per- 
cent and utility bonds 4.5 percent. 
The  distribution of  the investments of institutions of  higher edu- 
cation is difficult to study, because of  the lack  of published data. 
The leading universities and colleges  in  1929 invested  up to 49.8 
percent of  their endowment funds in bonds.  Of  this total only 3.3 
percent was placed in United States Government and 0.9 percent in 
municipal bonds.  On the other hand, utility bonds accounted for 
17.9 percent and railroad bonds  16.2 percent, while real estate obli- 
gations amounted to 0.8 percent, industrial bonds 8.3 percent  and 
foreign bonds 2.5  percent.  Preferred stock constituted 7.8  percent, 
and common stock only lo percent.  Real estate mortgages, a survival 
of the investment of individual capitalism, still accounted for 13.5 
percent.17 SECURITY POLICIES  267  066  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
D~UTXON  OF  SECURITY  INVESTMENTS  OF  NATIONAL  BANKS, 
1910-1935.18 
(percent of  total security investments) 
Explanation: 
Includes quasi-public obligations. 
INVESTMENTS OF NATIONAL BANKS 
J 
The  distribution of  the security investments of  commercial banks 
may  be studied  from Table 32  which  shows the distribution for 
national banks only.ls  National banks wisely reduced their holdings 
of  railroad bonds,  while  the proportion  of utility  securities rose. 
The proportion of  all other bonds and stocks which included indus- 
trial and investment trust securities rose from  12 percent in 1915 to 
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1.4 
percent in 1935. 
The holdings of  United States Government bonds were always 
large in the case of  national banks, due to the use of  these bonds as 
a basis for issuing circolating notes and for obtaining advances from 
the Federal  Reserve  banks.  The proportion increased  from  37.9 
percent in 1915 to 54.2  percent  in 1920 as the national banks ab- 
sorbed a large proportion  of  the government  bonds  issued during 















rose to 69 percent  in  1935.  The holdings of  municipal bonds in- 
creased from 10 percent in 1910 to a high of  14.5 percent  in  1933. 
The proportion of foreign bonds including Canadian securities rose 
from 0.9 percent in 1910 to a high of  7.7 percent in 1928 and then 
declined to 1.4 percent in 1935. 
UNITED 
GOVERN-  STATES 
MENT 












DISTRIBUTION  OF  SECURITY  INVESTMENTS  OF  MUTUAL  SAVINGS  BANKS, 
1890-1935.20 
(per cent of  total security investments) 
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Explanation: 
G, Includes quasi public obligations. 
(b'  Includes utility and other securities. 
(')  Includes railroad stocks. 
("  Includes stocks. 
(')  Includes utilities. 
15.4  13.0 
12 .g  14.3 
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The distribution of  the security investments of  mutual saving 
banks is shown in Table 33.  These banks carried a large proportion 
of their funds in railioad bonds despite the weakening credit of the 
carriers.  When utility bonds were made legal for investment, they 
became  an important part  of  the portfolio  of  the mutual savings 























I930  9.6  11.4 268  FINANCE CAPITALIShl 
States Government bonds to a low of  3.5  percent until  1931, after 
which year the proportion rose to over 35 percent.  The proportion 
of  municipal bonds fluctuated widely but later increased and consti- 
tuted about a fifth of  the total security investments.  Foreign bonds 
were negligible. 
INVESTMENTS OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
The distribution of  the investments of  life insurance companies 
is presented in Table 34. 
TABLE  34 
(per cent of  total security investments) 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
BONDS  STOCK 
UNITED 
I1  I  I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  1 
From this table it is seen that the funds of life insurance com- 
panies, notwithstanding the liberal provisions in the laws governing 
their investment, were largely placed in bonds rather than in stocks. 
The insurance companies wisely  decreased the proportion  of  their 
holdings of  railroad  bonds and increased the proportion  of  utility 
bonds.  Their  holdings  of  federal  bonds  declined  relatively  in 
importance from 17 percent in 1924 to a low of  4.7 percent in 1930, 
after which the proportion began to rise again reaching 24  percent 
in 1935.  There was also a moderate rise in the holdings of  munici- 
pal bonds through the depression  years.  The holdings of  foreip 
bonds remained fairly constant and unimportant.  The equity hold- 
ings of  the insurance companies consisted mainly of  preferred stocks. 
of  which the proportion rose to 6 percent in 1932 and then declined 
slightly.  Common stock holdings were insignificant. 
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RESULTS  OF  POLICIES  OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The purpose of  this section is to determine whether or not the 
various groups of  investors in recent years were able successfully to 
shape their policies to meet the changing conditions of  the security 
markets so as to retain the principal of  their security investments.  In 
other words, were the results of the system of  security capitalism in 
the post-war period satisfactory from the standpoint of  the investors ? 
It is  impossible  to appraise  precisely  the results  of  the invest- 
ment policies of  individuals, corporations, trustees and philanthropic 
institutions as  groups.  However  approximations of  the results of 
the policies of  the various classes of  financial  institutions may  be 
made.22 
The security investments of  each group of  financial institutions, 
including  mutual savings banks,  stock  savings banks,  state  banks, 
rational banks,  loan and trust companies,  and life insurance com- 
panies,  as  reported  in various  statistical  publications,  were  tabu- 
lated according to the forms of  securities, namely, bonds, common 
and preferred stock, and these in turn were separated into classes 
of  issuers as United States and municipal government, railroad, util- 
ity and industrial corporations as well as foreign issuers. The  average 
prices of each of these classes of  securities for the years from  1920 
to 1935 were obtained from the Standard Statistics Service.  These 
average security prices were then used to compute the probable ap- 
preciation  or depreciation in the value of  each class of  investment 
a year later.  An obvious margin of  error lies in the assumption that 
holdings did not change in the year.  However, this margin of  error 
is probably small, in view of  the relatively limited variation in the 
holdings throughout the year compared with the total of  the hold- 
ings.  A second margin of  error lies in the assumption that the se- 
curities held by  the institutions varied with  the Standard Statistics 
index.  However,  this  index  was  composed  largely  of  high-grade 
active securities, while many of  the institutions held  medium and 
even  low-grade securities, and so  the variation  in price  may have 
been  even greater.  Therefore this margin of  error would tend to 
strengthen rather than weaken the conclusions which  follow. 
The results of  this study are given in Tables 35 and 36 showing 
the net change in dollars in the investments of  financial institutions 
in the period from 1920 to 1934 by years and by securities as deter. 
mined by the net change in dollars. 
Table 35 shows that the financial institutions suffered losses  in 
1922 arising out of  the primary post-war depression.  The next four 
years showed a moderate appreciation but in the two years before 
the crash of 1929 the investment experience of  financial institutions FINANCE CAPITALISM 
(Net change in million dollars) 
1  I  I  1  I  I  I  I  1 
(Net  change  in  million  dollars) 
























(a) Includes gain of $61,ooo,ooo  in preferred shares held by insurance companies. 
(b) In the case of securities carried by mutual savings banks as "all other stocks and bonds," 

















were bonds and not stocks. 
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77  1932 
was unsatisfactory owing to the drop in bond prices.  The losses in 
1930 were heavy but in 1931 they were staggering and for this year 
alone amounted to $~,~oo,ooo,ooo.  Over the next three years there 
was a considerable recovery, and these losses were overcome. 
Table 36 shows the investment  experience of  financial  institu- 
tions according to the classes of  their securities.  From this table it 
will be seen that the absolute dollar losses  on foreign bonds were 
small while the losses on industrial securities were high.24 Railroad, 
utility and municipal securities showed good results.  The  most satis- 
factory  investment  experience  of  financial  institutions came  from 
their  holdings  of  United  States  Government bonds.  In fact the 
rapid recovery in the price of  these bonds in the period after 1932 
was the determining factor in bringing about a net appreciation in 
the value of  the investments of  the financial institutions. 




















(a'  For 1930. 
(b) Net capital is capital, surplus and undivided profits less bank buildings and real estate. 
("  In the case of the life insurance companies, the net reserves are considered as a basis for 










..........  National banks.. 
State banks.. ............. 
.......  Stock savings bank. 
Mutual savings banks.. .... 
Loan  and trust companies.. 
Life insurance companie~(~). 
Total. ................ 
classes of  financial institutions in relation to their net capital for the 
year  193  i when losses were heaviest. 
From this table it is  seen that the losses on securities in  1931 
absorbed 47.19 percent of  the net capital of the national banks as a 
whole,  54.58  percent  of  the state banks,  197.96 percent or a  sum 
almost twice as large as the net capital of  the stock savings banks, 
83.49 percent of  the mutual savings banks and 36.82  percent of  the 
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'43 272  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
that the life insurance companies by  1930 had  lost  approximately 
74.24 percent of  their net reserves. 
The conclusion derived from this study indicate that the system 
of  security capitalism from the standpoint of  the various classes of 
institutional  investors functioned very uncertainly in the post-war 
period.  A continuation of  the depreciation in security prices after 
1931 would have  seriously impaired  the solvency of the financial 
institutions. 
CHAPTER 18 
A  FINANCIAL STA  TEMENT 
THE  trend of  corporate and of  government finance was analyzed by 
presenting a financial statement and by  applying ratios to this state- 
ment. In similar manner a financial statement of  American security 
capitalism in the post-war period may be presented, and ratios may 
be employed  to study the trends of  the system.  Such  a financial 
statement of  American  security capitalism  in the post-war period 
is presented in Table 38. 
NATIONAL  INCOME 
The national  income  of  the American  people,  after dropping 
from $~rj,ooo,ooo,ooo  in 1920 to $~g,~oo,ooo,ooo  in 192 1, rose to the 
high of  $8~,ioo,ooo,ooo  in 1929.  With the coming of  the depression 
the total fell to $~~,~oo,oooo,ooo  in 1930, to $~6,ooo,ooo,ooo  in 1931 
and to a low of $~8,8oo,ooo,ooo  in  1933.  The ensuing business re- 
covery brought national income back to $~~,~OO,OOO,OOO  in 1934 and 
to $53,100,000,000 in 1935.~ 
SAVING  FUNDS 
There are as  yet  no  complete  statistics  which  state  the exact 
amount of national saving available for security investment, but the 
trend  may  be  studied from  the volume  of  the saving funds with 
financial  institutions  including  the  various  classes  of  banks,  life 
insurance  companies  and  building  and  loan  associations.  This 
total rose sharply  from $2o,goo,ooo,ooo in  1920 to $rj2,6oo,ooo,ooo 
in 1931 and fell to ~~~,rjoo,ooo,ooo  in 1933  with a recovery to $46,- 
ooo,ooo,ooo in  1934.  Under security capitalism  saving comes  not 
only from individuals  but also from corporations.  Corporate sav- 
ing is the amount of  annual net earnings of  domestic corporations 
and  other  business  organizations  not  declared  as  dividends  but 
credited  to surplus.  Accord~ng  to the estimates of  Fabricant  the 
total  annual corporate  saving was  generally  above  $2,ooo,ooo,ooo 
annually from 1920 to 1929, but in the depression years there was a 
continuous deficit which amounted to over $~,ooo,ooo,ooo  in 1932.~ 274  FINANCE CAPITALISILi 
TABLE  38 
FINANCIAL  STATEMENT  OF  AMERICAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM,  1920-ig85.l 
(billion dollars) 






















The demand for capital comes from sources which may or may 
not issue securities for the purpose of  obtaining such capital.  This 
study is concerned  only with  the demand for capital through the 
issue of  securities.  Securities may  be issued for the purpose either 
of  obtaining new capital or of refunding issues which have matured. 
These refunding issues do not represent the absorption of  new capi- 
tal and so are not included in the computation given in Table 38. 
The  deduction of  this item from the total of  new security issues gives 
the amount of  net capital demand arising from the issue of  securities 
as shown in column 3 of  Table 38.6 
From  these figures it is  seen that the volume of  new  securities 
rose almost  continuously  after  1920, reaching a  peak  of  $10,200,- 
ooo,ooo in 1929 and then fell off  sharply. 
Table 39 shows the items which made up the total of  new securi- 
ties and indicates in detail the trend of  the capital market  in the 
post-war period according to issuers both in dollar amounts and in 
percent.  The volume of  securities issued by the railroads remained 
comparatively steady with the exception of  the years 1924 and 1930. 
On the other hand, the volume of  securities placed by  the utilities 
increased rapidly from a low of  $382,ooo,ooo in 1920 to a high of 
$2,36~,ooo,ooo  in 1930.  The volume issued by  industrial corpora- 
tions was well sustained from 1925 to 1930 at over a billion dollars 
annually and rose to $1,928,000,000 in 1929.  Real estate securities, 
which had been small until the post-war period, rose to $7 15,000,000 
by 1925, and continued at a high level through 1928 when the realty 
boom began to slacken.  Investment trust securities, practically un- 
known before  1925, rose to $787,ooo,ooo in 1928 and to a peak of 
$2,222,ooo,ooo in 1929. After  1930, the volume of  railroad, utility, 
industrial,  real  estate  and investment  trust  issues  fell off  sharply. 
The issues of  the Federal government dropped continuously until 
1930 and then rose sharply to $3,iij2,ooo,ooo in 1932 and $5,164,- 
000,ooo in  1934.  Municipal financing from  1921 to  1930 held at 
a level of  well over a billion  dollars annually.  Foreign securities 
moved irregularly upward until 1927 when they rose to $827,ooo,ooo. 
In the following years they moved intermittently and were negligible 
after 1930.' 
The percentage  distribution of  these securities indicates several 
interesting trends in the capital market in the post-war period.  Rail- 
road securities, after 1924, with the exception of  1930, were a minor 
factor in the capital market.  This situation was  in direct contrast 
to the pre-war period, and when railroad issues had dominated the 
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TABLE  39 
NEW  SECURITIES-ACCORDING  TO ISSUERS,  1920--1935 
(million dollars) 
Explanation: 
(a) Includes U.S.  Government,  Farm  Loan  and  Government  agencies as  well  as  U.S. 
Possessions. 
(*) Municipal securities include state issues. 
(c)  The Chronicle carries Canadian securities separately, but for the purpose of this table 
they have been included with foreign securities. 
by the utilities which accounted for the largest percentage of  all the 
corporate issues.  Industrial issues after 1920 ranged from a high of 
20.82 percent in 1929 to a low of  0.40 percent in 1932.  Investment 
trusts experienced only one big year, 1929, when they accounted for 
21.83  percent of  the total.  The proportion of  federal government 
issues fell from 9.24 percent in 1922 to .04 percent in 1929, rose to 
73.92 percent in 1932 and to 84.04 percent in 1934.  Municipal se- 
curities continued to  account  for  a  high  proportion  of  the  total 




















1925  The interest payment on the bonded debt in the United States 
was $4,rgg,ooo,ooo in 192 I,  rose to a high of  $6,062,00o,ooo in 1929 
and then  fell  to $5,iog,ooo,ooo  in  1g32.l0  The separate amounts 
which composed these totals are presented in Table 40.  The trend 
of  interest payment on corporate debt rose from $3,06g,ooo,ooo in 
1922 to a high of  $~,~~~,ooo,ooo  in 1929.  This rapid increase was 
due to the extensive issuance of  new corporate securities over these 
years.  On the other hand  the trend of  interest  payment  on the 
federal debt reached a high of  $1,056,00o,ooo in 1923 and then de- 
clined to $rjgg,ooo,ooo in 1932.  The decline until  1930 was due to 
the reduction of  the Federal debt, while the drop from 1930 to 1932 
was  due to the lower cost at which the government was able to un- 
dertake its borrowing.  Although the total of  the federal debt ex- 
panded in 193  1 and 1932, the government floated a large proportion 
of short-term issues on which  the rate of  interest  was  low.  How- 
ever, after  1932 the interest  burden on the federal debt rose, and 
reached $68g,ooo,ooo in 1933 and was  $757,ooo,ooo in 1934.  The 
interest charge of  the state debt rose very sharply from $13,00o,ooo 
in  1921 to $gq,ooo,ooo in 1929 and in the depression  period  con- 
tinued upward to $1 12,000,000 in 1932.  Likewise the interest charge 
on the municipal debt rose from $146,00o,ooo in 192 1 to $366,000,- 
ooo  in  1929 and continued  upward  to $355,ooo,ooo  in  1932.  A 
study of  the percentage distribution of  these interest payments indi- 
cates that the corporations accounted for a rising proportion of  from 
71.1  percent in 1922, to a high of  81.2  percent in 1929 and a slight 
decline to 79.1  percent in 1932.  Conversely the proportion  of  the 
interest payment on the federal debt dropped from 23.2 percent in 
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100.00 TABLE  41 
BONDED  DEBT  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES,  1925-1933.11 
(million dollars) 
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mained  almost  unchanged.  On the  other  hand,  the  amount  of 
utility  bonds outstanding  increased  considerably,  and  the bonded 
debt of  industrial corporations likewise increased.  The amount of 
financial and real estate bonds showed the greatest  increase of  any 
class of  corporate obligations.  State and municipal debt increased 
rapidly  until  the  end of  1931.  The debt  of  the federal  govern- 
ment declined  until  1930 but from that year  it increased  precipi- 
tously. Total corporate debt over the period rose from $28,489,000,- 
ooo in 1925 to $42,gi5,ooo,ooo in  1933.  The total  governmental 
debt rose from  $32,736,000,00o to $42,243,ooo,ooo over  the same 
period and the grand total of  both corporate and governmental debt 
increased from $61,22~,ooo,ooo  to $85,158,000,000. 
The proportion  of  railway  debt  dropped sharply  to the total 
bonded debt while the proportion of  public utilities rose until 1930 
and then declined in relative importance.  In general, the propor- 
tion of  the industrial debt remained steady.  On the other hand, the 
proportion  of  the debt in the form of  financial and real  estate se- 
curities increased sharply until 1930 and then declined.  The total 
corporate debt rose  from  46.5  percent  in  1925 to a  high  of  58.8 
percent in 1930 and then dropped to 50.4 percent in 1933.  State, 
county and municipal bonds rose sharply to a high of  over  2 1 per- 
cent in  1931 and then declined  slightly.  The federal government 
debt declined from a high of  32.7  percent in 1925 to a low of  19.4 
percent in 1930 and then rose to 27.5  percent by  1933.  Through- 
out the depression period, the proportion of  the bonded debt in the 
form  of  total  government  securities,  including  federal,  state  and 
municipal, rose  from 44.1  percent  in  1931 to approximately  49.6 
percent by  1933.  These figures confirm the fact that in the United 
States, as in foreign countries, there has been a relative decline in 
private and an increase in public security capitalism. 
TOTAL SECURITIES OUTSTANDING 
The  total securities including both bonds and stock outstanding 
rose  from $i36,i5g,ooo,ooo  in  1925 to a high  of  $187,647,000,000 
in 1931 and then fell to $177,658,000,000 in  1933.13  Table 42  pre- 
sents the various items which make up the total securities outstand- 
ing.  From  this table it  is  seen  that  preferred  stock  outstanding 
showed  little  change,  rising  from  $iij,g47,000,000  in  1925  to  a 
high  of  $ig,~oo,ooo,ooo  in 1929, and then a relatively small reces- 
sion to $i8,~oo,ooo,ooo  in 1933.  On the other hand the volume of 
common stock increased sharply from $58,g87,ooo,ooo in 1925 to a 
high of  $8~,ioo,ooo,ooo  in 1930 and then dropped to $74,ioo,ooo,- 
ooo in 1933.  Corporations accumulated a large total surplus which 
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rose from $37,567,000,000 in  1925 to a high of  $~~,1oo,ooo,ooo  in 
1929, but in the depression this was sharply reduced to $35,ioo,ooo,- 
ooo.  Over these years the corporate bonded debt rose sharply from 
$28,489,000,000 in 1925 to a high  of  $47,gi4,000,00o  in 1930 and 
then declined slightly to $42,gi~,ooo,ooo  in 1933.  Total corporate 
capitalization rose sharply from $i~o,ggo,ooo,ooo  in 1925 to a high 
of  $2og,2i4,ooo,ooo  in  1930 and then  fell  to $~~o,~~~,ooo,ooo  in 
1933.  Because of  the relatively  greater decrease  in the preferred 
stock, common stock and surplus of  corporations as compared with 
their bonded debt, the proportion of  this debt in the total corporate 
capitalization showed an unsatisfactory increase from less than one- 
fifth in 1926 to more than one-fourth in 1933. 
In contrast to the variations in the total of  corporate issues on the 
other hand governmental securities, after remaining steady at $32,- 
ooo,ooo,ooo from  1925 to 1929, rose sharply  to $42,243,ooo,ooo by 
1933.  The proportion  of  corporate bonded  debt to total  bonded 
debt, after rising from 46.5 percent in 1925 to a high of  58.8 percent 
in 1930, dropped to 50.4 percent in 1933. 
WEALTH 
National wealth of  United States was estimated at $317,200,000,- 
ooo in 192 1 and $~6i,8oo,ooo,ooo  in 1929.  With the coming of  the 
depression, national wealth dropped to a low of  $~~6,~ooJooo,ooo  in 
1932 and then recovered to $~o8,goo,ooo,ooo  in 1935." 
ANALYSIS  OF RATIOS 
The  various items thus far studied individually are now used to 
compute ratios which indicate significant relationships in the finan- 
cial system.  Consideration will be given to the following ratios : 
A.  New securities to saving funds 
B.  Interest on bonded debt to national income 
C.  Bonded debt to total securities outstanding 
D.  National wealth to bonded debt 
E.  Total securities outstanding to national wealth. 
NEW SECURITIES TO SAVING FUNDS 
The ratio of  new  securities to saving funds shows the relation 
between the amount of  the net capital demand in the form of  new 
security issues to the total volume of  saving.  A more accurate ratio 
would be the volume of  new securities issued to the amount of  sav- 
ing available for the security market, but the latter item has never 
been computed.15 This ratio is a corollary of  total investment to total 
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saving.16 The  amount of  investment and the amount of  saving tend 
to equal each other over a long period  of  time,  but over a short 
period of  time there may be a definite maladjustment between these 
two forces. 
It has been  maintained  that saving in the United States grew 
more rapidly than the volume of  new securities in the post-war pe- 
riod until the depression of  1929, and as a result there was an excess 
of such saving.  This redundant saving, it is contended, then flowed 
into foreign securities and into investment trust issues, and the pro- 
ceeds of  the latter were applied to bidding up the prices of  outstand- 
ing securities.  This inflation of  security values, it is held,  finally 
resulted in the collapse of  the security market in 1929. 
That there was  not an excess of  saving in relation to security 
investment but rather an excess of  such security investment in rela- 
tion to saving in the years immediately preceding the crash of  1929 
seems clear  from an examination of  the conditions of  the capital 
market over these years.  In the first place the proportion of  new 
securities to total saving funds rose from  14.9 percent in 1921 to a 
high of  20.4 percent in 1929.  In other words, new securities were 
absorbing only a little more than one-seventh of  total saving funds in 
1921 but by  1929 were  absorbing well  over  one-fifth.17  Though 
the value of this ratio is limited, in that it shows the relationship 
between  the annual amount of  new securities and the volume  of 
saving funds accumulated over a period of  time, nevertheless an ex- 
amination of  the figures on new securities and saving funds shows 
that the increase in the latter figure rises less than the former. While, 
again, the crudeness of  these figures imposes limitations, neverthe- 
less they are an indication of  the general trend. 
Evidence of the excess of  new securities in relation to available 
saving is found in the unsatisfactory condition of  the bond market 
in the post-war period.  In describing the trend of  investment bank- 
ing over these yearsle it was seen that the dealers in new securities 
were continuously forced to resort to artificial  support for their is- 
sues in order to prevent  a fall in price.  Despite this support, the 
bond market over these years, particularly from 1927 to 1929 inclu- 
sive,  suffered  from an almost  chronic  condition  of  undigested  se- 
curities. 
The excess of  security investment in relation to saving may have 
been a factor in the increase  in the yield  of  bonds in the closing 
years of the period.  The bond price index of  the Standard Statistics 
Corporation declined from 102.1  in March, 1928, to 96.6 in Septem- 
ber,  1929 and the yield on these bonds rose  from 4.53 percent to 
4.91 percent.  Over the same period the municipal bond price index 
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3.89  percent to 4.32  percent.  The Liberty Bond price  index fell 
from a high of  104.1 in December, 1927, to a low of  99.3 in October, 
1929.  Moreover,  the  average yield  on preferred  stock  rose  from 
5.18  percent  to  5.65  percent  over  the years  from  April,  1928 to 
November,  i(~2g.l~  On the other hand, the average yield on com- 
mon stocks fell from 5.02  percent in January, 1927 to 3.36 percent in 
January, igeg.20 However, it may be argued that common stocks do 
not represent the cost of  capital since they are generally  purchased 
for price appreciation rather than for a return on capital. 
In view of  the fact that in theory the force of  the supply of  saving 
in relation to demand must necessarily equal each other, how then 
was  this excess of  demand  in the form of  new  securities over the 
flow of  saving overcome?  Temporarily it was met by the use of  bank 
credit.  For  a short period of  time, bank credit can carry  unsold 
securities and keep  them  off  the market.  In the long run these 
securities must be absorbed by actual saving, otherwise  when  they 
are thrown on the market prices will decline sharply.  Month after 
month in the twenties, the increasing issues of  new securities were 
carried by bank credit in the form of  brokers' loans, which rose from 
$2,ooo,ooo,ooo in  1925  to  $~,ooo,ooo,ooo  in  1927  and to $8,000,- 
ooo,ooo in the fall  of  1929 when  the security market  ~ollapsed.~~ 
It was  impossible  for  the  saving  available  for  the  security  mar- 
ket to keep pace with the ever-mounting volume of  new securities, 
and the collapse of  October, 1929 was  inevitable.  In other words, 
in the period  immediately  preceding  the collapse  of  1929, there 
was  an excess of  the demand for capital in the form of  new  issues 
in  relation  to the supply  of  new  capital  in  the  form  of  saving 
available for the security market.  The United States was  therefore 
suffering not from oversaving but from overinvestment. 
After  1930 the relation between the volume of  saving and new 
security  issues  was  reversed.  While  the  federal  government  in- 
creased  its  denland  for  capital,  corporate  demand  fell  off  very 
sharply.  As  a result  the ratio  of  new  securities  to  saving  funds 
dropped from 20.4 percent in 1930 to 8.3 percent in 1934. 
INTEREST ON BONDED DEBT TO NATIONAL INCOME 
From  1921 through  1925 the amount of  interest payments rose 
but national income increased more rapidly, and thus the ratio be- 
tween  these two  items  dropped  from  7.2  percent  to  6.3  percent. 
However,  after  1925  and  through  1929,  interest  payment  in- 
creased more rapidly  than the rise  in national income, and so the 
ratio rose to 7.3 percent in ig2g.22  After 1929 the decline in national 
income was more rapid than the drop in interest payment and the 
ratio rose sharply to 13.0 percent in 1932.  In other words, in that 
year, the interest payment on the bonded  debt was absorbing over 
one-eighth of national income and thus constituted a heavy burden. 
BONDED  DEBT TO TOTAL SECURITIES  OUTSTANDING 
The ratio of  bonded debt to total  securities outstanding shows 
the capital  structure  of  security  capitalism.  The proportion  of 
bonded debt to total corporate and governmental securities  showed 
a satisfactory decline from 44.9 percent  in  1925 to 42.2  percent  in 
1929.'~ However, in the period from  1929 to 1933 the proportion 
rose from 42.2  percent to 47.9 percent, and this unsatisfactory  in- 
crease was due to the rise in the governmental debt. 
WEALTH  TO BONDED DEBT 
The proportion of  wealth  to bonded debt is  comparable to the 
ratio showing the extent to which property or the debt base covers 
the debt in the case of  a corporation or a go~ernment.~'  In general 
the trend of  total wealth to bonded debt in the post-war period was 
decidedly downward.  In igro it was at the satisfactory level of  877 
percent.  However  from 192 1 to 1924 it moved irregularly down- 
ward to 504 percent.  In the depression with the inflexibility of  debt 
and the decline in national wealth, the ratio dropped to a low level 
of  295  percent  in 1932.  This downward trend was  unsatisfactory 
and reflected the weight of  the debt burden. 
SECURITIES  OUTSTANDING  TO  WEALTH 
The ratio of  securities  outstanding to wealth  indicates the ex- 
tent of  the development of  security capitalism.  The proportion of 
securities to wealth in the United States was  g3j4 percent in 1904,~~ 
while in the post-war period the proportion rose sharply from 37.6 
percent in 1925 to 50.3 percent in 1929.  Due to the increase in gov- 
ernment debt in the depression the total securities outstanding de- 
creased relatively little, while national wealth dropped sharply.  As 
a  result the ratio of  securities to wealth reached the high figure of 
73.5 percent in 1932.~~ 
The consequences  of  this  increase  in the proportion  of  total 
wealth in the form of  securities are of  vital importance. A century 
ago, ownership of  wealth  took the form largely of  the possession of 
physical assets, such as mills, ships and merchandise.  Capital  was 
not as  shiftable as  it is to-day, but its value was  more  stable.  In 
recent  years ownership of  wealth  has come to mean  ownership of 
paper  claims  representative  of  physical  property;  of  securities  in- FINANCE CAPITALISM 
dicative of  ownership, but very often possessing values apart from 
the physical property underlying them.  This change in the nature 
of  maintaining and holding wealth  from the direct  possession  of 
physical assets to the indirect ownership of  such assets by means of 
paper claims in the form of  securities, has increased the shiftability 
of  capital, but it has at the saae time led to serious instability of 
values.  The  value of  the paper claims evidencing ownership of  prop- 
erty often fluctuates quite apart from fluctuations in the value of  the 
property  itself.  This ownership  of  wealth  and capital  no longer 
carries with it the stability which previously characterized it.  This 
change in the shiftability  and stability of  wealth  has  in turn had 
serious consequences.  As values become more unstable and fluctuate 
widely from one extreme to another, the stability of  financial insti- 
tutions, such as commercial banks, saving banks, investment trusts, 
and  insurance  companies,  is  threatened,  and  their  continual 
existence becomes uncertain.  Fluctuating security values and losses 
to institutional investment  holders tend to weaken  and endanger 
the very foundation of  the whole financial structure. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus a financial statement of  American  security capitalism for 
the post-war period reveals certain unsatisfactory tendencies.  Ameri- 
can security capitalism experienced overinvestment rather than over- 
saving.  The  burden of  interest payment to national income became 
increasingly  heavy  and the former absorbed  an ever-growing pro- 
portion of  the latter.  The capital structure of  American  security 
capitalism became more and more unsound due to the increase of 
bonded debt in relation to total securities outstanding.  This debt 
was heavy and became less protected in view of  the fact that it was 
covered by a smaller proportion of  wealth.  Finally the increasing 
proportion of  securities to wealth  added  to the instability of the 
system. 
CHAPTER 19 
PUBLIC  CONTROL 
THE  tendencies of American security capitalism described previously 
gave rise to pressing problems, and consideration will now be given 
to the efforts of  the government  to cope with  these  problems  by 
public control and regulation.  This chapter will analyze critically 
control through monetary  action, Federal  Reserve policy, banking 
supervision, federal support of  the financial institutions of  security 
capitalism through direct assistance or through guaranteeing their 
obligations, and specific and general control over the demand for 
capital. 
CONTROL  THROUGH  MONETARY  POLICY 
The drastic economic disturbances of  the depression after  1  gr g 
led to an insistent demand for a change in the traditional monetary 
policy of  the United States.l  As shown in Chapter 11 the struggle 
over the monetary  policies  in the United States during the nine- 
teenth century was won by the supporters of  the gold standard, and 
the fruits of  this victory were embodied in the Gold Standard Act of 
1900.  Over the next three decades the gold standard came to be 
accepted with little question except by a small group of  currency 
reformers in academic circles and by some of  the agricultural inter- 
ests which grievously felt the burden of  debt after the commodity 
deflation of  the early twenties.  It was not until the coming of  the 
depression after 1929 which intensified the burden of  debt that any 
serious question rose over the acceptability of  the gold standard.  As 
the depression deepened and as the burden of debt became heavier, 
the demand  by  inflationary interests  for the abandonment of  the 
gold standard became stronger.  Accordingly, one of  the first acts 
of the Roosevelt administration was to abandon the gold standard. 
This cutting loose from old moorings was accomplished by the suc- 
cessive steps of  suspending gold payments at home  in the Act  of 
March 6, 1933, by requiring the delivery for the account of  the gov- 
ernment of  all domestic gold to the Federal Reserve banks in the Act 
of April 5,  1933 and finally by the embargo on gold exports in the 
Act  of April  20,  1933.  The Thomas Amendment to the Agricul- 
tural Adjustment Act gave permissive rather than mandatory power 
to take various inflationary steps.  The Federal Reserve banks might 
purchase $g,ooo,ooo,ooo of  government securities in the open market 
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for the purpose of  increasing the supply of  money  through the ex- 
pansion of  Federal Reserve credit.  The  President was also given the 
power to issue $~,ooo,ooo,ooo  of  fiat money without gold cover for 
the purpose of  retiring the interest-bearing debt.  The President was 
further given the power to devalue the dollar by reducing the gold 
content to no more than fifty percent of  its current value, and finally 
there was  also permissive legislation  to coin  silver.  The Federal 
Reserve banks had already  increased their holdings of  government 
securities to $2,~oo,ooo,ooo,  while the second power  of  issuing fiat 
money  was  not exercised.  The third provision  formed  the basis 
for the Gold Reserve Act of  1934.  This Act provided, first, for the 
reduction of  the gold content of  the dollar, which was accomplished 
by  lowering it from 23.22  grains of  fine gold to 13.71 grains, thus 
reducing the dollar to 59.06 per cent of  its former value.  At  the 
same time the Act provided for the nationalization of  the gold hold- 
ings of  the Federal Reserve banks which were to receive gold cer- 
tificates in exchange.  The Act thus transferred  the ownership and 
possession of  the nation's gold from the Federal Reserve banks to the 
Treasury.  The reduction of  the gold content and the seizure of  the 
gold holdings gave the government a stabilization profit of  $2,793,- 
ooo,ooo which  represents a nominal  appreciation in the value  of 
the gold holdings from $~,oz~,ooo,ooo  to $6,822,000,000.  The trans- 
fer of  gold signified the passing of  the largest single supply of  gold, 
representing  about  two-thirds  of  the world's  total,  from  private 
hands,  since  the  Federal  Reserve  banks  are  really  private  cor- 
porations, to the Treasury, a public body.  Furthermore, the stabi- 
lization profit from the appreciation of  gold redounded entirely to 
the government.  These were two important steps in the direction 
of  public security capitalism.  A further monetary step was the Silver 
Purchase Act.2  The  statute itself was of  no specific significance from 
the standpoint of  security capitalism beyond the fact that it repre- 
sented another step in the general movement to reduce the value of 
the  d~llar.~  The motive  underlying  the  monetary  policy  of  the 
New  Deal was to decrease the value of  the dollar in order to raise 
commodity prices, which in turn would relieve the burden of  debt 
and stimulate business recovery.  To  the inflationist the debtor rep- 
resented  a  harried  producer,  particularly  a  farmer,  who was  bur- 
dened with a large mortgage and who required government protec- 
tion against an aggressive creditor.  The inflationist argued that the 
pressure of  debt by forcing debtors to throw their goods on the mar- 
ket was the underlying cause of  depression and that the reduction of 
the debt burden would therefore bring about business revival.  This 
theory failed to recognize the true nature of  debt under the system of 
security  capitalism.  Debtors  under  security  capitalism  are  no 
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longer  only  individuals but are mainly  corporations  and govern- 
ments.  Few  of  these corporate and governmental  debtors to any 
extent possessed  inventories  of  goods which  they could  throw on 
the market to meet their obligations with the possible exception of 
industrial corporations.  However, as pointed out on page 244, the 
debt burden of industrial corporations was not serious as evidenced 
by the fact that few major industrial corporations carrying inventory 
were forced into receivership throughout the depression.  Obviously 
the argument, that the burden of debt, by  forcing the liquidation 
of  commodities,  intensified  the depression was unfounded.  Credi- 
tors, on the other hand, who are adversely affected by  the forced 
alleviation of debt, are to a large extent the indirect investors who 
hold bank deposits and life insurance policies. 
The  argument that reduction of  debt starts a nation back to  pros- 
perity is refuted by the actual experience of  European countries in 
the post-war period.  Debt reduction through inflation obtained its 
highest perfection in Central European countries, but they did not 
as  a result of  the drastic application of inflation enter a  new  era 
of  prosperity.  In fact drastic inflation resulted in discouraging thrift 
and in reducing  the  volume  of  capital  available  for  investment. 
Control of  capitalism through monetary manipulation  is therefore 
a futile policy. 
GOVERNMENTAL DOMINATION  OF RESERVE  ORGANIZATION 
Public  control  of  security  capitalism  was  also  exercised  over 
the organization and the operation of  the Federal Reserve System! 
In tracing the growth of  security capitalism in England, France and 
Germany, it was noted that the financial power came to be concen- 
trated in the leading metropolis of  each of these countries.  This 
movement naturally met with opposition  from the non-metropoli- 
tan interests,  but in time it proved  ineffective, and London, Paris 
and Berlin came to be the centers for conducting both national and 
international financial transactions.  By the end of  the second quar- 
ter of the nineteenth  century New  York  City became  the leading 
financial center in the United States, but rival markets continued to 
flourish in Boston, Philadelphia and later in Chicago.  In time the 
American financial metropolis was  faced with a powerful social and 
political  opposition  unparalleled  in any  other  capitalist  country. 
In most of these other countries there came to be a general accept- 
ance of the need of  a strong financial center, but in the United States 
the opposition to the so-called "Wall  Street"  interests grew rather 
than weakened  in intensity.  This opposition  found expression in 
the formation of  the Federal Reserve System.  The Pujo hearings 290  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
and the report on the "Money Trust"  publicized the concentration 
of  financial  power  in Netv  York  City, and consolidated the deter- 
mination both of  the public and of  Congress that the new banking 
system should not come under control of  "Wall Street."  As a result 
Federal Reserve organization was based on the two underlying prin- 
ciples that the system should be controlled by the government rather 
than by the bankers and that it should be regional rather than cen- 
tralized. 
William Jennings Bryan remembered his defeat at the hands of 
security capitalism in the elections of  1896 and of  1900, and cast his 
influence in favor of  government and against so-called banker con- 
trol of  the Reserve System.  As a result of  his support of  the nomina- 
tion and the later election of  Woodrow Wilson, Mr. Bryan exerted a 
powerful influence in the administration and was successful in win- 
ning over President Wilson, Secretary McAdoo, and Senator Owens 
who was directing banking legislation in the Upper House.  At first 
Carter Glass, who was then guiding banking legislation in the lower 
house, opposed Bryan's view but later accepted it.B 
As  a result  of  this opposition  to so-called banker  control the 
members of  the Federal Reserve Board in the original act were ap- 
pointed by the President, with the consent of  the Senate.  The  act, 
however, specified that at least two members should be "persons ex- 
perienced in banking or finance."'  However, in 1923, even this re 
quirement was dropped from the Act.  In later years there was a 
persistent  effort to re-introduce the requirement that some of  the 
members of  the Federal Reserve Board should have banking experi- 
ence..  In 1932 Senator Glass, in his draft of  a bill to change the or- 
ganization of  the Federal Reserve system restored the provision that 
two of  the appointed members of  the Federal Reserve Board should 
be persons of  tested banking experien~e.~  This provision, however, 
was left out of  the final form of  the Banking Act of  1933.  Again in 
the discussion of  the Banking Act of  1935 this provision was revived. 
The special committee of  the American Bankers Association, in its 
recommendation on the Banking Act of  1935, urged that two mem- 
bers of  the Federal Reserve Board should be selected when possible 
from persons who had banking experience.  However, no such pro- 
vision was  incorporated in the final draft of  the Act.  Due to the 
inherent fear of  so-called banker control, the qualification of  bank- 
ing experience  is still  not required  of  any  member of  the Board 
of  Governors  (the former Federal Reserve Board), even though the 
position  calls for  the highest  degree of  technical  skill and expert 
knowledge.  Although  these  qualifications  were  not  mandatory, 
nevertheless  the Roosevelt  administration  appointed several  mem- 
bers possessing seasoned banking experience. 
PUBLIC CONTROL 
In the Congressional  discussion of  the Banking Act  of  1935 a 
determined move was made to augment governmental control of  the 
Board of Governors. The earlier draft of  the bill contained the pro- 
vision that the chairman of the Board, as the acting executive officer, 
was  "to serve until the further order of  the President."  The  early 
drafts of the Act were not clearly worded and were susceptible to 
curious interpretations.  In fact, it would have been possible for a 
governor of  the Board to be advanced to the position of  chairman, 
removed as chairman and so automatically removed as a governor of 
the Board.  This provision was later reworded and the danger to the 
tenure of  board members was eliminated.  For a time it was insisted 
that the chief  executive  officer  of  the Board  should  serve at the 
pleasare of  the President on the ground that the latter had a right 
to appoint an officer in sympathy with administrative policy as to 
public and private finance.O  It was, however, felt that such a policy 
would have placed the chairman in the position of  merely a cabinet 
member and would have made it impossible for the Board of Gover- 
nors to constitute itself  as  an independent body,  and so the final 
provision gave the chairman a tenure of  a full term of  years. 
STRUGGLE FOR DOMINATION OF RESERVE BANKS 
The second element in the organization of  the Federal Reserve 
system is the group of  Federal Reserve banks.  In order to carry out 
the will of  Congress that the new system should be regional rather 
than centralized in New  York  City, twelve Federal  Reserve banks 
were established.  The  operations of  each bank were to be admin- 
istered by a board of  nine directors.  Three directors were to be ap- 
pointed by the Federal Reserve Board to represent the interests of 
the public, of which one was to be chairman and was to be desig- 
nated as the Federal Reserve agent.  Six members, three represent- 
ing banking and three others representing commerce,  agriculture 
and industry, were to be elected by the member banks.  The  bankers 
were therefore supposed to have only minority representation.  Al- 
though only three members of  the board of  directors of  the Federal 
Reserve banks were to voice the interest of  the banks, the three rep- 
resentatives of industry were also appointed by the member banks. 
It was therefore entirely natural for the member banks, in selecting 
the three industrialists, to choose those who would be friendly to the 
interests of  the banking institutions.  Thus in the course of  time the 
banking  interests  controlled  six  out of  the nine directors of  the 
Federal Reserve banks. 
A second institutional change which brought about a shift from 
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was  the creation of  the ofice  of  governor of  the Federal  Reserve 
banks.  The original Federal  Reserve Act  made  no provision  for 
this office, and so  it had no de jure but only a de facto basis.  In the 
course of  time the governor of  a Federal Reserve bank came to be 
more important than the Federal Reserve agent.  As  the governor 
had no legal existence, he could not be a member of  the board of 
directors, but it became the practice  for the board  of  directors to 
appoint an executive committee composed of  a small group of  its 
membership.  The governor was then appointed to serve as a mem- 
ber of  this committee which came to be the active and controlling 
body of  the Federal  Reserve banks.1° 
In the Banking Act of  1935, an effort was  made to extend the 
control of  the federal government over the appointment of  the gov- 
ernor of  a Reserve bank, but this proposal met with strong opposi- 
tion.  As  a result  the final act  was  a compromise  which  gave the 
Board of  Governors the right to approve the governor  (now called 
president) of  a Federal Reserve bank, but at the same time, permit- 
ted the president to serve for a term of  five years before the Reserve 
Board  of  Governors could again  pass  on his  reappointment.  Al- 
though the president  is not  legally a member of  the board  of  di- 
rectors of  a Reserve bank he can still be a member of  the executive 
committee in accordance with the practice in force in most Federal 
Reserve banks.ll 
OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE 
The third important institution in Federal Reserve organization 
has been  the open market committee.  Ever since the inception  of 
this committee unfortunately it provided  a  battleground  between 
the government  and  the  banking  forces.12  The original  Federal 
Reserve Act provided that open market purchases and sales of  the 
Federal Reserve banks were to be subject to the "rules and regula- 
tions prescribed by the Federal Reserve Board." l3  However, almost 
from  the start the actual  control over  these  operations  was  exer- 
cised by the Federal Reserve Bank of  New York.  In 1914, the Bank 
made its first open market operation in purchasing a block  of  the 
warrants  of  New  York  City.  The other  Federal  Reserve  banks 
joined  in this transaction and requested the New York bank to act 
as agent for them in the purchase  of  these warrants.14  In the fol- 
lowing year the Federal Reserve banks also appointed the Reserve 
Bank of  New  York as their agent in purchasing commercial paper 
in the open market. 
The federal government made an effort to assert its control over 
open market operations in 1915 when  the Reserve Board gave no- 
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tice that it would exercise its right to regulate such transactions if 
they should develop along undesirable lines?5 
With the increased importance of  open market operations after 
1920, the struggle between the Federal Reserve Bank of  New York 
and the Federal  Reserve  Board  for control became  more intense. 
The Federal Reserve banks appointed  an open market committee 
of  their own with the governor of  the Federal Reserve Bank of  New 
York as chairman.  In the following year the Federal Reserve Board 
asserted its authority by replacing this committee with a new "open 
market  investment committee for the Federal Reserve system"  hav- 
ing the same  membership  but appointed  by  the Federal  Reserve 
Board.  In time this committee was replaced by a new group known 
as the Open Market Policy Conference, which included representa- 
tives of the twelve Reserve banks, but the Reserve Board retained 
final approval of  all policies. 
All these open market committees were really extra-legal institu- 
tions created merely  by  agreement between the Reserve banks and 
the Reserve Board.  The Banking Act of  1933 legalized this open 
market  group  and provided  for  a  "Federal  Open  Market  Com- 
mittee"  which  as  later revised  consisted of  seven  members of  the 
Board  of  Governors and five representatives of  the Reserve banks. 
No Federal Reserve bank was to engage in open market operations 
except in accordance with the regulations of  the open market com- 
mittee. 
Under Section  14-b defining open market operations, a Federal 
Reserve bank is permitted to undertake open market operations not 
only at home but also abroad.  Under this power, the Federal Re- 
serve  Bank  of  New  York  gradually  established  financial relations 
with the Bank of  England, the Bank of  France and other important 
central banks of  the world.  This again was a natural development 
of  international security capitalism.  The Banking Act of  1933 how- 
ever definitely vested the administration of  these international i-ela- 
tions with  the Reserve  Board.l6  Thus in the post-war period the 
Federal government extended its control over the various organisms 
of  the central banking system such as the Reserve Board, the Reserve 
Banks and the Open Market Committee.  This trend was similar to 
the movement of  the extension of  governmental regulation of the 
central banks in France, and Germany. 
REGULATION  OF FEDERAL  RESERVE  OPERATIONS -RETREAT  FROM 
THE  ORTHODOX  THEORY 
The original Federal  Reserve  Act  was based  on the orthodox 
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operate the system  on this theory.17  The Federal  Reserve  Act  of 
1913 permitted  the Reserve banks to rediscount  only  commercial 
paper which met definite tests of  eligibility relating to maturity and 
purpose.  However,  early  in the history  of  Reserve  practice  there 
was  a gradual departure from this limited basis.ls  In 1917, under 
the exigencies of  war finance, the Federal Reserve Act was amended 
to permit  the Reserve  banks  to make  advances to member  banks 
not only on eligible commercial paper but also on their promissory 
notes secured by  United States obligations.  This amendment was 
the first legislative recognition of  the impracticability of  the original 
provision  limiting reserve  credit  to  the rediscounting  of  eligible 
commercial paper.  In the years after the close of  the War, the Fed- 
eral Reserve banks began to rediscount eligible paper on condition 
that additional collateral be provided by the borrowing banks.19 
Throughout the post-war period,  the volume  of  eligible paper 
declined sharply.  With the coming of  the depression many banks 
were hard pressed to meet the demands of  their depositors, but were 
unable  to  receive  adequate assistance  from  the  Federal  Reserve 
banks because of  the lack of  acceptable assets for rediscounts.  How- 
ever,  until  1931 the leading officials of  the reserve  system  clung 
stoutly to the orthodox theory,  and opposed  the liberalization of 
the eligibility req~irements.~~ 
By  1932 conditions were so serious that Congress had to broaden 
the base of rediscounts, and Senator Glass, the leading supporter of 
the orthodox  theory  in banking legislation,  introduced  legislation 
recognizing  the  liberal  theory.  The Banking  Act  of  1932  pro- 
vided that in an emergency whenever a member bank with capital 
not exceeding five million dollars had no further eligible assets to 
obtain  adequate  credit  accommodation  from  a  Federal  Reserve 
bank z1  the latter, on the affirmative action of  not less than five mem- 
bers of  the Federal Reserve  Board, could make an advance to the 
member bank on its note collateralled by  ineligible assets.  In the 
hearings on the Banking Act of  1935, a determined effort was made 
further to broaden eligibility.  This movement was led by Marriner 
S.  Eccles, Governor of  the Reserve Board.  He argued convincingly 
against limiting the Federal Reserve banks to the rediscounting of 
only eligible paper by testifying that $~oo,ooo,ooo  of  ineligible paper 
had  been rediscounted  by  the Federal  Reserve banks and all but 
$i,5oo,ooo had been repaid up to the time when he testified.z2  The 
Banking Act of  1935 in its final form eliminated the provision that 
advances on collateralled notes should be made only during an emer- 
gency  and when  the member bank has  no further eligible assets. 
The effect of  this elimination was to transform such advances from 
emergency to regular accommodation which a member bank might 
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receive from its Federal Reserve bank.  This was  one of  the most 
significant changes made by the Banking Act of  1935 in the powers 
of  the Federal  Reserve  banks,  for the Act  rejected  the orthodox 
theory and forwarded the movement for the liberalization of  Federal 
Reserve credit. 
In the entire movement toward liberalization there was only an 
occasional voice raised to urge the granting of  advances collateralled 
by  securities.  In  1918  this  matter  was  presented  to  the  Senate 
Banking Committee in its hearings on the establishment of  the War 
Finance Corp~ration.~~  W. P. G.  Harding, former Governor of  the 
Reserve  Board,  favored  the  liberalization  of  the  rediscounts  of 
the Reserve banks to the extent of  granting advances on high-grade 
bonds.24  The proposal,  however,  was  opposed  by  the Economic 
Policy Commission of  the American Bankers As~ociation.~~ 
The leading figures in the controversy over the liberalization of 
the eligibility  requirements in  1935 apparently had only in mind 
non-security assets such as ineligible commercial paper and real es- 
tate.  Neither  the opponents nor the proponents  in their  public 
utterances gave any indication that they wme considering the inclu- 
sion of  loans collateralled by stocks and bonds.  The  nature of the as- 
sets which may be offered as collateral for advances t.o  banks on their 
notes is not specified in the Banking Act of  1935, but this decision is 
left to the satisfaction of  the Federal Reserve bank.  The  way there- 
fore is left open for a Federal Reserve bank to grant advances based 
on stocks and bonds as collateral.  It is probably doubtful that the 
framers of  this provision had in mind the admission of  such collat- 
eral as the basis for advances by the Federal Reserve banks to mem- 
ber banksz6  but unconsciously they at last gave legal permission  to 
the granting of  advances on security collateral.  In the coming years 
this provision  will  undoubtedIy  be  utilized.  If  properly  adminis- 
tered, it can be developed into one of  the most effective methods of 
directing the flow of  credit into sound channels. 
CONTROL  OF SECURITY  OPERATIONS  OF COMMERCIAL  BANKING 
Control over security capitalism was also exercised through regu- 
lating the security operations of  the commercial banks.  These oper- 
ations were bitterly attacked  after the stock market crash of  1929. 
The Senate Committee on Banking  and Currency which  drafted 
the Banking Act of  1933 was determined to separate the commercial 
and investment operations of  banks and to restore commercial bank- 
ing to its supposedly "pure"  pre-war form.  The  spokesmen for the 
bankers argued desperately against restricting the security operations 
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Reserve Bank of  New  York addressed a carefully drawn  memoran- 
dum to the Senate  Committee on  the  subject of  the relations  be- 
tween the commercial banking system and the capital market.*'  The 
memorandum conceded  "certain  past  defects and the need for the 
prevention  of  possible  future  abuse  of  the capital  market,"  but 
urged  "that  any material  disorganization  of  that market would  be 
most unfortunate."  The memorandum stated the issue in the fol- 
lowing words : 
The broad question  to  be  determined  is  the  extent to  which  the 
capital market should be divorced from the banking system and removed 
from all supervision, or whether its relations with  the  banking system 
should be  maintained and placed under appropriate supervision. 
This was a clear statement of the issue, and public interest would 
have been  better  served had  Congress decided to supervise rather 
than divorce  the capital market from the commercial  banking sys- 
tem.  Certainly it would have saved Congress the inevitable task of 
retracing its course in the years which are yet to come.  However, 
in 1932, the plea of the New York Reserve Bank fell on deaf  ears. 
Over the years there had developed  in the United States really 
two  interrelated  banking  systems.  The commercial  banking  sys- 
tem composed largely of national  and state  banks,  headed  by  the 
Federal  Reserve banks  and the Board, was  under  careful  govern- 
mental supervision.  The investment banking system, composed of 
investment  dealers  (including the  security  affiliates), and  brokers 
capped by  the stock exchanges, was largely outside government con- 
trol.. Over the years the relations between the two systems had be- 
come closely intertwined.  The Ennking Act of  1933 sought to per- 
form the major operation of  severing these relationships which had 
largely been the result of the natural evolution of  security capitalism. 
The most  important  objective  was  tlie amputation of  the security 
affiliates from the commercial banks.  The  Act prohibited any finan- 
cial institution  from simultaneously engaging in investment  hank- 
ing operations such as underwriting or dealing in securities and in 
commercial banking operations such as receiving dcposits.  The Act 
further required  that bank  officers were not to be  associated with 
any partnerships or corporations, except mutual savings banks, which 
obtained  loans  on  stocks  or  bonds.  This section  was  aimed  to 
strengthen the Clayton Act of  1914 which had prohibited interlock- 
ing directorates but which had been amended in 1916 so as to give 
the local Federal  Reserve bank  the power  to  grant exemptions in 
exceptional cases.  In time such exemptions became  the rule, and 
the Banking Act of  1933 sought to end them. 
In drafting the Banking Act of  1935 efforts  were made to retrace 
some of  these steps.  The Senate draft of  the Banking Act of  1935 
(section 308) sought to restore the underwriting powers of  national 
banks  subject  to regulations  by  the comptroller  of  the currency. 
Senator Glass, in urging this proposal,  admitted the failure of  the 
restrictive measures which he had included in the Banking Act of 
1933, in the statement that : 
We  prohibited outright any  underwriting, by  a commercial bank.  We 
did  it  with  the  avowed  hope  and  expectation  that  thereafter  there 
would  be  organized  in  this  country  underwriting houses  such  as  exist 
in Great Britain and continental Europe . .  . That did not take place.28 
This provision  was  not  included  in the  final  draft  of  the Act. 
However, the Banking Act did in a measure weaken the original pro- 
visions of  the Clayton Act regarding interbanking directorates, for 
the Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve system was  author. 
ized by  general regulation rather than individual permit  to allow 
interlocking directorates.  Furthermore, the prohibition against in- 
terlocking relationships between banks and trust companies and in- 
stitutions which made loans secured by stock or bond collateral was 
repealed.  Thus year after year there was a continual struggle aris- 
ing  from  the  efforts  of  financial  evolution  to  free  itself  from 
legislative restraints which have sought to mould the course of  bank- 
ing organization into a legal form contrary to the natural trends of 
developed  security capitalism  in this  country  and abroad.  This 
conflict brought loss not only to the individual banker but also to 
the public as a whole. 
CONTROL  OVER  SECURITY LOANS 
The Banking  Act  of  1938 corrected  one of  the most  flagrant 
abuses of  the capital market by restricting the use of  bank credit for 
the purpose of  carrying securities.  The Act  (section 3) directed that 
each Federal Reserve bank should keep itself informed on "the gen- 
eral character and amount of  the loans and investments of  its mem- 
ber banks, for the purpose  of  determining whether  undue use  is 
being made of  bank credit for the speculation, carrying or trading 
in securities, real estate or commodities."  Any member bank which 
made undue use of  reserve credit for speculative purposes was, upon 
the judgment  of  the Federal  Reserve  Board, to be denied further 
credit facilities.  Furthermore under section 7 of  the Act the Federal 
Reserve Board was further empowered to fix the amount of  credit 
which might be extended  by  member  banks  for  speculative pur- 
poses.  Again, section g provided that if a member bank was obtain- 
ing accommodation from a Federal  Reserve bank and at the same 
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the bank should become immediately due and payable and the bank 
should become  ineligible as  borrower  for as long a  period as the 
Federal Reserve Board might determine. 
REGULATION OF BANK  INVESTMENTS 
The federal government made little effort to regulate the quality 
of  the investments of  member banks.  In 1927 the comptroller was 
given  the power to define the "investment  securities"  held  by  na- 
tional banksz8  but he took a limited view of  his powers by merely 
ruling  that such  investment  securities  must  be  "marketable."  In 
the Banking Act  of  1933,~~  the comptroller was again  given  power 
to define the scope of  the term "investment securities," but again he 
merely  reiterated  the  same  feeble  regulation  on  marketabilit~.~l 
However, in 1936 the comptroller made the first attempt to control 
the quality of  the investments of  the commercial banks,32  and pro- 
hibited member banks of  the Federal Reserve system, including not 
only national but also state banks and trust companies,  from pnr- 
chasing securities  "in  which  the investment characteristics  are dis- 
tinctly  or predominantly speculative  or investment  securities of  a 
lower designation standard than those which  are distinctly or pre- 
dominantly speculative."  This ruling therefore required that bank 
officers and also bank examiners study the statistical information on 
a bond and determine whether it was either of  investment or specula- 
tive character.  In case  of  doubt reference could be made  to the 
rating manuals of  the statistical agencies.  This regulation was  un- 
doubtedly a step in the right direction in seeking to raise the quality 
of  bank investments. 
STATE REGULATION  OF INVESTMENTS  OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
In general the investments of  state banks which were not mem- 
bers of the Reserve system continued to be unregulated.  Several 
states regulated  the investments of  the savings deposits of  commer- 
cial banks, and the investments of  the mutual savings banks of  the 
northeastern states were prescribed in a state legal list.  These legal 
lists generally permitted the investment of  savings funds in railroad, 
utility and municipal and real estate bonds, while industrial bonds 
and all forms of  stock, except stock of  banks, located with the state, 
were  barred.  The investment  standards established  by  the states 
were in many cases based on the investment experience of  the nine- 
teenth and early twentieth centuries in the period of  developing se- 
curity capitalism and proved inadequate in the critical years of  the 
nineteen thirties.  There was  a growing consciousness of  these de- 
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fects of  the legal list, and most states made progress in revising their 
standards to meet the new conditions in the investment market.3s 
The state laws governing the investment  of  trust funds varied 
widely as to the types of  securities which were legal.  Alabama took 
the extreme position in its state constitution which provided :  "that 
no act of  the legislature shall acuthorize  the investment of  any trust 
funds by  executors,  administrators,  guardians or other trustees  in 
the bonds  or stocks of  any  private  corporation."  34  Thus, at one 
sweep, Alabama settled the issue of  legal investments by prohibiting 
the investment of  trust funds in any corporate security whatsoever. 
At  the  same  time  Tennessee  permitted  the  investment  of  trust 
funds  in securities of  any  foreign  government  which  maintained 
diplomatic relations with the United States.  Louisiana  prohibited 
the investment  of  trust  funds  in railroad  bonds but allowed  the 
investment  in railroad stocks selling at or over par and regularly 
paying a dividend of  4 percent annually for at least five years before 
the date of  investment.  Corporate trustees were also permitted to 
invest in the bonds of  any county or municipality anywhere in the 
United States, with the only restriction that the bonds must be sell- 
ing at or above par and show no default in interest for two years 
before the date of  investment.  The state thus set up simple invest- 
ment tests and refused to concern itself with all the technical invest- 
ment  standards such as the relation of  debt to assessed  valuation, 
and the burden of  overlapping debt which should be carefully con- 
sidered in investing in municipal securities. 
The laws  of  the State of  New  York  regulating the investment 
of  trust funds were probably  more rigid  than  those  of  any other 
state.  However, in discussing these laws  George  A.  Slater, Surro- 
gate of  Westchester  county uttered the following note of  criticism: 
"The Legislature while  protecting  savings banks  depositors threw 
open to a wide degree, the throttle of  safety of  the machinery of  the 
law, for the protection of  testamentary trusts and guardian funds," 
and  added  that  "it  would  appear  that  the  Legislature  lacked 
vision."  S5 
The regulation  of  the security investments of  insurance  com- 
panies  also varied considerably.  Certain states, as  Connecticut  and 
Virginia,  permitted  insurance  companies to invest  their  funds in 
all securities not definitely prohibited.  Conversely, other states as 
New York, prohibited companies from investing in any securities not 
definitely authorized.  In later years theye was a movement to liber- 
alize these statutes.  In 1929 the states of  Georgia and Minnesota per- 
mitted life insurance companies to invest in bonds  and preferred 
and common stock of  all solvent  institution^.^^  Likewise Vermont 
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insurance funds in public utility and railroad  bonds.37  New York 
State even  permitted  insurance companies  to invest  in guaranteed 
and preferred stock.38  This step was particularly significant in view 
of  the fact that New York State ever since the Armstrong investiga- 
tion  of  1905 had  followed a conservative  policy  in  regulating the 
investments of  insurance companies.  The action was also important 
because a large part of  the insurance funds of  the United States come 
within the scope of  the jurisdiction  of New  York  State.  Though 
New York permitted investment in preferred stock, it continued to 
prohibit investment in common stock. 
In reviewing  the course of  state government  regulation  of  the 
investment  of  saving, trust  and life  insurance  funds,  it  is evident 
that there was a general trend toward liberalization and a widening 
of  the volume of  securities available for such investment.  At  first 
such  legal  investments  were limited  to government  securities,  and 
then to railroad  bonds.  In time public  utilities, particularly  elec- 
tric light and power  companies,  were  included.  Eventually  there 
was a gradual departure from this limited base and investment was 
permitted not only in bonds,  but also in preferred stock and even 
in common stock in some instances, for trust and insurance funds. 
It is not entirely unreasonable to anticipate that industrial securities 
in the course of  time will also be legal, particularly  in view  of  the 
increased stability of  large industrial corporations in the post-war 
period. 
SUSPENSION  OF  REGULATION  OF INVESTMENTS 
The successive  financial  crises of  recent  years  brought  heavy 
losses to banks on their investments.  These reverses were so severe 
that they forced the supervising governmental bodies to suspend the 
operation of  their regulations in order to save many of  the financial 
institutions from receivership.  In the fall of  1917 there was a sharp 
drop in the value of  bonds, particularly of  railroads and so on Octo- 
ber 15, 1917 the comptroller made the following statement: 
In  view  of  a11  conditions,  the  ComptroIlcr  of  Currency  has  in- 
structed National  banks holding high ,grade bonds  of  unquestioned in- 
trinsic value and merit, not to charge such investments down to present 
abnormal  figures ; but  an  intelligent  and  conservative discretion will 
be  exercised  as  to  the prices  at which  National  banks  can  safely  and 
reasonably  be  permitted  to  carry  such  high  class  securities, and  as  to 
what  proportion of  the depreciation should be  charged off  in any  six 
months' period.39 
State banking departments followed a similar  The collapse 
of  the bond market in 1920 again forced the federal and state bank- 
ing departments to pursue a similar policy. 
With the collapse of bond prices in 193  1, the national and state 
banking departments, in order to prevent widespread bank closings, 
were again forced to adopt drastic policies.  The comptroller ruled 
that national banks were permitted to refrain from writing off de- 
preciation on their high grade corporate bonds and on all the state 
and municipal bonds if  they were not in default.  These assets could 
be entered at their full value, on the ground that the depreciation 
of  high grade securities was due purely to momentary market fluctua- 
tion~.'~  On speculative and inferior grade bonds,  the banks were 
required  to make  a reasonable  reduction  for  depreciation.  This 
pdicy was  adopted  "in  the public  interest,"  and bank  examiners 
were given wide latitude in applying the ruling.  Where a severe 
write-off would have impaired the capital of  a bank, and therefore 
its solvency, the comptroller required only reasonable depreciation 
charges on bonds which had declined in value but which were not 
speculative or in default on interest. 
The closing weeks  of  1931 witnessed  a virtual  collapse  of  the 
bond market, and the comptroller, in issuing his call for the end of 
the year, advised examiners "to  use their discretion in virtually all 
types of  bonds, other than those which actually had been defaulted 
in fixing values that are considered fair."  The  comptroller held the 
view  that in many  instances  prices  that  had  been  quoted on the 
exchange  were  "perfectly  absurd."42  In the beginning  of  1932, 
the comptroller continued his policy because he was  satisfied that 
the prices at which many types of  bonds frequently sold in the market 
did not represent their true value."3 
Thus the government regulatory bodies in order to avoid a recog- 
nition  of  the impairment of  the banking system  were again and 
again forced to pose  as investment experts, to issue wise proclama- 
tions on investment values and to engage in metaphysical discussions 
of  intrinsic values of  which  they would have been hard pressed  to 
explain the meaning.  They were also forced to adopt policies based 
on legal fiction in order to keep open banking institutions actually 
insolvent due to the impairment of  their capital resulting from losses 
on their security holdings. 
The same policy had to be followed  in the case of  the invest- 
ments of  the insurance companies.  In 1931 the National  Conven- 
tion of Insurance Commissioners adopted a general resolution  per- 
mitting insurance companies in their annual statements of  Decem- 
ber  31,  1931 to carry  their securities  at the higher market values 
which had prevailed  as of  June 30,  1931.  As  the security market 
continued to fall, the Convention in December  1932, permitted the 
companies to carry their securities at practically the same valuation 
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GOVERNMENTAL  SUPPORT OF FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 
As seen before the European governments were forced to come to 
the aid of  their financial institutions in the crisis of  1920-192  1 and 
again in the crisis of  igzg-1933.  The United States Government 
took similar action through the formation of  the War Finance Cor- 
poration, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
The first step of  the government in granting direct financial aid 
to private industry came in the formation of  the War Finance Cor- 
p~ration.~~  Owing to the financial uncertainty of  the war period, 
commercial banks were unwilling to tie up  a large part of  their assets 
in securities or ineligible paper,  There was also uncertainty over 
the position of  the savings banks, since they could not be members 
of  the Federal Reserve system but at the same time faced the pos- 
sibility  of  heavy  withdrawals by  their  depositors.  To meet  these 
needs  Congress created  the War Finance  Corporation.  Its stock 
was  subscribed by the treasury, and the Corporation was managed 
by a board of  directors appointed by  the President, with the secre- 
tary of  the treasury as chairman.  The Corporation was empowered 
to grant loans to commercial  banks extending credit to borrowers 
whose operations were necessary to the prosecution of  the War and 
to savings banks facing heavy withdrawals by their depositors.  The 
quality of  the collateral for such loans was not carefully defined, and 
so the Corporation was really an agency whose purpose was to grant 
loans for war  purposes  and to rediscount  the ineligible  paper  of 
hard-pressed banking instit~tions.~~  However, little use was  made 
of  the resources of  the War Finance Corporation during the period 
of  h~stilities.'~  The savings banks did not avail themselves of  this 
assistance, since  the necessity  for  it  did not  materialize.  In the 
,  period  immediately  following  the War, the Corporation extended 
advances to the railroads due to the failure of  the passage  of  the 
Congressional appropriation bill which contained provision for the 
governmental  operation  of  the roads.  In  1920 the  Corporation 
granted export credits to stimulate international trade and in 1921 
it extended advances to finance agriculture.  In 1925 it began  the 
liquidation of  its operations. 
It was  not, however,  until the depression after  1929, that the 
federal  government granted  direct  financial  assistance  on  an  ex- 
tensive scale.  For this purpose Congress created the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation to aid practically all forms of  financial institu- 
tions, as commercial banks,  trust companies,  savings banks, build- 
ing and loan associations, and insurance companies, as well as rail- 
roads,  cities,  states  and  agriculture.  The loans  were  to  have  a 
maturity  of  not exceeding  three years and the security was  to be 
adequate.  The procedure for granting such a loan required first a 
formal  application  together  with  detailed  financial  statements. 
Based on credit analysis, the loan was then approved by the Recon- 
struction Finance Corporation, the collateral to secure the loan was 
deposited and the funds were then made available to the applying 
institution.  The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was  similar 
to the institutions formed  in various European  countries to over- 
come serious weaknesses in the financial structure resulting from the 
adverse effects of  the prolongation of  the depression. 
According  to radical  economic  philosophy,  the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation represented  "State financial aid to sustain tot- 
tering  private  industry,"  and it was  considered  as  "definite  evi- 
dence of  the decline of  American  ~apitalism."~~  This interpreta- 
tion was too pessimistic, since a large part of  the advances made by 
the Reconstruction  Finance Corporation was repaid, and it is prob- 
able that most  of  the remaining loans are recoverable due to the 
care exercised in obtaining sound collateral. 
While the actual experience of  the Reconstruction Finance Cor- 
poration does not substantiate the Cassandra prophecies of  its critics, 
nevertheless the Corporation must be regarded as a public financial 
institution created  to  perform a  function  which  private  financial 
institutions were unwilling or unable to perform.48 
FEDERAL DEPOSIT  INSURANCE  CORPORATION 
Not only did the federal government  grant direct assistance to 
the financial institutions of  security capitalism but it also guaranteed 
some of  the liabilities of  the banking institutions through the crea- 
tion of  the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. It was established 
under the Banking Act of  1953 and revised by  the Banking Act of 
1935.  The  revised system provided for a Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation headed by a board of directors consisting of  three mem- 
bers,  including the  comptroller  of  the  currency  and  two  other 
members,  appointed  by  the President,  with  the approval  of  the 
Senate.60 The  funds of  the Corporation were derived from contribu- 
tions by the treasury and by the Federal  Reserve banks, and from 
assessments on the member banks in the system.  Compulsory insur- 
ance was required of  all banks which were members of  the Federal 
Reserve system.  These banks were assessed at the rate of  one-twelfth 
of one percent of their total deposits and insurance protection was 
extended only to deposits up to and including $5,000. 
The plan served to strength public confidence in the commer- 
cial banking system and for this reason alone the Act justified itself. PUBLIC  CONTROL  305 
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However, the fundamental weakness of  the plan was  its failure to 
make adequate financial provision to meet the risks which commer- 
cial banking faces  under security capitalism  due to the increased 
holdings of  securities whose values fluctuated markedly.  A recent 
study shows that the funds of  the Corporation would have been in- 
sufficient to meet losses of  failing banks, assuming that the existence 
of  the Corporation had no effect on the number of  bank  failures. 
This conclusion  is based on a comparison of  a hypothetical assess- 
ment of  one-twelfth of one percent on the total deposits of  active com- 
merical  banks with the actual losses on total deposits in suspended 
banks from 1865 to 1934.  Such an assessment would have been in- 
sufficient  in the difficult years of  the seventies; generally  sufficient 
after 1878 with the exception of  the depression years of  1882, 1896 
and 1907; and entirely insufficient after 1919.  The  cumulative losses 
above the assessments from 1930 to 1934 alone would have amounted 
to $2,~oo,ooo,ooo."  It must however be noted that these are losses 
on total deposits whereas only deposits less than $5000 are insured. 
However  the losses on deposits of  less than $5000 in closed banks 
between  January  1,  1931 and March  15, 1933 alone amounted to 
$i,~oo,ooo,ooo  as compared with the capital of  $326,ooo,ooo of  the 
Deposit Insurance Corporati~n.~~ 
In the event of  the deficiency in the fund of  the Corporation, no 
additional sum may be collected from the Federal  Reserve  banks, 
since  under  the Act  they  are not  apparently  liable  beyond  their 
original assessments.  It would, however, be possible under the Act 
for the secretary of  tfie treasury to purchase an additional sum of 
$25o,ooo,ooo par value of  the obligations of  the Corporation when 
required for insurance purposes.  It would therefore seem that the 
funds of  the Deposit Insurance Corporation have so far come largely 
from the government, and in the future in case of  emergency would 
be derived largely from the federal treasury which would then seek 
repayment through assessment on the banks in future years. 
CONTROL OVER DEMAND FOR CAPITAL -  MUNICIPAL FINANCE 
The Federal government exercised little control over municipal 
finance.  An effort in this direction was made in the passage of  the 
National Municipal Bankruptcy Act which was to facilitate insolvent 
municipalities in adjusting their debts by  agreements with the ma- 
jority  of  their creditors.  The Supreme Court, however,  declared 
the act unconstitutional on the ground that it thus constituted inter- 
ference in the affairs of  the local  government and thus impaired 
state sovereignty. 
For many years most of  the states had exercised some form of 
control to limit the debtcontracting power  of  the municipalities 
within their jurisdictions.  New Jersey,  particularly,  established  a 
comprehensive limitation of municipal debt, and Massachusetts also 
enacted a drastic law for the purpose of  restricting the incurrence of 
municipal  debts.5s  These limitations generally  required  that the 
municipal debt could not be extended beyond a certain percentage 
of  the assessed valuation of  local property.  Some states also limited 
the debt in relation to the annual revenues of the municipality.  In 
other states restrictions were also placed  on the maximum  period 
within which the debt must mature.  Limitations were also placed 
on taxation which was  usually restricted to a certain percentage  of 
the assessed valuation of property within the confines of  the munici- 
pality.  Students of  municipal finance were generally in agreement 
that such debt and tax limitations were  ineffective in maintaining 
sound municipal finance. 
Municipal defaults became particularly serious after 1929, and as 
a result, there was a considerable extension of control over munici- 
pal finance by  such states as Massachusetts, New Jersey  and North 
Carolina.  Due to loss of  revenue-producing  power  caused by  the 
decline of  the textile industry in the years before  the depression, 
Fall River faced serious difficulties after 1930.  Massachusetts, there- 
fore, instituted what amounted to a state receivership in 1931, and 
appointed a "state board of  finance."  54 
In 193  1 New Jersey passed a law creating a State Commission on 
municipal finance for the purpose of  administering the numerous 
local government defaults within the state.55  Under this law either 
a holder of  a defaulted bond or a municipality itself could apply to 
the State Commission for the appointment of a receiver.  This offi- 
cial was  then given extensive control over the budget and over the 
debt of  the defaulted municipality.  He  was expected to rehabilitate 
the finances by  reducing  expenditures and by  obtaining tax pay- 
ments either through compromises on delinquent taxes, or, if  such 
compromises were unavailing, through the enforcement of  tax sales. 
In this way, the receiver was expected to bring about the payment 
of the municipal debt without reduction of  the capital sum. 
The most extensive form of state control over local finance was 
instituted in the Municipal Finance Act of  North Carolina passed 
in 1931.~~  Under this Act the State Commission possessed  not only 
temporary  administrative  power  in time  of  default  but exercised 
continuous supervision  over  local  finance.  The Commission  was 
vested with complete control over debt creation and in order to issue 
notes or bonds local governments had to obtain the approval of  the 
state commission.  In arriving at its decision, the Commission was 
to consider such factors as whether the amount of  the proposed bond FINANCE CAPITALISM  PUBLIC CONTROL 
issue was  excessive,  whether the resulting increase  in the tax rate 
would be burdensome and whether the local government was in de- 
fault on any  of  its existing  indebtedness.  The commission  also 
supervised  the investment  of  the sinking  fund assets  of  the local 
governments.  The maladministration of  sinking funds  has  been 
one of  the most serious abuses of  municipal finance throughout the 
United  States, for  time  and again  local officials had  placed  these 
funds  in  improper  assets.  The North  Carolina  Commission  was 
given  the power to designate the assets eligible for the investment 
of  sinking funds.  The Commission was  also empowered to bring 
about uniform  municipal  accounting and to institute a  system of 
regular reports and examinations. 
REGULATION  OF  RAILWAY  AND  UTILITY  FINANCE 
In the post-war period, the federal government extended its con- 
trol over railway financing under the Transportation Act of  1920.~~ 
One of  the fundamental purposes  of  this Act  was to maintain the 
credit of  the railroads and so attract capital for the improvement of 
railway service.  The Transportation Act gave the Interstate Com- 
merce  Commission control over the issue of  new securities by  the 
railroads.  The only  excepted  securities were  those  which  had  a 
maturity of less than two years and which were less than five percent 
of the par value of  a company's outstanding securities.  The Com- 
mission also had the power to fix the minimum price which a rail- 
road was to receive for a new issue.58  The Commission could also 
scrutinize the profits  of  the bankers underwriting railroad  issues, 
and at various times tried to prevent excessive fees.  In the railway 
field for many years it was the practice of  a road to float all its issues 
through the same banking house.  The Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission opposed this system of  closed relationship between railroads 
and banking houses, and insisted upon the policy of  open competi- 
tive bidding whenever  the railroads sought  to obtain new capital 
through equipment trusts.6B 
Over these years the state public utility commissions continued 
to exercise  extensive  control over  the financing of  these  corpora- 
tion~.~~  The commissions regulated  particularly  the capitalization 
of  the utility companies, and determined the amount of  stock which 
could be issued in relation to the volume of  bonds or LO  the earnings 
of  the company.  Holding company  control  has  often  obstructed 
regulation  by  public  service Commissions.  Through service con- 
tracts, overcapitalization and other means, holding companies have 
frequently rendered such control ineffective and at times even im- 
possible. 
REGULATION  OF  FOREIGN  FINANCE 
With the growth  in the volume  of  new  foreign  securities the 
federal government began to exercise control over this type of  financ- 
ing.  At first this regulation was for the purpose of  supporting the 
interests of  American bankers in their competition for such loans.61 
In the period  from  1914 until  1917 the national government  also 
attempted to control the sale of  the bonds of  the belligerent nations 
in  the  New  York  market.62  A  definite  statement  of  the  policy 
of  the American  government  toward the growing volume  of  capi- 
tal  export  in  the  post-war  period  was  enunciated  in  1922.  In 
192 1 several members of  President  Harding's  cabinet held a con- 
ference with a group of  investment bankers interested  in interna- 
tional finance.  At  this meeting the government expressed the de- 
sire to be kept informed of  the future capital movements from this 
country, and the banking group was asked to cooperate in furnishing 
the government with this information.*  Under date of  March  3, 
1922, the government issued its "Statement  for the Press on Flota- 
tions of  Foreign  Loans"  which  declared  that:  " . . . it  is hoped 
that American concerns that contemplate foreign loans will inform 
the Department of  State in due time of  the essential facts and sub- 
sequent  developments  of  importance."  This  statement  became 
known as the "ruling of  1922" and formed the basis of the govern- 
ment's  policy  regarding  the control  of  our foreign  loans in the 
twenties.  Under this ruling a definite procedure of  control over the 
flotation  of  foreign loans was establi~hed.~~  An American banking 
house, contemplating the flotation of  a foreign loan, would send to 
the State Department a written memorandum giving the important 
details of  the prospective  loan and asking whether there were any 
objections to it.  Thereupon the State Department with the coopera- 
tion of  other departments, undertook  an investigation of  the loan 
from the standpoint of  public policy.  Various government agencies 
particularly  the  Commerce  Department  began  to collect  data  on 
foreign financial developments, and usually there was adequate in- 
formation available to serve as a basis for judging whether the pro- 
posed loan was in accordance with public policy. 
Attempts were made by Congress to supplement or supersede the 
informal executive ruling of  1922 by  a formal act of  the legislature. 
Senator  Glass  particularly  attacked  its  legality  and  insisted  that 
the practice of  the State Department amounted to approval of  the 
issuance of  foreign bonds, and criticized the Department for "usurp- 
ing of  a banking function  and engaging in lawless activities."  He 
added that "the foreign bonds were sold to the investors of  this coun- 
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In general governmental control over foreign investment in the 
case of  the United States was relatively slight.  The American gov- 
ernment  did not  use  its power  to derive any  direct  political  ad- 
vantage for the United States.  Furthermore, the policy of  the Amer- 
ican government did not result in political complication.  Although 
American  investors  in the post-war period  lost  millions of  dollars 
in the defaults by  South American and by  European governments, 
in no case did such action bring about American  intervention  or 
direct political action. 
GENERAL  REGULATION  BY  STATE  BLUE  SKY  LAWS 
In addition to the regulation  of  specific classes of  securities as 
municipal, railway, utility and foreign issues, the state and the fed- 
eral governments also  exercised  general  control  over  the demand 
for capital.  Such general  regulation by  the state government was 
expressed in the passage of  the so-called "blue sky"  laws to prohibit 
the sale of  fraudulent issues.66  A series of  proceedings  were  insti- 
tuted to test the constitutionality of  the state blue sky laws and at 
first the courts took an unfavorable view.  However, after a num- 
ber of  contradictory opinions in the lower courts, the constitution- 
ality of  the basic principle of  the blue sky legislation was upheld by 
the Supreme Court of  the United StatesB7 
The  regulation of securities under these statutes was at first very 
limited.  Although the United States as a whole had experienced a 
rapid development of  security capitalism, the system was largely con- 
centrated in a small number of security markets.  Throughout the 
rest  of  the country the financial machinery  was  still undeveloped 
and most  of  the states  did not have  important  security  markets. 
However, after 1920 with  the extension of  security capitalism the 
need of  state regulation over security issues became pressing, and so 
state laws were  more  fully  developed.  These state laws may  be 
classified in two groups.  Fraud acts sought to punish fraud in the 
sale of  securities and general blue sky laws attempted to regulate the 
sale of  all but certain  exempted securitie~.~~  The fraud act gen- 
erally requires no registration of securities and is not in the true sense 
a blue sky law.  An example of  this type is the Martin Act of  New 
York under which criminal action can be brought against the issuers 
and dealers in fraudulent securities.  On the other hand, a real blue 
sky  law  makes  it unlawful to issue or sell  securities without first 
obtaining permission  of  the state within  which  the securities are 
to be sold.  Exemption is granted to certain classes of  securities, as 
the issues of  the United States Government, a state, a political sub- 
division, a friendly foreign government, or a public utility company 
supervised by a state government.  Because of  the variation in the 
blue  sky  laws,  the  National  Conference  of  Commissioners  on 
Uniform State Laws in 1922 began  the preparation  of  a uniform 
blue sky law, which in 1930 was finally adopted by the Conference 
and later approved by the American Bar Association.69 
In explaining the state laws on security regulation  the officials 
generally went out of  their way to indicate that such legislation was 
limited in scope and did not extend to the control of  the quality 
of  the  securities  being  issued.  Thus,  Attorney-General  Albert 
Ottinger of  New  York, in explaining the Martin Fraud Act to the 
National Association of  Security Commissioners, stated that : 
It,  (the Martin Act) does not create the licensing system because we 
believe  in  this  state the volume of  business  is  so  vast  that  it  would 
be absolutely impossible to pass upon the merits of  particular securities, 
and  that  being  so,  it would  be  most  unfortunate  for investors to  be 
seized by  the notion that there was  a state guarantee or a state sanction 
or a state approval of  the particular security which  is being sold to the 
people.T0 
However,  in  the actual  administration  of  the law,  the  attorney- 
general of  New York was often forced to exercise wide discretion 
which came close to qualitative control, as indicated by the fact that 
he drew up definite rules of  practice for certain classes of  securities 
"in  the public  interest."  Thus,  in 1926,  the attorney-general 
formulated definite rules regarding real estate mortgage bonds which 
went far beyond merely the elimination of  fraud, and established 
rules of  quality for the protection of investors in this type of  security. 
Again,  in a  report  on investment  trusts,  the attorney-general in- 
cluded specific statements as to the tests which this type of  security 
should pass. 
GENERAL REGULATION BY  THE FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT -  CAPITAL 
ISSUES  COMMITTEE 
The  first effort made by the federal government at general regula- 
tion of  the demand for capital occurred during the War through the 
agency of  the Capital Issues Committee.  The  operation of  this little- 
known organization was of  deep significance, since it constituted a 
general regulation of  both the quality and the quantity of the de- 
mand for ~apital.'~  The first intimation that the government was 
planning to control the capital market came in June 1917 in the 
press statement that "the closing of  money markets to further foreign 
government bond issues is regarded as imperative if  the Government 
is to remain master  of  the financial  situation." l3  The increasing 
pressure of  government financing brought about a better realization 
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The first exercise of formal governmental control over the flota- 
tion of  new capital issues was evidenced in a letter written by  Sec- 
retary McAdoo to the Miami conservation  district which was plan- 
ning to float a  large bond  issue  for  flood control  purposes.  Mr. 
McAdoo made the following statement : 
It  is  my  hope  that  others charged  with  similar  responsibilities in 
respect to the financing of  enterprises both public and private will make 
it  their practice to  consult with  the  Secretary  of  the Treasury before 
undertaking any  new  financing, or indeed before making commitments 
or expenditures that would require it to be financed by  borrowings.74 
This publicly-stated  wish  of the treasury  was  generally  respected, 
and so corporations and local governments submitted their requests 
to the federal government. 
The work of passing on these new issues was referred to a com- 
mittee consisting of three  members of  the Federal  Reserve  Board 
assisted by an advisory committee of  three bankers.  In each Federal 
Reserve district there was a local committee consisting of  the chair- 
man and the governor of  the Federal Reserve bank, and three other 
members including usually a banker, a public utility official and a 
manufacturer.  These local committees were consulted by  the com- 
mittee of  the Federal Reserve Board in determining whether a new 
issue was  "compatible with the public interest."  75 
This informal organization was given official status as the Capital 
Issues  Committee.  The formal  organization  of  this  government 
agency for control of  the capital market was the same as the previous 
informal  system.  There was  a national  Capital  Issues Committee 
composed of  three members of  the Federal Reserve Board and three 
advisory members, and in addition in each district there was a local 
sub-c~mmittee.~~ 
The primary purpose  of  the Capital  Issues  Committee was  to 
control the volume of  securities  floated.  As  one official  declared, 
"the first direct reason for having the control of  capital issues is to 
prevent  competition in the money  markets."77  In addition, how- 
ever, the agency also exercised qualitative control over new  issues. 
This is evident from an official statement that in performing their 
work the local committee members 
consider whether  that  corporation embarking in time of  war is  apt to 
achieve financial success, or whether it is not ; whether the men engaged 
in it are of  the proper character ; whether the subject-matter of  the new 
corporation  is  one  which  serves  a war  purpose.  And  then,  over  and 
beyond that, they also consider the plan and method whereby the moneys 
are to be  obtained by  that particular corporation to finance its work.78 
The  reports of  the local committees were carefuly studied by the 
Capital  Issues  Committee which  was  "thinking  in national  terms 
and acting in national terms."  The Committee was advised by well 
qualified experts.  Thus both the local and the national committees, 
in addition to considering merely the question of  the "compatibility" 
of a particular issue in relation to war finance, actually undertook a 
study of the credit position of  the prospective  issuer of  securities. 
The significant feature of  the Capital Issues Committee was the fact 
that it undertook both quantitative and even qualitative control of 
the capital market. 
The Committee, however,  made  it clear that its approval  of  a 
proposed  financial undertaking was  not  to be  construed  to  mean 
"that the committee had passed upon the credit standing of  the com- 
pany issuing the securities, or that it was recommending the security 
to the public as a  desirable investment."  70  In another statement 
the Committee said  that it would not "express  any  opinion  upon 
the intrinsic merits of  the securities to be offered for sale,"  and it 
was concerned only with whether the issue was timely in respect to 
the financial operations to be undertaken by  the government  and 
whether the purposes  for which  the funds were  to be raised, were 
compatible with national interest.*O 
The work  of the Capital  Issues  Committee was  considerable. 
Between  May  17, 1918 when the formal committee was organized 
and November  1  1,  1918 when the Armistice was signed, the Com- 
mittee passed upon 2,289 applications involving new securities with 
a par or face value of  $2,564,021,000.s1  In addition to this volume 
of securities which were approved, the Committee considered numer- 
ous issues which  were  not  approved.  In many cases  applications 
were voluntarily withdrawn, and thus the Committee exercised con- 
siderable influence in restricting the unnecessary use of  capital. 
With the close of  the War, the Committee unanimously recom- 
mended that "federal supervision of  security issues here undertaken 
for the first time  should be continued by  some public agency."82 
However,  there  was  a  general  feeling,  as  stated  by  Dr.  Willis, 
that  the  "limitation  of  investment  had  undoubtedly caused  con- 
siderable hardship."  During the administration of  Secretary of  the 
Treasury Glass, the Committee was advised that it might be well to 
reduce its activities" and soon thereafter was abolished entirely.B8 
FEDERAL  SECURITIES  ACT 
The  move for general federal regulation of  the demand for capi- 
tal came in  1918 when  the Capital Issues  Committee proposed  a 
federal securities act which was recommended to Congress by Presi- 
dent Wils~n.~'  This bill also had the support of  Secretary of  the 
Treasury Glass but the bill was  not reported out of  CommitteeT6 FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
Other bills to regulate the sale of investment securities were intro- 
duced in Congress, particularly in the years immediately following 
the close of  the War, but were not enacted.  The most  important 
of  these early bills was that of  E. T. Taylor, of  color ad^.^^  This 
bill was not passed by Congress but it later formed the basis for the 
Securities Act of  i 933.87 
In 1933  Congress passed  the Securities  Act  designed  "to  pro- 
vide full and fair disclosure of  the character  of  securities sold  in 
interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails and to pre- 
vent frauds in the sale thereof." ss  The purpuse  of  this Act  was 
not to replace state laws regulating securities but rather to supple- 
ment them, and in addition to furnish the investor with  more de- 
tailed financial  information, statistics and data.  The fundamental 
part of  the statute (Section 12)  provided severe penalties if  a prospec- 
tus "includes  an untrue statement of  a  material fact or omits to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements not 
misleading."  The Act, following the general content of  state blue 
sky laws, exempted from its provisions a number of  securities such 
as those issued or guaranteed by the United States, by any state, or 
by any political subdivision of  a state or territory, those issued by a 
corporation organized for non-profit making purposes, by a building 
and loan or similar association, or by  a common carrier subject to 
the Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  certificates issued  by  a  re- 
ceiver in bankruptcy, insurance policies issued by a corporation op- 
erating  under  a  state insurance commission,  and notes  or drafts 
with maturities not exceeding  nine months.  The federal act also 
exempted various types of  financial transactions, such as those con- 
ducted by  persons other than issuers, underwriters, or dealers and 
transactions not involving any public offering, brokers'  transactions 
executed  upon  customers'  orders,  and  the  exchange of  securities 
without payment of  a commission. 
With the exception of  these exempted securities and transactions, 
the law  applied to all securities in the sense of  notes,  bonds, de- 
bentures,  transferable shares, or certificates of  interest in property, 
tangible or intangible.  All such securities were to be registered with 
the Securities  and  Exchange  Commission,  which  administers the 
Act 
The Securities Act was based on the first premise that the invest- 
ing public had suffered losses on securities because it had received 
fraudulent (that is, untruthful) and inadequate information regard- 
ing new securities offered for sale.  The  Senate Committee on Bank- 
ing and Currency, made the statement that "the exposure at the sub- 
committee hearings of  flagrant misrepresentations and concealment 
in these prospectuses upon which members of  the investing public 
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implicitly relied, to their detriment, furnished one of  the most im- 
portant grounds for the passage of  the Securities Act of  1933."  The 
Committee added that the Securities Act was  passed  "to  prevent a 
recurrence of  these gross frauds."gD  In passing the Securities Act, 
it was also the accepted view of Congress that the losses experienced 
by investors in securities had been due mainly to the failure of  the 
issuing bankers to tell the "truth  about securities." 
The Securities Act  was  based  on the second  premise  that the 
investing  public  would  be  protected  if  it  received  truthful  and 
adequate information regarding securities offered for sale.  Publicity 
was  therefore the remedy offered by  the Securities Act.  Mr. J. P. 
Kennedy, as Chairman of  the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
stated that "the greater the publicity, the more protected the public 
will be and the more corrective the influence upon the financiers." 
Both of  these premises are questionable.  In the first place, the 
losses on securities caused by fraud as defined in the New York State 
law were relatively small compared with the vast total of  securities 
Very few cases of fraud were actually proved against invest- 
ment bankers.  The  various federal hearings on financial legislation 
did not disclose conclusive proof of  fraud, with the possible exception 
of one instance in the case of  the securities listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange.  Even in the case of foreign bonds there were only 
a  few cases of  misrepresentation  which  would  have  brought  such 
issues within the scope of the Securities Act had it been in operation 
at the time, according to an analysis, made by  the author, of  the 
prospectuses of  which  public notice was  given  in the leading New 
York  City newspapers  for the years from  1925 to 1929 inclusive.94 
Secondly, this study of the prospectuses showed that the invest- 
ing public  did receive  truthful and adequate  information  which 
disclosed the inherent weaknesses in most of the bonds eventually 
in default.  In most  cases a careful reading of  the prospectus by 
the investor would  have  indicated  the unsound financial position 
of  the bond which was being offered for sale.  Again and again the 
prospectus truthfully and adequately stated that the earning power 
of  the corporation was insufficient, that the security pledged  for the 
bonds was inadequate, that the past financial record of  the corpora- 
tion was bad, or that the corporation was reserving for itself powers 
which  might adversely affect the investment  position of  the bond. 
As shown on pages 370-371  the financial position of  a corporation, 
and therefore the investment  status of  its bonds, can best  be de- 
termined by  its income account, and so the Securities Act requires 
that a true statement of the income account must be given  to the  . 
public.  In the past such statements were frequently included in the 
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income of  the corporation was so meager  that even a small reduc- 
tion in income would have made it impossible for the corporation 
to meet the interest on the bonds which were being offered to the 
public.  A large steamship company offering its debentures showed 
that the operating ratio of  the company  was  93 percent  and that 
the balance after the interest on the funded debt to gross earnings 
was only 3.2  percent.  In other words the prospectus clearly showed 
that a drop of  3.2 percent in gross earnings would have impaired the 
protection of  the interest payment.B5 
Investment houses frequently  demonstrated their complete lack 
of  respect for the intelligence of  the investor by showing truthfully 
and adequately that the property pledged  as security for the bond 
issue was entirely insufficient.  An illustration was the twenty year 
6%  percent  sinking  fund  gold  debent,ures of  the  Lincoln  qnnd 
Street Corporation which, the circular stated, "will be a direct obli- 
gation of  the Lincoln q2nd Street Corporation subject only to the 
$16,00o,ooo first mortgage  issue."  The prospectus  further showed 
that these two issues amounted to $2 1,500,000 or over 84 percent of 
the estimated value of  the unconstructed building.D6 The holders 
of these bonds certainly could not claim fra,ud under the Securities 
Act, for the prospectus truthfully stated the material facts necessary 
to  show  the  unsoundness  of  the  bond  issue  and  was  neither 
fraudulent nor misleading in the literal sense of  the Act. 
One would generally believe that a corporation which had pre- 
viously defaulted on its bonds would  make every effort to conceal 
this condition  from  the investing public.  As  a  matter of  fact, a 
number. of  corporations  truthfully and accurately gave the invest- 
ing public the full details of  their previous bankruptcy, and even em- 
phasized  this fact  as  an argument  for  their  present  strong credit 
position.  A certain Southern railroad, in its prospectus describing 
its $4,136,000 first mortgage no-year 6 percent gold  bonds, frankly 
stated that "the recently consummated reorganization, by extinguish- 
ing the lien of  $8,ooo,ooo mortgage  debt of  the old company and 
providing the new company with $1,5rjo,ooo of  new money, besides 
the proceeds of  these Series A bonds, will have reduced fixed interest 
bearing  debt from  $11,6g2,000 to  ?$5,74r,ooo."  This road  for  a 
number of  years had poor earning power and as a result in October, 
1929 it again went  into receivership. 
Of  the various prospectuses which truthfully and adequately told 
the  investor  the unfavorable  terms  of  the issue,  a  common  type 
openly  proclaimed  that  the borrowing  corporation was  reserving 
for itself  without restriction  certain powers which  might adversely 
affect the investment position  of  the bond.  A spectacular  illustra- 
tion of  such a grant of  unrestricted power by  the bondholders to an 
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issuing corporation was  the $~O,OOO,OOO  5 percent secured sinking 
fund gold debenture of  the Krueger and Toll Company issued on 
March 1, 1929.  The  prospectus contained a clause that "in view of 
the nature of  the business of  the Company the Debenture Agreement 
will contain broad provision  in regard to withdrawal  and substitu- 
tion of pledged  securities."  The agreement merely provided  that 
such substitutions should not impair the required ratio of  120 per- 
cent between the par value of  the eligible securities on deposit and 
the principal  amount and interest  payable  on all the outstanding 
 debenture^.^^  The agreement further provided that the trustee was 
to rely upon the Krueger and Toll Company  for proof  that the se- 
curities were eligible and that the ratio was being maintained.  The 
debenture agreement specified the original collateral which secured 
this issue, and included a number of  sound bonds such as French 
3's and 4's.  In the course of  time these sound securities were with- 
drawn and there was substituted Yugoslavian and other bonds which 
were on the verge of  default.=  It is doubtful whether Ivan Krueger 
in this case could have been convicted under the Securities Act, for, 
as mentioned above, the agreement contained "broad provisions in 
regard to withdrawal and substitution of  pledged  securities." OD 
It is  doubtf,ul whether the flotation of  the above  issues could 
have been prevented or the corporate issuers or the investment bank- 
ers punished under the Securities Act.  Yet all these issues brought 
heavy losses to the investor, and such losses can legally be repeated 
in the future.  The Securities Act  relies on publicity  as  the sole 
protection against loss, but the previous cases show that, even when 
the truth regarding an investment is given, the investor is unable 
to understand  the significance of  this information.  The Securities 
Act fails to recognize the highly complicated  nature of  the modern 
investment system and the extreme technicality of  sec,urity  analysis.100 
The  Securities Act of  1933 therefore embodied little more than the 
early  Victorian  principle  of  publicity  laid  down  by  Gladstone's 
Committee in 1844.1°1  This principle,  possibly  adequate  for  the 
early period of  security capitalism, was certainly inadequate in its 
critical stage. 
The Securities Act was therefore based on questionable premises, 
since the major losses on securities were not caused by the investing 
public receiving fraudulent and inadequate information, and the in- 
vesting public was  not protected by  merely  receiving truthful and 
adequate information regarding securities. As shown in Chapter 16 
losses on corporate and governmental securities were caused by the 
unsound trends in private and in public finance.  This fundamen- 
tal defect  in the present  investment system is  entirely ignored by 
the Securities Act.lo2  Therefore it will still be possible for invest- FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
ment bankers under the stress of  competition to issue bonds which 
meet every provision  of  the Securities Act but which are of  uncer- 
tain quality.  As long as all of  the material facts are given, invest- 
ment bankers  can still legally issue bonds of  foreign governments 
with  budgetary  deficits, and real  estate  bonds resting  on overap- 
praised properties.  Also the Securities Act does not check the over- 
production of  securities.  In short, the main errors of  post-war finan- 
cial policy  namely, the issuing of  securities of  poor  quality and in 
excessive amount are still outside the scope of  the Securities Act.lo3 
A further weakness of  the Securities Act  lies in the fact that state 
and municipal financing is exempt from its provisions.  This vast 
field has been marked by  unfavorable financial practices which have 
brought loss to investors.  As emphasized in this study, it is essential 
for the government to consider the evils not only in corporate, but 
also in governmental finance. 
REGULATION  OF  THE  STOCK EXCHANGE 
The heavy losses sustained by  the public after the stock market 
collapse of  1929 led to a popular demand for drastic control of  the 
security market.  In response to the public demand for action, legis- 
lators at times sought extreme forms of  action.  Thus one leading 
senator, stirred by  heavy losses of  the public but unmindful of  the 
experience of  King Canute, sent the Stock Exchange the following 
telegram: 
Today's activity in your  Exchange demonstrates absolute necessity  for 
immediate adoption of  a rule limiting amount of  loss on any stock dur- 
ing  any  one  session.  The country  is  not  prepared  to  withstand  the 
effect of a repetition of  what happened today.  Unless a rule is adopted 
and published establishing a reasonable amount of  depreciation in any 
one session, campaign for reform will immediately take shape with pos- 
sible result either closing Exchange entirely or placing same under Gov- 
ernment supervision.  lo3 
In 1934 Congress passed  the Securities and Exchange Act.  To 
enforce the Act a Securities and Exchange Commission was created 
consisting of five members appointed by  the President for a term of 
five years.  Each securities exchange had to file a registration state- 
ment in a form prescribed by  the Securities and Exchange Commis- 
sion.  In  that statement the exchange agreed to comply with the pro- 
visions of  the Act and to require compliance by its members.  The 
rules of each exchange provided for the expulsion, suspension, or dis- 
ciplining of members whose conduct was inconsistent with equitable 
principles.  Margin requirements were  established  by  the Federal 
Reserve  Board,  with  provision  to be  made  especially  for  under- 
margined  accounts and for  the withdrawal  of  funds or securities 
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pledged  as  collateral  for  loans.  Members  of  the exchanges  and 
brokers or dealers operating through these exchanges could borrow 
on a registered security from member banks of  the Federal Reserve 
System or from non-member banks complying with  the Securities 
Exchange Act, the Federal Reserve Act and the Banking Act of  1933. 
However the Securities and Exchange Commission was given power 
to permit a broker to borrow elsewhere with its approval.  The total 
debt of  a broker, exclusive of  his fixed assets and the value of  his 
exchange membership, was not to exceed such percentage of  his net 
capital as the Securities and Exchange  Commission prescribed and 
in no case was to be over 2,000 percent of  such capital.  Moreover, 
no broker could lend securities carried for the account of  any cus- 
tomer without the latter's written consent. 
The Act forbade manipulation of  security prices by various de- 
vices as the transfer of  securities involving no change in beneficial 
ownership, the dissemination of rumors about the market movement 
of  a security to enable a group to buy or sell a security on favorable 
terms, and the employment of a manipulative practice in contraven- 
tion of  the rules of  the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
The  Securities and Exchange Act, like the Securities Act, sought 
to aid the security purchaser  by  giving him detailed information 
regarding stocks and bonds.  Corporations whose securities are listed 
or registered on exchanges must submit annual reports prescribed 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission.  However  the Securi- 
ties and Exchange Act  has been more effective than the Securities 
Act in correcting abuses of  the investment system.  The Securities 
and  Exchange  Act  has  made progress  in correcting  unfair prac- 
tices as security manipulation through pools, wash sales and matched 
orders which characterized many of  the stock market operations of 
the past.  Also the efficient administration of  the Act has regulated 
the use of  credit in financing security trading and has reduced the in- 
stability arising out of  inadequate margins. 
CONCLUSION 
Governmental  control  of  security  capitalism  in the  post-war 
period varied in its effectiveness.  Legislation aiming to bring about 
business revival and the relief of  the debt burden by monetary action 
rested on a misconception of  the debtor class under security capi- 
talism.  The Federal  Reserve system became  the battleground  for 
the conflicting  forces  of  the governmental  and banking  interests 
which  fought to gain possession  of  the Reserve Board, the Reserve 
banks and the Open Market  Committee, and this internecine war 
proved harmful to both sides.  The full operation of  the Reserve FINANCE CAPITALISM 
system was  restricted  by  its adherence to the orthodox thteory  of 
commercial banking.  This theory  led  to congressional  legislation 
separating commercial  from investment banking and the abolition 
of  the security affiliates of the commercial banks.  The Banking Act 
of  1933 made excellent provision for checking the use of  credit by 
commercial banks for speculative purposes and in other ways over- 
came a number of  the unsound practices which had crept into the 
commercial  banking system.  The regulation of  the quality of  the 
security investments of  the financial institutions by the federal gov- 
ernment was negligible, while such regulation  by  the state govern- 
ments was marked by  a lack of  uniformity and a failure to realize 
the changing conditions in the security market.  The federal gov- 
ernment in later years came to the aid of  the financial institutions 
through national organizations  created to grant direct assistance or 
to guaranty the liabilities  of  these institutions.  Both  the federal 
and state governments exercised public control over the demand for 
capital.  Specific control was exercised by some of the states in regu- 
lating municipal and utility investments and by the federal govern- 
ment in controlling railroad and foreign investment.  In addition, 
general control was exercised by the state governments in blue sky 
laws and by  the federal government in the Securities Act.  While 
the Securities and Exchange  Act proved useful, the Securities Act 
was inadequate to correct the fundamental unsound tendencies in 
the capital market.  The Capital Issues Committee, formed during 
the War, was  the only organization of  public  control which  pro- 
vided for quantitative and qualitative control of  the capital market. 
In general, federal legislation failed to realize that the United States 
had passed out of  agricultural and town economy and into the stage 
of  security capitalism which required a financial machinery carefully 
controlled for the purpose of  attaining not only profit for the indi- 
vidual but also welfare for society as a whole. 
CHAPTER 20 
RECONSTRUCTION 
OUR  survey has now traced  the evolution of  security capitalism in 
the leading countries of the world.  Let us consider therefore the 
general policies necessary for the reconstruction of  security capital- 
ism as well as a specific program for the control of  the financial in- 
stitutions of  the system. 
NON-FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS  OF SECURITY CAPITALISM -DEMOCRACY 
In the case of  most countries, parliamentary government was the 
political  institution which nurtured the growth of  security capital- 
ism.  Democracy was a potent factor in the growth of  security capi- 
talism in the nineteenth century in England, the United States and 
to a lesser degree in France.  However, democracy is not an abso- 
lutely essential condition for the existence of  security capitalism.  In 
the case of  Germany in the pre-war period, parliamentarianism  was 
a form rather than a  fact, but nevertheless  security capitalism  at- 
tained a high degree of  development.  During the post-war period, 
in the case of  Russia, Germany, Italy and Japan, security capitalism 
existed under political institutions from which parliamentarianism 
was  largely or completely eliminated.  The experience of  security 
capitalism under such conditions of  authoritarianism has been for so 
short duration that no definite conclusion can be drawn as to the 
relative social and economic progress which security capitalism has 
made in these countries.  However, the results of  security capitalism 
under  both  fascism  and communism  furnish  no  ground  for  the 
belief that these political systems would  enable security capitalism 
to bring individual or social benefit to the United States to the extent 
now derived under a democratic form of  government.  As far as the 
United States is concerned,  security capitalism can best  be served 
by maintaining and strengthening our present democratic system of 
government. 
In certain  countries security capitalism  has  exerted  an  unfor- 
tunate influence upon domestic politics, particularly in the struggle 
between  industrial  and banking security capitalism.  The conflict 
between these two types of security capitalism was  sharpest in the 
case of  Germany where the former supported National Socialism and 
obtained political domination.  The  struggle was also waged in Italy. 
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In the case of  Japan it has become rather a conflict of agrarian forces 
against both banking and industrial capitalism.  In England, and to 
a  less  degree  in  France,  banking  capitalism  has  been  dominant 
throughout  the  evolution  of  security  capitalism.  In the  United 
States, banking security capitalism triumphed in the pre-war period. 
However, as a result of the depression after 1929, banking capitalism 
has been weakened, while on the other hand industrial capitalism is 
today relatively  stronger than in the nineteenth  century.  Fortun- 
ately the issue between these two types of  capitalism has not been 
joined in the United States, and every effort should be made to avoid 
such a struggle which would inevitably have serious economic and 
social consequences. 
NECESSITY  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  PEACE 
While no particular domestic  political  institution is absolutely 
essential  to security capitalism, there is no question that interna- 
tional  peace  is  a  necessary  political  condition for the satisfactory 
operation of  world security capitalism.  Throughout the period of 
comparative international peace from the close of  the Napoleonic 
Wars to the outbreak of  the Great W7ar,  security capitalism flowered 
in England, France, Germany and the United States and to a lesser 
degree in other countries.  As  a result  of  the World War, the de- 
veloped stage of  world security capitalism was checked and the sys- 
tem as a whole entered its critical stage. 
The relation of  American  security capitalism to the Great War 
demonstrated  beyond  question  that  this  nation,  notwithstanding 
every intention to keep aloof  from the next conflict,  will abandon 
its economic, financial and eventually political neutrality and finally 
become an active participant.  It is therefore clear that the United 
States should take active and positive measures to join  with  other 
nations in the removal of  the political  and economic factors which 
are driving the nations of  the world to mother world conflict. 
Developed security capitalism also requires the expansion of  its 
international  economic  operations  as  evidenced  by  the  growing 
volume of  the export of  goods, services and of  capital.  In recent 
years the free flow  of  goods between  nations has been  seriously re- 
stricted by tariff barriers and currency regulations, and the volume 
of  world trade has declined in relation to world production.  This 
maladjustment  is  one of  the most  serious  problems  of  developed 
security capitalism.  The readjustment  of  world  trade and world 
production  is  highly  important  for  American  security  capitalism, 
since it became internationalized earlier in its history  than is gen- 
erally realized.  This characteristic of  American security capitalism 
was carried further by the events of the war and post-war periods. 
As a result of  the growing importance of  such internationalization, 
the United States during the depression was directly affected by the 
adverse  conditions of  security capitalism  in other countries,  and 
notwithstanding its own vast economic and financial resources was 
able to make only moderate progress  toward  recovery.  It would 
therefore be to the interest of the United States to remove the bar- 
riers hindering the free flow of  goods and capital, and bring about a 
revival of  both international trade and international investment. 
MONETARY POLICY 
Throughout the nineteenth century the growth of  security capi- 
talism was facilitated as a result of  the adoption of  the gold standard 
by the leading countries of the world.  Until the outbreak of  the 
War, these nations were favored by a comparatively stable monetary 
unit.  In the war and the post-war periods  the gold  standard was 
abandoned,  and the currencies  of  most  of  the countries were  de- 
valued.  These policies had an adverse effect upon security capital- 
ism, since such manipulation injected an element of  uncertainty in 
monetary value and intensified the instability of  the system.  More- 
over, the devaluation of  the currencies dealt serious blows to those 
classes in economic society which had accumulated capital and there- 
fore held fixed-interest bearing securities or bank deposits. 
It is  therefore clear  that a  policy  of monetary  stabilization  is 
desirable  and essential. 
Stabilization within a nation  may be attained after any one of 
three  possible  steps, namely,  repudiation,  restoration  or  devalua- 
tion.  Repudiation, really  a prelude to permanent  stabilization, as 
in the case of  Germany and Austria, implies the complete abandon- 
ment of  the old form of  currency and the adoption of  a new mone- 
tary unit.  Such a drastic policy becomes necessary only in cases of 
extreme depreciation of the currency and so is unthinkable for the 
United  States.  The second  policy  may  be ahat  of  restoration  or 
bringing the dollar back to its former gold content of  23.22 grains 
of  gold.  Devaluation is the policy of reducing the monetary content 
of  the standard. 
The choice for the United States lies between the policy either 
of  restoration or of devaluation.  From the standpoint of  the parties 
to security capitalism, a policy of restoration would in general bene- 
fit the holders of high-grade fixed-income securities and injure the 
holders of  equities and low-grade securities.  Raising the value of 
the dollar from  its present  level  to  the previous  par would  mul- 
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might even  prove  intolerable, for it must be remembered  that in 
the last analysis such interest and principal payments represent trans- 
fers of purchasing power from debtors and tax payers to creditors. 
It would  therefore seem that restoration  is impossible, and that a 
policy of  permanent devaluation is the only recourse for the United 
States.  Furthermore,  it  is  highly  essential  that  such  a  policy  of 
permanent  stabilization at about the present  levels be  carried  out 
with international cooperation as soon as possible in order to elimi- 
nate one of  the most serious uncertainties in the economic system of 
the world. 
DECLINE  IN  RATE  OF  POPULATION  GROWTH 
The  developed stage of  security capitalism was marked by a sharp 
increase in industrial production.  During the first industrial revolu- 
tion  the output of  the mines  and factories  of  England  expanded 
enormously, and in the course of  the second industrial revolution 
at the close of  the nineteenth century the plants of  France, England 
and the United States multiplied  their operations.  The domestic 
demand for their products was  increased  to a large extent  by  the 
rapid rate of  growth in population.  However, the rate of  popula- 
tion increase in England  dropped in the eighties; was  checked  in 
Europe during the War and declined even in the United States in 
the nineteen-twenties. 
This change in the population trend was a social factor of  deep 
significance for the system of  security capitalism.  In the past  the 
growth of  the railroads, the expansion of  the electric light and power 
companies and the increasing output of  the manufacturing concerns 
had consciously or unconsciously been  based on the ever-increasing 
rate of  population growth.  This basis can no longer be accepted in 
the future.  Under these conditions is has become necessary for the 
United States to adjust its production, whether in agriculture or in 
manufacture, and its plant  expansion to meet present  day market 
conditions. 
SOCIAL SUPPORT OF  SECURITY CAPITALISM 
The benefits of  the developed stage of  security capitalism were 
widely shared by economic society.  Not only did the upper class in 
economic society gain from,the system, but the middle and even the 
lower classes shared in the growth of  national income and national 
wealth.  The middle class  derived  increasing  returns  from  their 
business enterprises and from their security operations due to the 
appreciating value  of  their  stocks and  bonds.  While  unemploy- 
ment increased in England after the nineties, in other leading coun- 
tries, particularly Germany and the United States, the condition of 
the laboring class improved.  It is therefore little wonder that not 
only the upper, but the middle and lower classes gave strong social 
support to security capitalism. 
In the post-war period, this support was seriously weakened.  In 
almost every country business profits were sharply reduced or entirely 
eliminated.  The middle class saw its direct investment in securities 
as well as its indirect investment in bank deposits and life insurance 
policies swept away in the case of  Germany, decimated in the case 
of  France and depreciated in the case of  the United States and Eng- 
land.  The laboring classes suffered  severely from unemployment 
even in the United States.  In the post-war period there was prob- 
ably no decline in the proportionate share of  national income avail- 
able to the middle and lower class, but there was a sharp reduction 
in the total  national income  available to all classes.  As  a result, 
social support for security capitalism  gave way  to  social hostility. 
This opposition gave vent to the espousal of  National Socialism in 
Germany and the encouragement  of  fascist and communist move- 
ments in other countries. 
Private security capitalism, if it is to survive, must regain broad 
social support.  Not only the upper, but also the middle and lower 
classes, must derive full economic benefit from the system.  This end 
can be obtained by  both an increase in the national income and a 
more equitable distribution of  this income. 
PHILOSOPHIC BASIS  OF SECURITY CAPITALISM 
Over  the years  a  consciously-formulated economic  philosophy 
exercised little influence in shaping the course of  security capitalism. 
The classical economists in the early  nineteenth  ceritury failed  to 
understand the nature of  the system, and the socialist writers of  the 
middle nineteenth century were naturally hostile to it. 
The modern schools of  economic thought have made little prog- 
ress  in  the field  of  financial  philosophy.  Monetary  and banking 
theory have largely been based on the policies of  the old individual 
capitalism and not of  the new security capitalism.  Furthermore, this 
theory has failed to consider the effect of  the non-financial factors 
in modern civilization on financial institutions.  There is therefore 
urgent need for the formulation of  a realistic financial theory based 
on an appreciation of the changes in our financial institutions, and 
a recognition of  the influence of  the non-financial forces on monetary 
and banking policies.  As  in Plato's  republic of old, so today,  the 
constructive  economic  philosopher  should  take  an active part  in 
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LEGAL  BASIS 
The growth  of  corporate law  furnished a  further institutional 
basis for security capitalism.  The legal recognition of the principle 
of  limited liability, the incorporation by general rather than by  spe- 
cial charters, the sanctioning of  the holding company, the refinement 
of  the corporate mortgage, and the development of  the various forms 
of stock and bond instruments made possible the flotation of  securi- 
ties and their sale to the investing public.  Over the years these legal 
devices in every country were frequently misapplied as evidenced by 
the abuses of  the holding company by the separation of  capital man- 
agement from ownership and by the evils of  overcapitalization, and 
resulted in widespread violation of  property rights.  In recent years 
progress has been made in purifying corporate activities but there 
is still need of  drastic recodification and further regulation to over- 
come many of  the abuses which still exist and to protect the holders 
of  corporate securities. 
In summary, the non-financial institutions of  security capitalism 
in the United States can be strengthened by maintaining a demo- 
cratic  system  of  government,  avoiding the clash between  banking 
and industrial security capitalism,  taking positive measures to pro- 
mote world peace, reviving international trade and investment, se- 
curing international monetary stabilization, adjusting production to 
changing maikets, widening the social support of  security capitalism, 
developing a realistic financial philosophy  and recodifying the laws 
relating to security capitalism. 
FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS  OF SECURITY  CAPITALISM -  CENTRAL  BANK 
Consideration has thus been given to the broader political, eco- 
nomic, social, philosophic  and legal institutions of  security capital- 
ism, and the policies in these respective fields which should be car- 
ried out.  Attention will now be directed to the recommendations 
concerning purely financial institutions of  the system, as the central 
bank,  the stock exchange, banking organization and the supply of 
capital. 
The keystone in  the financial  organization  of  security capital- 
ism is the central bank.  The extent to which this institution aided 
the progress of  security capitalism varied considerably.  On the one 
hand, the Bank  of  France  and the Reichsbank  actively aided the 
growth of  the system, while on the other hand, the Bank of  ~n~land 
and the Federal Reserve system following slavishly the British tradi- 
tions of  central banking took only a passive  part in the movement. 
In the  United  States  the Federal  Reserve  should  take  an active 
not a passive role in the future in influencing the course of  Ameri- 
can security capitalism. 
Over the years a complete change has taken place in the relation 
between the government and the central bank.  In the case of  France 
and Germany, there was  a close  association  even  before  the War. 
In the post-war period in almost every country the banking and the 
political  forces struggled  for  control  over  the central  bank.  In 
France the fight was particularly bitter and led finally to the diminu- 
tion of the hereditary banking control over the Bank of  France.  A 
similar, though  fortunately milder, struggle was  waged  for control 
of  the Federal Reserve system, and legislation finally brought about 
an extension of  public control.  Unquestionably such  increase  of 
government control carries with it certain dangers, but it must be 
frankly recognized that in these days of  fiscal difficulties the federal 
government is justified  in its demand for increased control over the 
central bank.  A rational policy would bring about a proper balance 
between  the banking and the public control over the central bank 
by recognizing the respective interests and needs of  both the banks 
and of  the government. 
STOCK  EXCHANGE 
In the course of time in each country, the stock exchange of  the 
leading financial  center developed  more  rapidly  than the interior 
exchanges, and became the dominant security market.  The extent 
of  such  domination  was  carried  to a  marked  degree  in England, 
France and Germany, and to a lesser degree in the United States. 
Throughout the nineteenth century the stock exchange played  an 
important role not only in the financial  but also in the economic 
and political life of the nation.  However, after the Great War, the 
stock exchange became relatively less important due to the trend of 
banking concentration, to the relative decline in the volume of  cor- 
porate  financing,  to  the increase  in government  financing  which 
was generally undertaken directly with  investors and to the closer 
governmental regulation of  security operations. 
The stock exchange  is still a financial  institution of  major im- 
portance in the economic life of  modern capitalism.  Unquestion- 
ably  its  operations must  be regulated either by  within or by  the 
government.  Such regulation should be directed  toward checking 
as far as possible price fluctuations, for instability of  security value is 
one of  the major unsolved problems of  security capitalism. 326  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
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NEED FOR BANKING  RESPONSIBILITY 
An  important change  in the financial  system  before  the War 
was  the decline  in the relative  importance of  the private bank, a 
vestige of  individual capitalism, as compared with the incorporated 
bank.  This decline of the private bank was indicated by the lessen- 
ing importance of  Rothschilds on the Continent and of  Morgans in 
the United States.  In general these powerful private banks in their 
time exerted a stabilizing influence over the system of  security capi- 
talism.  Throughout the nineteenth  century Rothschilds aided the 
rise and development of  world security capitalism by  throwing its 
influence on the side of  peace and by  supporting .the principle of 
parliamentary  government, and in the capital market  by  floating 
issues of  high quality.  Similarly Morgans in the United States re- 
placed instability with stability, gave active assistance to the govern- 
ment in its financial difficulties during the nineties, and issued sound 
securities. 
However in the course of  time these single private houses, though 
possessed  of  considerable  financial  resources,  were  unable  to  in- 
fluence either broad public or banking policy due to the decline in 
their  relative  importance  as  compared  to  that  of  incorporated 
banking. 
Unfortunately incorporated banking did not develop a conscious- 
ness  of  its public responsibility.  Incorporated  banking  came into 
possession  of  tremendous power,  without realizing the significance 
of  this power.  It is therefore necessary for incorporated banking, 
since it has definitely replaced private banking to realize its social 
responsibility and to aid constructively in shaping public and bank- 
ing policies which will strengthen rather than weaken the structure 
of  security capitalism.  In recent years the American Bankers Asso- 
ciation representing commercial banking has made an effort in this 
direction. 
On the other hand, practically no progress has been made in the 
field of  investment banking where the need of  such a constructive 
policy has been all the greater.  After the War the dominance of 
Morgans over  investment banking declined and was replaced by  a 
competitive array of  houses which had little or no sense of  the social 
importance of  their operations.  This competition time and again 
led to serious evils in the overissue of  securities and in the emission 
of  low-grade securities.  The investment banker too frequently con- 
cerned himself rather with financial salesmanship than with financial 
statesmanship.  The post-war period brought not only banking irre- 
sponsibility in the field of  national banking, but also in international 
banking relations.  There is therefore need of  promoting close in- 
ternational banking cooperation to cultivate a higher responsibility 
among the banking systems of the world, in view  of  the fact that 
modern  capitalism  is  essentially  international  in  nature and can 
function best if there is close coordination among the financial sys- 
tems of  the leading nations. 
RECOGNITION  OF  CHANGING  NATURE  OF COMMERCIAL  BANKING 
With  the  development  of  security capitalism  the  function  of 
commercial banking changed.  This change was brought about not 
by  conscious banking policy  but by  the sweep of  broad  economic 
movements.  The improvement  in transportation and communica- 
tion  helped  to  bring about a change  in the method  of  financing 
business operations.  On the one hand, the need of  short-term capi- 
tal was  diminished, since the period of  time required for the ship 
ment of  goods was reduced.  This was  true of  the developed stage 
of  British  security capitalism in the middle of  the nineteenth  cen- 
tury with the replacement of  sailing vessels by  steamships and with 
the opening of  the Suez Canal.  It was similarly true of  developed 
American  security capitalism  in the nineteen-twenties with  the in- 
troduction of  the improved devices of  communications. Furthermore 
with the increase of the corporate form of  business organization and 
the rise  of  the large  business  units,  industry  obtained  its funds 
through securities sold to the public rather than through bank loans. 
As  a result, not only in the United States but in almost  every 
other country of  developed security capitalism there was an increase 
in time as compared with demand deposits, and an increase in the 
proportion of investment assets of banks particularly in the form of 
securities as compared with commercial assets in the form of  loans 
and discounts.  In addition the commercial banks performed invest- 
ment operations by  engaging in the purchase and sale of  securities. 
It is  essential  that the inevitability  of  these changes  be  recop 
nized in government regulation.  The function of  a banking system 
should  be  to mobilize  not  only  commercial  but also  investment 
credit,  and  legislation  should  be  directed  not  to  prohibit  but 
rather  to control  this  mobilization  which  in  the  future will  be 
needed to meet the heavy demands of  industry and of  government. 
A further change in the nature of  commercial banking, particu- 
larly in recent years, has been the increase in the proportion of  the 
assets of  the commercial banks  in the form of  the securities of  the 
national government.  This movement has developed to such an ex- 
tent  that the financial  position  of  banking  is  directly  dependent 
upon the soundness of  the credit of  the national government.  This 
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must be fully recognized by the government for it must be realized 
that the safety of  the banking system is dependent upon the sound- 
ness of public credit.  The  weakness of  the banking structure under 
security  capitalism  in foreign  countries  as  well as  in the  United 
States lies in the lack of  solvency or the insufficiency of  capital re- 
sources to meet losses on depreciating assets particularly  securities. 
It is therefore urgent that banks be encouraged and even required 
to build up their capital resources. 
ADJUSTMENT  OF  THE  CAPITAL  MARKET 
The history  of  security  capitalism  since  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth century shows two secular trends in the supply of  capital 
in relation to the demand.  The secular trend of  the supply of  capi- 
tal was  upward  until the closing years of  the nineteenth century, 
while thereafter the secular  tend has been downward.  A careful 
examination of  the available data leads to the conclusion  that the 
World as a whole to-day faces a shortage rather than a surplus of 
capital.  This condition is  particularly  true with  governments ab- 
sorbing an increasing proportion of  total capital accumulations and 
using a large part for unproductive expenditure on armaments. The 
peoples  of  the world  are  pinched,  and  their  standards  of  living 
lowered in order that a larger proportion of  their annual return may 
be absorbed by governments and applied to unsound and destructive 
purposes. 
It is also important to recognize that the sources of  saving have 
changed, and that under security capitalism saving emanates not only 
from individuals but also from corporations.  With government de- 
mand for capital expanding and a larger percentage of  the total ac- 
cumulation being absorbed by  tax levies, it seems illogical  to dis- 
courage the source of  such  accumulations.  In this country there 
exists a serious maladjustment  in the supply of  capital.  There ap- 
pears  to be an abundance available for seasonal enterprise,  but a 
great  dearth  for  new  risks.  Commercial  banking  channels  are 
choked with excess funds, but investment banking resources are in- 
sufficient to meet the real needs of  American  industry.  Consumer 
goods industries apparently are able to obtain necessary short-term 
credit, but long-term  capital  is not available  particularly  for the 
durable goods industries. 
Obviously  the problem  of  capital  supply  is  closely  related  to 
that of  capital demand, since both forces are in effect playing upon 
the same situation.  It becomes apparent  from this study that the 
maladjustment between  the force of  capital supply, or saving, and 
that of  capital demand, or investment, has been a fundamental cause 
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of  economic crises.  This conclusion  simplifies of  course, that it is 
necessary to look behind the forces of both saving and investment 
to determine the causes of  their relative movements, but it suggests 
that this may be the fulcrum point at which  to apply the lever of 
control in order to achieve a degree of stabilization. 
PUBLIC NATURE OF SECURITY CAPITALISM 
An important trend of security capitalism has been the growing 
public nature of the system.  This movement is evidenced  first in 
the growing proportion of  governmental to total securities.  In the 
early stage of  security capitalism it was mainly public in nature, since 
the government  alone was  in a  position  to  float  securities.  This 
condition was true of  England until the second quarter of  the nine- 
teenth century, and of  the United States until the middle of the nine- 
teenth century.  However,  in the ('  reloped stage of  security capi- 
talism, there was a relative increase ~n the volume of  the securities 
of  the railroads and of other corporations.  Modern  industry with 
its enormous plants and machinery required essentially fixed capital. 
Such capital could only be supplied through the issue of  stocks and 
bonds which  brought about the growth of  private security capital- 
ism. 
However, the large volume of  bonds issued by the national and 
local governments in the war and the post-war periods increased the 
proportion of  such public securities, and in the case of  most coun- 
tries they constituted the larger part of the total.  In view of  this 
fact, any program of control must be extended to the regulation not 
only of corporate but also of  public  securities,  since  it would  be 
futile to maintain standards for corporate financing  if  at the same 
time no similar standards were established for public financing. 
As a result of the increase of  debt, particularly  of  governments, 
the structure of  security capitalism has  been  weakened.  This un- 
favorable trend is evidenced by  the increase of  debt to total securi- 
ties, the increase in the proportion of  such debt to wealth  and the 
increase of  debt service to national income. 
Adam  Smith and David  Hume were  firmly convinced  that the 
burden of  the British national debt resulting from the wars of  the 
eighteenth  century could not be borne and would  be repudiated. 
However, the debt, though heavy, was  successfully carried  and re- 
duced due to the satisfactory political and economic conditions after 
the Napoleonic Wars.  This study has similarly emphasized the bur- 
den of  debt from the Great War and the depression, and has like- 
wise indicated the possibility of  eventual reduction or repudiation. 
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incurred for armament and other unproductive purposes.  The pres- 
ent debt  can  only  be  successfully carried  provided  the favorable 
political and economic conditions of  the post-Napoleonic period are 
repeated, and the World enters into a new era of  peace and of  an 
expanding industrial production and international trade. 
ATTITUDES  TOWARD  SECURITY  CAPITALISM 
Toward the system of security capitalism itself, several possible 
attitudes may be adopted.  The first or ultra-conservative attitude, 
based on the narrowest possible interpretation of  laissez faire, would 
be to permit the continued operation of  the system without regula- 
tion and with financial competition unrestrained by  either external 
government regulation or internal control.  This policy today is no 
longer possible, for there is a general acceptance of  the theory that 
the evils of  unrestrained security capitalism must be regulated either 
by  the parties to the system themselves or by the government.  The 
other or extreme radical policy would be to consider  that security 
capitalism has outlived its usefulness, that it is no longer able ade- 
quately to meet the requirements of  a modern economic society and 
therefore should be replaced by  an entirely new  economic  system. 
This policy  likewise  is  not  desirable  in view  of  the advantages 
to be derived from the efficient operation of  security capitalism. 
The third, or liberal policy, is  opposed  to the abolition of  se- 
curity capitalism but at the same time is based  on the conviction 
that the system cannot function without control.  The  liberal theory 
aims rather to develop a proper mechanism  of  control by  private 
and public agencies which will overcome the evils of  security capi- 
talism and at the same time retain  the benefits which  the system 
yielded  to society in leading capital-accumulating countries of  the 
world throughout the nineteenth century. 
Certain students, impressed by the gloom of  the crisis of  security 
capitalism have  discussed  the future of  modern  capitalism  in the 
same general philosophy of  pessimism expressed by  Spengler in his 
Decline of  Western  Civilization.  This attitude of  mind is in contrast 
to the  feeling  of  unrestrained  optimism  set  forth  by  the  classi- 
cists basking in the glow of  rising security capitalism.  While we 
must  necessarily recognize the fact that the system  is already  well 
advanced, it has not as yet entered into what critics would call the 
"decadent  stage."  True the system  of  private  security capitalism 
entered  the critical  stage  even  before  the War, and was  further 
weakened by the conduct and the results of  the War.  It is still pas- 
sible  for  private  security  capitalism  to  continue  and  regain  its 
strength  under  carefully  conceived  government  control  and con- 
sciously directed private management. 
It is essential for bankers in Wall Street as well as Main Street 
and legislators on Pennsylvania Avenue to appreciate this distinction 
between  democratically  controlled  capitalism  and  authoritarian 
capitalism.  There should be a clearer realization that, as much as it 
may be regretted, uncontrolled security capitalism is a thing of  the 
past.  Bankers and capitalists should realize that a controlled security 
capitalism under a liberal democracy is far more desirable than a 
drastically  regimented system under an authoritarian form of  gov- 
ernment.  This so-called liberal view has come to be accepted by  a 
wide range of  individuals who have given thought to the subject. 
The necessity for a reform of  the system is recognized not only by 
forward-looking economists but also by  progressive bankers.  As  a 
result of  his observations in Europe,  Mr.  Rudolph Hecht, former 
President of  the American  Bankers  Association,  in its convention 
of  1936 emphasized: 
The  need  of  our  gracefully  accepting  some  of  the  more  moderate 
evolutionary changes going on at home,  lest we,  too, may  face some of 
the social upheavals which  have taken place and are still taking place 
throughout Europe today.= 
Raymond N.  Ball, President of  the New York State Bankers Asso- 
ciation, declared that : 
The maladjustments  created  by  the  World  War  have  caused  revolu- 
tionary changes in the political social and economic life of  the peoples 
of  the world. . . There has been  a growing movement on the part of 
the  people,  even  ante-dating the  World  War  for  better  social  condi- 
tions.  This movement has been expressed in various forms in different 
countries.  In attempting to accomplish the expressed desires and needs 
of  the  majority  for  better  social  conditions  I  do  not  believe  we  are 
headed for Communism, Socialism or Fascism in this country.  I am not 
disturbed, as  yet,  about  a radical  change in  our form of  government. 
We  should be  greatly disturbed however unless we  face  the facts  and 
recognize  that  the  desire  for these  changes  are  world-wide  in  their 
A FINANCIAL PROGRAM 
In the past  too much  reliance has been placed  on the efficacy 
of  regulating the financial system through credit control by the cen- 
tral bank.  An almost childish faith has been placed in the efficacy 
of  control through changes in the rediscount rate and even through 
open-market operaticns which by influencing the cost of  money were 
supposed to ease or to tighten the money market.  The limitations 
of  these  traditional  methods of  control were demonstrated by  the 
experiences in the post-war period.  Monetary manipulation is too 332  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
weak  a  machine  to control  the powerful forces of  disintegration 
which  in recent years have shaken the financial  system to its very 
foundation, nor can these forces be checked merely by applying the 
disclosure principle as embodied in the Securities Act.  A more com- 
prehensive mechanism must be set up to regulate the financial insti- 
tutions of  security capitalism.  There is herewith presented a system 
for controlling these  institutions of  security capitalism.  The plan 
proposed is not original but rather eclectic in nature in that it seeks 
to bring together the ideas and practical  devices for the control of 
the financial institutions as evolved not only by the federal and state 
governments but also by bankers in their efforts to restore order from 
within. 
There is first a need of  unifying the various governmental agen- 
cies which regulate the operations of  security capitalism particularly 
the Federal  Reserve,  the Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation, 
the Comptroller of  the Currency, the Reconstruction  Finance Cor- 
poration,  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  (in  its  financial 
activities) the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Treasury 
Department.  It  would be well if all these federal agencies were uni- 
fied  into a  Federal  Finance  system  which  would  exercise  all  the 
powers now performed by these separate agencies. 
The organization of  the Federal Finance system should be built 
around the present Federal Reserve system which consists of  a Board 
of  Governors, Advisory Council, an Open Market Committee, twelve 
Federal Reserve banks and the commercial and the savings banks as 
members of  the system.  A Federal Finance Board could be forme2 
by  merging  the present  federal  agencies into a  single  supervising 
body.  This board and the system controlled by it should be divided 
into two parts, commercial and investment.  Similar to the present 
Federal Advisory Council which confers with the Board of  Governors 
on matters of  commercial  credit policy, there should be a Federal 
Advisory Council for Investment, appointed in the same manner as 
the present Advisory Council by the nomination of  one member by 
each of  the boards of  directors of  the twelve Federal Reserve Banks. 
However, the Federal Finance Board and the Federal Advisory Coun- 
cil for Investment should include not only representatives of  bank- 
ing, but also of  the railroads,  public utilities,  industry, labor and 
agriculture. 
The Federal  Finance  Board would do well  to revive  the local 
machinery of  the former Capital Issues Committee.  As described on 
pages  332-333  this agency operated through a local committee in 
each Federal Reserve District.  Such a local committee would  pass 
on the credit position of  the corporation or government proposing to 
float an issue of  securities in the national capital market.  The re- 
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port on this corporation or government would then be referred to 
the Investment Division of the Federal Finance Board which would 
consider not only the applicant's credit position but would also study 
the application in relation to the demand and supply in the national 
capital market. 
The fundamental object of  such control should be the proper 
direction of  the flow of capital  in order to avoid waste  in its use. 
The social  direction  of capital is  essential  for national  economic 
stability.  National saving must be regarded as a public utility whose 
flow can no longer be left to haphazard competition but must  be 
subject to careful guidance in the public interest. 
The Finance Board would budget the capital market by watch- 
ing the volume  of  new  financing,  particularly  in relation  to the 
amount of  saving.  If  the volume of  new issues continued to exceed 
the amount of  saving available for the capital market over a long 
period of time, the Board would then either ration or prevent  en- 
tirely further new issues until equilibrium between the demand and 
supply of capital has  again been restored.  Theoretically equilib- 
rium may be maintained by controlling either the rate of  saving or 
the rate of  inve~tment.~  Practically however the former is hard to 
control and is the more constant factor, while the latter is the vari- 
able one which should therefore be regulated. 
The  Federal Finance Board should also have the power to control 
the quality of  security investment.'  The Board would determine the 
quality  of  investment  credit  by  establishing  minimum  standards 
and by  defining the purposes of new bond issues.  These standards 
in the case of a corporation would be based essentially on its earning 
power.  In the case of  a government the standards would be deter- 
mined by its revenue-producing power.  Such minimum standards 
should be based on the experience of  bonds which held their value 
throughout depressions.  Critics of  this policy of  establishing mini- 
mum standards based on the experience in depression years may con- 
tend that such standards are too severe and that there will not be an- 
other reaction as severe as the past.  There is no assurance against 
a  recurrence of  a similar financial  crisis and in the future bonds 
should be required to meet the tests of  safety derived from the bitter 
experience of  these years.  As the engineer develops higher structural 
standards after a serious railway catastrophe, so it is the duty of  the 
financier to raise his standards after the calamitous crises of  recent 
years. 
Furthermore the Board  should have  the. power  to  determine 
whether  the issue will  be applied to a  productive  purpose  which 
is a  vital  factor.  Productivity for  investment  credit  is  parallel  to 
liquidity for commercial credit.  In other words, as the Federal Re- FINANCE CAPITALISM 
serve system now has the power to define the eligibility of  commer- 
cial paper which may be rediscounted, so the Finance Board should 
have  the power  to determine the desirability of  investment  paper 
offered to the public. 
The prospectus of  every bond issue would therefore contain the 
statement that the issue has met the minimum standards as estab- 
lished by  the Board and was for a productive  purp~se.~  Objection 
may  be raised  to such  qualitative  control  on the ground  that it 
would seem to imply the guarantee by  the government  of  such a 
bond.  The above plan, however, merely certifies that, at the time 
of issue, the bond met certain minimum requirements.  Qualitative 
control in no way determines the price which is a matter of  bargain- 
ing between the dealer and the buyer. 
The Finance Board would thus have control over the quantity 
or volume of both bonds and stocks, and the determination of  the 
quality of bonds only.  Stocks, both common and preferred, would 
be issued without regulation as to quality except as specified in the 
Securities Act, for it is necessary to permit  freely the financing of 
new enterprises which involve an element of  risk and which require 
financing by stocks of  varying grades. 
Such qualitative control by the Federal Government  should be 
closely coodnated with  the existing state regulation of  securities. 
The principle of  the legal list which prescribes the investments of 
savings banks should be preserved.  However, there  is an urgent 
and immediate  need of  revising legal  lists  to  the  end that there 
be a new  set  of  standards based  on the investment  experience of 
recent years,  and that these  standards be uniform  throughout the 
entire United States.  To  this end it is recommended that such stand- 
ards should  be adopted not only by  the federal government,  but 
also that there should be a uniform law on the legal list formulated 
by the commissioners of  the forty-eight states, similar to the uniform 
law  on bills  of  lading and warehouse  receipts.  A  uniform  code 
should be applied not only to the investment of  saving but also to 
trust and insurance funds.  Naturally greater latitude in the type of 
investment  should be allowed,  in the case of  trust  and insurance 
funds and the purchase of  preferred or even common stock should be 
permitted.  Over the years  not only has  there developed in this 
country a set of  conflicting laws on legal investments for trust funds 
within the various states, but this confusion has been further ac- 
centuated by the continual outpouring of  opinions made necessary 
in order to explain the complicated technical  provisions  of  these 
laws.  For this reason, there is need of  a complete revision of state 
laws to the end that simplicity and clarity in these statutes may be 
obtained. 
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In exercising  qualitative  control  over  the capital  market,  the 
Finance Board should work closely with the existing state agencies 
now controlling the supply of new securities.  There should be par- 
ticularly  close cooperation  with  the state  commissions  regulating 
the issue of securities of public utilities and also those established 
in certain  states  to supervise municipal  finance.  It should be re- 
membered that the securities of  the public utilities and municipali- 
ties are not generally sold to investors within  these states, but are 
distributed in the national capital market.  It would therefore be 
highly  advisable  that  state  control  over  the  financing  of  public 
utilities  and municipalities be  made  more  nearly  uniform.  The 
states would do well if  the present regulations governing the financ- 
ing of  public utilities were carefully examined in the light of  the 
changes in public utility  financing in recent  years.  Furthermore, 
the entire system of  state control over municipal financing should 
be reorganized.  In most states restrictions on municipal financing 
in the form of tax and debt limitations established in some cases over 
a half  a century ago are today obsolete.  The state law  of  North 
Carolina could well serve as a model for other states particularly its 
provisions  for regular  reports and examinations of  municipal  ac- 
counts, for a uniform system of  municipal accounting, and for con- 
servative investment of  sinking fund assets. 
Under  the new  system  each  Federal  Reserve  bank  would  be 
divided  into two  separate  divisions,  one  for granting commercial 
credit in the form of  rediscounts of  commercial paper and the other 
for extending investment credit in the form of  advances on bonds. 
Each division would have its own capital, and the assets and reserves 
of  each would be entirely distinct.  However, both departments of  a 
Reserve  bank  would  be  under the same administration,  and  the 
Finance Board as the unifying force would supervise both activities 
of  the revised system.  The investment division of  a Reserve bank 
would  obtain its funds from its own capital, deposits of  members 
and long-term bonds sold to the public.  Each member would con- 
tribute to the capital stock of  the Reserve bank.  Also each mem- 
ber would carry a reserve balance in proportion to its own liabilities. 
Furthermore, in case of  need, the Reserve banks would be able to 
issue obligations based on the underlying security of  standard bonds. 
In this way  investment division would  have time liabilities in the 
form of  its bonds while the commercial division would have demand 
liabilities in the form of  its circulating notes. 
Under the present provisions of  the Federal Reserve Act, com- 
mercial banks are required to meet certain reserve requirements in 
order to maintain their liquidity.  However one of  the most impor- 
tant lessons of  recent years is the fact that a bank must possess not RECONSTRUCTION  337  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
only liquidity but also  solvency, or  the ability  to meet  losses on 
depreciated assets.  Banks should therefore be required to maintain 
on account with  the investment  division  a certain  percent  of  net 
capital funds in relation to the quality and quantity of  their assets. 
The  law should prohibit the payment of  dividends or the increase of 
assets until this minimum percent has been met. 
The funds carried in savings accounts should be invested only 
in safe and liquid assets and in minimum standard bonds.  Against 
these savings acounts the commercial bank should maintain a reserve 
with  the investment  division of  the  Federal  Reserve  bank.  The 
member bank would also be permitted to conduct an investment de- 
partment  for dealing in securities.  This department would like- 
wise have  its separate capital and assets.  It would  have relations 
with  the investment  division  of  the Federal  Reserve  bank  which 
could grant advances and at the same time would be required to pur- 
chase  stock  of  the  Federal  Reserve  bank  in  proportion  to  the 
capitalization  of  the investment  department of  the member  bank 
and require the maintenance of  reserve balances in proportion to the 
amount of securities underwritten by the department of  the mem- 
ber bank. 
All investment dealers who buy, underwrite and sell directly to 
the public should become members of  the new system and should be 
supervised  by the investment  division  of  the Reserve bank which 
would locally take over the powers of  the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  Investment dealers would be required to incorporate 
and to possess  a  minimum paid-up  unimpaired  capitalization  in 
relation to their underwritings before they could sell securities in in- 
terstate commerce.  These dealers, similar to the investment depart- 
ments of  commercial banks, would then be required to purchase in 
proportion to their capitalization a certain amount of  stock of  their 
Federal Reserve bank and to maintain the required reserve against 
their underwriting liabilities. 
Such investment banks would be required to make reports of 
their inventory of  securities to the Federal Reserve bank of  which 
they  would  become  members.  This  information  on  individual 
houses would be kept confidential by the local Federal Reserve bank, 
but the composite national figure would be published weekly.  The 
publication of these figures would be a guide to investment banks 
in determining their policy;  and with  self  control on the part of 
the bankers themselves there would be need of  regulating the quan- 
tity of  investment credit by the Board only in case of  emergency. 
Not  less than three detailed reports should be made  annually on 
call of  the Federal Reserve bank on dates to be fixed by the ~ederal 
Reserve  Board.  As  a  privilege  of  membership,  such  investment 
banks would  be able to obtain from the Reserve banks  advances 
on their  notes  collateralled  by  bonds  which  met  the minimum 
standards. 
In other words,  commercial, savings  and  investment  banking 
could be conducted as departments of  a single institution or as three 
separate banks depending upon the needs of  each locality. 
Insurance companies,  building and loan,  and mortgage  banks 
should also be eligible as members of  the investment  division  of 
the Federal Finance system and so could obtain advances enabling 
them to meet sudden demands for cash by  their claimants.  These 
advances have been granted by the Reconstruction Finance Corpora- 
tion, but this function should be taken over by the Federal Finance 
system. Control over the entire financial structure, particularly over 
the investment system, would thus be attained.  The  attempt to con- 
fine central banking control to commercial operations alone failed 
dismally  in the past two decades.  It is now time to recognize the 
error, and try the alternative which was  proposed  in 1912 in the 
Aldrich Bill, but rejected because of  public fear of  undue concen- 
tration.  Such fear led to political action in 1913 which resulted in 
extreme competition in the investment  field in the twenties  with 
consequences already too familiar to require further elaboration. 
TWILIGHT  OR  DAWN 
American  financial  history  since  the beginning of  the century 
clearly  demonstrates that security capitalism cannot  be controlled 
alone from within.  In 1903 and in  1907 organized  finance,  even 
when  captained by  intelligent  leadership,  was  able to accomplish 
little more than check the downward plunge of  the stock market, 
and could not bring about an upswing in economic activity.  Again 
in October,  1929, the bankers by  themselves were able to do little 
more  than  fight  a  none-too  successful  rearguard  action  to  halt 
momentarily  the collapse of  security values.  Outside of  such tech- 
nical support they were powerless to restrain the forces which were 
swiftly bringing about a collapse of  the entire economic system.  It 
is therefore clear that in the future, control needs the cooperation of 
both public and private agencies. 
The reform of security  capitalism  is  unquestionably  the most 
pressing problem of  the day.  It is a standing challenge to all per- 
sons who are concerned not only in the advancement of  individual 
profit but also of  social welfare.  Security capitalism stands today at 
the crossroads.  If  the forces of  disintegration  now in operation for 
a number of  years continue unchecked in their ravages, then society 
will fall back to an economic status comparable only to the dark ages FINANCE  CAPITALIShf 
of a thousand years ago.  On the other hand, intelligent leadership 
based on sound private management and efficient public supervision 
can lift security capitalism to a new economic renaissance, for a care- 
fully directed security capitalism can well serve as a mechanism for 
a new  industrial revolution which could give society an economic 
welfare not attained by  any previous civilization.  Such a program 
for control of  security capitalism is a matter which cannot wait, for 
there is need of  an immediate adoption of  such a program to con- 
trol not only the financial institutions but what is more important 
the non-financial institutions. 
The first thought expressed in this study was the swiftness of  the 
entire movement of  the rise, development and crisis of  security capi- 
talism.  Feudalism lasted for a thousand years, and individual capi- 
talism covered three centuries.  In the case of  most  countries, the 
social, political, and economic institutions necessary for the growth 
of  security  capitalism  were  not  present  until  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth century.  A little more than a century encompassed the 
entire cycle of  security capitalism even in England where it had its 
longest history.  In Japan, where it developed last, the entire period 
of  security capitalism covered little more than a half century.  The 
lesson to be derived from this rapid tempo of  security capitalism is 
that sound comprehensive  and intelligent private  and public con- 
trol must be instituted immediately to check the disintegrating forces 
which are undermining the system and to raise it to a new high level 
of  social service.  It would be well for those who are concerned with 
the future of  security capitalism to remember that the "hours  pass 
and they are counted against us." 
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' CHAPTER  15  12.  Cafiital stock  include the common  stock  and the preferred  stock of  the  cor- 
1  To enable  the reader  to follow  the tests  used  in  this  chapter  a  brief  summary 
of  the technique of  corporate analysis in applied finance is herewith  given. 
The financial statement of  a corporation is  made up of  an income account  and a 
balance sheet which show respectively its earning power and its capital structure.  Due 
to the lack of  uniformity  in corporate accounting, it is of  course impossible to present 
a  financial statement  which  will  apply  exactly  to all  corporations.  Moreover,  there 
is  wide  variation  in the  terminology  used  to describe  even  the same  items.  With 
these  limitations  in  mind,  there  is  given  below  the  leading  items  to  be  found  in 
most  financial statements  and the  generally  accepted  term  used  to  state  each  item. 
ITEMS  IN THE  FINANCIAL  STATEMENT  OF  A  CORPORATION 
A  brief  explanation  of  the meaning of  these items  is  given  below: 
I. Operating revenues  are the returns received  by  an enterprise  from  the sale of 
its goods or  its services. 
2.  Operating  expenses  are the disbursements made in  the conduct  of  the business 
for  wages,  raw  materials  and  taxes  as  well  as  for  maintenance  and  depreciation. 
Maintenance  is  the sum  actually  spent  in keeping  up  the plant, while  depreciation 
is  the bookkeeping entry nominally  made in writing down  the value  of  the plant. 
3.  Operating  income  is  the  amount  left  over  aiter  deducting  operating expenses 
from  operating revenues. 
4. Non-operating  income  is  the  return  received  from  sources  other  than  from 
the conduct  of  the  business  itself,  as  for  example  interest  and dividends  from  se- 
curities of  unaffiliated companies purchased  with surplus funds as  an investment. 
5.  Total income is  the sum  of  the  operating  and the non-operating  income. 
6.  Interest  is  the  charge  paid  for  the use  of  borrowed  capital  as  represented  by 
the funded debt  of  the corporation. 
7.  Sinking  fund  is  a  reserve  into which  the  corporation  annually  contributes  a 
fixed sum in order to have sufficient monies on hand  to pay  off  the funded  debt  at 
maturity. 
8. Fixed  charges are the total  of  the  interest  on  the funded  debt  and the annual 
contribution to the sinking fund. 
g.  Net  income  is  the  sum  left  over  from  total  income  after  payment  of  fixed 
charges, and is the amount  available for  dividends. 
10. Dividends paid  are  the sums  actually  disbursed  on the common  and on the 
preferred  stock  of  the. corporation. 
11.  Funded  debt includes  all  obligations  maturing  after  a year's  time.  It is gen- 
erally  the same as the bonded  debt,  for  it consists largely  of  the  fixed-interest bear- 



















13. Surplus  and  undivided firofits constitute the undistributed equity of  the stock- 
holders. 
14.  Total  capitalization  includes  both  funded  debt  and  the total  equity  repre- 
sented by  the combined capital stock, surplus and undivided profits. 
15.  Property  includes  plant, equipment  and  other  fixed  assets. 
16. Reserves  for  depreciation consist of bookkeeping  entries that have accumulated 
over  the years  for  the purpose  of  writing down  the value  of  the property. 
17. Net  property  is the value of property after reserves for depreciation have been 
deducted. 
These items  may  be  analyzed  by  the increase or  decrease,  the  trend  percentage 
and the  ratio  methods.  For  application  of  these  methods  see  pp.  381-382  explain- 
ing  the trend  of  railway  finance,  and for detailed  discussion  of  these  methods  see 
Edwards,  George  W.,  Investments  11,  Corporation Finance  and  Investments  written 
for the  American  Institute  of Banking,  New  York,  1935, pp.  91-114.  The increase 
or decrease method simply shows the net change in the dollar amount of  each  item. 
Thus if  the X  corporation  showed  a  net  income  in  1935  of  $zoo,ooo  and $goo,- 
in  1936,  the  increase  would  be  $100,000.  The  trend  percentage  method  merely 
presents  these  changes  in  percentages,  and by  this  method  the  change  in the  net 
income of  the X  corporation would  be  expressed as 50 percent.  These two methods 
analyze each item  individually.  An  item may also be  studied in relation  to another 
item  by  means  of  a  ratio  which  is  a  statistical  device  expressing  the comparative 
relation  between  items  in the financial  statement  of  a  corporation  or of  a  govern- 
ment.  The ratio may  be  expressed in dollars, in  fractions,  in number  of  times  or 
in percent.  Thus if  the X corporation with net income of  $200,000 had fixed charges 
of  $ioo,ooo,  the  ratio  of  net  income  to  fixed  charges  may  then  be  expressed  as 
$-='=  2.00  times  or  200  percent.  The ratio can  therefore be  stated  as two  $loo,o00  1 
dollars  of  net  income  for  every  one dollar  of  fixed  charges,  2  over  I, two  times or. 
moo  percent.  The last  method  of  expressing  a  ratio  will  generally  be  used  in this 
study. 
While a large number  of ratios for  corporate  financial  analysis may  be  used  for 
the purpose  of  applied  finance, only  the  following  will  be  employed  in  this  study 
since for the purposes  of  social  finance we  are  interested  only  in problems  relating 
to the earning  power  and  capitalization. 
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These ratios  may  be  explained  as  follows : 
A.  Operating  expenses  to  operating  revenues.  This  ratio,  generally  called  the 
"operating  ratio,"  indicates  the  trend  of  the  efficiency  of  the  company,  and  shows 
the  extent  to  which  the  operating  expenses  absorb  the  operating  revenues  of  the 
corporation. 
B. Operating income  to operating revenues.  This ratio, the converse of  the above 
ratio, shows the extent  to which  the company  is  actually  receiving  income  from  its 
operations  after  the  payment  of  operating  expenses. 
C.  Total  income  to  fixed  charges.  This  so-called  "times  fixed  charges  earned" 
ratio is  the generally-accepted  test  of  financial  practice  for  determining  the  invest- 
ment  status of  the  bonds  of  a  corporation;  it  shows  the extent  to which  the total 
income covers or protects  the fixed charges. 
RATIOS 
Operating expenses to operating revenues 
Operating income to operating revenues 
Total income to fixed charges 
Net income to operating revenues 
Net income to dividends paid 
Funded debt to total capitalization 
Total income to total capitalization 
Net property to funded debt 
 EXPLANATION(^) 
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D.  Net  income  to operating revenues.  This test supplements the previous  test and 
shows  the  extent  to  which  the  operating  revenues  may  fall  before  the  protection 
of the  fixed  charges is impaired. 
E.  Net income  to dividends paid.  This ratio reflects the soundnm of  the dividend 
policy of  a corporation, since it shows whether  dividends  are actually  covered by  net 
Income  or  are merely  paid  out of  surplus. 
F.  Funded  debt  to  total  capitalization.  This  ratio  shows  the extent  of  funded 
debt  in  the capital  structure of  a  corporation. 
G. Total  income  to total  capitalization.  This ratio  reflects  the extent  to which 
the corporation  is  overcapitalized.  As  stated  in the  introduction,  the  basis  of  cor- 
porate valuation and therefore of  capitalization  is earning power.  This ratio shows 
the total income, or earning power, to total  capitalization  of  the corporation includ- 
ing both its bonds and stocks. 
H. Net  property  to funded debt.  This ratio shows the extent to which net prop- 
erty  covers the  funded  debt.  The theory  underlying  this  ratio  is  the same  as  that 
behind  the collateral  loan,  and  rests  upon  the  assumption  that  the  claim  of  the 
creditor  can  in  part  be  protected  by  requiring  collateral  with  a  sufficient  margin, 
or excess  value  over the amount  of  the loan,  to allow  for shrinkage in the value of 
the collateral  and still leave the principal  of  the loan protected. 
2 See pp.  181-182. 
3 Appendix  IX.  The trends  and position  of  railway  finance  Erom  1890  to  1910 
are discussed on p.  181. 
4 Ibid. columns 1 and 2. 
5 Ibid. Ratio A. 
6 Ibid.  Ratio  B. 
7 Ibid.  Ratio C. 
8 Ibid.  Ratio D. 
9 Ibid. columns 6 and 7, Ratio E. 
10 Investigation  of Railroad  Financing,  Hearings  before  the  Committee on Inter- 
state Commerce, United  States Senate, 74th  Congress,  1st session, p.  127. 
Appendix  IX.  column  8. 
12 Ibid.  column  g. 
13 Ibid.  Ratio F. 
14  See pp.  181-182. 
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16  Ibid.  Ratio B. 
17  Ibid.  columns 4 and 5. 
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'933.  P-  '49. 
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25 Ibid.  Ratios  B  and C. 
26 Ibid.  Ratio D. 
27 Adapted  from  Clark,  Evans,  op.  cit. p.  15%. 
2s Table 23,  Ratios A and C. 
29 Ibid.  Ratio A. 
so Ibid.  Ratio C. 
31 Ibid. Ratio D. 
82 Compiled  Erom  the Statistics  of Income,  Treasury Department.  Based  on re- 
ports  of  taxable and non-taxable corporations. 
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a4  Ibid.  Ratio  R. 
a5 Ibid.  Ratio C. 
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39 Ibid. item  I. 
40 Ibid.  Ratio  B.  . 
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Changes in the  United  States, New  York  1929, Vol.  I, p.  343. 
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Vol.  XLV, August  1931, p. 699. 
46A  study  made  by  Roy  A.  Foulke,  The  Commercial  Paper  Market,  New 
York  1931,  p.  51  showed  that  more  than  one-half  of  the  paper  then  outstanding 
orieinated  from medium sized corporations, or those with  net worth between $goo,ooo 
and SZ,~OO,OOO. 
47 Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  Monthly  Review  of  Credit  and  Business 
Conditions, October  go,  1920, p.  3 and July  1,  1933, p.  5. 
48yournal  of  Commerce, May  15,  1936, p. 4.  column  2. 
4s Clark,  op.  cit.  p.  175. 
60 Adapted  from Clark, Evans, op. cit.  p.  175.  Unfunded  debt here includes  notes 
and accounts payable,  and the  funded  debt  includes  bonds  and mortgages. 
alsecurity valuation  is  difficult in any field, but  it is especially so  in real  estate 
where  valuation or appraisal  is so largely  a  matter of  personal  opinion.  Because of 
this  uncertainty  of  ~aluation,  lenders of  funds on real  estate  attempted  to develop 
definite standards.  It became the accepted principle among experts that  a real estate 
mortgage  should  not  exceed more  than  60  percent  of  the  appraised  value  of  the 
property  even  when  it  was  improved  property.  This appraisal  was  to be  based  on 
earning  power,  and  income  from  the  operation  of  the  property  was  to  cover  the 
fixed charges on the mortgage by at least  200 percent. 
52Adapted  from  Clark.  Evans, op.  cit. p.  66.  Rentals  refer  to residential  rentals 
only. 
53  Table 26,  item  6. 
54 Ibid. item  1. 
65 Ibid. item 2. 
56 Ibid. item 6. 
57 Ibid. items 3,  4 and 5. 
58 Ibid.  item  6. 
59 Ibid.  item  6. 
60 Ibid. item  3. 
ellnterim report.  Real  Estate  Securities Committee,  Investment Bankers  Associa- 
tion  of  America  "Future  of  Real  Estate  Financing"  in  Investment  Banking,  June 
19~1,  pp.  7~10. 
62 For discussion see  Seagar, Henry R. and Gulick, Charles A.,  Trwt and  Corpora- 
tion Problems, New  York  and London  1929, p.  307  et seq. 
63  Stevens, W.  S.,  "A  Classification of  Pools  and Associations  Based  on American 
Experience,"  in the American  Economic  Review, Vol.  111,  September  1913,  pp.  545- 
575. 
64For  legal  discussion  of  consolidations  see Field,  Kenneth  "Nature  of  and Pro- 
cedure for Direct  Property  Owning  Consolidations," 6 Rocky  Mountain  Law  Review, 
232. 
mThe Associated  Gas  and  Electric  Properties  acquired  the  shares  of  beneficial 
interest in Manson Securities Trust at a cost  of  $544,500 and this interest was written 
up to $io,ooo,ooo.  Utility  Corporations  Report, No.  45,  p.  36. 
6eCited  by  John  T.  Flynn,  "What  Happened  to  Insull,"  in  the  The New  Re- 
public,  Vol.  LXX,  May  4,  1932,  p.  317. 
07 Utility  Corporations  Report  No.  45,  op, cit.  p.  50. 
68Statement  of  Harry  M.  Addinsell,  President  of  the Chase  Harris  Forbes  Cor- 
poration  in an address delivered  December  15,  1932 New  York  Times, December  16, 
1932, p.  29,  col. 8. 
69 United States Senate Committee on Banking and Currency.  Hearings  on Stock 
Exchange  Practices,  72nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part V.,  pp.  1589-1692. 
70 Ibid. 
71  Flynn, John T.,  Security  Speculation,  New  York  1934, p.  159 
72 United States Senate Committee, op. cit.  72nd Congress 2nd Session, No.  1455 on 
Stock  Exchange  Practices,  p.  354. 
73 Ibid.  p.  355. 
74 Ibid.  pp.  348-349. 
75 Ibid.  p.  354. 
76 Ibid. hp.->4&349. 
77 Flynn, John  T., Investment  Trusts Gone  Wrong, New York  1g30,  pp.  56-59. FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
78 Stock  Exchange  Practices,  p.  344. 
79 Standard Trade and Securities, Investment  Companies, Vol.  g,  section  P, March 
17.  1936,  pp  1-53. 
CHAPTER 16 
1A brief  summary  of  the  technique  of  governmental  financial  analysis  is  here- 
with given.  As  noted  before in the case of  corporate credit  the income account  and 
the  balance  sheet  furnish  the  data  from  which  an  analysis  can  be  made  of  the 
trend of  the earning  power  and the capital structure of  a corporation over a  period 
of  years.  In like  manner  the financial  analysis of  government  credit  can  be  made 
from a study of  the budget  showing revenues and expenditures and from the financial 
statement  showing  the  nature  of  the  debt  of  the  government.  Just  as  the credit 
of  a corporation depends upon its earning power, so the credit  of  a government  rests 
upon  its  ability  to obtain necessary revenues.  There is  of  course  a  wide difference 
in the terminology  used  in the  budgets  and in  the  financial  statements  of  federal, 
state,  municipal  and  foreign  governments,  and  it  is  therefore  difficult  to  frame  a 
single  classification which  exactly  fits  all  these  categories of  governments.  However. 
the  following summarized budget  and financial statement presents  the separate items 
needed  to understand  the  trend  of  government  finance. 
ITEMS IN THE BUDGET AND FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF A GOVERNMENT 
There is herewith  given an explanation of  the various  items  in the above state- 
ment. 
1. Revenues  are of  various  classes.  These  receipts  include  commercial  revenues 
from  rendering  services,  as  those  performed  by  a  post-office, public  bank,  steam  or 
electric  railway,  and  from  selling  commodities,  as  water,  gas  or  electric  power. 
From  exercising its  functions,  a government  may  also derive  administrative revenues 
as  fines, fees,  licenses and special  assessments.  The third  and most  important  class 
of revenue  is  raised  from  taxes which  may  be  either  direct  in the  form  of  property 
and income  taxes  or indirect  in the form  of  excise  duties  on commodities  and on 
services or  of  customs duties. 
2. Total  expenditures  are the outlays  made  by  the  government  to  finance  either 
current  operations or  permanent  improvements. 
3.  Balance  is the difference between revenues and expenditures, and may be either 
a  surplus  or  a  deficit. 
4.  Interest  on  debt  is  the charge paid  for the use  of  borrowed  capital  as repre- 
sented  by  the  debt  of  the government. 
5.  Public  debt  retirement  is  the  sum  which  the  government  is  required  to  set 
aside for  reducing the principal  sum of  its debt. 
6.  Debt  service  includes the interest  on the debt  and the public  debt  retirement. 
7.  Unfunded  debt  includes  short-term  loans,  warrants  issued  to  anticipate  tax 
payments, floating debt or that not covered either by  cash or by  available debt retire- 
ment assets, and all other obligations  payable  within  a  year. 
. 
NOTES 
8. Funded  debt, or the fixed,  long-term  debt,  includes  obligations  payable  after 
a  year.  Another  distinction  as  to  the  maturity  of  the  debt  may  be  drawn  at the 
five-year period,  and obligations maturing  after  one  year  but  before  five  years  are 
sometimes described as the intermediate debt which may be included in the unfunded 
debt. 
g. Gross  debt  is  the total  of  the unfunded debt  and the funded  debt. 
10. Deductions include the various  items  which  may  properly  be  subtracted  from 
the gross debt as accumulated debt  retirement  assets  actually held  in  a  sinking fund 
to meet  maturing obligations,  and also debts which are no actual  burden since they 
are based  on  self-supporting governmental properties. 
11. Net  debt  is  the  balance  of  the  gross  debt  after  the  above  deductions  have 
been  made, and constitutes the actual  direct  debt of  the government. 
12.  Indirect  debt.  Not  only  are there deductions from  the  gross  debt, but  there 
are  also  additions  to  the  debt.  The  gross  debt,  as  indicated  above,  constitutes 
only  the  direct  debt  of  a  government.  There may  also  be  additional  obligations. 
A  national  government  may  assume  or  guarantee  the  obligations  of  other  govern- 
ments and even of  public  corporations.  Likewise,  a  municipal  government  has  not 
only its own  direct debt  but  may also have  an overlapping debt derived  from  other 
governmental  bodies. 
13. Total debt is the sum of  the net  debt and the indirect  debt. 
14. Debt  base  is  the  foundation  upon  which  the  structure  of  the  government's 
debt rests.  The debt base may consist of  the taxable property within  the jurisdiction 
of  the  government.  In municipal  finance  this  property  is  carried  under  the  item 
of  "assessed  valuation."  A  broader  debt  base  is  the  total  wealth  of  the community 
within  the jurisdiction  of  the  government.  In the  past,  wealth  has  been  used  as 
the debt base  in judging  the financial position  of  a national  government,  but usually 
has not  been taken into consideration  in state and municipal finance.  In view  of  the 
fact  that  both  state and municipal  governments  in recent  years  have  been  deriving 
a growing proportion of  their revenues from  sources other than the general  property 
tax, it appears only logical to consider the item of  wealth as a factor  in determining 
the financial  trend of  state and municipal  finance.  The valuation  of  the debt  base 
is  generally  difficult  to  ascertain  with  any  degree  of  accuracy.  The valuation  of 
taxable  property  is  necessarily  indefinite  since  the  methods  of  assessment  are  gen- 
erally  unscientific, and  those  of  estimating  wealth  are  still  imperfect.  Nevertheless, 
with  these  reservations, the item  may be  used  as  a  means  of  studying  the  trend  of 
government  finance. 
Based  upon  the  items  mentioned  previously  the  following  ratios  may  be  used 
for the purpose  of  analyzing  the financial  trend  of  governments. 
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Numbers refer to the items in the financial statement on page 374. 







These ratios may be  explained as follows : 
A.  Revenues  to total  expenditures  shows  the extent  to which  the budget  is  or is 
not balanced.  One hundred  percent  or more  indicates  a  balanced  budget. 
B. Debt  service  to  total  expenditures  indicates  the  extent  of  the  total  outlays 
absorbed  by  debt  service.  A high  percentage  indicates  an  unsatisfactory  debt struc- 
ture. 
C.  Unfunded debt to gross debt shows the extent of  the short-maturing debt.  A low 
percentage  indicates a  more satisfactory debt  structure. 
D. Deductions  to gross  debt  shows  the extent of  the  debt  which  is  self-carrying 
and  not  an  actual  burden.  A  high  percentage  indicates  a  more  satisfactory  debt 
structure. 
RATIOS  - 
Revenues to total expenditures.. . .  . .  .  . . .  . . 
Debt service to total expenditures. . .  . .  . .  . . 
Unfunded debt to gross debt.. .  . .  .  . .  .  . . .  . . 
Deductions to gross debt.. .  . .  .  . .  .  . .  . .  . .  . . 
Debt base to total debt. .  . . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  .  . . 
~et  debt per capita('). .  .  . .  .  .  .  . .  . .  . .  . . . .  . 
EXPLANATION* 
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E.  Debt  bare  to total  debt  shows the extent  to which  taxable  property or wealth 
covers the total  debt.  A high  ratio reflects  greater protection  for  the debt. 
F.  Net  debt per  capita shows the size of  the net debt in relation to the population 
expressed in money  value  such as dollars.  A low  amount  indicates  a  small  pressure 
of  the debt per  person. 
2For  analysis  of  governmental  securities  see  Edwards,  George  W..  Investments, 
op. cit.,  chapters  12 and 13. 
The statistics used  in this section are presented in Appendix VII. 
4 Ibid.  column  6. 
5 Ibid.  columns g, lo and  I  I. 
6 Ibid.  column  14. 
7 Ibid.  Ratios  B and E. 
8 Ibid.  column  3. 
elbid.  columns  9, lo  and  11. 
lo  Ibid.  columns  I  I  and 14, Ratio E. 
Ibid. column  2. 
12  Ibid.  columns  I and 3. 
Ibid.  columns  4 and 5. 
14  Ibid.  column  6, Ratio  B. 
15  Ibid. columns  i I and 7. 
10 Ibid.  Ratio C. 
17  Ibid.  Ratio E. 
18  Ibid. columns  I,  o and 3. 
10  Ibid.  column  7. 
20 Ibid. Ratio C. 
21  Ibid.  column  12. 
In addition,  technically,  the  government  also  guaranteed  postal  savings  deposits 
amounting to $l,oiS,ooo,ooo and Federal  Reserve notes  amounting  to $3,453,000.~ 
For  descrivtion  of guaranteed  obligations,  see  the State and Municipal  compend~um  of the ~h;onicle. - 
22 Annendix  VII.  columns  2  and 6, ratio B.  --rr  -----  - 
23 Ibid.  Ratio E: 
24 Financial  Statistics  of  States;  Bureau  of  Census;  United  States 
Commerce.  This table continues the statistics on state debt given in 
presented  the trend  of  the state debt  from  1870 to  1913.  (See  p. 
ments  on the trend of  state credit, see Raymond, William Lee, State 
Bonds,  2nd  ed.,  Boston  1932; Trull, Edna,  Resources  and  Debt  of 
States,  Dun &  Bradstreet, New  York  1935. 
Department  of 
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180.)  For  com- 
I  and  Municipal 
the Forty-Eight 
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26 Ibid. Ratio B. 
27 Ibid.  Ratio C. 
28 Ibid. Ratio D. 
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30 Ibid.  items a  and 10.  .----  ~ 
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increased its direct  debt  from $x,ooo,ooo  in 1923 to $164,000,000  by  1932. As  a result, 
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85 Table 28, items  1 and g. 
86 Ibid. item  3. 
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Since the  reports of  these financial  institutions  were  made as  of  June  go  of  each 
year,  the security  prices  were  likewise  computed  as  of  this  date.  In the case  of  the 
life  insurance  companies  the fiscal  year ends on December 31st, and so  this date was 
taken  in  computing  the changes in  the value  of  the  investments. 
24This  figure  probably  contains  a  margin  of  error,  as  the  term  "industrial"  is 
loosely  defined in  the statistics on  investment  of  these  institutions. 
25 The fi~lancial  position  of  the mutual savings banks  was  actually  much stronger 
than that of  other classes of  financial institutions.  The strength of  the savings banks 
rested  mainly  in  the  fact  that  over  the  years  they  had  accu~nulated  large  reserves 
through conservative dividend policies. 
26 Since  1906 only  six life  insurance  companies actually failed.  These were  small 
institutions  whose  difficulties  developed  not  so  much  from  unsound  investment 
policies  but  from  unfavorable  niortality  experiences.  However,  the  losses  of  the 
insurance companies  on  their  securities  have  at  times  been  very  heavy.  In  the de- 
pression  of  1921  the  losses  of  the  life  insurance  companies  were  severe  and  as  a 
result, according to 4. Vere Shaw, "more  than a few  life  insurance  companies in  this 
country  were  actually  insolvent.  They  had  not  succeeded  in  maintaining  even  the 
nominal  value  of  their  capital."  Shaw, A.  Vere,  "Elements  of  Investment  Safety," 
in  the  Haruard  Business  Reuiezu,  Vol.  111,  July  1925, p.  447.  In fact, one domestic 
life  insurance  company, in its  statement  as  of  December 31,  1921, reported  a market 
value  belorv  cost  of  more  than  $63,000,000  on  its  bond  holdings.  Ibid.  p.  449. 
In  the  depression  following  1929 the  position  of  the  life  insurance  companies  be- 
came  elen  more  uncertain.  Not  only  was  the  decline  in  security  values  more 
precipitous,  but  in  these  low  markets  the  insurance  companies  were  forced  to  sell 
a  large  part  of  their  securities  in  order  to  meet  the pressing  demand  for  loans  on 
policies.  Life insurance companies increased  the  cash  surrender  value  of  their  assets 
from  $6.30o,ooo.ooo in  1922  to  $14,3oo,o00,000 in  1933.  See  Berle,  Adolph  A.,  and 
Peterson,  Victoria, J., Liquid  Claims  and  National  Wealth, New  York  1934, P.  103; 
see also Sulli\an, James P.,  "The Life Insurance Company  as  a  Banking  Concern"  In 
the 7our?tnl of  Business, October  1932, p. 346.  By  the end of  1931 the insurance com- 
pallies had  to apply a large part of  investments to grant loans to policy  holders.  See 
testimony of  Eclcr, Frederick  H.,  President  of  the Metropolitan  Life  Insurance Com- 
~nnyhefore  the sub-committee of  the United States Banking and Currency Committee, 
Hvnrings  on  !he Crenlion  of the  Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation,  Senate  Hear- 
ings, ;rind Congress, 1st Session, p. 130.  The situation became serious in  March, 1933, 
when the tlemands of policyholders for loans depleted the companies' holdings of  cash 
and reatlily marketable securities at a time when the amount of  new  funds which they 
were receiving declined,  Moreover, the companies were faced with  extensive defaults 
on both  their  mortgage  loans  and  their  security  holdings.  Under  these  conditions. 
in March,  1933, the Superintendent  of  Insurance in New  York. and in  several  other 
states,  ordered  the  inGrance  companies  to  suspend  the  loan  and  cash  surrender 
provisions of  their  policies. 
In  the  post-war  period  fire  and  marine  insurance  companies  increased  their  in- 
vestment  aswts, and  became  virtually  investment  trusts.  The investment  experience 
of these companies  in  recent  years  has  been  unsatisfactory.  A  study  of  the  period 
even  from 1921 to 1925 by  Nerlove  showed that of  290  such companies, 206  incurred 
underwriting  losses  of  $130,6~,wo  on  business  operations  and  on  their  securities 
xvhile  the  remaining  84  showed  profits  of  $28,3ov,~o  or  a  net  loss  in  all  of $102,- 
300.000.  Nerlove, S.  H.,  "Investments  Subsidize Fire and Marine Insurance Business," 
The  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  Vol.  35, February  1927, p. 128. FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
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I (a)  National  income:  Kuznets, Simon.  .Vational  Income  and  Capital  Formation, 
New  York  1997.  p.  16. 
(b) Saving funds:  includes  total  of  saving deposits of  state banks,  mutual savinga 
banks,  national  banks,  trust  companies, private  banks,  aggregate  reserves  of  life  in- 
surance companies  and assets of  building  and loan  associations, computed after  the 
method  used  by  F.  C.  Mills,  Economic  Tendencies of  the  United  States,  New  York 
10~2,  P. 42;;  sources, RePorts  of  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  and Proceedings 
oj-ltf'e lnkrance  ~residents. 
(c)  New  Securities: Table 99. 
(d) Interest  on  Bonded Debt:  Table 40. 
(e) Bonded  Debt:  Table 41. 
(f)  Total  Securities Outstanding:  Table  42. 
(g)  National  Wealth:  Standard  Trade  and  Securities,  Vol.  3,  Statistical  section, 
p.  D64. 
2 Table 28,  column  I. 
3 Ibid. column  2. 
4 Fabricant, S., Recent  Corporate Profits in the United States, p. lo National Bureau 
of  Economic Research, Bulletins  50 and 56 ; Ebersole, J. Franklin, "Income  Forecast- 
ing by  the  Use  of  Statistics of Income Data,"  In  the Revtew  of  Economzc  Statistics, 
November  1929.  Vol.  XI,  p.  180;  Nerlove, S.  H.,  A  Decade  of  Corporate  Incomes 
1920-1929,  Chicago  1932; King,  Wilford  I.,  The National  Income  and  rts  Purchas- 
ing  Power,  New  York  1930, p. 280;  Mills, Frederick  C.,  Economic  Tendencaes in  the 
United  States,  New  York  1932, P.  429:  For  a  consideration  of  the  significance of 
corwrate saving see Snvder, Carl. "Capital Supply and National  Well  Belng,"  Ameri- 
can' Economic  kevtew, '~ol.  XXVI,  line  1996; pp. 195-224. 
5 A further deduction would be to omit  the amount of  investment  trust securities, 
since the proceeds of  such issues are applied to the purchase af other securities.  This 
item  is,  however, included  in Table 39  in order  to  show  the relative  importance of 
investment  trust  issues. 
6 The figures on corporate securities wed in this table are compiled by  the Chron- 
icle.  Although  these  are  unquestionably  the  most  comprehensive  compilations  of 
new  security  issues  at present  available,  they  are incomplete  and do not  represent 
the total  demand  for  capital  through  the  flotation  of  securities,  since  they  do not 
include the  issues of  many  local  corporations.  These issues  in themselves are small 
in amount, but  the total  is  large.  Frederick  C.  Mills  states that  between  December 
31,  1928 and December 31,  1929 the total capital stock, plus bonds  and mortgages of 
corporations  submitting balance  sheets to the United  States Bureau  of  Internal Rev- 
enues inoeased by  $17,183.000.0o0,  while  for the same period  the new domestic capi- 
tal  issues  as compiled  by  the  Chro~ticle  totalled  only  $g,425,ooo,ooo.  This statement 
1s  questioned  by  Eddy, George A.,  "Security  Issues  and Real  Investment  in  1929,  in 
the Review  of  Economic  Statisttcs,  May  1937, Vo1.  XlV, No.  2,  pp.  79-91.  Statistics 
on new  security issues are also compiled  by  the Yournal  of  Commerce  and Moody's 
Investment  Service. 
7 These amounts are based  on the figures in Table 39. 
8 Computed  from the Chtonicle. 
9 (a) Federal Government -  Moody's  Manual  of  Governments and  Municipals,  19359 
D.  a1 : (b\ State and munici~al  eovernment -  U.  S.  Bureau of  the Census ; Dept. of  u.  >< 
Commerce, Financial  statistics  ofu~tates;  Financial  Statistics  of  Cities;  (c) Corporate 
-United  States Internal Revenue Office, United States Treasury Department, Statistics 
of  Income. 
10  Table 41.  These figures differ from those presented  in the study of  Long  Term 
Debts  in the  United  States,  United  States Department of  Commerce, Series  NO. 95, 
Washington  1997,  since  this  report  includes  not  only  bonded  but  also  other  long 
term  dgbt. 
11  The figures for the securities of the Federal Land Banks, 1920 to 1924 inclusive, 
were  obtained  from  the annual  reports  of  the Federal  Farm  Loan  Board  for the 
respective yean. 
The  figures  for  the  real  estate  securities  from  1920  to  1924  inclusive,  were 
obtained  from  the estimates of Charles E. Parsons  "Credit  Expansion  1920 to 1929" 
in  the  Quarterly  3ournal  of  Economics,  November  1913  Volume  45  Page  100. 
All  other  figures were obtained  from Moody's  Manual  of  Investment;  Industrial 
Securities.  Since the figures were  frequently revised in later editions, they  were not 
obtained  for  the respective  years  but  obtained  from  later  editions  of  the  manual. 
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particularly  1924  (page  LXV),  1925  (page  LI),  1926  (page LI),  1927  (page  XLIII), 
19-29  (page  XLIV),  1932  (page LIV),  1934  (page  -442).  and  1936  (page A38-39). 
The figures glven by  Moody's for state and municipal  securities differ  from  those 
presented  In  other  sources such  as  the Bond  Buyer  for  January  I, 1936. 
For  the years  1920 to  1931 inclusive, Moody's  figures are higher,  whlle  from  1932 
to  1935  ~nclusive  they  are lower  than  the Bond  Buyer  statistics. 
12  192~-Moody's Manual  of  Industrials,  lggn, page LIV ;  lgn6-1ggj,  1996, page a-38. 
13 See Table 38  item 6 p. 279. 
14  Ibid.  Column 7. 
15 See  Weidenhammer, Robert, "Control  of  the Capital  Market,"  in the American 
Economzc  Revzew,  Vol.  XXII,  September  1932, p.  402  ; and Doane,  Robert  R.,  The 
Measurement  of  American  Wealth, New  York  1933, p.  11  1. 
16 See  8. 
17  ~abt  38,  Ratio A. 
18  p. 232. 
19Standard  Trade and  Securities, Vol. 3, Statistical Section. 
20  New  York  Stock  Exchange  Bulletin-Dec.  1931. p.  12. 
21 Ibid. Federal  Reserve  Bullettn,  Vol.  16, January  iggo, p.  13. 
22 Table 38,  Ratio B. 
23 Ibid. Ratio C. 
24 Ibid.  Ratio D. 
25 Conant,  Charles  A..  "World's  Wealth  in Negotiable  Securities,"  in the Atlantic 
Monthly, January  1908, p.  97. 
26 Table 38,  Ratio E. 
CHAPTER 19 
1  Since much of the confusion in monetary  discussion has been due to the lack of 
clarity In  terminology particularly with respect to the technical meaning of  "money," 
"value  of money,"  and "inflation,"  the definition  of  these terms as used  in this analy- 
sis is  herewith  given.  Money, in the broad sense, includes the means of  payment held 
by  the public for the purpose of  discharging debt and price contracts.  For amplifica- 
tion  of  thls definition of  money, see Currie, Lauchlin, Supply  and  Control of  Money 
in  the  United States, Cambridge,  Mass.  1934, especially Chapter 11.  Money  is  there- 
fore composed of both cnrrency and bank deposits.  The expression "value  of  money" 
is used  in the sense of  both the external value and the internal value.  The external 
value is  expressed in terms of foreign exchange ;  the internal value of  money is stated 
not only in terms of  commodities but also of  securities.  For the distinction between 
the external  and the internal  value, see study by  Hardy,  Charles  O.,  Devaluation  of 
the  Dollar,  in Public Policy  Pamphlets, No.  8, University of  Chicago Press,  Chicago. 
1933.  Banking and monetary  theory  has  in the past  been  overinfluenced by  the re- 
stricted orthodox concept  of  the financial system.  As  in the case of  banking  theory, 
monetary  theory  has  been  largely  based  on the assumption  that  the financial  system 
is still  in the stage of  individual  capitalism,  and has  failed to appreciate  the signifi- 
cance of  security  capitalism.  As  a  result  even leading  monetary  economists, not  to 
mention  popular  writers,  discuss  the  subject  of  the  value  of  money  almost  exclu- 
sively  from the standpoint of  its  ]elation  to commodity  prices. 
The third  term  requiring definition  is  "inflation."  It is  used  in this  section  to 
describe  that economic condition caused by  an increase in the means of  payment  in 
the form of  currency and bank deposits in excess of  the volume of  goods and services 
offered for sale, and results  in a decrease in the value of  money ex  ressed  internally 
in terms not  only of  commodities but also of  securities and externaey in foreign ex- 
change.  Deflation is  the opposite  economic situation  caused  by  a  decrease  in  the 
means  of payment  in relation  to the amount of  goods  and services offered,  and re- 
sults in an increase in the internal and external value of  money. 
Inflation may  be either private or public.  Private inflation may be largely  com- 
mercial  in nature when  there is a  maladjustment  of  the  means  of  payment  in  rela- 
tion  to  commodities.  Private  inflation  may  be  large1  investment  in  nature  when 
the  maladjustment  in  the means  of  payment  is  in  refation  to  investment  assets  as 
securities or real estate.  With the development  of  security capitalism, private security 
investment  inflation  caused by  an excess of  security investment  over  saving available 
for the security market  has become of  more pressing importance. 
Public inflation may in turn either  be domestic or international  in nature.  Both 
forms of inflation arise from an emergency, as war or depression, which necessitates out- 
lays by  the government  in excess of  revenues, and so leads to a deficit in the govern- 
ment  budget.  The simplest  method  of  overcoming this  fiscal  problem  is  to balance 382  FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
the budget  by  decreasing expenditures and increasing  revenues.  Such a  fiscal  policy 
is  generally  impracticable in time of  emergency, and so the government  has recourse 
to the use of its credit.  Such credit in turn may be either  in the form  of  fiat  money 
or of bonds  sold to the investing public.  With  the  development  of  security  capital- 
ism  governments have made every effort to avoid  the use  of  fiat  money, primarily  an 
instrument  of individual  capitalism,  and have  rather  employed  the device of  issuing 
securities.  When  the sale of  such  securities is  no longer  possible and the country  is 
not  on the  gold  standard, inflation  often  takes  place  through  the central  bank  and 
is  partly  bank  note  and partly  deposit  credit  inflation. 
International  public  inflation  arises  out  of  a  deficit  in  the  nation's  balance  of 
international  payments.  This  deficit  results  from  an  excess  of  the  international 
debits in goods, services and capital  in excess of  the  international  credits  of  the na- 
tion.  Again,  the simple policy  is  to overcome the deficit  by  decreasing  debits  and 
increasing  credits  through  reducing  the imports  of  goods  and services  and through 
stimulating  exports.  When  this  policy  fails  the nation  makes  use  of  its  credit  by 
placing  its securities in foreign markets or as a last  recourse  by  selling its fiat money 
abroad. 
2 Technically Part I11 of  the Farm Relief  Act. 
8 In addition to these statutes enacted  by  Congress, numerous additional proposals 
for monetary  control  were  presented  to  Congress  but  were  not  enacted.  These  in- 
cluded  the Fraser Bill for the Bank of  the United  States, 74th  Congress,  1st  Session. 
Senate Document  1869; the Somers Bill  for  the National  Bank  of  the  United  States. 
74th  Congress,  1st  Session.  H.R.  3250;  the  Goldsborough  Bill  for  Federal  hlone- 
tary  Authority,  74th  Congress,  1st  Session,  H.R.  170;  and  the  Cutting  Bill  for  a 
Federal  Monetary  Authority,  73rd  Congress, 2nd  Session, 3744. 
4This structure, established  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  of  1913, was  continually 
modified by  subsequent legislation  particularly the Banking Acts of  1933 and of  1935. 
The Banking Act  of  1935 accomplished  a  sweeping  revision  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
system, and went  beyond  the  scope  of  the  original  Federal  Reserve  Act  in broad- 
ening the function  of  the Reserve system in its  relation  to the economic life  of  the 
nation.  An official review of  the Banking Act  of  1935 is given in the Federal  Reserve 
Bulletin, Vol.  21,  September,  1935, pp.  559-564;  see  also  Hearings  on the  Banking 
Act  of  1935, 74th Congress,  st  Session.  The Act  represented an effort  to repair the 
banking system in the light of  the unsatisfactory  experiences of  the post-war  period. 
It consisted of  three parts,  Title I  which  placed  the deposit  insurance  system  on a 
permanent  basis,  Title I1 which  revised  the Federal  Reserve  system,  and  Title I11 
which  effected  changes  in the  regulation  of  the  individual  banks  of  the country. 
This study  will  not  consider  Title 111 which deals with  the technical  regulation  of 
banking practice. 
6 S&  p.  193. 
6 Willis;  H.  Parker,  The Federal  Reserve  System,  New  York  1923, pp.  251-252, 
also Willis.  H. Parker, "The Federal Reserve Act  in Congress," in The Annals  of  the 
American Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  Vol. 99, January  1922, pp.  36-49. 
7 Federal  Reserve Act, Section  10. 
Senate bill  4412 as introduced  in the ~2nd  Congress,  1st  Session. 
9As a  matter of  fact,  it had  become  the practice  for  the President  to designate 
the chief  executive  officer  of  the Board  only  from  year  to year.  See  testimony  of 
Governor  Marriner  S.  Eccles,  United  States  Committee  on  Banking  and  Currency, 
House, 74th Congress,  1st Session, Hearings  on the Banking Act  of  19j5, pp.  189-190. 
loClark, Lawrence  E.,  Central  Banking  Under the Federal  Reserve  System,  New 
York 19359 PP- 95-98. 
11 It was first proposed that the position of  Federal Reserve agent be abolished, but 
in the final act the office  was  continued and he still serves as  chairman  of  the board 
of  directors. 
12  Harris, Seymour E.,  Twenty Years of  Federal  Resewe Policy, Cambridge,  Mass. 
1933. Vol.  I, p.  145 et seq. gives  an excellent account of  this controversy between  the 
Federal  Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Bank  of  New  York. 
1s  Federal  Reserve Act, Section 14. 
14 First  Annual  Report, Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York,  Washington  1916. 
p.  20. 
15 Federal  Reserve Bulletin. Vol.  I, 1915, p. 360. 
16The effectiveness of the  open  market  policies of  the Reserve  system  has  been 
subiect  to criticism.  See comments of  Dr.  Adolph  Miller,  Hearings  before  the  Com- 
mikee  on  Banking  and  Currency,  House,  70th  Congress,  1st  Session,  Pursuant  to 
H.R.  11806,  1928,  p.  125 ; also  Whitney,  Caroline,  Experiments  in  Credit  Control, 
The Federal  Reserve  System, New  York  1934.  p.  28. 
NOTES 
17  The Federal  Reserve Board  refused to recognize the fact that in actual  practice 
the banking  system was  turning  toward  the liberal rather  than the orthodox  theory. 
The Reserve  Board  scrupulously  avoided  public  discussion  of  the  broad  principles 
involved  in  the changing  character  of  the assets  of  the  member  banks.  No  public 
consideration  was  given  to the serious problem  as  to whether  the growing  diversion 
oE  bank  credit  into  direct  and  indirect  security  investment  was  in  the  interest  of 
public  welfare.  If  the individual  members  of  the Federal  Reserve  Board  were con- 
scious of  this actual revolution in the banking system, they  gave  no public  utterance 
of it.  Officially the Board  chose to  ignore  the fact that  the commercial banking  sys- 
tem  was  changing  as  capitalism  changed.  The first  official  notice  of  the  changing 
nature of  the assets of  the commercial banks did not come until  1926 when  the Board 
made  a  brief  comment  on  this  trend.  Thirteenth  Annual  Report  of  the  Federal 
Resen~e  Board,  Washington  1927, p.  10.  In  its  annual  report  of  1928  the  Federal 
Reserve  Board  made  only  a  passlng  reference  to  the  sweeping  effect  of  security 
capitalism  on the  banking  system.  Ibid.,  Fifteenth  Annual  Report,  op.  cit.,  Wash- 
ington  1929, p.  8. 
18  For  discussion, see  Harris,  op. cit.,  Vol. I, pp. 291-311. 
19 Hearings  on  Operations  of  the  Banking  System,  71st  Congress,  3rd  Session,  -  ~ 
Senate,  p. 711. 
20 United  States Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings  on Branch  Bank- 
ing, House.  71st  Congress, 2nd Session, 1930, Vol.  I. p.  500 ; United States Committee 
on Banking and Currency, Hearings, Operation of  National and  Federal  Reseme  Bank- 
ing Systems,  71st  Congress, 2nd  Session ; Appendix,  Part  6,  pp. 707-708. 
21 Banking Act  of  1932,  72nd Congress,  1st Session, Chapter 58 of  Revised Statutes. 
section  lob. 
22 Summary  of  statements  of  Marriner  S.  Eccles  on  the  Banking  Bill  of  1935 in 
reply  to questions  by  members  of  the  Committee  on  Banking  and  Currency  of  the 
House  of  Representatives at I;learings, March 4-20,  1935,  p.  18. 
23 Hearings:  Establishment  of  a  War Finance  Corporation,  65th  Congress,  2nd 
Session,  1918,  pp.  38-39;  United  States  House  Ways  and  Means  Committee,  1918, 
pp.  3-8,  23-26,-j3,  108--11o. 
24 Harding,  W.  P.  G.,  "Suggested  Changes in the Federal Reserve Act,"  in Ameri- 
can  Bankers  Association  Journal, Vol.  22,  February  1930, p.  734.  For  further  dis- 
cussion see  Mlynarski,  Felix,  Gold  and  Central Banks,  New  York,  1929,  pp.  36-37  ; 
Kisch,  Cecil  H.,  and Elkin,  W.  A.,  Central  Banks,  London,  1928.  p.  130;  Mitchell, 
Waldo,  The Uses  of  Bank  Funds, Chicago  1925, p.  177;  Watkins.  Leonard,  Bankers 
Balances, Chicago 1929, pp. 379-380. 
25 "Productiveness  as  the  Test  for  Rediscount,"  American  Bankers  Association 
Journal, Vol.  22, June  1930, pp. 1178-1183 ;  Hearings:  Operation of  Banking  System, 
71st Congress,  1st Session, op. cit. 1931. pp. 372-373. 
26The  hearings  and  the official  documents  relating  to  the  Banking  Act  of  1935 
contain  no direct or indirect  reference on  this  subject. 
27 United  States Senate Committee,  Hearings, Senate,  Committee on Banking and 
Currency,  72nd  Congress, 1st  Session,  1932 on the Senate Bill  4115, p.  501. 
28 Congressional Record, Vol.  79,  No.  15.8, July  25,  1935, p.  11827. 
ZeChapter  191, Section  2  (b) of  the Banking Act  of  February  25,  1927. 
30 Banking  Act  of  1933. 
31 See ruling of  December 27,  1934. 
s2See  regulations  governing  the  purchase  of  investment  securities  and  further 
defining the term "investment  securities," issued February  15, 1936. 
33 For statement of  the statutes of  the various states on the investment  of  savings 
and trust  funds, see state and municipal section of  the supplements to the Chronicle; 
see also pp.  195-196. 
34Reilly.  Edward  J.,  "Formulating  a  Sound  Code  Governing  Legal  Investments 
for Tru5t  Funds,"  Trust  Companies, February  1932, Vol.  LIV,  No.  2,  pp.  233-238. 
35 New  York State  Bar  Association  Bulletin, Vol.  6,  March  1934, p.  133. 
3eGeorgia  Laws,  Sec.  2409,  Acts  of  1929; Laws  of  Minnesota  1929,  Chapter  111. 
For  discussion  see  Halaas,  E.  T., "Legal  Control of  Life Insurance Company  Invest- 
ments,"  in  the yournal  of  Business, Vol.  5, October  1932, p. 332. 
a7Laws of Vermont,  1929,  Section  5580;  South  Dakota,  see  Comp.  Laws,  1929, 
Section q35ia. 
88 ~e&n loo of  Chapter  33 of  the Laws of  1900 as amended. 
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APPENDICES 
These appendices seek to present the statistical data for studying the 
evolution of  security capitalism.  In interpreting these appendices certain 
qualifications must be kept in mind.  Although every effort was made to 
select the most accurate and most reliable figures, many of  them, such as 
national wealth and national income, can only be crude estimates.  Fur- 
thermore,  the farther back  in time,  the less reliable  are these statistics, 
because of  the inadequacy of  the early data.  Also, it cannot be taken for 
granted that governments have released accurate data with respect to cer- 
tain items, such as expenditures for armament.  For recent years, in the 
case of  certain items, only estimated and not final figures were available, 
and so these were not  included.  Notwithstanding these limitations, the 
appendices bring together statistics which serve as a basis for undertaking 
a quantitative study of the subjects considered in this book, 388  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
APPENDIX I-A 
EVOLUTION  OF BRITISH  SECURITY  CAPITALISM,  1820-1935 
-- -  ECONOMIC  TENDENCIES 
I. COAL  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  1890 is 1889. 
Sources:  1820, 1840-1890  Mulhall, Michael George,  The Diction- 
ary  of  Statistics, London  and New 
York 1899, p.  "9. 
I goo  Webb, Augustus D., New Dictionary of 
Statistics, London, I 91  I, p. 86. 






























191  3,  1928-1930  Moody's Manual of Governments,  1935, 
p.  1920. 
1920-1922  Ibid. 1926, p. 100. 
1923-1927  Ibid. 1930, p.  153. 
1931-1936  Statesman's,  op. cit. 1937, p.  54. 
APPENDICES 
2.  PIG IRON  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  1890 is 1889. 
Sources:  I 820-1 890  Mulhall, op. cit. p. 332. 
I goo  Webb, op. cit. p. 353. 
19x0  Statesman's, op. cit. 1912, p.  xlviii. 




















1920-1925  Ibid. 1930, P. 153. 







~  4 
~iok,  1935/1936, P. 144. 
I927  Moody's  Manual of Industrials, 1929, 
p. xix. 











3.  STEEL  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  1890 is 1889, 1880 is 1881. 
Sources:  1870-1 890  Mulhall, op. cit. p. 334. 
I goo  Webb, op. cit. p. 353. 
1910  Statesman's, op. cit. 1912, p. xlviii. 
1913, 1928-1933  Moody's Manual of Governments, 1935, 
p. 1920. 
1920  Ibid. 1920, p.  34. 
1921  League of  Nations, op. cit. 1927, p. 100. 
1922, 1923, 1927  Moody's  Manual of Industrials,  1929, 
p. xix. 
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79%  6,610 
7589 
4.  INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  Base for 1870-1927 is 1913 = 
100; base for 1928-1935,1928 = 100. 
Sources:  187-1927  Bulletin, Bureau de  la Statistique Gen- 
erale de la France,  I 92811  929, p. I 06. 
























8,489  8,201 
7,385 
93 
5.  EXPORTS: 
Sources:  1820-1910  Page, William, Commerce and Industry, 
London 1919, Vol. 2, pp. 71-73. 
1913-1925  Moody's, op. cit. 1926, p:  101. 
1926-1931  League of  Nations, op. cit. 1935/1936, 
p. 218. 
1932-1 935  Statesman's,  op. cit. 1937, p. 57. 
6,192  7,326  98  571  "7  16.1 
3,758  5,176  391  100  21.7 
32573  5857 
7,003  %$4  9,192 
93  368 


















1  334 
703 
720 
6.  COMMODITY  PRICES: Explanation:  1910-1914 = 100. 
Source:  I 820-1 934  Warren, George F. and Pearson, Frank 












7.  UNEMPLOYMENT:  Explanation:  Percent of trade unionists unemployed. 
Sources:  I 860-1 gro  Webb, op. cit. pp. 610-612. 
1924-33  Moody's,  op. cit.  p.  1919, percentage 
unemployed of  insured workers. 
1913-1923  Ibid. 1926, p.  101. 
10.2 
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APPENDIX I-B 
EVOLUTION  OF BRITISH  SECURITY  CAPITALISM,  1820-1935 
NATIONAL  FINANCE 
8.  NATIONAL  DEBT: Explanation:  1820 is  the average  of  1815-1820; 
1850 is 1848; 1890 is 1889; 1900 is 1898; 1910 is I  09. 1913 is 1914. 
sources:  1820,1850, 1870  Baxter,  Robert  %uhley,  National 
Debts, London, 1871, pp.  76, 77. 
1830, 1840,1860  Page, op. cit. Vol.  2, p. 44. 
I 880  Mulhall,  Michael  George,  The Prog- 
ress o  the World, London, I 880?p:41. 
I 890  ~ulhad  Michael George, The Dgmon- 
ary of Statistics, p.  260. 
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I goo  Ibid. p. 699. 
1910  Webb, op. cit. p. 247. 
'9'3  Statesman's, op. cit. 1933, p. 30. 
I920  Moody's ManualofGovernrentn,  1926, 
p.  104. 
1921-1923  Statesman's, op. cit. 1924, p. 41. 
1924-1925  Ibid. 1926, p. 36. 
1925-1 932  Ibid. 1933, p. 38. 
1933-1935  Ibid. 1937, p. 40. 
g.  EXPENDITURES  FOR  DEBT  SERVICE: 
Sources:  1820-1 910  Page, op. cit. Vol. 2, pp. 38-40. 
'9'3  Statesman's, op. cit. 1914, p. M. 
1920-1923  Ibid. 1924, p. 41. 
I 924-1 925  Ibid. 1927, p.  38. 
1926-1928  Ibid. 1933, p. 38. 
1  929-1 933  Ibid. 1936, p. 38. 
1934-1935  Moody's,  Op.  Clt.  1935, P.  1926, 
10.  EXPENDITURES  FOR  ARMAMENT: 
Sources:  1820--1913  Fage, op. cit. Vol. 2, pp. 39-41. 
I 920  Statesman's op. cit. 1921, p. 44. 
1921  Ibid. 1922, p. 46. 
I 922  Ibid. 1923, p. 42. 
19233, I924  Ibid. 1924, p. 37. 
'925  Ibid. 1926, p. 33. 
I 926  Ibid. 1927, p. 35. 
I927  Ibid. 1928, p. 35. 
I 928  Ibjd. 1929, P. 35. 
1929  Ibld. 1930, P. 35. 
1930  Ibid. 1931, p. 35. 
1931  Ibid. 1932, p. 35. 
I932  Ibid. 1933, p. 35. 
I933  Ibjd. '934,  P- 35- 
I934  Ibld. 1935, P. 35. 
'935  Ibid. 1936, p. 35. 
I I. TOTAL  EXPENDITURES: 
Sources:  I 820-1 91  3  Page, op. cit. Vol. 2, pp. 32-33. 
I 920  Statesman's, op. cit. 1921, p. 41. 
1921-1926  Ibid. 1927, p.  32. 
1927, 1928  Statesman's, op. cit. 1929, p. 32 
1929-1 931  Ibid. 1933, p. 32. 
1  931-1935  Ibid. 1936, p. 32. 
12. TOTAL  REVENUES: 
Sources:  1820-1913  Page, op. cit. Vol. 2, pp.  32-33. 
1920-1931  Moody's, op. tit. 1935, PP.  1925-1926. 
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13-9  2.6  39.9  18.9 
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APPENDIX I-C 
EVOLUTION  OF BRITISH  SECURITY  CAPITALISM,  1820--1935 
SUPPLY  OF AND DEMAND  FOR  CAPITAL 
18. NATIONAL  INCOME:  Explanation:  Prior to 1923, amount includes Irish 
Free State.  Represents statutory income of  taxpayers, after deduc- 
tions of  incomes of  individuals below effective exemption limit. 
Sources:  I 857-1 87 I  Statistical  -.  .  Abstract for the  United Kingdom, 
I  I 
Vol.  19, p.  15. 
I 880  Ibid., Vol. 42, p. 35. 
I 890  Ibid., Vol. 46, p. 36. 
I goo  Ibid., Vol. 60, p. 34. 
1910  Ibid., Vol. 70, p. 143. 











19. SAVING  FUNDS:  Explanation:  Total of  amount due to depositors at 
end of  year  from  both  Post  Office and Trustee Savings Banks.  The 
Post  Office  figures are supplied  by  the Postmaster  and the Trustee 
figures by  the Commissioner  for the Reduction of the National Debt. 
Sources:  1900-1934  Ibid., Vol. 79, pp. 244-249;  Vo1.  70, p. 187; 
Vol. 61, pp. 367-370. 
20.  NEW  SECURITIES:  Explanation:  1910 is 1908; 1880 represents yearly 
average from  1879 to 1882. 
Sources:  I 880  Mulhall, op. cit., p.  107. 
1900, 1910  Webb, op. cit., p. 81. 
1913-1934  Economist, Vol.  78,  p.  88; Vol.  99, p.  659; 
Vol.  I I I, p.  634; Vol.  I 19, p.  642 ;  Vol. 
120, p. 376. 
94.  GOVERNMENT  BOND  YIELDS: Explanation:  Average yield for year. 
Sources:  1820-1933  Warren and Pearson, op. cit., p. 403 . 
1934-1935  League  of  Nations,  op.  cit.,  I g35/1936, 
























1  920 
1921 
25.  STOCK  PIUCES:  Explanation:  1921 = 100. 
Source:  I 92 1-1 935  Banker's  I~surance  Manager's  and Agents 




























EXPLANATION  AND SOURCES 
17. NATIONAL  WEALTH: Explanation:  1820 is 1822; 1830 is 1833;  1860 
is 1865; 1870 is  1875; 1880 is 1885; 1890 is 1888; 1913 is 1914. 
Sources:  1820  Estimate by Lord Liverpool 
I 830  Estimate by Pablo Pebrer 
I 840  Estimate by Porter  op. cit., 
1860-1880  Estimate by Giffen  Pa  589 
I 890  Estimate by Mulhall 
1913, 1930  Estimate by Josiah  Stamp, Journal  d the 
Ro al Statistical Society, London,  1931, 
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58.6 FINANCE CAPITALISM 
APPENDIX 11-A 
PRODUCTION 
EXPORTS  CO~~~~ 
(1901-10  =  francs) 
tons) 
I.  COAL  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  1890 is 1889; 1830 is 1831. 
Sources:  1820,1840--1890  Mulhall, op. cit., p. I 19. 
I 830  McCulloch, John Ramsay, A Diction- 
ary Geographical, Statistical  and  His- 
torical,  London.  1862,  Vol.  I,  p* 
858. 
Webb, op. cit. p. 86. 
Statesman's, op. cit. 1912, p. xlvii. 
Moody's Manual  of  Governments, I 931, 
P- 654. 
League of Nations, op. cit. 1926, p. 81. 
APPENDICES  395 
1921-1925  Ibid. 1929, p.  103. 
1926, 1928  Ibid. 1935/1936, p.  133. 
I927  Moody's  Manual of Industrials,  I 932, 
p. xxiv. 
1929-1933  Moody's  Manual  of  Governments, 
'9357  P. 2447. 
1934-1935  Statesman's, op. cit. 1936, p. xix. 
2.  PIG IRON  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  1890 is 1889. 
Sources:  I 820-1 890  Mulhall, op. cit. p. 332. 
I goo  Webb, op. cit. p. 353. 
1910  Statesman's, op. cit. 1913, p:  802. 
I 91  3,  1922-1924  Moody's Manual of Industrtals,  1929, 
p. xix. 
I 920-1 92 I  League of Nations, op. cit. 1926, p. 86. 
1925, I 927,1928  Moody's ManuaIof Governments, I 930, 
p. 619. 
I 926  League of Nations, op. cit. 1935/1936, 
P- '44. 
1929-1 932  Moody's,  op. cit. !935,  p. 2447. ... 
1933-1935  Statesman's, op. cit. 1936, p.  xvill. 
3.  STEEL  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  1900 is 1899; 1890 is 1889. 
Sources:  1870-1 890  Mulhall, op. cit. p. 334. 
I goo  Statesman's, op. cit. 1901, p.  564. 
1910  Ibid, 1912, p. xlviii. 
1913,192g-1g32  Moodfs,  op. cit. 1935, pp.  17,2447. 
1920, 1921, 1923 
1924, 1926, 19281  Ibid. 1930, p. 619. 
1922, 1925  Moody's Manual of Industrials,  1929, 
D. xix. 
'927  ~eague  of Nations, op. cit. 1935/1936, 
P.  '45. 
1933-1 935  Statesman's,  op. cit. 1936, p. xviii. 
4.  INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  1913 = 100. 
Sources:  1900-1929  Annuaire Statistigue de France, 1929, 
D.  KO*.  r-  d.7  - 
1930-1934  Ibid. 1935, p. 72*. 
'935  Ibid. 1935, p. 73*. 
5.  EXPORTS:  Explanation:  In gold value. 
Sources:  I 830-1 933  Ibid. 1935, pp.  rq*, 125*. 
1934-1935  Statesman's,  1936, p. 893. 
6.  COMMODITY  PRICES: 
Sources:  1820-1933  Annuaire Statistique de France, 1933, 
PP. 441 *-443*. 
1934-1935  Ibid. 1935, p. 441 *. 
7.  UNEMPLOYMENT:  This item is omitted since figures are unavailable for 
France, but the number of the column IS Included in order to  retainuni- 
formity  with Appendices I and 111. FINANCE CAPITALISM  APPENDICES  397 
APPENDIX II-B 
EVOLUTION  OF FRENCH  SECURITY  CAPITALISM,  1820-1935 
NATIONAL  FINANCE 
8.  NATIONAL  DEBT:  Explanation:  Total  of  interior  debt  (less  debt 
Viegere), floating debt and external debt. 
Source:  I 820-1 935  Annuaire  Statistique  de France,  I 935,  pp. 
201 *-202*. 
g.  EXPENDITURES  FOR  DEBT  SERVICE: 
Source:  1820--1924  Ibid. 1935, pp. 201*-202*. 
10.  EXPENDITURES  FOR  ARMAMENT:  Explanation:  1850 is 1848;  1870- 
1880 includes expenditure for colonies.  This item, however, was not 
very significant. 
Sources:  1850  McCulloch, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 866. 













11. TOTAL  EXPENDITURES:  Explanation: Expenditure for 1932, April 1st 
to December 31st.  Prior to 1930 the financial year  ran  from  April 
 st,  but in October 1931 it was reverted to the calendar year, there- 
fore all budget estimates relate to the period  from April  st, 1932 to 
December grst, I 932. 











1927-1932  ~tatcsman's, op. cit. 1932, p. 858. 































TO TOTAL  NA- 
EXPENDI-  'IoNAL 
INCOME 
TURES  (percent,  (percent, 
12.  TOTAL  REVENUES: 
Sources:  1820-1926  Annuaire  Statistique  de  France,  op. cit. 
pp. 203*-204*. 
1927-1932  Statesman's, op. cit. 1932, p. 858. 
















15.3  14.3 














3,173  3,124  16.1 
3,365  3531  36.3 
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27,323 FINANCE CAPITALISM  APPENDICES  399 
APPENDIX 11-C 
EVOLUTION  OF FRENCH  SECURITY  CAPITALISM,  1820-1935 
SUPPLY  OF AND DEMAND  FOR  CAPITAL 
17.  NATIONAL  WEALTH: Explanation:  1913 is 1914; 1890 is  1892;  1910 
is 1908. 
Sources:  1850  Charguerant, A.,  L'Economie  Politique et 
L'lmpor, Paris, 1864, p. 47. 
















fiance, Paris, 191  I, p.  247. 
1910  Estimate by Thtry, in Moulton, Harold G. 
and Lewis, C.,  The French Debt Problem,  .- --  -  New  York.  1925, p. 425. 
1913  Thtry, Edmond, Consequences Economiques 






































-  ~ 
Pa  337- 
I924  Statesman's, op. cit. 1925, p. 882. 
I 928  Dresdner Bank, The Economic Forces of the 
World, Berlin,  I 930, p.  177. 
18.  NATIONAL  INCOME. 
Sources:  1890, 1900  Moulton and Lewis, op. cit. p. 425. 
1913-1932  Revue d'Economie Politique,  1933, Vol. 47, 
P. 654. 
3.44  878 














































-  "" 
1933-1934  League of Nations World Economic Survey, 
'934/1935,  P.  140. 
19. SAVING  FUNDS:  Explanation: Represents savings deposits. 
Sources:  1840-1910  Annuaire Statistique de France, I 935, pp.3 *, 




















191  3-1923  League of  Nations, Statistical Year Book, 
1926, p.  162. 
1924-1926  Ibld. 1932/1933, p. 243. 
1926-1935  Ibid. 1935/1936, p. 277. 
20.  NEW  SECURITIES: 
Source:  I 920-1 934  Bulletin,  Bureau  de  la  Statistique G6n6 




















1276  24.  GOVERNMENT  BOND  YIELDS: Explanation:  Based upon Perpetual 3 
percent rentes. 
Sources:  I 830-  I 923  journalde la Sociltl de Statistiques de Paris, 
May 1928, pp. 166-167. 
1924-1925  League  of  Nations,  op.  cit.  1932/1g33, 














































25.  STOCK  PRICES:  Explanation:  1905 = 100. 
Source:  I 860-1  932  Bulletin,  Bureau  de  la  Stati~ti~uc  Gin& 
~le  de la France, July-September  1934, 
P. 759. 
2d  ,,.,  6.1  :;:a 



















32.0  14.4 FINANCE CAPITALISM 
APPENDIX 111-A 
YEAR 
PRODUCTION  I 
EXPORTS 
(million 
COAL  PI0 IRON  STEEL  INDUSTRIAL  marks) 
(thousand  (thousand  (thousand  (1913' 






I. COAL  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  Only anthracite and not lignite.  1870 
is 1871; 1920-1934 excludes Alsace and Saar; 1935 includes Saar. 
Sources:  1870-1 910  Annuaire  Statistique  de  France,  1926, 
p.  268*. 
1021  Statesman's op. cit. 1924, p. 946. 
- ., 
1913, 1922-1924  Ibid. 1925, p. xix.  - 
19200,  1925  League  of  Nations,  Statistical  Year 
Book.  I 926. P. 81. 
p. 248.0 
I933  Statesman's,  op:  cit. 1935, p.  xix. 
1  934-1935  Ibid. 1936, p.  XIX. 
APPENDICES 
1913, 1922-1924  Ibid. 1925, p. xix. 
1920-1921  Ibid. 1924, pp. xix, 946. 
I 925-1 926  Ibid. 1927, p. xxi. 
192  7-1930  Moody's,  op. cit. 1935, p.  2488. 
'931-1932  Statesman's,  op. cit. 1934, p.  xviii. 
'933-1  935  Ibid. 1936, p. xviii. 
3.  STEEL  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  1895 is rgoo. 
Sources:  I 870-1 goo  Mulhall, op. cit., pp. 334, 757. 
1910  Statesman's, op. cit. 1912, p. xlviii. 
1913, 1922-1924  Ibid. 1925, p. xix. 
I 920-1 92 I  Ibid. 1924, pp. xjx, 946. 
1925-1926  Ibid. 1927, p. xxi. 
1  92 7-1930  Moody's,  op. cit. 1935, p.  2488. 
1931-1932  Statesman's, op..+t.  1934, p. xviii. 
1933-1 935  Ibid. 1936, p.  XVIII. 
4. GENERAL  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  191  3 = 100; 1932-1 935  figures 
were shifted from 1928 base to 1913  base by author. 
Sources:  1870-1927  Bulletin, Bureau de la Statistique Gdni- 
rale de la France,  I g28/ I 929, p.  I 04. 
1928-1934  Annuaire  Statistique  de France,  I 934,  - - -. 
PP. 333*-334*. 
Bullettn, Bureau de la Statistique Gbnb- 
rule de la France, Supplement, S~D-  - -  . . 
tember 1936, p. 16. 
5.  EXPORTS:  Explanation:  1870 is 1875; 1920--1g23 in gold marks. 
Sources:  I 870-1 934  Aiznuaire  Statistique  de  France,  I 934, 
P. 430.* 
'935  Statesman's,  op. cit. 1936, p.  969. 
6. COMMODITY  PRICES:  Explanation:  1901-1 9x0 = 100.  1923 unavailable. 
Sources:  I 880-1 934  Annuaire  Statistique  de France,  1934, 
P. 441 *.  .* 
7.  UNEMPLOYMENT:  Explanation:  Number  seeking  employment.  1934 
-first  nine months only. 
Sources:  1920-1921  League of Nations, op. cit. 1926, p.  34. 
1922-1928  Ibid. 1929, p. qq. 
1929-1934  Ibid. 1935/1936, p. 62. 
2.  PIG  IRON  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  1890 is 1889; 1895 is 1900. 
Sources:  1870-1 goo  Mulhall, op. cit., pp. 332, 757. 
1910  Statesman's,  op. cit. 1912, p. xlviii. FINANCE CAPITALISM  APPENDICES  403 
APPENDIX 111-B 
EVOLUTION  OF GERMAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM,  187-1935 
NATIONAL  FINANCE 
EXPLANATION  AND SOURCES 
8.  NATIONAL  DEBT: 
Sources:  I 870-1 933  Annuaire Statistique de France,  I 934,  p. 
a86*.  a-  -  - 
1934-1935  Statesman's,  op. cit. 1936, p. 964. 
g.  EXPENDITURES  FOR  DEBT  SERVICE: 
Sources:  I 880  Ibid. 1881,  p. 99. 
I 890  Ibid. 1891, p. 535. 
I goo  Ibid. 1901,  p. 626. 
I 910-1913  Annuaire Stati~tique  de France,  1934, p. 
486*.  EXPENDI- 
TURES 



























I924  statesman's, op. cit. 1925, p. 953. 
'925  Ibid. 1926, p. 926. 
I 926-1 933  Annuaire  Statrstique de  France,  I 934, 
p. 486. 
I934  Moody's, op. cit. 1935, p. 2491. 




TO  NA- 
TIONAL 
INCOME 
10. EXPENDITURES  FOR  ARMAMENT: 
Source:  1880-1935  Statesman's,  op. cit. cited in issue of fol- 
lowing year. 
I I. TOTAL  EXPENDITURES: 
Source:  1880--1933  Annuaire Statistique de France,  1934, p. 
489*. 
I934  Statesman's, op. cit. 1937, p. 976. 
12. TOTAL  REVENUES: 
Sources:  I 880-1 933  Annuaire Statistique de France,  I 934, p. 
489*. 




























8-12:  Explanation:  Because of  the currency  inflation,  computations for 


































































































































































7.0 FINANCE CAPITALISM 
APPENDIX,  111-C 
sources:  1890 
I goo 
I910 
19'3,  1923 
I924 
19. SAVING  FUNDS: 
Source:  1870-1933 
20.  NEW  SECURITIES: 
Sources:  1910 
1913 
I 920-192  I 
1924-1931 
1932-1934 
24.  GOVERNMENT  BOND  YIELDS: 
Sources:  1880-19x0 
APPENDICES  405 
17.  NATIONAL  WEALTH:  Explanation:  1890 is 1895; 19x0 is 1907. 
Sources:  In FinanzArchiv Zeitschrift far das gesammte Finamme- 
sen, Stuttgart, Germany,  1928, p. 65: 
1890-1 goo  Estimate of  Schmoller. 
1910  Estimate of Steinman-Bucher 
1913  Estimate of  Ballad. 
I924  Estimate of  Helfferich. 
1928  Economic Forces of  the World, op. at. 
P.  '77. 
18. NATIONAL  INCOME:  Explanation:  1890 is 1895; 1910 is 1907; 1920 is 
19'9- 
Estimate of Helfferich 
Estimate of Schrnoller 
Estimate of Reichsschatzent  Ibid. 
Estimate of Banker's Trust Co.  p. 66 
Estimate of Mundestens-  I 
Shirras  J 
Europa Encyclopedia, Vol. I, p.  D536. 
Moody's, op. clt. 1936, p.  2520. 
Ibid. 1937, 
League  of  E:!:;I,  World Economic 
Annuaire Statistique de France,  1934, 
P- 477 *. 
Statistisches Jahrbuch far das Deutsche 
Reich, 1913, p. 274. 
Ibid. 1920, p. 122. 
Ibid. 1921-1gz2, p. 279. 
League  of  Nations,  Statistical Year 
Book,  1931-1933,  p. 248. 
Ibid. 1934-1935,  p. 252. 
25.  STOCK  PRICES: 
Explanation:  I 913-1924 
1927-1934 
Sources:  1913-1924 
National Monetary Commission, Sta- 
tistics for  the  United States,  1869- 
I 909, Washington, 19x0. 
Dresdner Bank, Germany's  Economic 
Forces, Berlin, 1913, p.  287. 
League of Nations, op. c~t.  1935-1936, 
p. 260. 
1913 '  100. 
Base 1924-1926  = 100. 
Statistisches Jahrbuch,  op.  cit.  1g24/ 
!925,  p. 325'. 
Ibld. 1935, P. 370. FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
APPENDIX IV 
EVOLUTION  OF WORLD  CAPITALISM,  1820-1935 
ECONOMIC  AND SOCIAL  TENDENCIES 
EXPLANATION  AND  SOURCES 
1..  COAL  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  1890 is 1889; 1910 is 1907. 
Sources:  1820, 1840-1890  Mulhall, op. cit., p.  I 19. 
I goo  Bukharin,  Nicolar,  Imperialism  and 
World  Economy,  New  York,  1929, 
P. 3'. 
1910  Webb, op. cit. p. 87. 
1913, 1922-1924  Statesman's, op. cit. 1925, p. xix. 
1925-1928  Moody's  Manual of Industrials,  1929, 
p. xxi. 
1929-1933  Ibid. 1934, p. a-10. 
1934-1935  League of  Nations, op. cit.  1935/1936, 



























2.  PIG IRON  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  1890 is 1889; 1910 is 1907. 
Sources:  I 820--I 890  Mulhall, op. cit. p. 332. 
1910  Webb, op. cit. p. 353. 
1913  Moody's, op. clt. p.  a-32. 
I 920  Statesman's, 09.  cit. 1922, p.  XX. 
1921-1923  Ibid. 1924, p. xix. 
1  924  Moody's,  op. cit.,  1933, p. a-96. 
1925-1931  Moody's,  op. cit. p. a-32. 
1932-1 934  Statesman's, op. cit.  1935, p.  xviii. 
I935  League of Natlons, op. at. 1935/1936, 
P.  '44. 































Sources:  I 870-1 890  Mulhall, op. cit. p. 334. 
1910  Webb, op. cit. p. 353. 
1913, 1925-1931  Moody's,  op. cit. !934,  p. a-32. 
I 920  Statesman's, op. cit. 1922, p. XX. 
1921-1923  Ibid. 1924, p. xix. 
1924  Moody's,  op. cit. 1933, p. a-96. 
'925-3'  Moody, op. cit. 1934, p.  a-34. 
1932-1934  Statesman's, op. cit. 1935, p. xviii. 
I935  League of Nations, op. cit.  1935/1936, 
P.  '45.  4.  RAW  MATERIAL  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  Excludes  Russian  pro- 
duction. 
Source:  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Reports Department, 
Chart 2577, January 6, 1934. 
5. TRADE:  Explanation:  1890 is  1889; 1900 is yearly  average of  1902- 
1906; 1913 is  1912;  1924-1928,  converted  from  United States dollars 
into English pounds sterling, using average yearly rate of  exchange for 
respective years as given  in  the Federal Reserve Bulletin for 1929, Vo1. 
15, p. 35; and for 1936, Vol.  22, p. 45. 
Sources:  1820-1890  Mulhall, op. cit. p. 128. 
I goo  Webb, op. cit. p. 94. 
1910-1922  National  Association  of  Merchants  and 
Manufacturers, London, World Trade and 
the Standard of  Living in Europe.  Lon- 
don, 1923, p.  2. 
1924-1925  League of Nations, Memorandum  on  Inter- 
national Trade and Balance of  Pavmentx. 
"  d  -  --, 
I  11-1925, p.  133. 
1926-1928  ~biB  1926-1928,  p. 17. 























1 ,645  z  1 ,603 
















6. COMMODITY  PRICES:  Explanation:  1820 is  1819;  1830 is  1829;  1840 
is 1839; 1850 is  1849; 1860 is 1859; 1870 is 1869. 
Sources:  1820--1870  Mulhall, op, cit. p. 491.  The base for these 
years is I 789 = 100. 
1928-1935  Annalist, September 18, 1936, p. 389.  The 
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APPENDICES 
7.  EMPLOYMENT:  Explanation:  1919 = IOO 
Source:  I 929-1 935  League  of  Nations,  Statistical Year  Book, 
193511936, P. 75. 
8. POPULATION:  Explanation:  1820 is  1822; 1830 is 1828; 1840 is 1845; 
1850 is 1854; 1860 is 1859;  1870 is  1874;  1890 is  1886;  ~gm  is  1903; 
I913 IS 1914. 
Sources:  1820-18403  ) Mulhall, op. cit. p. 442.  1870, 1890 
1850, 1860, \ Australia, Census and Statistics Osee, Vol. I, 
I 880,  I goo  Appendix A, Census of  I gr I, p. 30. 
19x0  Webb, op. cit. p. 467. 
I913  Bukharin, op. cit. p. 86. 
1925  Annuaire Statistique  de France, 1926, p.18 I *. 
1926  Journal  des  Economistes,  January,  1929,  - 
p.  16. 
I927  League of Nations, Memorandum on Produc- 
tion and Trade, 1913  and 1923-1927, p. 12. 
1928  Ibid. 1923 and 192-811929, p.  12. 
I929  Ibid. 1925 and 1g29/1930? p.  12. 
1930  League  of  Nations,  Stattstrcal Year  Book, 
"  - 
f 93'11932,  P.  23. 
1931  Ib!d.  193211933, P. 23. 
I932  Ibld. 193311934, P. 23. 
I933  Ibid. 193411935, P. 23. 
I934  Annuaire Statistique  de France, I 934, p.229*. 
I935  League of Nations, op. cit. 193511936, p. 24. 
APPENDIX V 
NATIONAL  DEBTS  OF LEADING  COUNTRIES,  1870-1935 
(PERCENT,  1870 = 100) 
SOURCES: 
General Source: Annuaire Statistique de France, 1933, pp. 489*, 490*. 
Ibid. 1935, p. 485*. 
Individual Sources: 
(a) State~man's  Year Book,  1936, p.  707,  1061. 
(b)  See Appendix for each country. 
(c)  I  35 is-1934. 










(e)  Statesman's, op. cit. 1872, p. 31 I, conve;ted  into lire from English 
pound sterling b  author. 
(j)  1b1d.  1881, p.  310, jlanuary 1, 1879. 
(g) Ibid. 1871, p. 333; 1881, p. 332; 1891, p.  759; 1901, P.  866; 1911, 
p.  1038; 1921, p. 1103; 1931, p.  1118; 1936, p:  1157. 
(A) 1880 is September I, 1878.  Statesman's,  op. clt. 1881, p.  377. 
(i)  Ibid.  18 I, p. 863. 
(j)  1920 is  eptember I, 191  7.  Statesman's, op. cit: 1936, p.  1271.  1 





































































1325.6 FINANCE  CAPITALISM  APPENDICES 
APPENDIX VI-A 
EVOLUTION  OF AMERICAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM,  1906--1935 
ECON~MIC  TENDENCIES  (AGRICULTURE  AND INDUSTRY) 
I.  PRICES  RECEIVED  BY FARMERS:  Explanation:  1910-1914  = roo. 
Sources:  1910-1919  United States Bureau of  Agricultural Eco- 




























cember,  1935, p  23. 
1920-1936  Ibid. December I, 1937, p. 24. 
2.  PRICES  PAID  BY FARMERS:  Explanation:  1910-1914 = 100. 
Sources:  1910-1919  Ibid. December,  1935, p. 23. 
1920-1936  Ibid. December I, 1937, p. 24. 
4. INDUSTRIAL  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  I 926 = 100. 
Source:  1906-1935  Standard  statistics,  Trade  and Indu~ldc~, 
VO~.  3, P. D-25. 



























































Source:  I 906-1 935  Statistical Abstract, I 936, p.  363. 
6.  STEEL  INGOT  PRODUCTION: 
Sources:  1906-1909  Ibid. 1925, p. 719. 
1910-1935  Ibid. 1936, p. 701. 
7.  COAL  PRODUCTION:  Explanation:  1926 = 100. 
Source:  Ibid. 1936, p. 716. 
8. CRUDE  PETROLEUM  PRODUCTION: 
Source:  Ibid. 1936, p. 723. 
g.  BUILDING  CONTRACTS:  Explanation:  Statistics for 37 states not com- 
piled prior to 1925.  1926 = roo. 
Sources:  1913-1925  StatisticalAbstract, 1925, P. 810. 
Includes 27 northern and eastern states. 
1926-1935  Ibid. 1936, p. 807, includes 37 states. 
ro.  CONSTRUCTION  COSTS: Explanation:  Statistics for 37 states not corn- 
piled prior to 1925.  1913 = 100. 
Sources:  1913-1925  Ibid. 
1926-1 935  Ibid. 
INDUSTRY  AORICULTURE 
PRICES 
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195.2 FINANCE CAPITALISM 
APPENDIX VI-B 
EVOLUTION  OF AMERICAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM-ECONOMIC  TENDENCIES- 
(EXPORT  TRADE,  COMMODITY  PRICES  AND LABOR)  1906-1935. 
APPENDICES 
1  I. EXPORT  TRADE: 









I 2.  COMMODITY  PRICES:  Explanation:  Wholesale prices. 
Source:  United States Department of  Labor, Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics, Handbook  of  Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 
616, Washington, 1936, p. 674. 
1  3.  EMPLOYMENT:  Explanation: Employment in manufacturing industries, 
1923-5  = 100. 
Source:  Ibid.,  p.  132. 
14. PAYROLLS:  Explanation:  1923-1925 = 100. 
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78:8 
82.2 
15.  WAGES  PAID  BY  ALL  MANUFACTURING  INDUSTRIES: 
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2222 : FINANCE CAPITALISM  APPENDICES  415 
APPENDIX VII-A 
EVOLUTION  OF AMERICAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM,  1820-1935 
NATIONAL  FINANCE  (BUDGET) 
(Million Dollars) 
I. TOTAL  REVENUES: 
Source:  1820-1935  United States Treasury Department, Annua! 
Report  of  the  Secretary  on  the  State  of 
Finances,  1935/1936, PP.  357-359. 
2.  TOTAL  EXPENDITURES: 
Source:  1820-1935  Ibid. pp. 360-363. 
4.  INTEREST  ON DEBT: 











Explanation:  This item  consists of  sinking  fund;  cash  repayment  of 
principal;  bonds,  etc., received  as repayments of  prin- 
cipal; bonds, etc., received as interest payments; bonds 
and  notes  received  for  estate  taxes,  franchise  tax 
receipts,  Federal Reserve banks; net earnings, Federal 
Intermediate Credit Banks, miscellaneous gifts, forfeit- 
















































Source:  1918-1935,  Ibid. pp. 360-363. 
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1394.5 FINANCE CAPITALISM  APPENDICES  417 
APPENDIX VII-B 
EVOLUTION  OF AMERICAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM,  1820-1935 
NATIONAL  FINANCE  (DEBT) 
EXPLANATION  AND  SOURCES 
8.  FUNDED  DEBT: Explanation:  Includes all  bond  issues whose  date 
of  maturity is five  years after date. 
g.  GROSS  DEBT: 
Sources:  1820-1850  United States Treasury Department, An- 
nual Report of the Secretary of  the  State 
ofFinances, 1goo/1go1, p.  101. 
186-1935  Ibid.1g35/1g36,pp.411-412. 
10. SINKING  FUNDS: 
Sources:  Ibid. compiled from reports of treasury for 
respective years. 
1918-1919  Ibid. 1918/1919,  p.  615. 
192  1-1935  Ibid. 1935/1936, p. 438. 
12.  INDIRECT  DEBT: Explanation:  Consists of  Federal Farm Mortgage 
Corporation, Home Owners Loan Corporation, Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation obligations. 
Source:  Ibid. 
14. NATX~NAL  WEALTH: Explanation:  1910  is 1912. 
Sources:  1850-1900  King, Wilford I.,  The Wealth and  Income 
of  the People  of  the United States, New 
York,  1923, p.  13. 
191  0-1 935  Standard Statistics  Trade and  Securities, 
P*  64. 
15. NATIONAL  INCOME: 
Sources:  1850-1900  King, Wilford I., op. cit., p.  129. 
1910-191  8  King, Wilford I.,  The National Income and 
Its Purchasing Power, No. 15,  New York, 
1930, p. 74, Publication of National Bu- 
reau of Economic Research. 
1919-1935  Kuznets, Simon, The National Income and 
Capital Formation,  No,  32, New  York, 
19%!  .  Publication  of  National Bureau 






































































































































































































































































































573. 418  FINANCE CAPITALISM 
APPENDIX VII-C 
EVOLUTION  OF AMERICAN  SECURITY  CAPITALISM,  1820-1935 
NATIONAL  FINANCE  (BUDGET  AND DEBT) 
(Ratios A through E in Percent) 
I  I 
BUDGET  I 
DEBT  I 
1  I  I  EXPENDI-  1  I  I  I  I 
TURES FOR 
REVENUES  DEBT SER- 
UNFUNDED  DEDUCTIONS  NATIONAL 
YEA1  TO  EXPENDI-  DEBT TO  TO  GROSS  WEALTH  TO  VICE  TO 
DEBT 
(6 t  2) 
Source: F.  Gross  Debt per  capita (1860-1936) United  States Treasury 
Department, 1935/1936, op. cit. pp. 41 1-412. 
APPENDICES  419 
APPENDIX VIII 
FINANCIAL  POSITION  OF NATIONAL  BANKS,  1870--1935 
(Percent) 
EXPLANATION  AND SOURCES 
EXPLANATION: 
Ratio C:  Earning Assets include total securities and total loans and dis- 
counts. 
Ratio D:  Reserve  assets  include  net cash  (cash  minus  bills  payable  and 
rediscounts),  bankers'  acceptances,  commercial  paper  bought  in  the 
open  market,  net loans  to banks  (loans  to banks  minus  loans  from 
banks), eligible paper, loans collateralled  by United  States Government 
securities, and United States Government securities. 
Ratio E:  Net capital is ca  ital, surplus and undivided profits minus bank  R  building, furniture and  xtures and real estate. 
Ratio G:  Other securities include securities other than those of the United 
States Government. 
SOURCE:  Compiled  from  the Annual  Report  of  the  Comptroller  of  the 









































































































































































































































59.73 FINANCE  CAPITALISM  APPENDICES 
APPENDIX IX-A 
FINANCIAL  POSITION  OF THE RAILROADS,  1890-1934 
(Percent, 1890 = 100) 
EXPLANATION: 
(3)  Operating income-technically  called "net  operating revenue." 
(4)  Total income-technically  called  "balance  for  fixed charges." 
(5)  Fixed charges-include  lease rentals. 
(8) Total debt-includes  lease rentals capitalized at  6 per cent. 
SOURCE: Statistics of  Railroads, Interstate Commerce Commission. 
APPENDIX IX-B 


























Explanation:  Averages are for the averages of the individual years within 
each period. 
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3.5 FINANCE CAPITALISM 
INDEX 
APPENDIX X 
(Percent of  Total Assets) 
SOURCES:  Annual Reports of the  Comptroller of the  Currency. 
Proceedings of the As~ociation  of Life In~urance  Presidents. 
YEAR 
A 
Agriculture, maladjustment of,  015416 
Aldrich Bill, 198-199,  337 
Aldrich-Vreeland Act, 198 
Alsace Lorraine,  103 
American Acceptance Council, 244 
American Bankers Association, 197, 290 
Argentina, financial condition of, 258 ;  in- 
vestments  in,  37 
Armaments,  expenditures  for,  55,  86-87, 
115, 128, 135, 136 
Armstrong Report, 171, 195 
Asquith, 40 
Astor, John Jacob,  141 
Austria,  banking development, 85-86,  138 
B 
Baer, George, 191 
Bagehot,  Walter, 27 
Baker, George F., 170-171, 193 
Ball, Raymond N.,  331 
Baltimore Plan, 197 
Banca Commerciale Italiano, 119 
Banca di Roma, 119 
Banca Italiana di Sconto, 119 
Bank  for  International  Settlements,  112, 
I34 
Bank  of  England,  29,  37-38,  47,  93,  101, 
141, 324 
Bank of  France, 38, 46-48,  50-51,  103-105. 
324-325 
Bank of  the United States  (private), 220 ; 
(second), 143 
Banking Act of  1932, 294 
Banking Act  of  1933, 293.  296-297,  303 
Banking Act  of 1935, 291-2,  294-5,  303 
Banks, private, decline of, 326 
Banks, private in the U. S.,  143-144 
Banking and industry, 69, 76, 85, 94,  107. 
ll0-11g. 173, 174, 202 
Banking, central, see Central banking 
Banhing,  commercial,  see  Commercial 
banking 
Banking,  investment,  see  Investment 
banking 
Bankers'  acceptance, decline of, 244 ;  mis- 
application  of, 206--207 
"banques-d'affaires,"  53-105 
Banque de L'Union  Parisienne, 54 
Eanque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, 54 
Baring,  I;,  144, 150 ; crisis of, 36-37 
Barron, C. W.,  166 
"beating  the gun,"  233 
Beaulieu, Leroy, 54 
Belgium, 85 





Belmont, August,  164-172 
Berlin  Bourse, 62, 71.  116-117 
Bernstein, E.,  83 
Biddle, Nicholas, 143, 149 
Blaine, James J.,  158 
Bland-Allison Act,  161 
Bleichroder, 65-67 
Blue  Sky  Laws,  ,215,  308-9 
Blum, Leon,  103-104 
Boer War, 4-41,  182 
Bolivia, financial condition of, 91 
Bond secured  currency,  142 
Bond  yields,  33,  35,  91, 98,  284 
Brandeis,  Louis  Dembitz,  191 
Brazil, financial condition of, 259-260 
Briand,  A.,  102,  I lo 
Brook Farm,  142 
Brown, Alexander, Sons,  143 
Briining,  I 13 
Bryan,  William  Jennings,  163-164,  197, 
204-206,  290 
Eubble Act, 14 
C 
Caisse des Prtts, 138 
Caisse Nationale d'Espargne, 53 
Capital, accumulation  of,  19, 34 : concen- 
tration  of  in Japan,  127 ; government 
control in Great  Britain, loo :  proposed 
control  of  volume,  333-5  ; shiftability, 
7 ;  source of, 15 ;  supply of  and demand 
for, 135 ; supply of  and demand for in 
France, 48-9,  55-6,  106 ; supply of and 
demand for in Germany, 62,  64,  71-3  ; 
supply  of  and  demand  for  in  Great 
Britain,  18,  33,  42.  96; supply  of  and 
demand for in Japan,  124-5,  127; sup- 
ply  of and demand  for  in Russia,  go; 
supply  of  and  demand  for  in  the 
United  States,  145-7,  158-9,  179, 18~:~. 
328-9 : supply of and  demand  for  ~n 
the world, 86-7,  89-90 
Capital Issues Committee, 309-l1 
Capitalism,  banking  security,  54,  107, 
110-13.  202,  222,  319-20;  classification, 
1 : increasing  control  of  in  post-war 
period,  132 ; individual,  evolution,  9, 
61 ; individual  in  the  United  States, 
140;  industrial  security,  54,  57,  107, 
110-4,  202,  319-20;  industrial security, 
growth  of,  in  the  United  States,  155, 
174 ; industrial  security,  triumph  of, 
"4;  security,  American  ratio  an- 
alysis  of, 2824; attitudes toward, 33- 
1 ; characteristics  of,  5-6 ; control  of, 
137 ; control of  in France, 58, 106 ; con- 
trol  of  in Germany,  73-4.  1167; con- 
NATIONAL 




1900  10.8  24.4 














192~  23.5  19.1  24.2  22.6  20.5  42.4  40.1 
24.1  20.4  25.0  17.7  23.1  37.8  27.4 

























































































































42.0 Fascism, 319 : in Germany  (see  National 
Socialism) ; in Italy, 118 ;  in Japan,  125 
Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation, 
303-4 
Federal Finance Board, 332-3 
Federal Land Banks, 253 
Federal  Reserve  System,  antecedents  of, 
197-9; and War  Finance,  210; chang- 
ing  nature  oE,  227 ;  government  domi- 
nation  of, 289-92  ; open market  opera- 
tions, 292-3  ;  organization  of, 290 ; pro- 
posed  reorganization  of,  832-7 ; redis- 
counting, 293-5 
Federal  Trade  Commission,  214-5 
Feudalism, in Japan, 123 
Financial  institutions,  assets  of,  in  the 
U.  S.,  183 ; investment  experience  of, 
269-70 
Financ~al  iournalism.  in France.  a8 : in 
424  FINANCE 
trol  of,  in  Great  Britain,  24,  36,  46, 
100-1  ;  control of, in the United  States, 
$53,  194-6,  2873!8;  criticism  of,  in 
rance,  58 ;  cr~tlclsm  of,  in  Germany, 
73 ;  criticism of, in Great Britain, 22, 41, 
98-9 ; criticism of, in  the  U.  S.,  151-2, 
190-3  ; defense of, in the United  States, 
194 ; definitions of, 2 ;  early crisis of, in 
the U.  S.,  148-50 ; establishment  of, in 
Japan,  123 ; future of, 337-8 ; growing 
instability  of,  285-6 ;  international 
crisis  of,  129-30, 133-4  ; legal  basis  of, 
324 ; Marxian  view of, 81-2  :  parties to, 
2 ; philosophic  basis  of.  323 ; post-war 
crisis in Great Britain, go ;  problems of, 
6 ; public nature of, gzg ;  reconstruction 
of,  319-3538 ; restoration  of  in  Soviet 
Russia,  121-2 
Carnegie, Andrew, 177-8 
Central banking,  origin and development 
of,  9, 83 
Central banks, development of, in France, 
462, 50-1,  103-5,  324-5  ; development 
of  in  Germany,  62-3  ; development  of 
in Great  Britain,  29,  93,  324 ; develop- 
ment  of, in the  U.  S.,  143, 197-9, 227, 
290-5;  role  of, 324-5 
Chile, financial condition of, 260 
Choate, Joseph, 163-4 
"Circular  to Bankers," 24 
Cibil  War,  150, 152 
Clark, E. W., CO., 144 
Clay, Henry,  143 
Clayton Act, 296-7 
Cleveland, Grover, 172 
Claws, Henry,  178 
Cobbett, William,  16, 23 
Cobden, William, 23 
Colombia, financial condition of, 260 
Combination  motement,  168-70 
Commercial banking,  changing  nature of, 
132-3,  137-8,  166,  223-4,  327;  concen- 
tration  of, in Great  Britain,  41,  93-5 ; 
concentration  of, in Japan, 125-7 ;  con* 
dition  of, in  post-War  Italy,  119 ; crisis 
of, 138 ;  decelopment  of,  in Austria* 
6 ; development  of, on  the  Continent* 
85 ;  development of, in Germany, 62-3, 
67 ; development  of,  in  Great  Britain, 
15, 30 ; development  of, in Russia, 86 ; 
development  of, in  Soviet Russia,  l2l ; 
development  of. in  the U.  S.,  144, 166, 
183-4  ; liquidity  and solvency of, 224- 
6 ; orthodox  theory  of. 15,  42,  449  '66, 
293-5  ; regulation  of,  in  the  U.  S., 
lgw, 296-8,  300-1 ; security  holdings 
of. 226--7 
Com~nercial  Code, 46, 61, 78 
Commercial paper, decline of, 243-4 
Comitk des Forges, 104 
Communism, 3  19 
Communist  Party,  2 14 
Companies Act, of  1844, 25 ;  of: 1862. 78 ; 
of  ]goo, 45, ; of 1929.  100 
Comptoir d'Escompte, 53 
..,- 
~ermany',  64 ; in dreat Britain, 24, 3s 
Fisk, James, 155, 173 
Flandin,  104 
Ford, Henry, 179 
Foreign  trade,  comparative,  78 : Great 
Britain,  39-40.  93 ; Japan.  124 ;  world 
maladjustment of, 130-1 
Foster, William Z., 214 
Fourteenth  Amendment,  154, 159 
Foxwell, 42 
Franc, devaluation of, 103 
France, armament expenditures, 55 : Bank 
of, 46-8,  50, 103-5 ; commercial banking 
development of, 48, 52-3,  105 : commer- 
cial  code  of,  46;  control  of  security 
capitalism  in,  58,  106;  corporate  de- 
velopment  in, 46 ; criticism of  security 
capitalism  in, 58 ; devaluation of  franc, 
103 ; diffusion of  securities, 56-7  ; eco- 
nomic  development,  47,  103 ; financial 
concentration,  48,  54,  103-4;  financial 
journalism,  58 ; foreign  loans,  56,  58- 
60 ; imperialism,  49-50  ; Left  Cartel, 
102-4 ; national  income,  106 ; National 
Union,  102-3 ; public  debt,  467, 55-6, 
105 ; railroad  development,  48 : saving 
and  investment  rate  of,  56-7,  106:  se- 
curity speculation.  54; supply  and de- 
mand for capital, 48-9,  55-6,  106 
Franco-Prussian  War,  54-5 
Free Banking Act, 142 
French  overseas banks,  105 
Frick, Henry C.,  190 
Fuggers, g 
CAPITALISM 
Confederate debt repudiation.  159 
Consols, price of, 44 
Cooke. Jay, 144, 156, 160, 169.  173 
Coolidge, Calcin, 214-5 
Corcoran and Riggs,  144 
Corporate  organization,  development  of, 
78,  80 ; developmen:  of, in  France,  46, 
52-3  ; development  of,  in  Germany, 
61-3,  117 ; development  of,  in  Great 
Britain,  14, zg ; development  of, in the 
U.  S., 142, 162, 163 ; malpractices, 32-8, 
44-5,  186-7 
Coulisse, 54, 91 
Creditanstalt, 135, 220 
Cledit  hanks, 65,  105 
Credit Foncier, 51, 54, 58 
Credit Lyonnais, 53-4 
Credit Mobiller, 51, 85 
Credito Italiano,  i ~g 
Croix de Feu, log 
Cuba, 165 
Customs Unions, 63 
D 
Darmstadter Bank, 63-4.  70,  log, 114-5 
Davidson, Henry P., no3 
Dawes Plan, 102, 108-9 
Debs, Eugene, 214 
Debt,  bonded,  277-80;  interest  on,  277- 
80 
Debt, municipal, 145-6, 179 ;  defaults on. 
159-60;  control  of,  195 
Debt,  public,  comparative,  88,  136 ; 
France, 46-7,  55-6, 105 ; Germany, 115 ; 
Great  Britain,  42,  95 ; Italy,  119-20; 
Japan, 127 ; Russia,  122 ;  United States, 
145-6.  179, 251-3 
Debt,  state,  145-6.  179-80 ; defaults  on, 
149-5" 
Democracy, 319-20 
Deutsche Bank, 68, 70, 75,  log.  112,  114-5 
de Wendel, Francois, 104,  112 
Devaluation,  321 
Disclosure principle,  26,  loo, 313-5,  332 
Disconto  Gesellschaft,  62-3,  69-70,  109, 
114-5 
Disraeli, Benjamin, 24 
Dorr Rebellion,  142 
Dresdner Bank, 63, 68, 70,  log, 114-5 
Drew, Daniel,  155-6 
Duma, 59 
Dun, R. G. & Co., 264-5 
DuPont,  178 
Durant, William C., 178-9 
E 
Ebert.  Franz, 107 
Eccles, hlarriner  S.,  294 
Economic expansion,  comparative, 78-9 
Emerson, R. \V.,  142 
Engels, F., 39, 82 
Erie Railroad,  155-6 
Gary.  Elbert,  ]go 
General Motors CO., 179 
George, Henry, 191 
George, Lloyd, 40-1,  99 
Germany,  armament  expenditures,  115 ; 
central banking development,  62 ; com- 
INDEX 
I 
mercial banking development. 62-3.  67 ; 
conflict between industrial and banking 
capitalism,  107-14 ; corporate  develop': 
ment,  61-3,  117 ; criticism  of  security 
capitalism,  73 ; depreciation  of  mark. 
109 ; economic development, 61, 63, 65 ; 
financial journalism,  64 ; foreign  loans, 
72 ;  government  control  of  security 
capitalism,  73-4,  I 16-7 ; imperialism. 
65. 75.  111 ;  Jewish influence, 70-1, 110 ; 
national  income,  I I I,  I 15-6  : national 
wealth,  I I I : occupation  of  Ruhr,  108 ; 
Panic of  1873.  73 ; Panic  of  1900, 73 ; 
public  debt  under  national  socialism. 
115 ;  rate of  saving, I 15-6  ; Reichsbank. 
67,  109,  "6;  relation  of  banks  to  in- 
dustry,  69,  76,  85 ; reparations,  108-9, 
112 ;  security speculation, 74 ;  social con- 
ditions, 66; stabilization of  mark, I 10-1  ; 
supply  and demand for  capital, 62,  64, 
71-3  ;  Thirty Years War, 61 ;  triumph of 
industrial  capitalism,  "4  ; unemploy- 
ment  in, I I I ;  unification, 64 
Giffen,  43 
Girard, Stephen, 141 
Gladstone, 25 
Glass, Carter, 199, 290, 294, 311 
Gold Reserve Act  of  1934, 288 
Goldschmidt,  17 
Goldsmid, Abraham, I 1 
Gold Standard, 93,  123,  130 ;  struggle for 
in the U.  S.,  161,  163 
Gold Standard Act, 197, 287 
Gosbank,  120 
Gould, J.,  156, 173 
Great  Britain,  Bank  of  England,  29,  38, 
93,  101 ;  banking  and  industry,  94; 
Boer War, 40-1  ;  national wealth, 34-5  : 
capital  control,  loo ; commercial bank- 
ing development,  15, 30, 41-2,  44, 93-5 ; 
corporate malpractices, growth of, 32-3, 
44-5  ; corporate  organization  and  de- 
velopment,  14, 28 ; criticism of  security 
capitalism, 22, 41, 98-9  ; depreciation  of 
securities, 44, 98 : diffusion of  securities. 
20,  98; economic development,  13,  27, 
39.  gr ; financial  journalism,  24,  32 ; 
foreign  trade,  3g-40,  93 ; government 
control of  security capitalism, 24, 36,45, 
loo,  101 ; imperialism,  28,  39,  41 ; in- 
vestment banking development,  16, 30 ; 
investment  trusts,  development  of,  31 ; 
Labour Party, 40, 92,  IOI ;  middle class, 
44 ; national  income,  43,  97 ; national 
wealth.  34-5  ; panic  of  1825.  21 ; panic 
of  1846,  22;  post-war  crisis in security 
capitalism,  gn : price  of  consols,  44 ; 
public  debt, 42,  95;  railroad  develop- 
ment,  22 ; revenue  and  taxation,  43 ; 
saving and investment  rate  of,  21,  35. 
43,  97;  security  speculation,  22,  45 ; 
supply  and  demand  for  capital,  18-9. 
33-4.  42.  96 ; unemployment, 40.  93 
Greeley, Horace,  157 
Gregory, T. E.,  gg FINANCE  CAPITALISM 
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Haiti, 165 
Hamilton, Alexander,  140.  145 
Hanna, Mark,  164 
Harding, W.  P.  C.,  295 
Harriman, E. H.,  174-5,  183 
Harrison, William, 150 
Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 142 
Hecht, Rudolph, 331 
Hepburn, A.  B.,  166 
Herriot.  102-4 
~ilferdin~,  80,  108 
Hill, James J.,  175, 189 
Hirota, 125 
Hitler. Adolph,  107, 113-4  .  - 
Hobson, J. A.,  41 
Holding companies,  162-3,  246-8 
Home Owners Loan CorpOratlOn. 253 
Hoover, Herbert, 112, 134 
Hottingeur, 48 
Hudson, George, 22 
Hume, David,  13, 329 
Huntington, Collis, 155 
Imperialism,  French, 4950 ;  German,  65, 
75,  1  I 1 ; British,  28,  39,  41 ; Japanese, 
128-9 ;  Marxian view  of, 81.  83 ;  Amer- 
ican;  164-5 
Income, national, in France,  106 ;  in Ger- 
many,  11  I, I 15-6 ; in Great  Britain, 43. 
n? : in the  United States, 159.  183, 273  =, , --- 
"Increasing  misery"  theory, 81 
Indianapolis Currency Commission, 197 
Industrial  Revolution,  13,  39,  49.  65-6, 
154-5. 
Industrials, declining  use  of  bank  credit 
by,  243 ; financial  condition  of,  240-4 ; 
Inventory policy of, 243 
Instituta de Constructional  Industrial, 119 
Instituto Mobiliare Italiano,  119 
Insurance companies, investments of, 268 ; 
regulation  of,  195,  299-300 
Insull, Samuel, 230, 247-8 
Interest rates, course of, in the U. S.,  188 
International  peace,  77.  3zo-I ; disrup- 
tion of, 91,  129 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  230, 
306 
Investment  banker, function of, g ;  profits 
,  of,  17 
Investment  Bankers  Association, m8-g 
Investment  banking,  development  in 
France,  48,  53; development  in  Great 
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